

THE MEASURE OF AGGRESSION

**A DOCUMENTATION
OF THE COMMUNIST EFFORT
TO SUBVERT SOUTH VIETNAM**

**REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
Saigon, August 1966**

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« For the temporary loss of part of our territory is the price we pay for the permanent preservation of all our territory and for the recovery of lost territory. »

MAO TSE-TUNG
on protracted war

« The so-called presence of forces of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam in South Viet Nam is but a myth fabricated by the U.S. imperialists by way of justification for their war of aggression in South Viet Nam. »

PHAM VAN DONG,
Premier of North, Viet Nam
In a Radio Hanoi Interview
January 28, 1966

PREFACE

WHAT IS the measure of aggression? How far must one compromise to attain peace? Dr. Tran Van Do, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet Nam has said:

« Initiatives taken by the many countries anxious for peace in Viet Nam show that the chief concern of the Government of Viet Nam and its allies is centered on the search for an equitable and lasting peace; a peace that can be effectively guaranteed against misinterpretation, that will safeguard the freedom of the Vietnamese people and not stain the honor of those, living or dead, who have fought for it. »

Unhappily, this goal remains beyond our reach despite the manifold offers of mediation that have come from all sides. Compromise, we are told, is for the victim, not for the predator.

Direct and indirect approaches made both by governments and individuals from the West and from the non-aligned nations, and perhaps even by Socialist nations, have all foundered on the intransigence of Hanoi, which, in spite of heavy losses of its finest young men, and of its limited material resources, stubbornly continues its war against the Republic of Viet Nam. Hanoi persists in exploiting all opportunities to infiltrate Communist military personnel into the South and to commit daily acts of terrorism, sabotage, and assassination with the object of destroying the cultural, economic, political and social fabric of the South Vietnamese people. Hanoi hinders the work of reconstruction, stirs up hatred, and exacerbates class divisions in order to foster the transformation of all Viet Nam into an advance bastion of Communist imperialism under the guise of national reunification.

This encroachment was the subject of the Special Report addressed to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference by the International Control Commission in 1962. The Report unequivocally condemns the campaign of subversion and aggression mounted in South Viet Nam by the authorities of the North in contravention of Articles 10, 19, 24, and 27 of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

The tragic clash of Vietnamese wills today is made all the more serious by the fact that the Viet Cong campaign in the South receives ever increasing quantities of arms, equipment and technical assistance from supposedly « peace-loving » countries in the Communist Bloc, notably from the Peking Government which is ready as always to « fight to the last Vietnamese ».

In this increasingly bitter and ominous struggle the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam is compelled to take, with the assistance of friendly countries, all possible measures to protect its people south of the 17th parallel, and to oppose, with all the determination of those who know the price of freedom's fragility, the massive and blatant subversion being conducted by the Hanoi regime.

This White Paper, which covers the period June 1965 to June 1966, presents additional documentation of how relentlessly Hanoi, with the support of other Communist countries, pursues its war of aggression and turns a deaf ear to all proposals that might lead to peace. The following pages furnish further evidence that the Hanoi leaders are responsible beyond all doubt for imposing on the people of South Viet Nam a needless, internecine war between brothers that threatens world peace and offends the conscience of mankind.

**I - REMARKS BY FOREIGN MINISTER DR. TRAN VAN DO,
OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM
TO THE SEATO ELEVENTH COUNCIL,
meeting in Canberra, June, 27-29, 1966**

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary General, excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I wish to express my deep appreciation to you Mr. Chairman, and to you Mr. Secretary General, as well as to the other representatives of the SEATO members, for granting me the opportunity to address this Meeting. I see it as a privilege that you want to reserve to the Observer of the Republic of Viet Nam, but also as a reflection of your grave concern at the increasing threat against the security of Asia by the spread of militant Communism.

South Viet Nam has received world wide attention for several years, not only because of the shooting war which is going on, but also because of political disturbances, all promptly exploited by the Communists.

The whole picture has been confused further by dissenting voices which have questioned the nature of the Vietnamese war and the intervention of Allied forces, voices which have questioned even the determination of the Vietnamese people to fight for their survival as a free nation.

There is no need to tell you, distinguished members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, that the elementary fact is that my people are under armed and overt aggression, and that our will to resist and the Allied nations' efforts to help us have been the only barriers which have checked the tide of Communism in Southeast Asia so far.

What are, therefore, the other essential facts that need to be emphasized today ?

The Communists had very shrewdly maintained their armed attacks under the level which could be called a frontal attack. They had waged, rather, an intensive campaign of indoctrination against the helpless people in rural areas. They had built their infrastructure composed of political agents — well-known as the « cadres » — of infiltration routes, of stockpiles and secret bases strategically dispersed. They had especially streamlined their tactics of terrorism, and applied them systematically as a vehicle to disrupt the national life. In 1965 alone, the law-enforcement authorities in South Viet Nam reported that the Viet Cong killed over 2,000 civilians, wounded about the same number and kidnapped around 7,000 people.

Those are only specific instances, to which one should add numerous cases not reported.

Violence and terrorism and sabotage cannot be carried out without a continuous stream of arms and men smuggled in from outside.

The Vietnamese Liaison Mission with the International Control Commission (ICC) has given the following figures concerning the infiltration of men from North Viet Nam :

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of Men</i>
1959	300
1960	2,700
1961	11,000
1962	10,700
1963	7,500
1964	8,400 (1)

That means that a yearly average nearly 7,000 men, trained and armed from outside, were sent to South Viet Nam in order to sustain what the Communists and some uninformed people call the « civil war in Viet Nam » or an « internal rebellion. »

From 1965 until the present time, an average of about 4,500 men have infiltrated monthly from North to South Viet Nam.

There is no doubt whatsoever that these men and their equipment come from North Viet Nam. The Armed Forces of Viet

(1) Figure based on documents and prisoner interrogation through Dec. 1964.

Nam and the Allied Forces have captured North Vietnamese regulars ; in addition, several thousand Communist cadres and troops have surrendered to the national cause, bringing with them documents and equipment coming from North Viet Nam and the Communist Bloc.

As to arms and ammunition, you all remember that in February 1965, the Vietnamese Navy sank in Vung Ro Bay (Cape Varella) a North Vietnam ship from which was salvaged all kinds of arms and supplies, from 57mm recoilless rifles to physiological serum, antibiotics, maps and Communist Party membership cards.

At the beginning of this month, the Allied Forces seized in Ba Dong, province of Vinh Binh, a Viet Cong trawler which surrendered over two thousand weapons and ten tons of ammunition. The weapons, including 82 mm mortars, 75 and 57 mm recoilless rifles, bazookas and machine-guns, were enough to supply one regiment of the Viet Cong force.

