Stalin, J.W.

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Preface

The tenth volume of J. V. Stalin's Works contains writings and speeches of the period August-December 1927.

By the end of 1927 the policy of the socialist industrialisation of the country had achieved decisive successes. The Bolshevik Party and the Soviet people were faced with the urgent task of passing to the collectivisation of agriculture.

In the Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin analyses the international situation of the Soviet Union, the situation in the capitalist countries and the state of the revolutionary movement all over the world; shows the successes achieved in building socialism in the U.S.S.R. in the conditions of capitalist encirclement; defines the tasks involved in expanding and consolidating the socialist key positions and eliminating the capitalist elements from the national economy. J. V. Stalin substantiates the course taken towards the collectivisation of agriculture, which was approved and adopted by the congress.

In the report to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and in his reply to the discussion on this report, in his speeches "The Political Complexion of the Russian Opposition," "The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now," "The Party and the Opposition," and in other works, J. V. Stalin completes the ideological rout of Trotskyism, sets the Party the task of completely routing the Trotsky-Zinoviev anti-Soviet bloc organisationally and eliminating it, and emphasises the necessity of fighting tirelessly for unity and iron discipline in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party.

J . V. Stalin's works "The International Character of the October Revolution," "Interview with Foreign Workers' Delegations," and "The International Situation and the Defence of the U.S.S.R." reveal the historic significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which marked the radical turn in the history of mankind from capitalism to communism and the triumph of Marxism-Leninism over Social-Democracy. J. V. Stalin emphasises the importance of the U.S.S.R. as the base of the world revolutionary movement and the necessity of defending the Soviet Union from attacks by imperialism.

In his "Interview with the First American Labour Delegation," J. V. Stalin shows the indissoluble unity of Marxism and Leninism and reveals the new contribution that Lenin made to the general treasury of Marxism by developing the teachings of Marx and Engels in conformity with the new era — the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

In this volume are published for the first time J . V. Stalin's letter "To Comrade M. I . Ulyanova. Reply to Comrade L. Mikhelson" and his "Synopsis of the Article 'The International Character of the October Revolution.'"

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.)1
July 29 - August 9, 1927

The International Situation and the Defence of the U.S.S.R.
Speech Delivered on August 1

I
The Attacks of the Opposition on Sections of the Comintern
Comrades, I should like, first of all, to deal with the attacks of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Trotsky on sections of the Comintern, on the Polish section of the Comintern, on the Austrian, British and Chinese sections. I should like to touch on this question because they, the oppositionists, have muddied the waters here and have tried to throw dust in our eyes as regards our brother parties, whereas what we need here is clarity and not opposition twaddle.

The question of the Polish Party. Zinoviev boldly stated here that if there is a Right deviation in the person of Warski in the Polish Party, it is the Communist International, the present leadership of the Comintern, that is to blame. He said that if Warski at one time adopted—and he certainly did adopt—the standpoint of supporting Pilsudski's troops, the Comintern is to blame for it.

That is quite wrong. I should like to refer to the facts, to passages, well-known to you, of the verbatim report of the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission held in July of last year,

I should like to refer to and cite the testimony of a man like Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who stated at the time that if there was a Right deviation in the Polish Party, it was fostered by none other than Zinoviev.

That was during the days of the so-called Pilsudski rising, 2 when we, the members of the Polish Commission of the E.C.C.I. and of the Central Committee of our Party, which included Dzerzhinsky, Unszlicht, myself, Zinoviev and others, were drafting the resolutions for the Communist Party of Poland. Zinoviev, as the Chairman of the Comintern, submitted his draft proposals, in which he said, among other things, that at that moment in Poland, when a struggle was flaring up between the forces that were behind Pilsudski and the forces that were behind the Witos government of Poland, that at such a moment, a policy of neutrality on the part of the Communist Party was impermissible and that for the time being no sharp pronouncements against Pilsudski should be made.

Some of us, including Dzerzhinsky, objected and said that that directive was wrong, that it would only mislead the Communist Party of Poland. It was necessary to say that not only a policy of neutrality, but also a policy of supporting Pilsudski was impermissible. After some objections, that directive was accepted with our amendments.

By this I want to say that it does not need much courage to come out against Warski, who made a mistake at that time and was suitably rebuked for it; but to blame others for one's own sins, to shift the blame for fostering the Right deviation in the Polish Party from the guilty one, Zinoviev, to the Comintern, to the present leaders of the Comintern, means to commit a crime against the Comintern.

You will say that this is a trifle and that I am wasting my time on it. No, comrades, it is not a trifle. The struggle against the Right deviation in the Polish Party is continuing and will continue. Zinoviev has—well, what is the mildest way I can put it—the audacity to assert that the Right deviation is supported by the present leadership of the Comintern. The facts, however, show the opposite. They show that Zinoviev is slandering the Comintern, that he is blaming others for his own sins. That is a habit with Zinoviev, it is nothing new for him. It is our duty, however, to expose this slanderous habit of his on every occasion.

About Austria. Zinoviev asserted here that the Austrian Communist Party is weak, that it failed to assume the leadership of the action that took place recently in Vienna. 3 That is true and not true. It is true that the Austrian Communist Party is weak; but to deny that it acted correctly is to slander it. Yes, it is still weak, but it is weak because, among other things, there is not yet that profound revolutionary crisis of capitalism which revolutionises the masses, which disorganises Social-Democracy and rapidly increases the chances of communism; it is weak because it is young; because in Austria there has long been firmly established the domination of the Social-Democratic "Left wing," 4 which is able, under cover of Left phrases, to pursue a Right-wing, opportunist policy; because Social-Democracy cannot be shattered at one stroke. But what indeed is Zinoviev driving at? He hinted, but did not dare to say openly, that if the Austrian Communist Party is weak, the Comintern is to blame for it. Evidently, that is what he wanted to say. But that is an impotent accusation. It is a slander. On the contrary, it was precisely after Zinoviev ceased to be the Chairman of the Comintern that the Austrian Communist Party was freed from nagging, from indiscriminate interference in its internal life, and thus obtained the opportunity to advance, to develop. Is it not a fact that it was able to take a most active part in the Vienna events, having won for itself the sympathy of the masses of the workers? Does not this show that the Austrian Communist Party is growing and becoming a mass party? How can these obvious facts be denied?

The attack upon the British Communist Party. Zinoviev asserted that the British Communist Party gained nothing from the general strike and the coal strike, 5 that it even emerged from the struggle weaker than it was before. That is not true. It is not true because the importance of the British Communist Party is growing from day to day. Only those who are blind can deny that. It is obvious if only from the fact that whereas previously the British bourgeoisie paid no serious attention to the Communist Party, now, on the contrary, it is furiously persecuting it; not only the bourgeoisie, but also both the General Council and the British Labour Party have organised a furious campaign against "their" Communists. Why were the British Communists more or less tolerated until recently? Because they were weak, they had little influence among the masses. Why are they no longer tolerated, why are they now being fiercely attacked? Because the Communist Party is now feared as a force to be reckoned with, because the leaders of the British Labour Party and General Council fear it as their grave-digger. Zinoviev forgets this.

I do not deny that, in general, the Western sections of the Comintern are still more or less weak. That cannot be denied. But what are the reasons? The chief reasons are:

firstly, the absence of that profound revolutionary crisis which revolutionises the masses, brings them to their feet and turns them abruptly towards communism;

secondly, the circumstance that in all the West-European countries the Social-Democratic parties are still the predominant force among the workers. These parties are older than the

Communist Parties, which appeared only recently and cannot be expected to shatter the Social-Democratic parties at one stroke.

And is it not a fact that, in spite of these circumstances, the Communist Parties in the West are growing, that their popularity among the masses of the workers is rising, that some of them have already become, and others are becoming, really mass parties of the proletariat?

But there is still another reason why the Communist Parties in the West are not growing rapidly. That reason is the splitting activities of the opposition, of the very opposition that is present in this hall. What is required to enable the Communist Parties to grow rapidly? Iron unity in the Comintern, the absence of splits in its sections. But what is the opposition doing? It has created a second party in Germany, the party of Maslow and Ruth Fischer. It is trying to create similar splitting groups in other European countries. Our opposition has created a second party in Germany with a central committee, a central organ, and a parliamentary group; it has organised a split in the Comintern, knowing perfectly well that a split at the present time is bound to retard the growth of the Communist Parties; and now, throwing the blame on the Comintern, it is itself crying out about the slow growth of the Communist Parties in the West! Now, that is indeed impudence, unlimited impudence. . . .

About the Chinese Communist Party. The oppositionists cry out that the Chinese Communist Party, or properly speaking, its leadership, has committed Social-Democratic, Menshevik mistakes. That is correct. The leadership of the Comintern is being blamed for that. Now, that is absolutely incorrect. On the contrary, the Comintern has systematically rectified the mistakes of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Only those who are blind can deny that. You know it from the press, from Pravda, from The Communist International ; 6 you know it from the decisions of the Comintern. The opposition has never named, and will not be able to name, a single directive, a single resolution of the Comintern capable of giving rise to a Menshevik deviation in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, because there have been no such directives. It is foolish to think that if a Menshevik deviation has arisen in some Communist Party, or in its Central Committee, the Comintern must necessarily be to blame for it.

Kamenev asks: Where do the Menshevik mistakes of the Chinese Communist Party come from? And he answers: They can only come about owing to the faulty leadership of the Comintern. But I ask: Where did the Menshevik mistakes of the German Communist Party during the 1923 revolution come from? Where did Brandlerism 7 come from? Who supported it? Is it not a fact that the Menshevik mistakes committed by the Central Committee of the German Party were supported by the present leader of the opposition, Trotsky? Why did not Kamenev say at that time that the appearance of Bran-dlerism was due to the incorrect leadership of the Comintern? Kamenev and Trotsky have forgotten the lessons of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. They have forgotten that with the upsurge of the revolution Right and Left deviations are bound to appear in the Communist Parties, the former refusing to break with the past and the latter refusing to reckon with the present. They have forgotten that no revolution is without such deviations.

And what happened in our Party in October 1917? Were there not a Right and a Left deviation in our Party at that time? Have Kamenev and Zinoviev forgotten that? Do you remember, comrades, the history of the Menshevik mistakes that Kamenev and Zinoviev made in October? What were those mistakes due to? Who was to blame for them? Could Lenin, or the Central Committee of Lenin's Party, be blamed for them? How could the opposition "forget"

these and similar facts? How could it "forget" that with the upsurge of the revolution Right and Left deviations from Marxism always make their appearance within the parties? And what is the task of the Marxists, of the Leninists, under such circumstances? It is to fight the Left and Right deviators.

I am surprised at the arrogance displayed by Trotsky who, you see, apparently cannot tolerate the slightest mistake being made by the Communist Parties in the West or in the East. He, if you please, is surprised that over there, in China, where there is a young party, barely two years old, Menshevik mistakes could make their appearance. But how many years did Trotsky himself stray among the Mensheviks? Has he forgotten that? Why, he strayed among the Menshe-viks for fourteen years—from 1903 to 1917. Why does he excuse his own straying among all sorts of anti-Leninist "trends" for fourteen years before he drew near to Bolshevism, but does not grant the young Chinese Communists at least four years? Why is he so arrogant towards others while forgetting about his own strayings? Why? Where is the "fairness" of it, so to speak?

II
About China
Let us pass to the question of China.

I shall not dwell on the mistakes of the opposition on the question of the character and prospects of the Chinese revolution. I shall not do so because enough has been said, and said quite convincingly, on this subject, and it is not worth while repeating it here. Nor shall I dwell on the assertion that in its present phase the Chinese revolution is a revolution for customs autonomy (Trotsky). Nor is it worth while dwelling on the assertion that no feudal survivals exist in China, or that, if they do exist, they are of no great importance (Trotsky and Radek), in which case the agrarian revolution in China would be absolutely incomprehensible. You no doubt already know from our Party press about these and similar mistakes of the opposition on the Chinese question.

Let us pass to the question of the basic premises of Leninism in deciding the questions of revolution in colonial and dependent countries.

What is the basic premise of the Comintern and the Communist Parties generally in their approach to the questions of the revolutionary movement in colonial and dependent countries?

It consists in a strict distinction between revolution in imperialist countries, in countries that oppress other nations, and revolution in colonial and dependent countries, in countries that suffer from imperialist oppression by other states. Revolution in imperialist countries is one thing: there the bourgeoisie is the oppressor of other nations; there it is counter-revolutionary at all stages of the revolution; there the national factor, as a factor in the struggle for emancipation, is absent. Revolution in colonial and dependent countries is another thing: there the imperialist oppression by other states is one of the factors of the revolution; there this oppression cannot but affect the national bourgeoisie also; there the national bourgeoisie, at a certain stage and for a certain period, may support the revolutionary movement of its country against imperialism; there the national factor, as a factor in the struggle for emancipation, is a revolutionary factor.

To fail to draw this distinction, to fail to understand this difference and to identify revolution in imperialist countries with revolution in colonial countries, is to depart from the path of

Marxism, from the pathof Leninism, to take the path of the supporters of the Second International.

Here is what Lenin said about this in his report on the national and colonial questions at the Second Congress of the Comintern :

"What is the most important, the fundamental idea of our theses? The distinction between oppressed nations and oppressing nations. We emphasise this distinction—in contrast to the Second International and bourgeois democracy" (Vol. XXV, p. 351).

The principal error of the opposition is that it fails to understand and does not admit this difference between the two types of revolution.

The principal error of the opposition is that it identifies the 1905 Revolution in Russia, an imperialist country which oppressed other nations, with the revolution in China, an oppressed, semi-colonial country, which is compelled to fight imperialist oppression on the part of other states.

Here in Russia, in 1905, the revolution was directed against the bourgeoisie, against the liberal bourgeoisie, in spite of the fact that it was a bourgeois-democratic revolution. Why? Because the liberal bourgeoisie of an imperialist country is bound to be counter-revolutionary. For that very reason among the Bolsheviks at that time there was not, and could not be, any question of temporary blocs and agreements with the liberal bourgeoisie. On these grounds, the opposition asserts that the same attitude should be adopted in China at all stages of the revolutionary movement, that temporary agreements and blocs with the national bourgeoisie are never permissible in China under any conditions. But the opposition forgets that only people who do not understand and do not admit that there is a difference between revolution in oppressed countries and revolution in oppressing countries can talk like that, that only people who are breaking with Leninism and are sinking to the level of supporters of the Second International can talk like that.

Here is what Lenin said about the permissibility of entering into temporary agreements and blocs with the bourgeois-liberation movement in colonial countries :

"The Communist International must enter into a temporary alliance* with bourgeois democracy in the colonies and backward countries, but must not merge with it, and must unfailingly preserve the independence of the proletarian movement, even if in its most rudimentary form" (see Vol. XXV, p. 290) . . . "we, as Communists, should, and will, support bourgeois-liberation* movements in colonial countries only when those movements are really revolutionary, when the representatives of those movements do not hinder us in training and organising the peasantry and the broad masses of the exploited in a revolutionary spirit" (Vol. XXV, p. 353).

How could it "happen" that Lenin, who fulminated against agreements with the bourgeoisie in Russia, admitted that such agreements and blocs were permissible in China? Perhaps Lenin was mistaken? Perhaps he had turned from revolutionary tactics to opportunist tactics? Of course not! It "happened" because Lenin understood the difference between revolution in an oppressed country and revolution in an oppressing country. It "happened" because Lenin understood that, at a certain stage of its development, the national bourgeoisie in the colonial and dependent countries may support the revolutionary movement of its own country against

the oppression of imperialism. That the opposition refuses to understand, but it refuses to do so because it is breaking with Lenin's revolutionary tactics, breaking with the revolutionary tactics of Leninism.

Have you noticed how carefully in their speeches the leaders of the opposition evaded these directives of Lenin's, being afraid to mention them? Why do they evade these universally-known tactical directives of Lenin's for the colonial and dependent countries? Why are they afraid of these directives? Because they are afraid of the truth. Because Lenin's tactical directives refute the entire ideological and political line of Trotskyism on the questions of the Chinese revolution.

About the stages of the Chinese revolution. The opposition has got so confused that it is now denying that there are any stages at all in the development of the Chinese revolution. But is there such a thing as a revolution that does not go through definite stages of development? Did not our revolution have its stages of development? Take Lenin's April Theses 8 and you will see that Lenin recognised two stages in our revolution: the first stage was the bourgeois-democratic revolution, with the agrarian movement as its main axis; the second stage was the October Revolution, with the seizure of power by the proletariat as its main axis.

What are the stages in the Chinese revolution?

In my opinion there should be three :

the first stage is the revolution of an all-national united front, the Canton period, when the revolution was striking chiefly at foreign imperialism, and the national bourgeoisie supported the revolutionary movement;

the second stage is the bourgeois-democratic revolution, after the national troops reached the Yangtse River, when the national bourgeoisie deserted the revolution and the agrarian movement grew into a mighty revolution of tens of millions of the peasantry (the Chinese revolution is now at the second stage of its development);

the third stage is the Soviet revolution, which has not yet come, but will come.

Whoever fails to understand that there is no such thing as a revolution without definite stages of development, whoever fails to understand that there are three stages in the development of the Chinese revolution, understands nothing about Marxism or about the Chinese question.

What is the characteristic feature of the first stage of the Chinese revolution?

The characteristic feature of the first stage of the Chinese revolution is, firstly, that it was the revolution of an all-national united front, and secondly, that it was directed mainly against foreign imperialist oppression (the Hongkong strike, 9 etc.). Was Canton then the centre, the place d'armes, of the revolutionary movement in China? Of course, it was. Only those who are blind can deny that now.

Is it true that the first stage of a colonial revolution must have just such a character? I think it is true. In the "Supplementary Theses" of the Second Congress of the Comintern, which deal with the revolution in China and India, it is explicitly stated that in those countries "foreign domination is all the time hindering the free development of social life," that "therefore, the

first step* of a revolution in the colonies must be to overthrow foreign capitalism" (see Verbatim Report of the Second Congress of the Comintern, p. 605).

The characteristic feature of the Chinese revolution is that it has taken this "first step," has passed through the first stage of its development, has passed through the period of the revolution of an all-national united front and has entered the second stage of its development, the period of the agrarian revolution.

The characteristic feature, for instance, of the Turkish revolution (the Kemalists), on the contrary, is that it got stuck at the "first step," at the first stage of its development, at the stage of the bourgeois-liberation movement, without even attempting to pass to the second stage of its development, the stage of the agrarian revolution.

What were the Kuomintang 10 and its government at the first stage of the revolution, the Canton period? They were a bloc of the workers, the peasants, the bourgeois intellectuals and the national bourgeoisie. Was Canton at that time the centre of the revolutionary movement, the place d'armes of the revolution? Was it correct policy at that time to support the Canton Kuomintang, as the government of the struggle for liberation from imperialism? Were we right in giving assistance to Canton in China and, say, Ankara in Turkey, when Canton and Ankara were fighting imperialism? Yes, we were right. We were right, and we were then following in the footsteps of Lenin, for the struggle waged by Canton and Ankara was dissipating the forces of imperialism, was weakening and discrediting imperialism, and was thus facilitating the development of the centre of the world revolution, the development of the U.S.S.R. Is it true that at that time the present leaders of our opposition joined with us in supporting both Canton and Ankara, giving them certain assistance? Yes, it is true. Let anybody try to refute that.

But what does a united front with the national bourgeoisie at the first stage of a colonial revolution mean? Does it mean that Communists must not intensify the struggle of the workers and peasants against the landlords and the national bourgeoisie, that the proletariat ought to sacrifice its independence, if only to a very slight extent, if only for a very short time? No, it does not mean that. A united front can be of revolutionary significance only where, and only on condition that, it does not prevent the Communist Party from conducting its independent political and organisational work, from organising the proletariat into an independent political force, from rousing the peasantry against the landlords, from openly organising a workers' and peasants' revolution and from preparing in this way the conditions for the hegemony of the proletariat. I think that the reporter fully proved on the basis of universally-known documents that it was precisely this conception of the united front that the Comintern impressed upon the Chinese Communist Party.

Kamenev and Zinoviev referred here to a single telegram sent to Shanghai in October 1926, stating that for the time being, until Shanghai was captured, the agrarian movement should not be intensified. I am far from admitting that that telegram was right. I have never regarded and do not now regard the Comintern as being infallible. Mistakes are sometimes made, and that telegram was unquestionably a mistake. But, firstly, the Comintern itself cancelled that telegram a few weeks later (in November 1926), without any promptings or signals from the opposition. Secondly, why has the opposition kept silent about this until now? Why has it recalled that telegram only after nine months? And why does it conceal from the Party the fact that the Comintern cancelled that telegram nine months ago? Hence, it would be malicious slander to assert that that telegram defined the line of our leadership. As a matter of fact, it

was an isolated, episodic telegram, totally uncharacteristic of the line of the Comintern, of the line of our leadership. That is obvious, I repeat, if only from the fact that it was cancelled within a few weeks by a number of documents which laid down the line, and which were indeed characteristic of our leadership.

Permit me to refer to these documents.

Here, for instance, is an excerpt from the resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the Comintern, in November 1926, i.e., a month after the above-mentioned telegram:

"The peculiar feature of the present situation is its transitional character, the fact that the proletariat must choose between the prospect of a bloc with considerable sections of the bourgeoisie and the prospect of further consolidating its alliance with the peasantry. If the proletariat fails to put forward a radical agrarian programme, it will be unable to draw the peasantry into the revolutionary struggle and will forfeit its hegemony in the national-liberation movement."*

And further :

"The Canton People's Government will not be able to retain power in the revolution, will not be able to achieve complete victory over foreign imperialism and native reaction until the cause of national liberation is identified with the agrarian revolution"* (see Resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.).

There you have a document which really does define the line of the Comintern leadership.

It is very strange that the leaders of the opposition avoid mention of this universally-known Comintern document.

Perhaps it will not be taken as boastful if I refer to the speech I delivered in November of that same year, 1926, in the Chinese Commission of the Comintern, which, not without my participation of course, drafted the resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum on the Chinese question. That speech was subsequently published in pamphlet form under the title The Prospects of the Revolution in China. Here are some passages from that speech :

"I know that there are Kuomintangists and even Chinese Communists who do not consider it possible to unleash revolution in the countryside, since they fear that if the peasantry were drawn into the revolution it would disrupt the united anti-imperialist front. That is a profound error, comrades. The more quickly and thoroughly the Chinese peasantry is drawn into the revolution, the stronger and more powerful the anti-imperialist front in China will be."

And further :

"I know that among the Chinese Communists there are comrades who do not approve of workers going on strike for an improvement of their material conditions and legal status, and who try to dissuade the workers from striking. (A voice: "That happened in Canton and Shanghai.") That is a great mistake, comrades. It is a very serious underestimation of the role and importance of the Chinese proletariat. This fact should be noted in the theses as something decidedly objectionable. It would be a great mistake if the Chinese Communists failed to take advantage of the present favourable situation to assist the workers to improve

their material conditions and legal status, even through strikes. Otherwise, what purpose does the revolution in China serve?" (See Stalin, The Prospects of the Revolution in China.) 11

And here is a third document, of December 1926, issued at a time when every city in China was bombarding the Comintern with assertions that an extension of the struggle of the workers would lead to a crisis, to unemployment, to the closing down of mills and factories :

"A general policy of retreat in the towns and of curtailing the workers' struggle to improve their conditions would be wrong. The struggle in the countryside must be extended, but at the same time advantage must be taken of the favourable situation to improve the material conditions and legal status of the workers, while striving in every way to lend the workers' struggle an organised character, which precludes excesses or running too far ahead. Special efforts must be exerted to direct the struggle in the towns against the big bourgeoisie and, above all, against the imperialists, so as to keep the Chinese petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie as far as possible within the framework of the united front against the common enemy. We regard the system of conciliation boards, arbitration courts, etc., as expedient, provided a correct working-class policy is ensured in these institutions. At the same time we think it necessary to utter the warning that decrees directed against the right to strike, against workers' freedom of assembly, etc., are absolutely impermissible."

Here is a fourth document, issued six weeks before Chiang Kai-shek's coup 12 :

"The work of the Kuomintang and Communist units in the army must be intensified; they must be organised wherever they do not now exist and it is possible to organise them; where it is not possible to organise Communist units, intensified work must be conducted with the help of concealed Communists.

"It is necessary to adopt the course of arming the workers and peasants and converting the peasant committees in the localities into actual organs of governmental authority equipped with armed self-defence, etc.

"The Communist Party must everywhere come forward as such; a policy of voluntary semi-legality is impermissible; the Communist Party must not come forward as a brake on the mass movement; the Communist Party should not cover up the treacherous and reactionary policy of the Kuomintang Rights, and should mobilise the masses around the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of exposing the Rights.

"The attention of all political workers who are loyal to the revolution must be drawn to the fact that at the present time, in connection with the regrouping of class forces and concentration of the imperialist armies, the Chinese revolution is passing through a critical period, and that it can achieve further victories only by resolutely adopting the course of developing the mass movement. Otherwise a tremendous danger threatens the revolution. The fulfilment of directives is therefore more necessary than ever before."

And even earlier, already in April 1926, a year before the coup of the Kuomintang Rights and Chiang Kaishek, the Comintern warned the Chinese Communist Party, pointing out that it was "necessary to work for the resignation or expulsion of the Rights from the Kuo-mintang."

That is how the Comintern understood, and still understands, the tactics of a united front against imperialism at the first stage of a colonial revolution.

Does the opposition know about these guiding documents? Of course it does. Why then does it say nothing about them? Because its aim is to raise a squabble, not to bring out the truth.

And yet there was a time when the present leaders of the opposition, especially Zinoviev and Kamenev, did understand something about Leninism and, in the main, advocated the same policy for the Chinese revolutionary movement as was pursued by the Comintern, and which Comrade Lenin out lined for us in his theses. 13 I have in mind the Sixth Plenum of the Communist International, held in February-March 1926, when Zi-noviev was Chairman of the Comintern, when he was still a Leninist and had not yet migrated to Trotsky's camp. I mention the Sixth Plenum of the Communist International because there is a resolution of that plenum on the Chinese revolution, 14 which was adopted unanimously in February-March 1926, and which gives approximately the same estimate of the first stage of the Chinese revolution, of the Canton Kuomintang and of the Canton government, as is given by the Comintern and by the C.P.S.U.(B.), but which the opposition is now repudiating. I mention this resolution because Zinoviev voted for it at that time, and not a single member of the Central Committee, not even Trotsky, Kame-nev, or the other leaders of the present opposition, objected to it.

Permit me to quote a few passages from that resolution.

Here is what is said in the resolution about the Kuo-mintang:

"The Shanghai and Hongkong political strikes of the Chinese workers (June-September 1925) marked a turning point in the struggle of the Chinese people for liberation from the foreign imperialists. . . . The political action of the proletariat gave a powerful impetus to the further development and consolidation of all the revolutionary-democratic organisations in the country, especially of the people's revolutionary party, the Kuomintang, and the revolutionary government in Canton. The Kuomintang party, the main body of which acted in alliance with the Chinese Communists, is a revolutionary bloc of workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the urban democracy,* based on the common class interests of these strata in the struggle against the foreign imperialists and against the whole military-feudal way of life, for the independence of the country and for a single revolutionary-democratic government" (see Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the E.C.C.I.).

Thus, the Canton Kuomintang is an alliance of four "classes." As you see, this is almost "Martynovism" 15 sanctified by none other than the then Chairman of the Comintern Zinoviev./p>

About the Canton Kuomintang government:

"The revolutionary government created by the Kuomintang party in Canton* has already succeeded in establishing contact with the widest masses of the workers, peasants, and urban democracy, and, basing itself on them, has smashed the counterrevolutionary bands supported by the imperialists (and is working for the radical democratisation of the whole political life of the Kwangtung Province). Thus, being the vanguard in the struggle of the Chinese people for independence, the Canton government serves as a model for the future revolutionary-democratic development of the country"* (ibid.).

It turns out that the Canton Kuomintang government, being a bloc of four "classes," was a revolutionary government, and not only revolutionary, but even a model for the future revolutionary-democratic government in China./p>

About the united front of workers, peasants and the bourgeoisie:

"In face of the new dangers, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang must develop the most wide-spread political activity, organising mass action in support of the struggle of the people's armies, taking advantage of the contradictions within the camp of the imperialists and opposing to them a united national revolutionary front of the broadest strata of the population (workers, peasants, and the bourgeoisie) under the leadership of the revolutionary-democratic organisations"* (ibid.).

It follows that temporary blocs and agreements with the bourgeoisie in colonial countries at a certain stage of the colonial revolution are not only permissible, but positively essential.

Is it not true that this is very similar to what Lenin tells us in his well-known directives for the tactics of Communists in colonial and dependent countries? It is a pity, however, that Zinoviev has already managed to forget that.