All this evidence shows that the so-called Front of Liberation has been operating with the means and men provided by Hanoi. It is a front organization, and as such an instrument of Hanoi's devious policy of conquest and subversion. To speak of the Front as a legitimate representative of the people of Viet Nam, or as a possible partner in any negotiation, is to accept to be deceived by one of the most elementary Communist tricks.

It is heartening to recall here that the SEATO Ninth Council Meeting expressed formally « its grave concern about the continuing Communist aggression against the Republic of Viet Nam, a Protocol State under the terms of the Manila Pact. Documentary and material evidence continues to show that this organized campaign is directed, supplied and supported by the Communist regime in North Viet Nam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. »

I should like also to quote here parts of a special Report of the International Control Commission, dated June 2, 1962 :

1. Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of sup-

porting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam.

2. In examining the complaints and the supporting material, in particular documentary material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the further conclusion that there is evidence to show that the People's Army of Viet Nam has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South. The use of the Zone in the North for such activities is in violation of Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam.

The Republic of Viet Nam has drawn the attention of the free nations for several years. It has to wage a war to defend itself, and at the same time build and rehabilitate the country, establish the foundations for a new and democratic society. I am happy to show what we have done, and what we are going to do next to reach these aims.

Militarily, the Armed Forces of Viet Nam have brilliantly broken what the Viet Cong called their monsoon season offensive, and the Communist pressure in the Central Highlands has been successfully removed. In short, the South Vietnamese forces from June 1965 to June 1966, launched 5,496 operations, and inflicted on the Viet Cong over 53,000 casualties, including 6,640 captured in combat. Over 10,000 individual weapons, and 3,145 heavy weapons were seized. The main Viet Cong bases such as Zone D, Duong Minh Chau and Do Xa have been either destroyed or continuously attacked.

At the same time a Revolutionary Development Program was launched which is aimed not only at bringing new life to the peasants who have suffered at the hands of the Viet Cong, but also at instilling a spirit of self-sufficiency and confidence in the entire rural population. It is also designed to show by concrete action that the central Government has the welfare of the country people in mind and is determined to do something constructive for them.

Coincident with, and directly related to, the Revolutionary Development Program, our Government is embarked on other undertakings, a few of which I will mention.

In the economic field, we are working to stabilize the supply and the price of rice. We are constantly reviewing our procedures to make the best utilization of foreign aid. We have imposed heavier import taxes on luxury consumer items. In the battle against inflation we are making progress toward balancing supply and demand. Our commercial imports and the foreign aid programs, particularly that of the United States, are making up shortages of essential goods and consumer items which, when in adequate supply, will absorb pockets of excess purchasing power, maintain fair prices, eliminate black marketeering and profiteering, and thereby tend to stabilize the currency. Wage scales, the floating supply of currency, and the value of the piastre on the international market are being carefully watched. The war situation resulted in a relative increase in prosperity in the urban areas without an attendant increase in the rural areas. These measures will level out this situation.

In the social field we are working to improve the educational system. We are attempting to organize youth associations and activities in order to channel the vigor and enthusiasm of youth into productive channels.

In the field of Government and administration, we are reorganizing the central and local administrative machinery to make it less complicated and more efficient. We are vigorously prosecuting every case of corruption on the part of officials.

We have much to do, but we feel we are making progress. In some areas progress is slow, in others not so slow. The strains are great, especially for a developing country.

One indication of progress is the increased cooperation on the part of formerly indifferent peasants. With this is an increase in the number of Viet Cong who are coming over to the Government in the Open Arms campaign. In the past year, more than 36,000 Viet Cong have rallied to the national cause. This is attributable in part, it is true, to the military successes and to the constant pressure on the Viet Cong. And it is due partly to the discouragement which the Viet Cong feel at their consistent losses and defeats. And, to a certain extent, it is due to disenchantment

on the part of the Viet Cong with acts of terrorism, murder and destruction.

In the political field, the Government of South Viet Nam has enacted several laws to lay the foundations for a truly democratic system of Government. Nation-wide elections will be held next September in order to have an elected Constituent Assembly. A Joint Military and Civilian Council will be set up to act as a consultative organ for the Government. The National Leadership Committee has been expanded to include now ten civilians, alongside the ten military members.

However, the establishment of these institutions will not be hastened by the actions instigated by some of the critics of the Government. Such actions, which are exploited by the Communists, only hinder the progress toward real democracy.

That is why it was necessary to have dealt firmly with the recent disorders in our own country. While we dealt firmly — and will continue to deal firmly should any future attempt at disorder occur — we have so far been careful against the use of force merely for the sake of force.

These events of the past three months have disturbed us as they have no doubt disturbed — and perhaps even confused — you. It is not sufficient to attribute these disorders — as some have done — to the vigor, the individuality and temperament of the Vietnamese. It is more than that. For most countries, the war came to an end in 1945. These countries had at least an atmosphere of peace and relative security in which to set about to rebuild themselves. For our people, the war went on, and it has not stopped. We have an entire generation in our country which has never seen a single day of peace in this country. We have had all the social and economic problems which derive from, and accompany, war. Our post-1945 troubles were more violent than in most other countries. We have not had a single day in the past twenty-five years which could be called normal by any standards, and very few before that.

Under these circumstances I think that the steps already taken by my Government are an eloquent testimony to its determination to promote democracy, and to carry out a true social revolution. As Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky said on June 19, 1966 — the first anniversary of the Government over which he presides —

« Although the fight has not ended in victory, we have certainly left the dark days far behind... It is certain that sound foundations have been laid and good changes have been brought about. »

It is compulsory to note here how much the Vietnamese people owe to the assistance given by friendly nations. We have requested the aid of nations whose security is threatened like ours, and many have responded with enthusiasm. The full weight of the assistance program to Viet Nam has fallen on the shoulders of the United States of America, and the people of Viet Nam are aware of and grateful for the great sacrifices and courage of the American people. Other nations like New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, the Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, and others have also joined the struggle, by bringing their contribution. I should like to note here the special contribution of the Commonwealth of Australia, our host country today. Australia has committed troops — troops who are splendid jungle fighters and who are affectionately known in our villages. It has also progressively increased its economic aid, under the Colombo Plan, as well as under the SEATO aid for economic development. There are also Australian surgical teams and engineering teams serving in the rural provinces of Viet Nam.

Australian troops are engaged in the task of economic assistance by helping the Vietnamese villagers under various civic action schemes. The determination of the Government and the people of Australia in helping Viet Nam, and the extent of their aid constitutes a great encouragement for the people of Viet Nam. I should like on behalf of my Government and of the people of Viet Nam to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to the Government and the people of Australia.

It is normal that nations threatened by a common danger should unite their efforts. It is a self-defense action, recognized by international law, by the Charter of the United Nations and by common sense.