The question of withdrawal from the Kuomintang:

"Certain sections of the Chinese big bourgeoisie, which had temporarily grouped themselves around the Kuomintang Party, withdrew from it during the past year, which resulted in the formation on the Right wing of the Kuomintang of a small group that openly opposed a close alliance between the Kuomintang and the masses of the working people, demanded the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang and opposed the revolutionary policy of the Canton government. The condemnation of this Right wing at the Second Congress of the Kuomintang (January 1926) and the endorsement of the necessity for a militant alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communists confirm the revolutionary trend of the activities of the Kuomintang and the Canton government and ensure for the Kuomintang the revolutionary support of the proletariat"* (ibid.).

It is seen that withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang at the first stage of the Chinese revolution would have been a serious mistake. It is a pity, however, that Zinoviev, who voted for this resolution, had already managed to forget it in about a month; for it was not later than April 1926 (within a month) that Zinoviev demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang./p>

About the deviations within the Chinese Communist Party and the impermissibility of skipping over the Kuomin-tang phase of the revolution:</p>

"The political self-determination of the Chinese Communists will develop in the struggle against two equally harmful deviations: against Right Liquidationism, which ignores the independent class tasks of the Chinese proletariat and leads to a formless merging with the general democratic national movement; and against the extreme Left sentiments in favour of skipping over the revolutionary-democratic stage of the movement to come immediately to the tasks of proletarian dictatorship and Soviet power, forgetting about the peasantry, that basic and decisive factor in the Chinese movement for national emancipation"* (ibid.).

As you see, here are all the grounds for convicting the opposition now of wanting to skip over the Kuomin-tang phase of development in China, of underestimating the peasant movement, and of dashing post-haste towards Soviets. It hits the nail right on the head.

Do Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky know about this resolution?

We must assume that they do. At any rate Zino-viev must know about it, for it was under his chairmanship that this resolution was adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the Comintern and he himself voted for it. Why are the leaders of the opposition now avoiding this resolution of the highest body of the world communist movement? Why are they keeping silent about it? Because it turns against them on all questions concerning the Chinese revolution. Because it refutes the whole of the present Trotskyist standpoint of the opposition. Because they have deserted the Comintern, deserted Leninism, and now, fearing their past, fearing their own shadows, are obliged cravenly to avoid the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Comintern.

That is how matters stand as regards the first stage-of the Chinese revolution.

Let us pass now to the second stage of the Chinese revolution.

While the distinguishing feature of the first stage was that the spearhead of the revolution was turned mainly against foreign imperialism, the characteristic feature of the second stage is that the spearhead of the revolution is now turned mainly against internal enemies, primarily against the feudal landlords, against the feudal regime.

Did the first stage accomplish its task of overthrowing foreign imperialism? No, it did not. It bequeathed the accomplishment of this task to the second stage of the Chinese revolution. It merely gave the revolutionary masses the first shaking up that roused them against imperialism, only to run its course and hand on the task to the future.

It must be presumed that the second stage of the revolution also will not succeed in fully accomplishing the task of expelling the imperialists. It will give the broad masses of the Chinese workers and peasants a further shaking up to rouse them against imperialism, but it will do so in order to hand on the completion of this task to the next stage of the Chinese revolution, to the Soviet stage.

There is nothing surprising in that. Do we not know that analogous facts occurred in the history of our revolution, although in a different situation and under different circumstances? Do we not know that the first stage of our revolution did not fully accomplish its task of completing the agrarian revolution, and that it handed on that task to the next stage of the revolution, to the October Revolution, which wholly and completely accomplished the task of eradicating the survivals of feudalism? It will therefore not be surprising if the second stage of the Chinese revolution does not succeed in fully completing the agrarian revolution, and if the second stage of the revolution, after giving the vast masses of the peasantry a shaking up and rousing them against the survivals of feudalism, hands on the completion of this task to the next stage of the revolution, to the Soviet stage. That will only be a merit of the future Soviet revolution in China.

What was the task of the Communists at the second stage of the revolution in China, when the centre of the revolutionary movement had obviously shifted from Canton to Wuhan, and

when, parallel with the revolutionary centre in Wuhan, a counter-revolutionary centre was set up in Nanking?

The task was to utilise to the full the possibility of openly organising the Party, the proletariat (trade unions), the peasantry (peasant associations), and the revolution generally.

The task was to push the Wuhan Kuomintangists to the Left, towards the agrarian revolution.

The task was to make the Wuhan Kuomintang the centre of the fight against counter-revolution and the core of a future revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

Was that policy correct?

The facts have shown that it was the only correct policy, the only policy capable of training the masses of workers and peasants for the further development of the revolution.

The opposition at that time demanded the immediate formation of Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. But that was sheer adventurism, an adventurist leap ahead, for the immediate formation of Soviets at that time would have meant skipping over the Left Kuomintang phase of development. Why?

Because the Kuomintang in Wuhan, which supported the alliance with the Communists, had not yet discredited and exposed itself in the eyes of the masses of workers and peasants, and had not yet exhausted itself as a bourgeois revolutionary organisation.

Because to have issued the slogan of Soviets and of the overthrow of the Wuhan government at a time when the masses had not yet been convinced through their own experience of the worthlessness of that government and of the necessity of overthrowing it, would have meant leaping ahead, breaking away from the masses, losing the support of the masses and thus causing the failure of the movement that had already started.

The opposition thinks that, if it understands that the Wuhan Kuomintang was unreliable, unstable and insufficiently revolutionary (and it is not difficult for any qualified political worker to understand that), that is quite enough for the masses also to understand all this, that is enough for replacing the Kuomintang by Soviets and for securing the following of the masses. But that is the usual "ultra-Left" mistake made by the opposition, which takes its own political consciousness and understanding for the political consciousness and understanding of the vast masses of workers and peasants.

The opposition is right when it says that the Party must go forward. That is an ordinary Marxist precept, and there can not be any real Communist Party if it is not adhered to. But that is only part of the truth. The whole truth is that the Party must not only go forward, but must also secure the following of the vast masses. To go forward without securing the following of the vast masses means in fact to break away from the movement. To go forward, breaking away from the rear-guard, without being able to secure the following of the rear-guard, means to make a leap ahead that can prevent the advance of the masses for some time. The essence of Leninist leadership is precisely that the vanguard should be able to secure the following of the rear-guard, that the vanguard should go forward without breaking away from the masses. But in order that the vanguard should not break away from the masses, in order

that the vanguard should really secure the following of the vast masses, a decisive condition is needed, namely, that the masses themselves should be convinced through their own experience that the instructions, directives and slogans issued by the vanguard are correct.

The misfortune of the opposition is that it does not accept this simple Leninist rule for leading the vast masses, that it does not understand that the Party alone, an advanced group alone, without the support of the vast masses, cannot make a revolution, that, in the final analysis, a revolution "is made" by the vast masses of the working people.

Why did we Bolsheviks, in April 1917, refrain from putting forward the practical slogan for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power in Russia, although we were convinced that in the very near future we should be faced with the necessity of overthrowing the Provisional Government and of establishing Soviet power?

Because the broad masses of the working people, both in the rear and at the front, and, lastly, the Soviets themselves, were not yet ready to accept such a slogan, they still believed that the Provisional Government was revolutionary.

Because the Provisional Government had not yet disgraced and discredited itself by supporting counterrevolution in the rear and at the front.

Why did Lenin, in April 1917, denounce the Bag-datyev group in Petrograd which put forward the slogan of the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power?

Because Bagdatyev's attempt was a dangerous leap ahead which created the danger of the Bolshevik Party breaking away from the vast masses of the workers and peasants.

Adventurism in politics, Bagdatyevism in matters concerning the Chinese revolution—that is what is now killing our Trotskyist opposition.

Zinoviev asserts that in speaking of Bagdatyevism I identify the present Chinese revolution with the October Revolution. That, of course, is nonsense. In the first place, I myself made the reservation in my article "Notes on Contemporary Themes" that "the analogy is a qualified one" and that "I make it with all the necessary reservations, bearing in mind the difference between the situation of China in our day and that of Russia in 1917." 16 In the second place, it would be foolish to assert that one must never draw analogies with revolutions in other countries when characterising certain tendencies and certain mistakes committed in the revolution of a given country. Does not a revolution in one country learn from revolutions in other countries, even if those revolutions are not all of the same type? If not, what does the science of revolution amount to?

In essence, Zinoviev denies that there can be a science of revolution. Is it not a fact that in the period just before the October Revolution Lenin accused Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov and others of the "Louis Blancism" of the French Revolution of 1848? Look at Lenin's article "Louis Blancism" 17 and you will realise that Lenin made wide use of analogies from the French Revolution of 1848 in characterising the mistakes made by various leaders before October, although Lenin knew very well that the French Revolution of 1848 was not of the same type as our October Revolution. And if we can speak of the "Louis Blancism" of Chkheidze and Tsereteli in the period before the October Revolution, why cannot we speak of

the "Bag-datyevism" of Zinoviev and Trotsky in the period of the agrarian revolution in China?

The opposition asserts that Wuhan was not the centre of the revolutionary movement. Why then did Zi-noviev say that "all round assistance should be rendered" the Wuhan Kuomintang, so as to make it the centre of the struggle against the Chinese Cavaignacs? Why did the Wuhan territory, and no other, become the centre of the maximum development of the agrarian movement? Is it not a fact that it was precisely the Wuhan territory (Hunan, Hupeh) that was the centre of the maximum development of the agrarian movement at the beginning of this year? Why could Canton, where there was no mass agrarian movement, be called "the place d'armes of the revolution" (Trotsky), whereas Wuhan, in the territory of which the agrarian revolution began and developed, must not be regarded as the centre, as the "place d'armes" of the revolutionary movement? How in that case are we to explain the fact that the opposition demanded that the Communist Party should remain in the Wuhan Kuomintang and the Wuhan government? Was the opposition, in April 1927, really in favour of a bloc with the "counter-revolutionary" Wuhan Kuomintang? Why this "forgetfulness" and confusion on the part of the opposition?

The opposition is gloating over the fact that the bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang proved to be shortlived, and, moreover, it asserts that the Comintern failed to warn the Chinese Communists of the possibility of the collapse of the Wuhan Kuomintang. It scarcely needs proof that the malicious glee displayed by the opposition only testifies to its political bankruptcy. The opposition evidently thinks that blocs with the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries ought to be of long duration; but only people who have lost the last remnants of Leninism can think that. Only those who are infected with defeatism can gloat over the fact that at the present stage the feudal landlords and imperialists in China have proved to be stronger than the revolution, that the pressure exercised by these hostile forces has induced the Wuhan Kuomintang to swing to the Right and has led to the temporary defeat of the Chinese revolution. As for the opposition's assertion that the Comintern failed to warn the Communist Party of China of the possible collapse of the Wuhan Kuomintang, that is one of the usual slanders now so abundant in the opposition's arsenal.

Permit me to quote some documents to refute the slanders of the opposition.

First document, of May 1927:

"The most important thing now in the internal policy of the Kuomintang is to develop the agrarian revolution systematically in all provinces, particularly in Kwangtung, under the slogan 'All power to the peasant associations and committees in the countryside.' This is the basis for the success of the revolution and of the Kuomintang. This is the basis for creating in China a big and powerful political and military army against imperialism and its agents. Practically, the slogan of confiscating the land is quite timely for the provinces in which there is a strong agrarian movement, such as Hunan, Kwangtung, etc. Without this the extension of the agrarian revolution is impossible*. . . .

"It is necessary to start at once to organise eight or ten divisions of revolutionary peasants and workers with absolutely reliable officers. This will be a Wuhan guards force both at the front and in the rear for disarming unreliable units. This must not be delayed.

"Disintegrating activities must be intensified in the rear and in Chiang Kai-shek's units, and assistance must be given to the insurgent peasants in Kwangtung, where the rule of the landlords is particularly unbearable."

The second document, of May 1927:

"Without an agrarian revolution, victory is impossible. Without it the Central Committee of the Kuomintang will be converted into a wretched plaything of unreliable generals. Excesses must be combated not, however, by means of troops, but through the peasant associations. We are decidedly in favour of the actual seizure of the land by the masses. Apprehensions concerning Tang Ping-shan's mission are not devoid of foundation. You must not sever yourselves from the working-class and peasant movement, but must assist it in every way. Otherwise you will ruin the work.

"Some of the old leaders of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang are frightened by events, they are vacillating and compromising. An in creased number of new peasant and working-class leaders must be drawn from the masses into the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. Their bold voices will either stiffen the backs of the old leaders or result in their removal. The present structure of the Kuomintang must be changed. The top leadership of the Kuo-mintang must certainly be refreshed and reinforced with new leaders who have come to the fore in the agrarian revolution, while the local organisations must be broadened from the millions of members in workers' and peasants' associations. If this is not done the Kuomintang will run the risk of becoming divorced from life and of losing all prestige.

"Dependence upon unreliable generals must be eliminated. Mobilise about 20,000 Communists, add about 20,000 revolutionary workers and peasants from Hunan and Hupeh, form several new army corps, use the students at the officers' school as commanders and organise your own reliable army before it is too late. If this is not done there is no guarantee against failure. It is a difficult matter, but there is no alternative.

"Organise a Revolutionary Military Tribunal headed by prominent non-Communist Kuomintangists. Punish officers who maintain contact with Chiang Kaishek or who incite the soldiers against the people, the workers and peasants. Persuasion is not enough. It is time to act. Scoundrels must he punished. If the Kuo-mintangists do not learn to be revolutionary /acobins they will perish so fat as the people and the revolution ate concerned."*

As you see, the Comintern foresaw events, it gave timely warning of the dangers and told the Chinese Communists that the Wuhan Kuomintang would perish if the Kuomintangists failed to become revolutionary Jacobins.

Kamenev said that the defeat of the Chinese revolution was due to the policy of the Comintern, and that we "bred Cavaignacs in China." Comrades, only one who is ready to commit a crime against the Party can say that sort of thing about our Party. That is what the Mensheviks said about the Bolsheviks during the July defeat of 1917, when the Russian Cavaignacs appeared on the scene. In his article "On Slogans," 18 Lenin wrote that the July defeat was "a victory for the Cavaignacs." The Mensheviks at that time gloatingly asserted that the appearance of the Russian Cavaignacs was due to Lenin's policy. Does Kamenev think that the appearance of the Russian Cavaignacs during the July defeat of 1917 was due to Lenin's policy, to the policy of our Party, and not to some other cause? Is it becoming for

Kamenev in this case to imitate the Menshevik gentry? (Laughter.) I did not think that the comrades of the opposition could sink so low. . . .

We know that the Revolution of 1905 suffered defeat, more over that defeat was more profound than the present defeat of the Chinese revolution. The Mensheviks at that time said that the defeat of the 1905 Revolution was due to the extreme revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks. Does Kamenev here, too, want to take the Menshevik interpretation of the history of our revolution as his model and to cast a stone at the Bolsheviks?

And how are we to explain the defeat of the Bavarian Soviet Republic? By Lenin's policy, perhaps, and not by the correlation of class forces?

How are we to explain the defeat of the Hungarian Soviet Republic? By the policy of the Comintern, perhaps, and not by the correlation of class forces?

How can it be asserted that the tactics of this or that party can abolish or reverse the correlation of class forces? Was our policy in 1905 correct, or not? Why did we suffer defeat at that time? Do not the facts show that if the policy of the opposition had been followed the revolution in China would have reached defeat more rapidly than was actually the case? What are we to say of people who forget about the correlation of class forces in time of revolution and who try to explain everything solely by the tactics of this or that party? Only one thing can be said of such people—that they have broken with Marxism.

Conclusions. The chief mistakes of the opposition are:

1) The opposition does not understand the character and prospects of the Chinese revolution.

2) The opposition sees no difference between the revolution in China and the revolution in Russia, between revolution in colonial countries and revolution in imperialist countries.

3) The opposition is departing from Leninist tactics on the question of the attitude to the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries at the first stage of the revolution.

4) The opposition does not understand the question of the Communists' participation in the Kuomintang.

5) The opposition is violating the principles of Leninist tactics on the question of the relations between the vanguard (the Party) and the rear-guard (the vast masses of the working people).

6) The opposition is departing from the resolutions of the Sixth and Seventh Plenums of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

The opposition noisily brags about its policy on the Chinese question and asserts that if that policy had been adopted the situation in China today would be better than it is. It scarcely needs proof that, considering the gross mistakes committed by the opposition, the Chinese Communist Party would have landed in a complete impasse had it adopted the anti-Leninist and adventurist policy of the opposition.

The fact that the Communist Party in China has in a short period grown from a small group of five or six thousand into a mass party of 60,000 members; the fact that the Chinese

Communist Party has succeeded in organising nearly 3,000,000 proletarians in trade unions during this period; the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded in rousing the many millions of the peasantry from their torpor and in drawing tens of millions of peasants into the revolutionary peasant associations; the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded during this period in winning over whole regiments and divisions of national troops; the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded during this period in converting the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat from an aspiration into a reality—the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded in a short period in achieving all these gains is due, among other things, to its having followed the path outlined by Lenin, the path indicated by the Comintern.

Needless to say, if the policy of the opposition, with its mistakes and its anti-Leninist line on questions of colonial revolution, had been followed, these gains of the Chinese revolution would either not have been achieved at all, or would have been extremely insignificant.

Only "ultra-Left" renegades and adventurers can doubt this.

III

The Anglo-Soviet Unity Committee 19

About the Anglo-Soviet Committee. The opposition asserts that we banked, so to speak, on the Anglo-Soviet Committee. That is not true, comrades. It is one of those slanders that the bankrupt opposition so often resorts to. The whole world knows, and, therefore, the opposition should know too, that we do not bank on the Anglo-Soviet Committee, but on the world revolutionary movement and on our successes in building socialism. The opposition is deceiving the Party when it says that we banked, or are banking, on the Anglo-Soviet Committee.

What, then, is the Anglo-Soviet Committee? The Anglo-Soviet Committee is one of the forms of contact between our trade unions and the British trade unions, reformist trade unions, reactionary trade unions. At the present time we are carrying on our work for revolutionising the working class in Europe through three channels:

a) through the channel of the Comintern, through the Communist sections, the immediate task of which is to eliminate reformist political leadership from the working-class movement;

b) through the channel of the Profintern, through the revolutionary trade-union minorities, the immediate task of which is to defeat the reactionary labour aristocracy in the trade unions;

c) through the Anglo-Soviet Unity Committee, as one of the means of helping the Profintern and its sections in their struggle to isolate the labour aristocracy in the trade unions.

The first two channels are the main and permanent ones, essential for the Communists as long as classes and class society exist. The third is only a temporary, auxiliary, episodic channel and, therefore, not durable, not always reliable, and some times quite unreliable. To put the third channel on a par with the first two means running counter to the interests of the working class, to communism. That being the case, how can one talk about our having banked on the Anglo-Soviet Committee?

Our aim in agreeing to form the Anglo-Soviet Committee was to establish open contact with the masses of the organised workers of Britain.

For what purpose?

Firstly, for the purpose of helping to form a workers' united front against capital, or, at any rate, of hindering the efforts of the reactionary trade-union leaders to prevent the formation of such a front.

Secondly, for the purpose of helping to form a workers' united front against the danger of imperialist war in general and against the danger of intervention in particular, or, at any rate, of hindering the efforts of the reactionary trade-union leaders to prevent the formation of such a front.

Is it permissible at all for Communists to work in reactionary trade unions?

It is not only permissible, but sometimes it is positively essential to do so, for there are millions of workers in the reactionary trade unions, and Communists have no right to refuse to join those unions, to find a road to the masses and to win them over to communism.

Look at Lenin's book "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder 20 and you will see that Lenin's tactics makes it obligatory for Communists not to refuse to work in reactionary trade unions.

Is it at all permissible to conclude temporary agreements with reactionary trade unions, agreements on trade-union matters, or on political matters?

It is not only permissible, but sometimes it is positively essential to do so. Everyone knows that the ma jority of the trade unions in the West are reactionary, but that is not the point at all. The point is that these unions are mass unions. The point is that through these trade unions it is possible to gain access to the masses. Care must be taken, however, that such agreements do not restrict, do not limit the freedom of Communists to conduct revolutionary agitation and propaganda, that such agreements help to disintegrate the ranks of the reformists and to revolutionise the masses of the workers who still follow the reactionary leaders. On these conditions, temporary agreements with mass reactionary trade unions are not only permissible but sometimes positively essential.

Here is what Lenin says on this score :

"Capitalism would not be capitalism if the 'pure' proletariat were not surrounded by a mass of exceedingly motley intermediate types between the proletarian and the semi-proletarian (who earns his livelihood in part by the sale of his labour power), between the semi-proletarian and the small peasant (and the petty artisan, handicraft worker and small proprietor in general), between the small peasant and the middle peasant, and so on, and if the proletariat itself were not divided into more developed and less developed strata, if it were not divided according to place of birth, trade, sometimes according to religion, and so on. And from all this follows the necessity, the absolute necessity, for the vanguard of the proletariat, for its class-conscious section, for the Communist Party, to resort to manoeuvres, arrangements and compromises with the various groups of proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small proprietors.* The whole point lies in knowing how to apply these tactics in order to raise, and not lower, the general level of proletarian political consciousness, revolutionary spirit, and ability to fight and win" (Vol. XXV, p. 213).

And further:

"That the Hendersons, Clyneses, MacDonalds and Snowdens are hopelessly reactionary is true. It is equally true that they want to take power into their own hands (though, incidentally, they prefer a coalition with the bourgeoisie), that they want to 'rule' on the old bourgeois lines, and that when they do get into power they will unfailingly behave like the Scheidemanns and Noskes. All that is true. But it by no means follows that to support them is treachery to the revolution, but rather that in the interests of the revolution the working-class revolutionaries should give these gentlemen a certain amount of parliamentary support"* (ibid., pp. 218-19).

The misfortune of the opposition is that it does not understand and does not accept these instructions of Lenin's, and instead of Lenin's policy prefers "ultra-Left" noisy talk about the trade unions being reactionary.

Does the Anglo-Soviet Committee restrict our agitation and propaganda, can it restrict it? No, it cannot. We have always criticised and will criticise the reactionary character of the leaders of the British labour movement, revealing to the masses of the British working class the perfidy and treachery of these leaders. Let the opposition try to refute the fact that we have always openly and ruthlessly criticised the reactionary activities of the General Council.

We are told that this criticism may cause the British to break up the Anglo-Soviet Committee. Well, let them do so. The point is not whether there will be a rupture or not, but on what question it will take place, what idea will be demonstrated by that rupture. At the present moment we are faced with the threat of war in general and of intervention in particular. If the British break away, the working class will know that the reactionary leaders of the British labour movement broke away because they did not want to counteract the organisation of war by their imperialist government. There can scarcely be any doubt that a rupture brought about by the British under such circumstances will help the Communists to discredit the General Council, for the question of war is the fundamental question of the present day.

It is possible that they will not venture to break away. But what will that mean? It will mean that we have established our freedom to criticise, our freedom to continue criticising the reactionary leaders of the British labour movement, to expose their treachery and social imperialism to the broad masses. Will that be good for the labour movement? I think it will not be bad.

Such, comrades, is our attitude towards the question of the Anglo-Soviet Committee.

IV

The Threat of War and the Defence of the U.S.S.R.

The question of war. First of all, I must refute the absolutely incorrect and false assertion made by Zino-viev and Trotsky that I belonged to the so-called "Military Opposition" at the Eighth Congress of our Party. It is absolutely untrue, comrades. It is a fable, invented by Zinoviev and Trotsky for want of something better to do. I have before me the verbatim report, from which it is clear that, together with Lenin, I spoke against the so-called "Military Opposition." Lastly, there are people here who attended the Eighth Party Congress and can confirm the fact that I spoke against the "Military Opposition" at the Eighth Congress. I did not oppose the "Military Opposition" as strongly as Trotsky would perhaps have liked, because I considered that among the Military Opposition there were splendid workers who could not be dispensed with at the front; but that I certainly did speak against and combat the

Military Opposition is a fact, which only incorrigible individuals like Zinoviev and Trotsky can dispute.

What was the dispute about at the Eighth Congress? About the necessity of putting an end to the voluntary principle and the guerilla mentality; about the necessity of creating a genuine, regular, workers' and peasants' army bound by iron discipline; about the necessity of enlisting the services of military experts for that purpose.

There was a draft resolution submitted by the advocates of a regular army and iron discipline. It was supported by Lenin, Sokolnikov, Stalin and others. There was another draft, that of V. Smirnov, submitted by those who were in favour of preserving elements of the guerilla mentality in the army. It was supported by V. Smirnov, Safarov, Voroshilov, Pyatakov and others. Here are excerpts from my speech:

"All the questions touched upon here boil down to one: Is Russia to have, or not to have, a strictly disciplined regular army?

"Six months ago, after the collapse of the old, tsarist army, we had a new, a volunteer army, an army which was badly organised, which had a collective control, and which did not always obey orders. This was at a time when an Entente offensive was looming. The army was made up principally, if not exclusively, of workers. Because of the lack of discipline in this volunteer army, because it did not always obey orders, because of the disorganisation in the control of the army, we sustained defeats and surrendered Kazan to the enemy, while Krasnov was successfully advancing from the South. . . . The facts show that a volunteer army cannot stand the test of criticism, that we shall not be able to defend our Republic unless we create another army, a regular army one infused with the spirit of discipline, possessing a competent politicai department and able and ready to rise at the first command and march against the enemy.

"I must say that those non-working-class elements—the peasants—who constitute the majority in our army will not voluntarily fight for socialism. A whole number of facts bear this out. The series of mutinies in the rear and at the fronts, the series of excesses at the fronts show that the non-proletarian elements comprising the majority of our army are not disposed to fight for communism voluntarily. Hence our task is to re-educate these elements, infusing them with a spirit of iron discipline, to get them to follow the lead of the proletariat at the front as well as in the rear, to compel them to fight for our common socialist cause, and, in the course of the war, to complete the building of a real regular army, which is alone capable of defending the country.

"That is how the question stands.

". . . Either we create a real workers' and peasants' army, a strictly disciplined regular army, and defend the Republic, or we do not, and in that event our cause will be lost.

". . . Smirnov's project is unacceptable, because it can only under mine discipline in the army and make it impossible to build a regular army." 21

Such are the facts, comrades.

As you see, Trotsky and Zinoviev have resorted to slander again.

Further. Kamenev asserted here that during the past period, during these two years, we have squandered the moral capital that we formerly possessed in the international sphere. Is that true? Of course not! It is absolutely untrue!

Kamenev did not say which strata of the population he had in mind, among which strata of the population of the East and the West we have lost or gained influence. For us Marxists, however, it is precisely that question that is decisive. Take China, for example. Can it be asserted that we have lost the moral capital that we possessed among the Chinese workers and peasants? Clearly, it cannot. Until lately, the vast masses of workers and peasants of China knew little about us. Until lately, the prestige of the U.S.S.R. was limited to a narrow upper circle of Chinese society, to a narrow circle of liberal intellectuals in the Kuomintang, leaders like Feng Yu-hsiang, the Canton generals, and so forth. The situation has now radically changed. At the present time the U.S.S.R. enjoys a prestige among the vast masses of the workers and peasants of China that may well be envied by any force, by any political party in the world. On the other hand, the prestige of the U.S.S.R. has fallen considerably among the liberal intellectuals in China, among the various generals, and so forth; and many of the latter are beginning to wage a struggle against the U.S.S.R. But what is there surprising, or bad, about that? Can it be required of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government, our Party, that our country should enjoy moral prestige among all strata of Chinese society? Who but mere liberals can require this of our Party, of the Soviet Government? What is better for us: prestige among the liberal intellectuals and all sorts of reactionary generals in China, or prestige among the vast masses of workers and peasants in China? What is decisive from the standpoint of our international position, from the standpoint of the development of the revolution throughout the world: the growth of the U.S.S.R.'s prestige among the vast masses of the working people with an undoubted decline of the U.S.S.R."s prestige among reactionary liberal circles of Chinese society, or prestige among those reactionary liberal circles with a decline of moral influence among the broad masses of the population? It is enough to put this question to realise that Kamenev is wide of the mark. . . .

But what about the West? Can it be said that we have squandered the moral capital we possessed among the proletarian strata in the West? Obviously not. What is shown, for example, by the recent actions of the proletariat in Vienna, the general strike and the coal strike in Britain, and the demonstrations of many thousands of workers in Germany and France in defence of the U.S.S.R.? Do they show that the moral influence of the proletarian dictatorship is declining among the vast working-class masses? Of course not! On the contrary, they show that the moral influence of the U.S.S.R. is rising and growing stronger among the workers in the West; that the workers in the West are beginning to fight their bourgeoisie "in the Russian way."

There can be no doubt that hostility against the U.S.S.R. is growing among certain strata of the pacifist and reactionary liberal bourgeoisie, especially owing to the shooting of the twenty "illustrious" terrorists and incendiaries. 22 But does Kamenev really prize the good opinion of the reactionary liberal pacifist circles of the bourgeoisie more than the good opinion of the vast proletarian masses in the West? Who would dare deny the fact that the shooting of the twenty "illustrious ones" met with a profoundly sympathetic response among the vast masses of the workers in the West as well as among us in the U.S.S.R.? "Serves them right, the scoundrels!"— such was the cry with which the shooting of the twenty "illustrious ones" was met in the working-class districts.