South Viet Nam is designated in the Protocol of the South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty as one of the states to which the provisions of the Treaty apply. At the ninth and tenth SEATO Council meetings, the Council expressed grave concern about the continuing Communist aggression against the Republic of Viet Nam and affirmed and reaffirmed that the defeat of the

Communist campaign was essential not only to the security of the Republic of Viet Nam but to that of Southeast Asia.

Member Governments of SEATO have accordingly provided generous assistance, both military and economic to the Republic of Viet Nam, upon the request of my Government and in the exercise of the obligations which they accepted under the Manila Treaty.

It is in large measure due to the assistance of these Governments that the Communist forces have now lost the military initiative in Viet Nam, and that the military situation in my country has shown a significant improvement in recent months. My Government looks to SEATO members to provide continuing support for its efforts to resist Communist aggression and to pursue the program of revolutionary development. The assurance of such support will contribute materially to bringing the Communist leadership of North Viet Nam — which has so far rejected all offers of unconditional discussions — to realize that its aggression against the South no longer has any prospect of success.


As for South Viet Nam, I have said, and I should like to say again, we do not wage this war as an end for itself, nor do we want to take advantage of the military assistance given to us to promote any policy of conquest. Our aim has been constantly to live peacefully and freely. Peace and freedom will always be the guiding principle of our action.

That is the reason why we cannot accept any bogus solution which would mean a relinquishment of our freedom. It is a well-known fact that SEATO was conceived in 1954 as a shield to protect the Indochinese States against Communist aggression. SEATO can only survive now by resolutely fulfilling its obligations. To speak of a possible neutralization policy under the present circumstances is to encourage the Communists to go on trying their devious strategy, and to give them the opportunity to win by political means a victory that they can no longer win by military means.

Thank you.



Captured Viet Cong Terrorists Tran Dinh Hai, Nguyen Anh Tuan, and Vo Ke. They were caught with 120 kg of explosive plastic, January 7, 1966. Members of a suicide unit, B-1-F100 of the the Saigon-Gia Dinh special sector, the terrorists were to have used the explosive to blow up the Alabama Hotel in Saigon.



The Nguyen Cu Trinh Street explosion on December 4, 1965.



A three-year-old girl, victim of a grenade thrown by a Viet Cong at Khanh Hoi on July 31, 1965.



A child, innocent victim of a Viet Cong attack during the night of December 11-12, 1965 at Tan Huong, Dinh Tuong Province.


Prisoners who acknowledged to the I.C.C. their membership in the North Vietnamese Army's 325th Division which had infiltrated the demilitarized zone. These men were released at the Hien Luong Bridge January 30, 1966, to return home.




1. NGUYEN VAN GIAP



2. NGUYEN VAN MIENG



3. NGUYEN TRONG HOP



II - DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION

A. Terror As An Ally

1. On June 25, 1965, at 8 p.m. Vietnamese Communist (or Viet Cong in the Vietnamese language) terrorists exploded two plastic charges on the bank of the Saigon River near a children's playground and the My Canh floating restaurant. The explosions, which took place at an interval of several minutes, happened at a time when the crowd of pedestrians and customers was at its thickest.

Of an unprecedented size, the charges, which were of the Claymore or DH-10 variety and were furnished with a splinter scat, tering device, killed 42 people, many of them women and children and wounded 80 others, 20 of them gravely.

One of the charges was cleverly placed in an innocent-looking motor bicycle near the footpath leading to the restaurant, while the second was placed on the edge of the pavement opposite.

This arrangement and the fine timing between the explosions could not have been aimed other than to cause the maximum number of casualties, any casualties. The second explosion caught people running out of the restaurant and those on the street going to the aid of the victims of the first explosion. The incident was reported by the Republic of Viet Nam Liaison Mission with the I.C.C. in letter N° 2480 of June 28, 1965.

2. On July 1, 1965, five agents armed with submachine guns crossed the Ben Hai River from North Viet Nam and killed the chief of the Hai Chu hamlet, Mr. Nguyen Thi. The victim, who had already escaped three previous attempts, was shot in the head. An investigation was made on July 2, 1965, by I.C.C.

Team N° 76. The family of Nguyen Thi could not read the report of the investigation ; it was in English. They did not need to ; they knew the source of terror.

Subsequently, during the night of July 7 and 8, 1965, a police officer, Mr. Nguyen Van Thuy, was shot by terrorists from North Viet Nam while he was on patrol five hundred meters from the Xuan Hoa post in the demilitarized zone not far from Hai Chu hamlet. Informed of the incident by the Chief of the Gio Linh attachment, I.C.C. Team 76 investigated the incident the same day. It was also reported by letter N° 2663 of July 10, 1965, from the Republic of Viet Nam to the I.C.C..

3. On August 16, 1965, a particularly audacious attack was attempted in Saigon by Communist terrorists. Around 9 a.m. a car containing a plastic charge was driven into the National Police Compound at Cong Hoa Boulevard near the Vo Thanh crossroads. Once at the Compound, two Viet Cong jumped from the car which then exploded. Two sentries and a police officer who had attempted to stop the car at the last moment were shot by the terrorists. Taking advantage of the confusion, the driver of the car and an accomplice raced to another car from which submachine gun fire covered their retreat. The police returned the fire, hitting two terrorists. The Viet Cong raced away in the second car in the direction of Cholon. In the course of their flight, they shot a police guard outside the Truong Van Le post at the corner of Nguyen Hoang and Petrus-Ky Streets. Pursued by the police, the terrorists finally abandoned their car in Su-Van-Hanh Street and disappeared into a warren of small alleys.

In the abandoned second car were found forty-five slabs of TNT of Communist Chinese manufacture, one box of plastic explosive, four detonators, one Thompson submachine gun, one 45 Colt revolver, two MK-2 grenades and one MK-26 grenade, and two tear gas grenades.

In addition to four policemen killed during the attack, another one who had been injured in the explosion later died of his wounds, thus bringing the total victims to five killed and a dozen wounded. This incident was reported in letter N° 3266 of August 24, 1965, to the I.C.C.

4. During the night of July 31, 1965, a grenade was thrown by terrorists at a police patrol car in Ton Dan Street in the Khanh

Hoi area. It missed the car, but exploded on the pavement, killing a girl of three and wounding ten people, including three women and two children. Although Viet Cong terrorists sometimes miss their targets they usually manage to kill someone, anyone. This incident was reported in letter No. 3538 of September 11, 1965.

5. On September 25, 1965, the so-called Southern Liberation Forces (i.e., the Viet Cong) summarily murdered two American soldiers, Captain Versace and Sergeant K.M. Roaback, whom they had been holding prisoner since the end of 1963. In a program on September 27, 1965, Hanoi Radio expressed its official approval of the killings and openly stated that they had been in retaliation for the executions of three Communist agents at Danang on September 22, 1965. Moreover, Hanoi let it be understood that other executions would follow if more Communists were condemned in South Viet Nam, regardless of their acts, presumably. This incident was reported by letter No. 3794 of October 1, 1965.

6. On December 4, 1965, another « political » act was committed by a group of Viet Cong at the Nguyen Cu Trinh Street bus station behind the Metropole Hotel in a densely-populated area of Saigon. As usual the terrorists laid their plans to ensure the maximum possible number of victims.

At 5:30 a.m. three agents started to sweep the area surrounding the hotel with submachine gun fire from a car, but policemen guarding the hotel retaliated and the terrorists escaped on a motorcycle. However, the car they left behind contained a heavy plastic charge and exploded with lethal effect.

A second delayed-action Claymore anti-personnel mine was then discovered outside the hotel, timed to go off half an hour after the first explosion; fortunately, it had not exploded and was successfully de-fused.

The first explosion, estimated to have been of a 40 kg charge, killed nine people, of whom three were women and two children. One hundred and twenty-seven were wounded, twenty-seven gravely. Most of the wounded were ordinary working-class (proletarian, in Viet Cong terminology) Vietnamese among whom were twenty-four women and twelve children.

The day after the attack, Radio Hanoi made a point of praising the terrorists and retold the story of the exploit in all its edifying

details, thus proving at least that the Hanoi Government is not neutral concerning terrorist activities in the South. This incident was reported in letter No. 4736 of December 6, 1965.

7. During the night of December 11-12, 1965, armed members of the Viet Cong assaulted the hamlet of Tan Phu (in the village of Tan Huong of the Ben Tranh district, Dinh Tuong Province) where one hundred and fifty-four workers employed in the construction of the Tan Huong canal were spending the night. Two groups of terrorists mounted simultaneous and well-executed attacks with grenades and automatic rifle fire. Twenty-three of the canal workers were killed, including two women and a child of fifteen. Eleven of those killed were in the Chua Ong pagoda where they were sleeping; the other twelve were marched six hundred meters down the My Tho road and shot. Eight other workers were seriously wounded. This incident was reported in letter No. 5011 of December 31, 1965.

8. On January 7, 1966 a National police patrol at the Bang-Ky bridge on the Saigon-Thu Duc road discovered a 120 kg plastic charge with a delayed-action fuse. The charge had been hidden in a three-wheeled cart. The Viet Cong agent responsible, Tran Dinh Hai, was caught nearby and arrested, and later the same morning two of his accomplices, Nguyen Anh Tuan and Vo Ke, were caught. In the house of the three men the police found 30 kg of TNT of Communist manufacture, a Soviet grenade, a .45 Colt revolver, a .45 Remington revolver and twenty-eight .45 cartridges.

The terrorists made a complete confession. All three were members of the People's Revolutionary Party (Communist Party) and were volunteers in a suicide unit (B. 4-F.100) in the Saigon-Gia Dinh special sector. They had undergone a period of training in a secret camp at Ho Bo in Hau Nghia Province, and had been given orders to blow up the Alabama Hotel on Cong Quynh Street. This is in a particularly crowded quarter of Saigon near two schools and an orphanage. The terrorists were on their way to the target with a charge of 120 kg of plastic explosives when arrested. According to expert opinion, if they had succeeded in detonating the charge as planned, they would have caused extensive damage and the deaths of hundreds of people. This incident is reported in letter No. 481 of February 11, 1966.

9. On February 7, 1966, members of the Viet Cong committed a typically cold-blooded act of terrorism in the crowded area of Phu Nhuan on Vo Tanh Street, Saigon. In order to eliminate the maximum number of their enemies they chose the lunch-time rush hour to set off two Claymore mines. The double explosion killed twelve and wounded sixty, among them the usual quota of women and children, all Vietnamese. This incident is reported in letter No. 708 of March 2, 1966.

10. On March 2, 1966, at 7:45 a.m. five policemen on patrol from the Hai Cu post, in the Trung Luong district of Quang Tri Province of South Viet Nam, were ambushed by North Vietnamese armed forces which could only have infiltrated to the south in that area across the demilitarized zone. One policeman died of wounds. Two hours later two police detachments coming to the aid of the Hai Cu post were ambushed in classical fashion by the same North Vietnamese forces whose strength was estimated to be that of a battalion. Eleven policemen were killed, two wounded and twenty-four others reported missing. During the incident, the attackers were supported by machine gun and mortar fire from armed elements in the nearby northern sector of the demilitarized zone. Attacks mounted in the demilitarized zone constitute particularly flagrant violations of the Geneva Agreements of 1954, and are a severe provocation because of the special legal nature of the zone. The North Vietnamese, however, appeared to take the lack of South Vietnamese forces in the zone as an obvious invitation to use it as an area for infiltration immune from countermeasures. This incident is reported in letter No. 969 of March 8, 1966.

11. Civil representatives, teachers and pupils of the Province of Long An question Viet Cong educational policies. The Viet Cong on January 16, 1966, assassinated five pupils of Nhi Binh village in Thu Thua district, burned a primary school on March 6 at Long Thuong in Can Giuoc district, and, on March 17 mined three classrooms of the elementary school at Long Hiep in the district of Ben Luc. The acts were apparently part of the Viet Cong's well-known program to win over the population, and educate them in the proper nationalist spirit.

Since the beginning of the 1965-1966 school year in Long An Province alone, the Viet Cong have burned or blown up twenty-

six primary and elementary schools, interrupting the studies of 5,746 children. These incidents are reported in letter No. 1592 of May 4, 1966.

12. Between April 1 and May 15, 1966, the forces of the Viet Cong concentrated an increasing number of acts of terrorism against the population of Saigon and surrounding areas. During this period of six weeks, thirty-one incidents (or nearly one a day) were reported in which forty people were killed and one hundred and seventy-six wounded, among them, of course, women and children. These incidents were reported in letter No. 1887 of May 24, 1966.

13. On May 28, 1966, at about eight o'clock in the evening, Mr. Quach Van Sat, an information cadre of the third ward of the Saigon prefecture, was shot by Viet Cong terrorists. On June 5 after several days of investigation, the National Police caught the murderer and his seven accomplices who were all members of a Viet Cong assassination committee for the Saigon-Cholon zone. This incident is reported in letter No. 2082 of June 9, 1966.

14. During the night of May 21-22, 1966, armed elements of the Viet Cong invaded the village of Vinh Hanh, in the Chua Thanh district of the Province of An Giang. They machine-gunned laborers employed in the construction of the Tra Kiet canal. Twenty-three people were killed in their sleep, including, of course, women and children. This attack is reported in letter No. 2270 of June 22, 1966.

CONCLUSION: Mao Tse-Tung has said, « The losses incurred in a revolutionary movement involve destruction, and what is gained is construction of a progressive character. » The above recitation of Viet Cong terrorist acts, therefore, logically leads to one conclusion: According to Mao, the killing of a three-year-old child in the proper objective circumstances (a South Vietnamese child, in Saigon, 1965) must be considered a constructive and progressive revolutionary development.