I know that there are people of a certain sort among us who assert that the more quietly we behave the better it will be for us. These people tell us: "Things were well with the U.S.S.R. when Britain broke off relations with it, and they became still better when Voikov was assassinated; but things became bad when, in answer to the assassination of Voikov, we bared our teeth and shot the twenty 'illustrious' counter-revolutionaries. Before we shot the twenty they were sorry for us in Europe and they sympathised with us; after the shooting, that sympathy vanished and they began to accuse us of not being such good boys as the public opinion of Europe would like us to be."

What can be said about this reactionary liberal philosophy? The only thing that can be said about it is that its authors would like to see the U.S.S.R. toothless, unarmed, grovelling at the feet of its enemies and surrendering to them. There was a "bleeding" Belgium, pictures of which at one time used to decorate cigarette packets. Why should there not be a "bleeding" U.S.S.R.? Everybody would then sympathise with it and be sorry for it. But no, comrades ! We do not agree with this. Rather let all those liberal pacifist philosophers with their "sympathy" for the U.S.S.R. go to the devil. If only we have the sympathy of the vast masses of the working people, the rest will follow. And if it is necessary that somebody should "bleed," we shall make every effort to ensure that the one to be bloodily battered and "bleeding" shall be some bourgeois country and not the U.S.S.R.

The question whether war is inevitable. Zinoviev vehemently asserted here that Bukharin's theses say that war is "probable" and "inevitable," but not that it is absolutely inevitable. He insisted that such a formulation is liable to confuse the Party. I picked up Zinoviev's article "The Contours of the Future War" and glanced through it. And what did I find? I found that in Zinoviev's article there is not a single word, literally not a single word, about war having become inevitable. In that article Zinoviev says that a new war is possible. A whole chapter in it is devoted to proving that a war is possible. That chapter ends with the sentence: "That is why it is legitimate and necessary for Bolshevik-Leninists to think now about the possibility of a new war." (General laughter.) Please note, comrades—"to think" about the possibility of a new war. In one passage in the article Zinoviev says that war "is becoming" inevitable, but he does not say a single word, literally not a single word, about war already having become inevitable. And this man has—what is the mildest way of putting it?—the audacity to make an accusation against Bukharin's theses which say that war has become probable and inevitable.

What does it mean to say now that war is "possible"? It means dragging us back at least some seven years, for it was as early as some seven years ago that Lenin said that war between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world was possible. Was it worth while for Zinoviev to repeat what was said long ago and to make out his reversion to the past to be a new utterance?

What does it mean to say now that war is becoming inevitable? It means dragging us back at least some four years, for it was as early as the period of the Cur-zon ultimatum 23 that we said that war was becoming inevitable.

How could it happen that Zinoviev, who only yesterday wrote such a confused and quite absurd article about war, containing not a single word about war having become inevitable, how could it happen that this man dared to attack Bukharin's clear and definite theses about the inevitability of war? It happened because Zinoviev forgot what he wrote yesterday. The fact of the matter is that Zinoviev is one of those fortunate people who write only to forget the very next day what they have written. (Laughter.)

Zinoviev asserted here that Bukharin was "prompted" by Comrade Chicherin to draft his theses on the lines that war is probable and inevitable. I ask: Who "prompted" Zinoviev to write an article about war being possible now when war has already become inevitable? (Laughter.)

The question of the stabilisation of capitalism. Zinoviev here attacked Bukharin's theses, asserting that on the question of stabilisation they depart from the position of the Comintern. That, of course, is nonsense. By that Zinoviev only betrayed his ignorance of the question of stabilisation, of the question of world capitalism. Zinoviev thinks that once there is stabilisation, the cause of the revolution is lost. He does not understand that the crisis of capitalism and the preparation for its doom grow as a result of stabilisation. Is it not a fact that capitalism has lately perfected and rationalised its technique and has produced a vast mass of goods which cannot find a market? Is it not a fact that the capitalist governments are more and more assuming a fascist character, attacking the working class and temporarily strengthening their own positions? Do these facts imply that stabilisation has become durable? Of course not! On the contrary, it is just these facts that tend to aggravate the present crisis of world capitalism, which is incomparably deeper than the crisis before the last imperialist war.

The very fact that the capitalist governments are assuming a fascist character tends to aggravate the internal situation in the capitalist countries and gives rise to revolutionary action by the workers (Vienna, Britain).

The very fact that capitalism is rationalising its technique and is producing a vast mass of goods which the market cannot absorb, this very fact tends to intensify the struggle within the imperialist camp for markets and for fields of capital export and leads to the creation of the conditions for a new war, for a new redivision of the world.

Is it difficult to understand that the excessive growth of capitalism's productive potentialities, coupled with the limited capacity of the world market and the stability of "spheres of influence," intensifies the struggle for markets and deepens the crisis of capitalism?

Capitalism could solve this crisis if it could increase the wages of the workers severalfold, if it could considerably improve the material conditions of the peasantry, if it could thereby considerably increase the purchasing power of the vast masses of the working people and enlarge the capacity of the home market. But if it did that, capitalism would not be capitalism. Precisely because capitalism cannot do that, precisely because capitalism uses its "incomes" not to raise the well-being of the majority of the working people, but to intensify their exploitation and to export capital to less-developed countries in order to obtain still larger "incomes"—precisely for that reason, the struggle for markets and for fields of capital export gives rise to a desperate struggle for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence, a struggle which has already made a new imperialist war inevitable.

Why do certain imperialist circles look askance at the U.S.S.R. and organise a united front against it? Because the U.S.S.R. is a very valuable market and field of capital export. Why are these same imperialist circles intervening in China? Because China is a very valuable market and field of capital export. And so on and so forth.

That is the basis and source of the inevitability of a new war, irrespective of whether it breaks out between separate imperialist coalitions, or against the U.S.S.R.

The misfortune of the opposition is that it does not understand these simple, elementary things.

The question of the defence of our country. And now permit me to deal with the last question, how our opposition intends to defend the U.S.S.R.

Comrades, the revolutionary spirit of a given group, of a given trend, of a given party, is not tested by the statements or declarations it issues. The revolutionary spirit of a given group, of a given trend, of a given party, is tested by its deeds, by its practice, by its practical plans. Statements and declarations, no matter how striking they may be, cannot be believed if they are not backed by deeds, if they are not put into effect.

There is one question which serves as a dividing line between all possible groups, trends and parties and as a test of whether they are revolutionary or anti-revolutionary. Today, that is the question of the defence of the U.S.S.R., of unqualified and unreserved defence of the U.S.S.R. against attack by imperialism.

A revolutionary is one who is ready to protect, to defend the U.S.S.R. without reservation, without qualification, openly and honestly, without secret military conferences; for the U.S.S.R. is the first proletarian, revolutionary state in the world, a state which is building socialism. An internationalist is one who is ready to defend the U.S.S.R. without reservation, without wavering, unconditionally; for the U.S.S.R. is the base of the world revolutionary movement, and this revolutionary movement cannot be defended and promoted unless the U.S.S.R. is defended. For whoever thinks of defending the world revolutionary movement apart from, or against, the U.S.S.R., goes against the revolution and must inevitably slide into the camp of the enemies of the revolution.

Two camps have now been formed in face of the threat of war, and as a result two positions have arisen: that of unqualified defence of the U.S.S.R. and that of fighting the U.S.S.R. One has to choose between them, for there is not, nor can there be, a third position. Neutrality in this matter, waverings, reservations, the search for a third position, are attempts to avoid responsibility, to wriggle out of the unqualified struggle to defend the U.S.S.R., to be missing at the most critical moment for the defence of the U.S.S.R. What does avoiding responsibility mean? It means imperceptibly slipping into the camp of the enemies of the U.S.S.R.

That is how the question stands now.

How do matters stand with the opposition from the standpoint of the defence, the protection, of the U.S.S.R.?

Since things have gone so far, let me refer to Trotsky's letter to the Central Control Commission in order to demonstrate to you the "theory" of defence, the defence slogan, that Trotsky is holding in reserve in the event of war against the U.S.S.R. Comrade Molotov has already quoted a passage from this letter in his speech, but he did not quote the whole passage. Permit me to quote it in full.

This is how Trotsky understands defeatism and de-fencism:

"What is defeatism? A policy which pursues the aim of facilitating the defeat of one's 'own' state which is in the hands of a hostile class. Any other conception and interpretation of

defeatism will be a falsification. Thus, for example, if someone says that the political line of ignorant and dishonest cribbers must be swept away like garbage precisely in the interests of the victory of the workers' state, that does not make him a 'defeatist.' On the contrary, under the given concrete conditions, he is thereby giving genuine expression to revolutionary defencism: ideological garbage does not lead to victory!

"Examples, and very instructive ones, could be found in the history of other classes. We shall quote only one. At the beginning of the imperialist war the French bourgeoisie had at its head a government without a sail or rudder. The Clemenceau group was in opposition to that government. Notwithstanding the war and the military censorship, notwithstanding even the fact that the Germans were eighty kilometres from Paris (Clemenceau said: 'precisely because of it'), he conducted a fierce struggle against petty-bourgeois flabbiness and irresolution and for imperialist ferocity and ruthlessness. Clemenceau was not a traitor to his class, the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, he served it more loyally, more resolutely and more shrewdly than Viviani, Painleve and Co. The subsequent course of events proved that. The Clemenceau group came into power, and its more consistent, more predatory imperialist policy ensured victory for the French bourgeoisie. Were there any French newspapermen that called the Clemenceau group defeatist? There must have been: fools and slanderers follow in the train of every class. They do not, however, always have the opportunity to play an equally important role" (excerpt from Trotsky's letter to Comrade Orjonikidze, dated July 11, 1927).

There you have the "theory," save the mark, of the defence of the U.S.S.R. proposed by Trotsky.

"Petty-bourgeois flabbiness and irresolution"—that, it turns out, is the majority in our Party, the majority in our Central Committee, the majority in our government. Clemenceau—that is Trotsky and his group. (Laughter.) It turns out that if the enemy comes within, say, eighty kilometres of the walls of the Kremlin, this new edition of Clemenceau, this comic opera Clemenceau will first of all try to overthrow the present majority, precisely because the enemy will be eighty kilometres from the Kremlin, and only after that will he start defending. And it turns out that if our comic-opera Clemenceau succeeds in doing that, it will be genuine and unqualified defence of the U.S.S.R.

And in order to do this, he, Trotsky, i.e., Clemenceau, is first of all trying to "sweep away" the "garbage" "in the interests of the victory of the workers' state." And what is this "garbage"? It turns out that it is the majority in our Party, the majority in the Central Committee, the majority in the government.

It turns out, then, that when the enemy comes within eighty kilometres of the Kremlin, this comic-opera Clemenceau will be concerned not to defend the U.S.S.R., but to overthrow the present majority in the Party. And that is what he calls defence!

Of course, it is rather funny to hear this small quixotic group, which in the course of four months barely managed to scrape together about a thousand votes, to hear this small group threatening a party a million strong with the words: "We shall sweep you away." You can judge from this how deplorable the position of Trotsky's group must be if, after toiling for four months in the sweat of its brow, it barely managed to scrape together about a thousand signatures. I think that any opposition group could collect several thousand signatures if it knew how to set to work. I repeat, it is funny to hear a small group in which the leaders outnumber the army (laughter), and which after working hard for four whole months barely

managed to scrape together about a thousand signatures, threatening a party a million strong with the words: "We shall sweep you away." (Laughter.)

But how can a small factional group "sweep away" a party a million strong? Do the comrades of the opposition think that the present majority in the Party, the majority in the Central Committee, is an accidental one, that it has no roots in the Party, that it has no roots in the working class, that it will voluntarily allow itself to be "swept away" by a comic-opera Clemenceau? No, that majority is not an accidental one. It has been built up year by year in the course of our Party's development; it was tested in the fire of struggle during October, after October, during the Civil War, and during the building of socialism.

To "sweep away" such a majority it will be necessary to start civil war in the Party. And so, Trotsky is thinking of starting civil war in the Party at a time when the enemy will be eighty kilometres from the Kremlin. It seems that one could hardly go to greater lengths. . . .

But what about the present leaders of the opposition? Have they not been tested? Is it an accident that they, who at one time occupied most important posts in our Party, later became renegades? Does it still need proof that this cannot be regarded as an accident? Well, Trotsky wants, with the aid of the small group which signed the opposition's platform, to turn back the wheel of our Party's history at a time when the enemy will be eighty kilometres from the Kremlin; and it is said that some of the comrades who signed the opposition's platform did so because they thought that if they signed they would not be called up for military service. (Laughter.)

No, my dear Trotsky, it would be better for you not to talk about "sweeping away garbage." It would be better not to talk about it because those words are infectious. If the majority becomes "infected" from you by the method of sweeping away garbage, I do not know whether that will be good for the opposition. After all, it is not impossible that the majority in the Central Committee may become "infected" by this method and "sweep away" somebody or other.

Talk about sweeping away is not always desirable or safe, for it may "infect" the majority in our Central Committee and compel it to "sweep away" somebody or other. And if Trotsky is thinking of using the broom against the Party and its majority, will it be surprising if the Party turns that broom the other way and uses it against the opposition?

Now we know how the opposition intends to defend the U.S.S.R. Trotsky's essentially defeatist theory about Clemenceau, which is supported by the entire opposition, is sufficiently striking evidence of this.

It follows, therefore, that to ensure the defence of the U.S.S.R., it is necessary, first of all, to carry out the Clemenceau experiment.

That, so to speak, is the opposition's first step towards "unqualified" defence of the U.S.S.R.

The second step towards defence of the U.S.S.R., it turns out, is to declare that our Party is a Centrist party. The fact that our Party is fighting both the Left deviation from communism (Trotsky-Zinoviev) and the Right deviation from communism (Smirnov-Sapronov) is apparently regarded by our ignorant opposition as Centrism.

It turns out that these cranks have forgotten that in fighting both deviations we are only fulfilling the behests of Lenin, who absolutely insisted on a determined fight both against "Left doctrinairism" and against "Right opportunism."

The leaders of the opposition have broken with Leninism and have consigned Lenin's behests to oblivion. The leaders of the opposition refuse to admit that their bloc, the opposition bloc, is a bloc of Right and Left deviators from communism. They refuse to admit that their present bloc is the re-creation on a new basis of Trotsky's notorious August bloc of dismal memory. They refuse to understand that it is this bloc that harbours the danger of degeneration. They refuse to admit that the union in one camp of "ultra-Lefts," like those scoundrels and counter-revolutionaries Maslow and Ruth Fischer, and Georgian nationalist deviators is a copy of the Liq-uidationist August bloc of the worst kind.