B. Infection by Infiltration

1. On July 14, 1965, a police patrol intercepted four suspected Viet Cong near the village of Xuan Hoa, 50 meters south of the Ben Hai river. The police opened fire and captured one of the

party who was carrying a pneumatic buoy, a MAT-49 submachine gun with four magazines and 76 cartridges, and 3 grenades of local make. I.C.C. Team 76 from Gio Linh made an on-the-spot interrogation of the captive, Phan Luong, who admitted that he had been under orders to infiltrate the demilitarized zone in order to carry out sabotage and terrorism in the South. Terror was no longer a South Vietnamese Viet Cong prerogative; it had become a direct function of North Vietnamese infiltrators who individually had never before been in the south. This incident is reported by letters Nos. 2766 of July 17, 1965, and 2949 of July 21, 1965.

2. In the face of severe losses of their troops in South Viet Nam the authorities in Hanoi started sending reinforcements no longer consisting of small groups or individuals but of special levies from the North Vietnamese armed forces. These reinforcements passed from training camps in the North and were introduced into the South along trails running through Laos or across the demilitarized zone. The most flagrant example, which has been carefully verified, was the infiltration of three regiments and specialized battalions of the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese regular army during February and March 1965. (Reference letter No. 3763 of September 30, 1965 to the I.C.C.) As proof of North Vietnamese complicity, the Republic of Viet Nam was able to provide the I.C.C. with photocopies of the original declarations written by seven prisoners and ralliers from the 325th Division. Their names were: Nguyen Van Dung, Nguyen Van Doanh, Nguyen Duc Xe, Nguyen Van Mieng, Nguyen Trong Hiep, Nguyen Van Giap, and Nguyen Ngoc Tri. These findings are in letter No. 4151 of October 27, 1965.

On November 11, 1965, the Mission brought the seven prisoners before the I.C.C. in Saigon for interrogations which took place on November 11-18. (Letter No. 4356 of November 10, 1965). Subsequently, the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam released three of the prisoners, Nguyen Van Giap, Nguyen Van Mieng, and Nguyen Trong Hiep, for humanitarian reasons and allowed them to return to the North according to their wishes. They crossed the Hien Luong bridge on January 30, 1966. Their repatriation was supervised by I.C.C. Team 76 which was on duty at the bridge.

By accepting the return of these men, Hanoi authorities in effect admitted that units of their regular army are operating in the South with the Viet Cong. The men returned, however, have not been heard of since. (Letter No. 0399 of February 4, 1966).

3. On April 1, 1965, an attack was launched by the 800th Viet Cong battalion against a Government military post at Thanh Tan in the Phong Dien district of the province of Thua Thien. The attackers were repulsed and three of them captured: Nguyen Duc Phuc, Doan Doan, and Le Trach.

The three were brought before the I.C.C. at Hue on April 7, 1965. They readily acknowledged that they had been captured by ARVN forces (Army of the Republic of Viet Nam) during an attack on the post at Thanh Tan, and admitted that they were all members of the regular army of North Viet Nam and had undergone special training before being infiltrated to the South to fight in the ranks of the so-called Southern Liberation Forces. By this date, April 1965, it was becoming apparent that Viet Cong recruitment was not able to meet its requirements and only by infiltrating northerners could the Communists accomplish their self-assigned tasks. A further interrogation of these same prisoners was carried out by an I.C.C. team from Saigon on April 1, 2, 4 and 7, 1966. These incidents are reported in letters Nos. 4135 of October 26, 1965 and 1095 of March 29, 1966.

4. On October 20, 1965 an ARVN post at Ba Long in Quang Tri was attacked by Viet Cong battalions 8, 800, and 806. On October 28 the I.C.C. team from Danang examined at Hue some weapons of Communist manufacture and interrogated three prisoners — Phan Van Luong, Bach Hung Dai, and Phan Van Thanh — captured during the battle. The confessions of the three prisoners confirmed beyond reasonable doubt that soldiers from the regular North Vietnamese Army were continuing to receive special training for combat in the ranks of the so-called Southern Liberation Forces, and that under orders from the Ministry of Defense in Hanoi they were being deliberately, if illegally, infiltrated to the South to take part in operations against the Republic of Viet Nam. This is reported in letters No. 4266 of November 5, 1965 and 4943 of December 24, 1965.

5. On January 3, 1966, a patrol of South Vietnamese civil police intercepted three suspected Viet Cong in the hamlet of

Vo Xa in the Trung Luong district of Quang Tri Province. When their order to halt was ignored, the police opened fire and killed one of the three; the other two escaped by swimming across the Ben Hai river to North Viet Nam. The dead man was found to be carrying a 9.20 mm rifle with a magazine and four cartridges and two home-made grenades, a book of poems published in North Viet Nam and a one-piastre Ho Chi Minh note. The I.C.C. team from Gio Linh made an on-the-spot investigation the following day.

The circumstances surrounding the incident as well as the arms, documents and money found on the dead man were sufficient to identify the intruders as North Vietnamese and not Southern revolutionaries. This incident is reported in letter No. 240 of January 23, 1966.

6. On April 10, 1966 Government forces encountered at Ha Thanh hamlet, in the Gio Linh district of Quang Tri Province, armed troops infiltrated from North Viet Nam. Heavy losses were inflicted on the infiltrators, with the Government forces killing nine, taking three prisoners and capturing fourteen rifles of Communist Chinese manufacture, a B-14 rocket launcher, an automatic rifle, and a large quantity of grenades. I.C.C. Team No. 76 from Gio Linh promptly visited the area on the same day to examine the dead and the captured weapons. They also interrogated three prisoners — Nguyen Cam, age 16, Nguyen Thu, age 22, and Vo Van Cang, age 21. All three came originally from Gio Linh district and had been taken to the North for a special combat course. They were then sent back to the South to join the ranks of the Viet Cong.

7. On April 18, 1966, a civil police patrol was ambushed along the Kinh Thi Vo Xa road in the Gio Linh district of the southern area of the demilitarized zone by armed infiltrators from the North. The attackers were supported by sustained rifle and machine-gun fire from the nearby northern part of the zone, but after thirty minutes fighting they were forced to withdraw, leaving behind them two dead and a quantity of weapons which included a Communist Chinese machine gun, CKC automatic rifle, a case of cartridges for a heavy machine gun, and six grenades. The police also captured a medical orderly named Nguyen Tam who belonged to the Le Hong Phong battalion of the North Vietnamese

regular army and came from the village of Duc Tho in Ha Tinh Province.