And so, it turns out that to arrange for defence it is necessary to declare that our Party is a Centrist party and to strive to deprive it of its attractiveness in the eyes of the workers.

That, so to speak, is the opposition's second step towards "unqualified" defence of the U.S.S.R.

The third step towards defence of the U.S.S.R., it appears, is to declare that our Party is non-existent and to depict it as "Stalin's faction." What do the oppositionists mean to say by that? They mean to say that there is no Party, there is only "Stalin's faction." They mean to say that the Party's decisions are not binding upon them and that they have the right to violate those decisions at all times and under all circumstances. In that way they want to facilitate their fight against our Party. True, they adopted this weapon from the arsenal of the Menshevik Sotsialisticheskу Vestnik 24 and of the bourgeois Rul. 25 True, it is unworthy of Communists to adopt the weapons of Mensheviks and bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, but what do they care about that? The opposition regards every means as justified as long as there is a fight against the Party.

And so, it turns out that to prepare the defence of the U.S.S.R., it is necessary to declare that the Party is nonexistent, the very Party without which no defence is conceivable.

That, so to speak, is the opposition's third step towards "unqualified" defence of the U.S.S.R.

The fourth step towards defence of the U.S.S.R., it appears, is to split the Comintern, to organise a new party in Germany headed by those scoundrels and counterrevolutionaries Ruth Fischer and Maslow, and thereby make it more difficult for the West-European proletariat to support the U.S.S.R.

And so, it turns out that to prepare the defence of the U.S.S.R., it is necessary to split the Comintern.

That, so to speak, is the opposition's fourth step towards "unqualified" defence of the U.S.S.R.

The fifth step towards defence of the U.S.S.R., it appears, is to ascribe Thermidor tendencies to our Party, to split it and begin to build a new party. For if we have no party, if there is only "Stalin's faction," whose decisions are not binding upon the members of the Party, if that faction is a Thermidor faction—al-though it is stupid and ignorant to speak of Thermidor tendencies in our Party—what else can be done?

And so, it turns out that to arrange for the defence of the U.S.S.R., it is necessary to split our Party and to set about organising a new party.

That, so to speak, is the opposition's fifth step towards "unqualified" defence of the U.S.S.R.

There you have the five most important measures that the opposition proposes for defence of the U.S.S.R.

Does it still need proof that all these measures proposed by the opposition have nothing in common with the defence of our country, with the defence of the centre of the world revolution?

And these people want us to publish their defeatist, semi-Menshevik articles in our Party press! What do they take us for? Have we already "freedom" of the press for all, "from anarchists to monarchists"? No, and we shall not have it. Why do we not publish Menshevik articles? Because we have no "freedom" of the press for anti-Leninist, anti-Soviet trends "from anarchists to monarchists."

What is the aim of the oppositionists in insisting on the publication of their semi-Menshevik, defeatist articles? Their aim is to create a loop-hole for bourgeois "freedom" of the press; and they fail to see that thereby they are reviving the anti-Soviet elements, strengthening their pressure upon the proletarian dictatorship, and opening the road for bourgeois "democracy." They knock at one door, but open another.

Here is what Mr. Dan writes about the opposition:

"Russian Social-Democrats would ardently welcome such a legalisation of the opposition, although they have nothing in common with its positive programme. They would welcome the legality of the political struggle, the open self-liquidation of the dictatorship and the transition to new political forms that would provide scope for a wide labour movement" (Sotsialisticheskiy Vestnik, No. 13, July 1927).

"The open self-liquidation of the dictatorship"— that is what the enemies of the U.S.S.R. expect of you, and that is where your policy is leading, comrades of the opposition.

Comrades, we are faced by two dangers: the danger of war, which has become the threat of war; and the danger of the degeneration of some of the links of our Party. In setting out to prepare for defence we must create iron discipline in our Party. Without such discipline defence is impossible. We must strengthen Party discipline, we must curb all those who are disorganising our Party. We must curb all those who are splitting our brother parties in the West and in the East. (Applause.) We must curb all those who are splitting our brother parties in the West and are supported in this by those scoundrels Sou-varine, Ruth Fischer, Maslow and that muddle-head Treint.

Only thus, only in this way shall we be able to meet war fully armed, while at the same time striving, at the cost of some material sacrifice, to postpone war, to gain time, to ransom ourselves from capitalism.

This we must do, and we shall do it.

The second danger is the danger of degeneration.

Where does it come from? From there! (Pointing to the opposition.) That danger must be eliminated. (Prolonged applause.)

Speech Delivered on August 5

Comrades, Zinoviev was grossly disloyal to this plenum in reverting in his speech to the already settled question of the international situation.

We are now discussing point 4 on the agenda: "The violation of Party discipline by Trotsky and Zinoviev." Zinoviev, however, evading the point under discussion, reverted to the question of the international situation and tried to resume the discussion of an already settled question. Moreover, in his speech he concentrated his attack on Stalin, forgetting that we are not discussing Stalin, but the violation of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky.

I am therefore compelled in my speech to revert to several aspects of the already settled question in order to show that Zinoviev's speech was groundless.

I apologise, comrades, but I shall also have to say a few words about Zinoviev's thrusts at Stalin. (Voices: "Please, do!")

First. For some reason, Zinoviev in his speech recalled Stalin's vacillation in March 1917, and in doing so he piled up a heap of fairy-tales. I have never denied that I vacillated to some extent in March 1917, but that lasted only a week or two; on Lenin's arrival in April 1917 that vacillation ceased and at the April Conference 1917, I stood side by side with Comrade Lenin against Kamenev and his opposition group. I have mentioned this a number of times in our Party press (see On the Road to October, Trotskyism or Leninism?, etc.).

I have never regarded myself as being infallible, nor do I do so now. I have never concealed either my mistakes or my momentary vacillations. But one must not ignore also that I have never persisted in my mistakes, and that I have never drawn up a platform, or formed a separate group, and so forth, on the basis of my momentary vacillations.

But what has that to do with the question under discussion, the violation of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky? Why does Zinoviev, evading the question under discussion, revert to reminiscences of March 1917? Has he really forgotten his own mistakes, his struggle against Lenin, his separate platform in opposition to Lenin's Party in August, September, October and November 1917? Perhaps Zinoviev by his reminiscences of the past hopes to push into the background the question, now under discussion, of the violation of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky? No, that trick of Zinoviev's will not succeed.

Second. Zinoviev, further, quoted a passage from a letter I wrote to him in the summer of 1923, some months before the German revolution of 1923. I do not remember the history of that letter, I have no copy of it, and I am therefore unable to say with certainty whether Zinoviev quoted it correctly. I wrote it, I think, at the end of July or beginning of August 1923. I must say, however, that that letter is absolutely correct from beginning to end. By referring to that letter Zinoviev evidently wants to imply that I was in general sceptical about the German revolution of 1923. That, of course, is nonsense.

The letter touched first of all on the question whether the Communists should take power immediately. In July or the beginning of August 1923 there was not yet in Germany that profound revolutionary crisis which brings the vast masses to their feet, exposes the compromising policy of Social-Democracy, utterly disorganises the bourgeoisie and raises the question of the immediate seizure of power by the Communists. Naturally, under the circumstances prevailing in July-August, there could be no question of the immediate seizure of power by the Communists in Germany, who moreover were a minority in the ranks of the working class.

Was that position correct? I think it was. And that was the position held at that time by the Political Bureau.

The second question touched on in that letter relates to a demonstration of communist workers at a time when armed fascists were trying to provoke the Communists to premature action. The stand I took at that time was that the Communists should not allow themselves to be provoked. I was not the only one to take that stand; it was the stand of the whole Political Bureau.

Two months later, however, a radical change took place in the situation in Germany; the revolutionary crisis became more acute; Poincare began a military offensive against Germany; the financial crisis in Germany became catastrophic; the German government began to collapse and a ministerial reshuffle began; the evolutionary tide rose, threatening to overwhelm the Social-Democrats; the workers began en masse to desert Social-Democracy and to go over to the Communists; the question of the seizure of power by the Communists came on the order of the day. Under these circumstances I, like the other members of the Comintern Commission, was resolutely and definitely in favour of the immediate seizure of power by the Communists.

As is known, the German Commission of the Comintern that was set up at that time, consisting of Zinoviev, Bukharin, Stalin, Trotsky, Radek and a number of German comrades, adopted a series of concrete decisions concerning direct assistance to the German comrades in the matter of seizing power.

Were the members of that commission unanimous on all points at that time? No, they were not. There was disagreement at that time on the question whether Soviets should be set up in Germany. Bukharin and I argued that the factory committees could not serve as substitutes for Soviets and proposed that proletarian Soviets be immediately organised in Germany. Trotsky and Radek, as also some of the German comrades, opposed the organisation of Soviets and argued that the factory committees would be enough for seizure of power. Zinoviev wavered between these two groups.

Please note, comrades, that it was not a question of China, where there are only a few million proletarians, but of Germany, a highly industrialised country, where there were then about fifteen million proletarians.

What was the upshot of these disagreements? It was that Zinoviev deserted to the side of Trotsky and Radek and the question of Soviets was settled in the negative.

True, later on, Zinoviev repented of his sins, but that does not do away with the fact that at that time Zinoviev was on the Right, opportunist flank on one of the fundamental questions of

the German revolution, whereas Bukharin and Stalin were on the revolutionary, communist flank.

Here is what Zinoviev said about this later:

"On the question of Soviets (in Germany — J. St.) we made a mistake in yielding to Trotsky and Radek. Every time a concession is made on these questions, one becomes convinced that one is making a mistake. It was impossible to set up workers' Soviets at the time, but that was a touchstone for revealing whether the line was Social-Democratic or Communist. We should not have yielded on this question. To yield was a mistake on our part. That is how the matter stands, comrades" (Verbatim Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. with Represent tives of the Communist Party of Germany, January 19, 1924, p. 70).

In this passage Zinoviev says "we made a mistake." Who are "we"? There was not, and could not have been, any "we." It was Zinoviev who made a mistake in deserting to the side of Trotsky and Radek and in adopting their erroneous position.

Such are the facts.

Zinoviev would have done better not to recall the German revolution of 1923 and disgrace himself in the eyes of the plenum; the more so because, as you see, the question of the German revolution which he raised has nothing to do with point 4 of the plenum agenda which we are now discussing.

The question of China. According to Zinoviev it appears that Stalin, in his report at the Fourteenth Party Congress, identified China with America. That, of course, is nonsense. There was no question of any identification of China with America in my report, nor could there have been. Actually, in my report I merely dealt with the right of the Chinese people to national unity and to national liberation from the foreign yoke. Concentrating my criticism on the imperialist press, I said: If you, Messieurs the imperialists, justify, at any rate in words, the national war in Italy, the national war in America, and the national war in Germany for unity and liberation from a foreign yoke, in what way is China inferior to these countries, and why should not the Chinese people have the right to national unity and liberation?

That is what I said in my report, without in any way touching upon the question of the prospects and tasks of the Chinese revolution from the standpoint of communism.

Was that presentation of the question legitimate in controversy with the bourgeois press? Obviously, it was. Zinoviev does not understand a simple thing like that, but for that his own obtuseness is to blame and nothing else.

Zinoviev, it appears, considers that the policy of transforming the Wuhan Kuomintang, when it was revolutionary, into the core of a future revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry was wrong. The question arises: What was wrong about it? Is it not a fact that the Wuhan Kuomintang was revolutionary at the beginning of this year? Why did Zinoviev shout for "all-round assistance" for the Wuhan Kuomintang if the Wuhan Kuomintang was not revolutionary? Why did the opposition swear that it was in favour of the Communist Party remaining in the Wuhan Kuomintang if the latter was not revolutionary at that time? What would Communists be worth who, belonging to the Wuhan Kuomintang and enjoying influence in it, did not attempt to get the Kuomintang fellow-travellers to follow

them and did not attempt to transform the Wuhan Kuomintang into the core of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship? I would say that such Communists would not be worth a farthing.

True, that attempt failed, because at that stage the imperialists and the feudal landlords in China proved to be stronger than the revolution and, as a consequence, the Chinese revolution suffered temporary defeat. But does it follow from that that the Communist Party's policy was wrong?

In 1905 the Russian Communists also attempted to transform the Soviets which existed at that time into the core of a future revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry; but that attempt also failed at that time owing to the unfavourable correlation of class forces, owing to the fact that tsar-ism and the feudal landlords proved to be stronger than the revolution. Does it follow from this that the Bolsheviks' policy was wrong? Obviously, it does not.

Zinoviev asserts, further, that Lenin was in favour of the immediate organisation of Soviets of workers' deputies in China, and he referred to Lenin's theses on the colonial question that were adopted at the Second Congress of the Comintern. But here Zinoviev is simply misleading the Party.

It has been stated in the press several times, and it must be repeated here, that in Lenin's theses there is not a single word about Soviets of workers' deputies in China.

It has been stated in the press several times, and it must be repeated here, that in his theses Lenin had in mind not Soviets of workers' deputies, but "peasant Soviets," "people's Soviets," "toilers' Soviets," and he made the special reservation that this applied to countries "where there is no industrial proletariat, or practically none."

Can China be included in the category of countries where "there is no industrial proletariat, or practically none"? Obviously not. Is it possible in China to form peasant Soviets, toilers' Soviets, or people's Soviets, without first forming class Soviets of the working class? Obviously not. Why, then, is the opposition deceiving the Party by referring to Lenin's theses?

The question of the respite. In 1921, on the termination of the Civil War, Lenin said that we now had some respite from war and that we ought to take advantage of that respite to build socialism. Zinoviev is now finding fault with Stalin, asserting that Stalin converted that respite into a period of respite, which, he alleges, contradicts the thesis on the threat of war between the U.S.S.R. and the imperialists.

Needless to say, this fault-finding of Zinoviev's is stupid and ridiculous. Is it not a fact that there has been no military conflict between the imperialists and the U.S.S.R. for the past seven years? Can this period of seven years be called a period of respite? Obviously, it can and should be so called. Lenin more than once spoke of the period of the Brest Peace, but everybody knows that that period did not last more than a year. Why can the one-year period of the Brest Peace be called a period and the seven-year period of respite not be called a period of respite? How is it possible to take up the time of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission with such ridiculous and stupid fault-finding?