I.C.C. Team 76 carried out an examination of the bodies and captured weapons and of the documents found on one of the bodies. The documents consisted of a membership card issued by the Central Executive Committee of the Youth Branch of the «Lao Dong» (the official name of the Communist Party in North Viet Nam) to Tran Van Than native of Le Loi, Van Hoa, Tuyen Hoa, Quang Binh, and a photograph of a dead soldier in the uniform of the North Vietnamese Army. The documents obviously indicate that the soldiers carrying them were infiltrated from the North.

Team 76 also interrogated the captured orderly April 20-22, 1966. He fully admitted that he belonged to the regular forces of the PAVN (People's Army of North Viet Nam) and had been infiltrated to the South under orders after a special military training course lasting two months at Vinh Hoa in the northern section of the demilitarized zone. (Reported in letter No. 1587 of May 3, 1966).

CONCLUSION : To be legitimate in terms of historical determinism, a «people's revolutionary war» must be initiated, carried out, and successfully completed by the local population itself under the leadership of the Communist Party, not by any external force. This was true in the USSR, China, and North Viet Nam. To act otherwise is hypocrisy even if one cleverly masks it by labeling it national reunification.

C. The Logistics of Terror

1. In the pleasant high plateau areas of Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, and Thua Thien, and in certain provinces of the rice-rich Mekong Delta, heavily-armed regular Communist forces of regimental size and larger, including whole divisions from the North Vietnamese Army, have been disrupting the age-old agricultural cycle for the past year. In the Communist operations, increasing use has been made of modern weapons of Communist Bloc manufacture including heavy artillery and anti-aircraft equipment. The increasingly large size of the units indicates that the Communists are moving from phase two to phase three in the classical

pattern of their subversive «people's war.» These facts are noted in letter No. 3460 of September 6, 1965.

2. On August 23, 1965, Government forces in the Ba Long district of Quang Tri Province uncovered several extensive underground caches of arms and equipment hidden under a camouflaged cottage. In addition to two tons of rice, a ton of maize and two hundred pounds of salt there were also : forty cases of 1.5, 22.5, 45, 71 and 130 volt radio batteries which carried the Vietnamese inscription «Hang TT Pin 71 gui Bac Do» which means 71 batteries for Bac Do from factory TT, and 20 flares and flare pistols of Communist Chinese manufacture marked with Chinese characters. The I.C.C. team from Danang made an on-the-spot examination of the captured equipment on August 26. This incident is reported in letter No. 3618 of September 29, 1965.

3. On January 8, 1966, two Communist boats carrying arms were intercepted in South Vietnamese territorial waters and were sunk by the Vietnamese Navy at Cua Tieu, twenty-five kilometers from Go Cong, after four hours of fighting in which Communist forces ashore nearly intervened. The following equipment was recovered : a Czech machine gun, a 57 mm SKZ recoilless rifle with 216 shells, twenty cases of ammunition, and 164 Russian rifles. These weapons are listed in letter No. 370 of February 3, 1966.

4. On May 19, 1966, two battalions of the Southern Liberation Forces (as the North Vietnamese armed forces that infiltrate the south call themselves) audaciously attacked an ARVN post at Gio Linh. The ARVN post was just one hundred meters to the northeast of the headquarters of the I.C.C. Team at Gio Linh. The Team, of course, is charged under the Geneva Accords with supervision of the demilitarized zone to the effect that, «No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so...» (Article 5 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, July 20, 1954).

The unauthorized border crossers in this instance were equipped with automatic rifles, 81 mm mortars and B-40 rocket launchers. Due to their numerical superiority they gained the upper hand within an hour, but the arrival of ARVN reinforcements forced them to retreat toward the north by mountain paths. They left

behind them eight dead and the following : two AK submachine guns of 7.62 calibre, copied in Communist China from the Russian Kalashnikov model ; one K50 submachine gun of Communist Chinese manufacture ; one MAT-49 ; one Colt automatic revolver ; a forage cap bearing a label of manufacture in Binh Minh, North Viet Nam ; a first-aid satchel with Russian writing ; a helmet of woven bamboo covered with black nylon of the type that is standard issue to all North Vietnamese regular troops ; a battery made in Communist China bearing the intriguing inscription in English, « Peace — made in China » ; two celluloid boxes marked « Made in Haiphong » and two batteries of North Vietnamese manufacture.

I.C.C. Team 76 from Gio Linh carried out an investigation the same day. The bodies of the dead soldiers, the documents they were carrying, and the captured equipment were all examined on the spot.

Again, the evidence on the battlefield clearly proves that the attackers were undoubtedly regular soldiers from the North Vietnamese Army who had been illegally infiltrated to the South, and that arms and ammunition from Communist countries are still being sent by the north into South Viet Nam. The fact that the Hanoi authorities are indifferent to the presence of the ICC in Viet Nam is shown in their allowing this attack to take place practically on top of the headquarters of Team 76 at Gio Linh.

The Government of the Republic of Viet Nam protested to the ICC over the attack on the part of North Vietnamese regular troops who could only have infiltrated to the South across the demilitarized zone, and affirmed that the Communist regime of Hanoi would have to take full responsibility for all the consequences. This is reported in letter No. 2141 of June 13, 1966.

5. On May 10, 1966 an unidentified boat was detected in South Vietnamese territorial waters off the coast of An Xuyen Province, near the mouth of the Bo De River. According to experts, who later examined it, it was a modern cargo boat, 35 meters long, 21 meters wide, of 80-100 tons that had been carefully camouflaged as a fishing boat. In the face of heavy Viet Cong fire from the coast, naval forces of the Republic of Viet Nam attempted to capture the boat. Eventually it became evident that it would be impossible to seize the cargo intact because the fire from the

large concentration of Communist forces on the shore repulsed repeated attempts to board the vessel. Consequently, ARVN naval and air forces, in conjunction with U.S. forces, mounted a combined ground, air, and naval operation on the evening of May 10. The boat was hit by a bomb, and hundreds of weapons and many tons of ammunition were destroyed in the resulting explosion. As soon as the nearby coastal area had been cleared, ARVN forces made a search of the cargo and recovered from the beached wreck the following equipment : one 57 mm recoilless rifle ; two anti-aircraft machine guns of Communist Chinese manufacture ; two heavy submachine guns of Russian origin ; one Czech submachine gun with three spare barrels, 4 mountings and accessories ; a large quantity of 120, 81 and 60 mm mortar shells of Chinese Communist manufacture and two cases of TNT also from Communist China.

In addition to this war material, a large quantity of propaganda equipment was also seized : three movie cameras, three amplifiers, three loudspeakers and two transformers, all of Chinese Communist manufacture with trademarks in Chinese and English characters. Also seized were 35 reels of propaganda film already shown in North Viet Nam on such subjects as : « Strong Resolution to Overcome the American Aggressors, » « Universal struggle against the Americans, » « The Dien Bien Phu Victory » and « Long live the Fire of the Revolution. » The film was presumably destined to provide light entertainment to the Viet Cong troops.