About the dictatorship of the Party. It has been stated several times in our Party press that Zinoviev distorts Lenin's conception of the "dictatorship" of the Party by identifying the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the Party. It has been stated several times in our Party press that by "dictatorship" of the Party Lenin understood the Party's leadership of the working class, that is to say, not the Party's use of force against the working class, but leadership by means of persuasion, by means of the political education of the working class, to be precise, leadership by one party, which does not share, and does not desire to share, that leadership with other parties.

Zinoviev does not understand this and distorts Lenin's conception. However, by distorting Lenin's conception of the "dictatorship" of the Party, Zinoviev is, perhaps without realising it, making way for the penetration of "Arakcheyev" methods into the Party, for justifying Kautsky's slanderous allegation that Lenin was effecting "the dictatorship of the Party over the working class." Is that a decent thing to do? Obviously not. But who is to blame if Zinoviev fails to understand such simple things?

About national culture. The nonsense Zinoviev talked here about national culture ought to be perpetuated in some way, so that the Party may know that Zinoviev is opposed to the development of the national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. on a Soviet basis, that he is, in fact, an advocate of colonisation.

We used to regard, and still regard, the slogan of national culture in the epoch of the domination of the bourgeoisie in a multi-national state as a bourgeois slogan. Why? Because, in the period of the domination of the bourgeoisie in such a state, that slogan signifies the spiritual subordination of the masses of the working people of all nationalities to the leadership, the domination, the dictatorship, of the bourgeoisie.

After the proletariat seized power we proclaimed the slogan of the development of the national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the Soviets. What does that mean? It means that we adapt the development of national culture among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. to the interests and requirements of socialism, to the interests and requirements of the proletarian dictatorship, to the interests and requirements of the working people of all the nationalities of the U.S.S.R.

Does that mean that we are now opposed to national culture in general? No, it does not. It merely means that we are now in favour of developing the national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., their national languages, schools, press, and so forth, on the basis of the Soviets. And what does the reservation "on the basis of the Soviets" mean? It means that in its content the culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. which the Soviet Government is developing must be a culture common to all the working people, a socialist culture; in its form, however, it is and will be different for all the peoples of the U.S.S.R.; it is and will be a national culture, different for the various peoples of the U.S.S.R. in conformity with the differences in language and specific national features. I spoke about this in the speech I delivered at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East about three years ago. 26 It is on these lines that our Party has been operating all the time, encouraging the development of national Soviet schools, of a national Soviet press, and other cultural institutions; encouraging the "nationalisation" of the Party apparatus, the "nationalisation" of the Soviet apparatus, and so on and so forth.

It is precisely for this reason that Lenin, in his letters to comrades working in the national regions and republics, called for the development of the national culture of these regions and republics on the basis of the Soviets.

It is precisely because we have pursued this line ever since the proletariat seized power that we have succeeded in erecting an international edifice never before seen in the world, the edifice known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Zinoviev, however, now wants to overturn all this, to obliterate, to bury all this by declaring war on national culture. And this colonialist twaddle on the national question he calls Leninism! Is that not ridiculous, comrades?

The building of socialism in one country. Notwithstanding the series of severe defeats they have sustained on this question, Zinoviev and the opposition in general (Trotsky, Kamenev) clutch at it again and again and waste the time of the plenum. They try to make it appear that the thesis that the victory of socialism is possible in the U.S.S.R. is not Lenin's theory, but Stalin's "theory."

It scarcely needs proof that this assertion by the opposition is an attempt to deceive the Party. Is it not a fact that it was none other than Lenin who, as far back as 1915, stated that the victory of socialism is possible in one country? 27 Is it not a fact that it was none other than Trotsky who, at that very time, opposed Lenin on this question and described Lenin's thesis as "national narrow-mindedness"? What has Stalin's "theory" to do with it?

Is it not a fact that it was none other than Kamenev and Zinoviev who dragged in the wake of Trotsky in 1925 and declared that Lenin's teaching that the victory of socialism is possible in one country was "national narrow-mindedness"? Is it not a fact that our Party, as represented by its Fourteenth Conference, adopted a special resolution declaring that the victorious building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is possible, 28 in spite of Trotsky's semi-Menshevik theory?

Why do Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev evade this resolution of the Fourteenth Conference?

Is it not a fact that our Party, as represented by its Fourteenth Congress, endorsed the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference and spearheaded its decision against Kamenev and Zinoviev29?

Is it not a fact that the Fifteenth Conference of our Party adopted a decision substantiated in detail declaring that the victory of socialism is possible in the U.S.S.R., 30 and that it spearheaded that decision against the opposition bloc and its head, Trotsky?

Is it not a fact that the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. endorsed that resolution of the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and found Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev guilty of a Social-Democratic deviation 31 ?

The question is: What has Stalin's "theory" to do with it?

Did Stalin ever demand of the opposition anything else than that it should admit the correctness of these decisions of the highest bodies of our Party and of the Comintern?

Why do the leaders of the opposition evade all these facts if their consciences are clear? What are they counting on? On deceiving the Party? But is it difficult to understand that nobody will succeed in deceiving our Bolshevik Party?

Such, comrades, are the questions which, properly speaking, have nothing to do with the point under discussion about the breach of Party discipline by Trotsky and Zinoviev, but which nevertheless Zinoviev has dragged in for the purpose of throwing dust in our eyes and of slurring over the question under discussion.

I again ask you to excuse me for taking up your time by examining these questions, but I could not do otherwise, for there was no other way of killing the desire of our oppositionists to deceive the Party.

And now, comrades, permit me to pass from "defence" to attack.

The chief misfortune of the opposition is that it still fails to understand why it has been "reduced to this kind of life."

In point of fact, why did its leaders, who only yesterday were among the leaders of the Party, "suddenly" become renegades? How is this to be explained? The opposition itself is inclined to attribute it to causes of a personal character: Stalin "did not help," Bukharin "let us down," Rykov "did not support," Trotsky "missed the opportunity," Zinoviev "overlooked," and so forth. But this cheap "explanation" is not even the shadow of an explanation. The fact that the present leaders of the opposition are isolated from the Party is a fact of no little significance. And it certainly cannot be called an accident. The fact that the present leaders of the opposition fell away from the Party has deep-seated causes. Evidently, Zinoviev, Trotsky and Kamenev went astray on some question, they must have committed some grave offence—otherwise the Party would not have turned away from them, as from renegades. And so the question is: On what did the leaders of the present opposition go astray, what did they do to deserve being "reduced to this kind of life"?

The first fundamental question on which they went astray was the question of Leninism, the question of the Leninist ideology of our Party. They went astray in trying, and they are still trying, to supplement Leninism with Trotskyism, in fact, to substitute Trotskyism for Leninism. But, comrades, by doing so the leaders of the opposition committed a very grave offence for which the Party could not, and cannot, forgive them. Obviously, the Party could not follow them in their attempt to turn from Leninism to Trotskyism, and owing to this the leaders of the opposition found themselves isolated from the Party.

What is the present bloc of the Trotskyists with the former Leninists in the opposition? Their present bloc is the material expression of the attempt to supplement Leninism with Trotskyism. It was not I who invented the term "Trotskyism." It was first used by Comrade Lenin to denote something that is the opposite of Leninism.

What is the principal sin of Trotskyism? The principal sin of Trotskyism is disbelief in the strength and capacity of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. to lead the peasantry, the main mass of the peasantry, both in the struggle to consolidate the rule of the proletariat and, particularly, in the struggle for victory in building socialism in our country.

The principal sin of Trotskyism is that it does not understand and, in essence, refuses to accept the Leninist idea of the hegemony of the proletariat (in relation to the peasantry) in the matter of winning and consolidating the proletarian dictatorship, in the matter of building socialism in separate countries.

Were the former Leninists—Zinoviev and Kamenev — aware of these organic defects of Trotskyism? Yes, they were. Only yesterday they were shouting from the housetops that Leninism is one thing and Trotskyism is another. Only yesterday they were shouting that Trotskyism is incompatible with Leninism. But it was enough for them to come into conflict with the Party and to find themselves in the minority to forget all this and to turn to Trotskyism in order to wage a joint struggle against the Leninist Party, against its ideology, against Leninism.

You, no doubt, remember our disputes at the Fourteenth Congress. What was our dispute at that time with the so-called "New Opposition"? It was about the role and significance of the middle peasant, about the role and significance of the main mass of the peasantry, about the possibility of the proletariat leading the main mass of the peasantry in the matter of building socialism in spite of the technical backwardness of our country.

In other words, our dispute with the opposition was on the same subject as that on which our Party has long been in dispute with Trotskyism. You know that the result of the disputes at the Fourteenth Congress was deplorable for the "New Opposition." You know that as a result of the disputes the "New Opposition" migrated to the camp of Trotskyism on the fundamental question of the Leninist idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the era of proletarian revolution. It was on this basis that the so-called opposition bloc of the Trotskyists and the former Leninists in the opposition arose.

Did the "New Opposition" know that the Fifth Congress of the Comintern had defined Trotskyism as a petty-bourgeois deviation 32 ? Of course, it did. More than that, it itself helped to carry the corresponding resolution at the Fifth Congress. Was the "New Opposition" aware that Leninism and a petty-bourgeois deviation are incompatible? Of course, it was. More than that, it shouted it from the house-tops for the entire Party to hear.

Now judge for yourselves: Could the Party refrain from turning away from leaders who burn today what they worshipped yesterday, who deny today what they loudly preached to the Party yesterday, who try to supplement Leninism with Trotskyism in spite of the fact that only yesterday they denounced such an attempt as a betrayal of Leninism? Obviously, the Party had to turn away from such leaders.

In its zeal to turn everything upside down, the opposition even went so far as to deny that Trotsky belonged to the Mensheviks in the period before the October Revolution. Don't let that surprise you, comrades. The opposition bluntly says that Trotsky has never been a Menshevik since 1904. Is that a fact? Let us turn to Lenin.

Here is what Lenin said about Trotsky in 1914, three and a half years before the October Revolution.

"The old participants in the Marxist movement in Russia know the figure of Trotsky very well and there is no need to discuss him for their benefit. But the younger generation of workers

does not know him, and it is therefore necessary to discuss him, for he is typical of all the five coteries abroad, which, in fact, also vacillate between the Liquidators and the Party.

"In the period of the old Iskra (1901-03), these waverers, who flitted from the 'Economists' to the 'Iskra-ists' and back again, were dubbed 'Tushino deserters' (the name given in the Turbulent Times in Russia to soldiers who deserted from one camp to another). . . .

"The only ground the 'Tushino deserters' have for claiming that they stand above factions is that they 'borrow' their ideas from one faction one day and from another faction the next day. Trotsky was an ardent 'Iskra-ist' in 1901-03, and Ryazanov described his role at the Congress of 1903 as that of 'Lenin's cudgel.' At the end of 1903, Trotsky was an ardent Menshevik,* i.e., he had gone over from the Iskra-ists to the 'Economists.' He proclaimed that 'there is a gulf between the old and the new Iskra.' In 1904-05, he deserted the Mensheviks and began to oscillate, co-operating with Martynov (an 'Economist') at one moment and proclaiming his absurdly Left 'permanent revolution' theory the next. In 1906-07, he approached the Bolsheviks, and in the spring of 1907 he declared that he was in agreement with Rosa Luxemburg.

"In the period of disintegration, after long 'non-factional' vacillation, he again went to the Right, and in August 1912 he entered into a bloc with the Liquidators. Now he has deserted them again, although, in substance, he repeats their paltry ideas.*

"Such types are characteristic as the wreckage of past historical formations, of the time when the mass working-class movement in Russia was still dormant, and when every coterie had 'space' in which to pose as a trend, group or faction, in short, as a 'power,' negotiating amalgamation with others.

"The younger generation of workers need to know thoroughly whom they are dealing with when people come before them making incredibly pretentious claims, but absolutely refusing to reckon with either the Party decisions that since 1908 have defined and established our attitude towards Liquidationism, or the experience of the present-day working-class movement in Russia, which has actually brought about the unity of the majority on the basis of full recognition of the above-mentioned decisions" (see Vol. XVII, pp. 393-94).

It turns out therefore that throughout the period after 1903 Trotsky was outside the Bolshevik camp, now flitting to the Menshevik camp, now deserting it, but never joining the Bolsheviks; and in 1912 he organised a bloc with the Menshevik-Liquidators against Lenin and his Party, while remaining in the same camp as the Mensheviks.

Is it surprising that such a "figure" is distrusted by our Bolshevik Party?

Is it surprising that the opposition bloc headed by this "figure" finds itself isolated from and rejected by the Party?

The second fundamental question on which the leaders of the opposition went astray was that of whether the victory of socialism in one country is possible in the period of imperialism. The opposition's mistake is that it tried imperceptibly to liquidate Lenin's teaching on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

It is now no secret to anyone that as far back as 1915, two years before the October Revolution, Lenin proclaimed the thesis, on the basis of the law of uneven economic and political development in the conditions of imperialism, that "the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately" (Lenin, Vol. XVIII, p. 232).

It is now no secret to anyone that it was none other than Trotsky who, in that same year 1915, opposed Lenin's thesis in the press and declared that to admit the possibility of the victory of socialism in separate countries "is to fall a prey to that very national narrow-mindedness* which constitutes the essence of social-patriotism" (Trotsky, The Year 1917, Vol. III, Part 1, pp. 89-90).

Nor is it a secret, but a universally-known fact, that this controversy between Lenin and Trotsky continued, in fact, right up to the appearance in 1923 of Lenin's last pamphlet On Co-operation, 33 in which he again and again proclaimed that it is possible to build "a complete socialist society" in our country.

What changes in connection with this question occurred in the history of our Party after Lenin's death? In 1925, at the Fourteenth Conference of our Party, Kamenev and Zinoviev, after a number of vacillations, accepted Lenin's teaching on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country and, with the Party, dissociated themselves from Trotskyism on this question. Several months later, however, before the Fourteenth Congress, when they found themselves in the minority in the struggle against the Party and were compelled to enter into a bloc with Trotsky, they "suddenly" turned towards Trotskyism, repudiating the resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of our Party and abandoning Lenin's teaching on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country. As a result, Trotsky's semi-Menshevik twaddle about the national narrow-mindedness of Lenin's theory has served the opposition as a screen by means of which it attempts to cover up its activities aimed at liquidating Leninism on the question of building socialism.

The question is: What is there surprising in the fact that the Party, educated and trained in the spirit of Leninism, considered it necessary, after all that, to turn away from these Liquidators, and that the leaders of the opposition found themselves isolated from the Party?

The third fundamental question on which the leaders of the opposition went astray was the question of our Party, of its monolithic character, of its iron unity.