On May 14 a press conference and exhibition of the captured material was organized at the headquarters of the Naval High Command at Quai Bach Dang. Representatives of the ICC Permanent Mission in Saigon attended, and the commander of the patrol boat which had taken part in the interception of the suspected vessel was able to give full details of this most recent and flagrant example of how war material from North Viet Nam and other Communist countries is being smuggled into the South. This incident was reported by letter No. 2269 of June 22, 1965.

6. On June 19, 1966, a patrol aircraft detected and photographed a trawler, side number 2135, off the coast of Vinh Binh Province near Ba Dong. The trawler was on a course of 210 degrees, speed 10 knots, when sighted, and altered course to 220 degrees shortly thereafter. Early on the morning of June 20 it was challenged

by a patrol ship and altered course to the west toward shore. The vessel later halted and was identified as a steel-hulled ship with a blue or green sampan alongside. The vessel immediately abandoned the sampan and headed towards the beach. Simultaneously she fired on the patrol ship with automatic weapons and continued a running fire fight, putting out intense .50 calibre automatic weapons fire. The trawler ran hard aground. The fate of the sampan is unknown, but it may have been sunk by the patrol boat's gunfire. Additional ships arrived on scene, and fire was exchanged between these ships, the trawler, and Viet Cong on the beach. A fire from unknown causes broke out on the trawler, and a number of small secondary explosions erupted. Additional friendly forces converged on the scene ; hostile fire from the beach was suppressed, and the fire fighting and salvage teams were put aboard the trawler. The fires subsequently were brought under control, and the trawler was then salvaged and eventually taken to Saigon. An estimated 90 to 100 tons of supplies were recovered from the ship.

The infiltration vessel is a steel hull trawler-type, 98 feet 11 inches in length, 19 feet 4 inches across the beam, with an estimated full load draft of 6 feet 7 inches and an estimated full load displacement of 280 tons. The ship had two cargo holds with an estimated total cargo capacity of 95 tons based on 40 cubic feet per cargo ton. The hull was green and the superstructure ivory. The only full identification displayed was number 2135 on removable metal plates set in slots on each bow. The basic hull configuration was similar to that of the ship intercepted off Ca Mau December 31, 1965, and another destroyed on the coast of An Xuyen Province May 10, 1966.

Cargo found aboard the trawler is listed below. A number of documents which apparently had come from the trawler were found near it. These included two engineering logs, notebooks containing personal notes, poems and propaganda, a navigator's notebook and a number of charts printed in North Viet Nam. Two probable crew members, both wounded, were taken prisoner by ARVN forces on June 21 in the vicinity of the trawler's grounding. One prisoner died without regaining consciousness. The track that the trawler followed was very similar to that of the ship returning from Ca Mau to Communist China January 1-7, 1966. The voyage of the vessel captured June 20 probably originated in North Viet Nam. The cargo is believed to have been

loaded in China. The suspected crew member is believed to be from North Viet Nam and an ethnic Chinese. Documents and charts from the trawler were all in Vietnamese except for an instruction manual for a signal lamp manufactured in China.

The trawler was attempting to infiltrate with supplies into South Viet Nam when detected. No attempt had been made to off-load anything prior to the detection as the hatches were still covered and the holds were still full when first boarded. The destination of the trawler was probably either the Thanh Phong secret zone on the southeast coast of Kien Hoa Province or the Long Tuan secret zone on the southeast coast of Vinh Binh Province. The hull design of the ships involved in the December 31, May 10 and June 20 attempts are identical. The Vung Ro ship of February 1965 is also similar. Where these ships were built is unknown. One prisoner who infiltrated from North Viet Nam in a similar ship reported that such ships were built in Haiphong. The bulk of the heavier machinery in the trawler captured June 20 was manufactured in East Germany, and the lighter equipment and much of the electrical gear bore Chinese nameplates.

The ICC Permanent Team from Saigon investigated the vessel and examined the cargo and some of the dead crew members on June 21. The following arms and ammunition were taken from the trawler.

A. Weapons

82 mm mortar, Chinese Communist	35
7.62 mm side arms, Chinese Communist	117
7.62 mm auto-and semi-auto rifles	1,777
7.62 mm machine guns	17
BAR type 7.62 mm weapons	18
75 mm recoilless rifle, SKZ Chinese Communist	20
40 mm rocket launcher, Chinese copy of Model PRG.2	100
12.7 mm heavy machine gun, Chinese copy of Soviet model DSHK	5
Grenade launchers	7

B. Ammunition (10 tons total)

82 mm mortar rounds	1,851
7.62 mm rounds	222,880
40 mm rockets	1,500
75 mm RR rounds	1,000
12.7 mm API rounds	122,000
40 mm heat rounds	2,000
Fragmentary grenades, pull friction	100
57 mm RR rounds	200

C. Miscellaneous

82 mm mortar bi-pod assembly	9
82 mm mortar base plates	7
82 mm mortar battery powered range sight w-carrying case	13
82 mm mortar sighting stakes (sets)	18
Light MG drum type mag w-links	91
7.62 mm AA MG carriages	10
75 RR base rings	18
75 mm RR tool kits	1
12.7 mm HY MG barrels	12
12.7 mm HY MG receiver groups	12
12.7 mm HY MG carriage wheels w-axle	18 Pair
12.7 mm HY MG tri-pod	2
12.7 mm ammo cans w-links	58
12.7 mm HY MG AA sights	3
200 grams TNT blocks	33
Unident small cal. ammo cans w-links	20
Battery powered 57 RR sight sets	3
Bayonets	500

The above incidents, involving trawler number 2135 and the earlier cargo boat off Bo De, were similar in pattern of infiltration to previous cases, notably :

Vung Ro (Phu Yen) February 16, 1965
 Da Bia (Phu Yen) March 14, 1965
 Cua Tieu (Go Cong) January 8, 1965
 (Refer to letter No. 2560 of July 18, 1966.)

7. All of the above cases were reported to the ICC, adding to the overwhelming evidence already collected by the ICC. The Republic of Viet Nam also compiled a tabulation (Appendix D) of the main types of arms and their origin seized in various operations in South Viet Nam between June 1962 and the end of December 1965. This record does not attempt the gigantic task of giving complete figures for all equipment captured, but does convey some idea of the principal countries of origin and the nature of the weapons illegally introduced into the South. It shows that by far the greatest proportion of arms were supplied by Communist China, and reflects the magnitude of logistical support given by the Peking Government to the war North Viet Nam is waging against the South. After Communist China, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, respectively, provide the largest quantities of arms. The tabulation was provided the ICC in letter No. 370 of February 3, 1966.

CONCLUSION : The breadth of logistical support shown by the tabulation must inevitably become even greater if Hanoi holds to its policy of conducting wider-scale mobile warfare, that is, of moving into phase three of the « People's Revolutionary War » from guerrilla, or phase two, warfare. (Phase one, the initial organizational period, is still going on in many sectors, but had ended by the early 1960's throughout much of the Viet Cong operating areas.) The Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese Army, General Van Tien Dung, in a statement in the Army newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, May 21, 1966, made it crystal clear that Hanoi intends to increase infiltration to meet and annihilate the buildup of Free World Forces in the South. This will require more intensive logistical support than heretofore in order to maintain the regimental and divisional size North Vietnamese units operating in the South. The Government of Viet Nam has repeatedly stated to the ICC that the Hanoi regime must bear full

responsibility for the consequences of these acts. The Republic of Viet Nam has also reserved the right to take all measures necessary to protect itself in these circumstances. This right is based on the principle of self-defense recognized by the Charter of the United Nations. The Republic of Viet Nam continues to attach great importance to the authority of the ICC to inspect cases of North Vietnamese infiltration of supplies to the Viet Cong. The diligent efforts of the ICC in carrying out inspections has been of singular value in recording infractions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. This responsibility may well increase in importance as Hanoi steps up its military intrusions into the South.

D. Collusion between Communists

1. According to Nhan Dan, the official newspaper of the North Vietnamese Communist (Lao Dong) Party published in Hanoi (issues No. 4227, 4229 and 4230 of October 31, and November 2 and 3, 1965) a delegation from the so-called National Front for the Liberation of South Viet Nam (the political façade of the Viet Cong) was invited to Poland. The visit took place under the leadership of Tran Hoai Nam from October 26 to 31, 1965.

On October 30 a joint communique was published in which Poland promised aid and assistance to the Front, and a permanent representation of the Front was established in Warsaw. It is hoped by all impartial observers that by permitting the Front to set up an official mission in Warsaw, the Polish Government has not demonstrated a partiality that might prejudice the performance of its duties as a member of the International Control Commission in Viet Nam. The Republic of Viet Nam brought the matter to the attention of the ICC in letter No. 4763 of December 10, 1965.


2. In a reply to Russian accusations that the Peking Government had hindered the transit of Russian military equipment to Viet Nam, Radio Peking, in a Vietnamese broadcast, announced :

« In the fulfillment of its international proletarian duty, China has always made every effort to give political, economic, and military assistance to the struggle of the Vietnamese people for national salvation against the Americans. Concerning the Russian military equipment sent by land to Viet Nam, China has always done everything possible to expedite its delivery, a fact which can be ascertained from the waybills which may

easily be consulted. All this war material has been transported by China without any charge. »


At a time when unprecedented efforts for the reestablishment of peace in Viet Nam are being made throughout the world, the continued supply of arms and war equipment from North Viet Nam and other countries in the Communist Bloc to the Viet Cong constitutes an open defiance of the international rule of law and is a cynical and deliberate threat to world peace.

APPENDIX A



Infiltration of cadres and military personnel from North Viet Nam

APPENDIX B



Map of infiltration route by sea, taken by Trawler N°. 2135, June 14-20 1966

APPENDIX C

Tabulation of principal types of arms and ammunition of Communist origin seized from June 1962 to the end of December 1965 in South Vietnam. The list does not include all the important quantities of arms and war materials seized and destroyed on the battlefield.

Type *Number*

A. Communist Chinese Origin

1. 75mm SKZ recoilless rifles made in Communist China after the American M-20 model and equipped with Russian tripods	36
2. Shells for 75mm SKZ rifles, Chinese inscriptions	1,138
3. 75mm SKZ recoilless rifles	29
4. Shells for 57mm SKZ rifles, Chinese inscriptions. (Some inscriptions obliterated and replaced by false American marks)	396
5. 82mm mortars	47
6. 60mm mortars	22
7. Shells for 82mm and 60mm mortars	17,405
8. 90mm anti-tank bazookas	1
9. 7.62mm submachineguns (AK), type 56, copied from the Russian Kalashnikov model	194
10. Maxim 08 heavy machineguns, 7.92mm, copied from the German MG-08 model with water cooling system and tripods, can be used as anti-aircraft	6

11. Degtyarev automatic 7.62mm rifles made in Communist China, copied from Russian DMP and RPD Degtyarev models, air cooled 47-cartridge circular loader, fire 600 rounds per minute, Chinese characters on the breech	152
12. 7.62mm cal. semi-automatic rifles (SKZ) similar to Russian Simonov model	1,787
13. Mossin Nagant rifles with folding bayonet; automatic, made in Communist China copied from Russian model	4,259
14. 12.7mm heavy machineguns copied from the Russian DSHK	43
15. Brno automatic rifles made in Communist China after the Czech Brno ZB (1925) model, 7.92mm, air cooled fire 500 rounds per minute	100
16. RP.46 automatic rifles, 7.62mm Model 58, copied from Russian RP.46	44
17. Rocket launchers, 40mm copied from the Russian RPG-2 model, antitank weapon with smooth-bored barrel of stainless steel, adjustable for 50, 100, and 150mm rockets	189
18. Rocket launchers CCX.B-50	1
19. Automatic pistols, 7.62 cal. copied from Russian Tokarev	177
20. Automatic pistols copied from the American M3-A1	31
21. LPO flame-throwers	10
22. Cartridges for rifles of all calibres	483,200 rds
23. M.P.82 fuses for 60mm and 80mm mortar shells	various quantities
24. 200 gram charges of TNT explosive	»
25. Cartridges for 7.92mm machineguns	»

- | | |
|---|-----------------------|
| 26. Fuses for 60mm mortar shells | various
quantities |
| 27. Red phosphorus :
Inscription on casings
Red Horse brand
Red amorphous phosphorus
Made in the People's Republic
of China
Net weight 5 kilos
Inflammable — dangerous — keep dry
Handle with care. | » |

B. Czech Origin

- | | |
|---|--------|
| 1. 7.62mm K-50 submachineguns, air-cooled, fires 700 to 750 rounds per min. | 1,028 |
| 2. Czech pistols | 30 |
| 3. Brno automatic rifles (Czech) | 14 |
| 4. Cartridges for K-50 submachineguns | 14,000 |

C. Soviet Origin

- | | |
|--|----|
| 1. Mossin Nagant rifles with folding bayonet, automatic, 7.62mm, 1944, Russian | 38 |
| 2. M.1933-TT Tokarev automatic pistols | 2 |
| 3. 7.62mm Kalashnikov submachineguns | 1 |
| 4. M.1891-30 rifles (59 with telescopic sight) | 62 |

D. East German Origin

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 1. MG-34 heavy machineguns, 7.92mm, circular loader for 50 cartridges, fires 100 to 120 rounds per minutes, equipped with special sight, long tripod for anti-aircraft firing | 33 |
| 2. GWE 38K Mauser rifles, 7.92mm, anti-aircraft | 1,679 |