Leninism teaches that the proletarian Party must be united and monolithic, that it must not have any factions or factional centres, that it must have a single Party centre and a single will. Leninism teaches that the interests of the proletarian party require enlightened discussion of questions of Party policy, an enlightened attitude of the mass of the Party membership towards the Party's leadership, criticism of the Party's defects, criticism of its mistakes. At the same time, however Leninism requires that the decisions of the Party should be unquestioningly carried out by all members of the Party, once these decisions have been adopted and approved by the leading Party bodies.

Trotskyism looks at the matter differently. According to Trotskyism, the Party is something in the nature of a federation of factional groups, with separate factional centres. According to Trotskyism, the Party's proletarian discipline is unbearable. Trotskyism cannot tolerate the

proletarian regime in the Party. Trotskyism does not understand that it is impossible to carry out the dictatorship of the proletariat unless there is iron discipline in the Party.

Were the former Leninists in the opposition aware of these organic defects in Trotskyism? Of course, they were. More than that, they shouted from the house-tops that the "organisational schemes" of Trotskyism were incompatible with the organisational principles of Leninism. The fact that in its statement of October 16, 1926, the opposition repudiated the conception of the Party as a federation of groups is only additional confirmation of the fact that the opposition had not, and has not, a leg to stand on in this matter. This repudiation, however, was only verbal, it was insincere. Actually, the Trotskyists have never abandoned their efforts to foist the Trotskyist organisational line upon our Party, and Zinoviev and Kamenev are helping them in that disgraceful work. It was enough for Zinoviev and Kamenev to find themselves in the minority in their struggle against the Party for them to turn to the Trotskyist, semi-Menshevik organisational plan and, jointly with the Trotskyists, to proclaim war on the proletarian regime in the Party as the slogan of the day.

What is there surprising in the fact that our Party did not consider it possible to bury the organisational principles of Leninism and that it cast aside the present leaders of the opposition?

Such, comrades, are the three fundamental questions on which the present leaders of the opposition went astray and broke with Leninism.

After that, can one be surprised that Lenin's Party in its turn broke with those leaders?

Unfortunately, however, the degradation of the opposition did not end there. It sank still lower, to limits beyond which it is impossible to go without running the risk of landing outside the Party.

Judge for yourselves.

Until now it was difficult to suppose that, low as it had sunk, the opposition would waver on the question of the unqualified defence of our country. Now, however, we must not only assume, but assert, that the attitude of the present leaders of the opposition is a defeatist one. How else is one to interpret Trotsky's stupid and absurd thesis about a Clemenceau experiment in the event of a new war against the U.S.S.R.? Can there be any doubt that this is a sign that the opposition has sunk still lower?

Until now it was difficult to suppose that the opposition would ever hurl against our Party the stupid and incongruous accusation of being a Thermidor party. In 1925, when Zalutsky first talked about Thermidor tendencies in our Party, the present leaders of the opposition emphatically dissociated themselves from him. Now, however, the opposition has sunk so low that it goes farther than Zalutsky and accuses the Party of being a Thermidor party. What I cannot understand is how people who assert that our Party has become a Thermidor party can remain in its ranks.

Until now the opposition tried "merely" to organise separate factional groups in the sections of the Comintern. Now, however, it has gone to the length of openly organising a new party in Germany, the party of those counter-revolutionary scoundrels Maslow and Ruth Fischer, in opposition to the existing Communist Party in Germany. That stand is one of directly splitting

the Comintern. From the formation of factional groups in the sections of the Comintern to splitting the Comintern—such is the road of degradation that the leaders of the opposition have travelled.

It is characteristic that in his speech Zinoviev did not deny that there is a split in Germany. That this anti-communist party was organised by our opposition is evident if only from the fact that the anti-Party articles and speeches of the leaders of our opposition are being printed and distributed in pamphlet form by Mas-low and Ruth Fischer. (A voice: "Shame!")

And what is the significance of the fact that the opposition bloc put up Vuiovich to undertake in our press the political defence of this second, Maslow-Ruth Fischer, party in Germany? It shows that our opposition is supporting Maslow and Ruth Fischer openly, is supporting them against the Comintern, against its proletarian sections. That is no longer merely factionalism, comrades. It is a policy of openly splitting the Comintern. (Voices: "Quite right!")

Formerly, the opposition strove to secure freedom for factional groups within our Party. Now, that is not enough for it. Now, it is taking the path of an outright split, creating a new party in the U.S.S.R., with its own Central Committee and its own local organisations. From the policy of factionalism to the policy of an outright split, to the policy of creating a new party, to the policy of "Ossovskyism" 34 — such are the depths to which the leaders of our opposition have sunk.

Such are the principal landmarks on the road of the opposition's further degradation in departing from the Party and the Comintern, in pursuing the policy of splitting the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.).

Can such a situation be tolerated any longer? Obviously not. The splitting policy cannot be permitted either in the Comintern or in the C.P.S.U.(B.). That evil must be eradicated immediately if we value the interests of the Party and the Comintern, the interests of their unity.

Such are the circumstances that compelled the Central Committee to raise the question of expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee.

What is the way out?—you will ask.

The opposition has landed in an impasse. The task is to make a last attempt to help the opposition to extricate itself from that impasse. What Comrade Orjoni-kidze proposed here on behalf of the Central Control Commission is the method and the maximum of concession to which the Party could agree in order to promote peace in the Party.

Firstly, the opposition must emphatically and irrevocably abandon its "Thermidor" twaddle and its foolish slogan of a Clemenceau experiment. The opposition must understand that people with such views and such tendencies cannot defend our country in face of the threat of war that hangs over it. The opposition must understand that people with such views and such tendencies cannot continue to be members of the Central Committee of our Party. (Voices: "Quite right!")

Secondly, the opposition must openly and definitely condemn the splitting, anti-Leninist Maslow-Ruth Fischer group in Germany and break off all connection with it. Support of the policy of splitting the Comintern cannot be tolerated any longer. (Voices: "Quite right!")

The U.S.S.R. cannot be defended if support is given to the splitting of the Comintern and to the disorganisation of the sections of the Comintern.

Thirdly, the opposition must emphatically and irrevocably abandon all factionalism and all the paths that lead to the creation of a new party within the C.P.S.U.(B.). The splitting policy must not be permitted in our Party either two months or even two hours before our Party congress. (Voices: "Quite right!")

Such, comrades, are the three chief conditions which must be accepted if we are to allow Trotsky and Zino-viev to remain members of the Central Committee of our Party.

It will be said that this is repression. Yes, it is repression. We have never regarded the weapon of repression as excluded from our Party's arsenal. We are acting here in conformity with the well-known resolution of the Tenth Congress of our Party, in conformity with the resolution that was drafted and carried through at the Tenth Congress by Comrade Lenin. 35 Here are points 6 and 7 of this resolution:

Point 6: "The congress orders the immediate dissolution of all groups without exception that have been formed on the basis of one platform or another and instructs all organisations strictly to see to it that there shall be no factional pronouncements of any kind. Non-observance of this decision of the congress shall involve certain and immediate expulsion from the Party."

Point 7: "In order to ensure strict discipline within the Party and in all Soviet work and to secure the maximum unanimity, doing away with all factionalism, the congress authorises the Central Committee, in case (cases) of breach of discipline or of a revival or toleration of factionalism, to apply all Party penalties, up to and including expulsion from the Party and, in regard to members of the Central Committee, to reduce them to the status of candidate members and even, as an extreme measure, to expel them from the Party. A condition for the application of such an extreme measure (to members and candidate members of the C.C. and members of the Control Commission) must be the convocation of a plenum of the Central Committee, to which all candidate members of the Central Committee and all members of the Control Commission shall be invited. If such a general assembly of the most responsible leaders of the Party, by a two-thirds majority, considers it necessary to reduce a member of the Central Committee to the status of a candidate member, or to expel him from the Party, this measure shall be put into effect immediately."

Voices: This should be put into effect at once.

Stalin: Wait, comrades, don't be in a hurry. This was written and bequeathed to us by Lenin, for he knew what iron Party discipline is, what the proletarian dictatorship is. For he knew that the dictatorship of the proletariat is exercised through the Party, that without the Party, a united and monolithic party, the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible.

Such are the conditions which must be accepted if Trotsky and Zinoviev are to remain members of the Central Committee of our Party. If the opposition accepts these conditions, well and good. If it does not, so much the worse for it. (Applause.)

With Reference to the Opposition's "Declaration" of August 8, 1927

Speech Delivered on August 9

Comrades, what the opposition is offering us cannot be regarded as peace in the Party. We must not harbour any illusions. What the opposition is offering us is a temporary armistice. (A voice: "Not even temporary!") It is a temporary armistice, which may be something of a step forward under certain circumstances, but on the other hand it may not. That must be borne in mind once and for all. That must be borne in mind, whether or not the opposition agrees to yield further.

It is a step forward for the Party that the opposition has retreated to some extent on all the three questions we put to it. It has retreated to some extent, but with such reservations as may create grounds for an even sharper struggle in the future. (Voices: "Quite right!" "Quite right, that's true!")

The question of the defence of the U.S.S.R. is a fundamental one for us in view of the threat of war that has arisen. In its declaration the opposition states in a positive form that it stands for the unqualified and unreserved defence of the U.S.S.R., but it refuses to condemn Trotsky's well-known formula, his well-known slogan about Clemenceau. Trotsky must have the courage to admit facts.

I think that the entire plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission is unanimously of the opinion that a man who in his heart, who in deed and not only in word, stands for the unqualified defence of our country would not write what Trotsky wrote in his letter to the Central Control Commission addressed to Comrade Orjonikidze.

I think that the entire plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. is convinced that this slogan, this formula, of Trotsky's about Clemenceau can only raise doubts of Trotsky's sincerity in regard to the defence of the U.S.S.R. More than that, it creates the impression that Trotsky adopts a negative attitude towards the questions of the unqualified defence of our country. (Voices: "Quite right, absolutely right!")

I think that the entire plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. is profoundly convinced that in issuing this slogan, this formula, about Clemenceau, Trotsky made the defence of the U.S.S.R. depend on the condition contained in the point about changing the leadership of our Party and the leadership of the Soviet Government. Only those who are blind can fail to see that. If Trotsky lacks the courage, the elementary courage, to admit his mistake, he himself will be to blame.

Since the opposition in its document does not condemn this mistake of Trotsky's, it means that the opposition wants to keep a weapon in reserve for future attacks on the Party in regard to the defence of the country, in regard to the line that the Party is pursuing. It means that the opposition is keeping a weapon in reserve with the intention of using it.

Hence, on this fundamental question, the opposition seeks not peace, but a temporary armistice, with a reservation that may still further intensify the struggle in the future. (A voice: "We don't need an armistice, we need peace.")

No, comrades, you are mistaken, we do need an armistice. If we were to take an example, it would be best to take that of Gogol's Ossip, who said: "A piece of string? Give it here, even a piece of string will come in handy." It will indeed be best to act like Gogol's Ossip. We are not so rich in resources and so strong that we can afford to reject a piece of string. We must not reject even a piece of string. Think well and you will understand that our arsenal must include even a piece of string.

On the second question, the question of Thermidor, the opposition has undoubtedly retreated; on this score it has retreated to some extent from its previous stand, for after such a retreat there cannot (to be logical, of course) be any more of that stupid agitation about a "Thermidor degeneration" of the Party which has been conducted by certain members of the opposition, particularly by some of its semi-Menshevik members.

The opposition, however, has accompanied this concession with a reservation that may, in future, remove all possibility of an armistice and peace. They say that there are certain elements in the country who betray tendencies towards a restoration, towards a Thermidor. But nobody has ever denied that. Since antagonistic classes exist, since classes have not been abolished, attempts will always, of course, be made to restore the old order. But that was not the point of our dispute. The point of the dispute is that in its documents the opposition makes thrusts at the Central Committee, and hence at the Party, concerning Thermidor tendencies. The Central Committee cannot be separated from the Party. It cannot. That is nonsense. Only anti-Party people who fail to understand the basic elementary premises of Lenin's organisational structure can assume that the Central Committee, particularly our Central Committee, can be separated from the Party.

The opposition, however, accompanies its concessions with the reservations I have mentioned. But such reservations provide the opposition with a weapon in reserve with which to attack the Party again when the opportunity occurs.

Of course, it is ludicrous to speak of Thermidor tendencies of the Central Committee. I will say more: it is nonsense. I don't think that the opposition itself believes that nonsense, but it needs it as a bogey. For if the opposition really believed that, then, of course, it should have declared open war on our Party and on our Central Committee; but it assures us that it wants peace in the Party.

And so, on the second point also, the opposition is keeping a weapon in reserve with which to attack the Central Committee again later on. That, too, must be borne in mind comrades, under all circumstances. Whether we remove the leaders of the opposition from the Central Committee or not on the fundamental question of Thermidor they will have a weapon in reserve, and the Party must take now all measures so as to eliminate the opposition if it takes up this anti-Party weapon again.

The third question is that of the split in the Communist Party of Germany, of the anti-Leninist and splitting group of Ruth Fischer and Maslow.

We had a strange talk in the commission yesterday. With great, very great, difficulty, after a number of speeches, the oppositionists found the courage to say that, in obedience to the decision of the Comintern — not because they were convinced, but in obedience to the decision of the Comintern — they agreed to admit that organisational contact with this anti-Party group is impermissible. I proposed: "organisational contact with and support of this group." Trotsky said: "No, that is not necessary, we cannot accept that. The Comintern's decision to expel them was wrong. I shall try to get those people—Ruth Fischer and Maslow—reinstated."

What does that show? Judge for yourselves. How completely the elementary notion of the Party principle has disappeared from the minds of these people!

Let us suppose that, today, the C.P.S.U.(B.) expels Myasnikov, about whose anti-Party activities you all know. Tomorrow, Trotsky will come along and say: "I cannot refrain from supporting Myasnikov, because the Central Committee's decision was wrong, but I am willing to break off organisational contact with him in obedience to your orders."

Tomorrow we expel the "Workers' Truth" group, 36 about whose anti-Party activities you also know. Trotsky will come forward and say: "I cannot refrain from supporting this anti-Party group, because you were wrong in expelling it."

The day after tomorrow the Central Committee expels Ossovsky, because he is an enemy of the Party, as you know very well. Trotsky will tell us that it was wrong to expel Ossovsky, and that he cannot refrain from supporting him.

But if the Party, if the Comintern, after a detailed discussion of the conduct of certain people, including that of Ruth Fischer and Maslow, if these high proletarian bodies decide that such people must be expelled, and if, in spite of that, Trotsky persists in supporting these expelled people, what is the position then? What becomes of our Party, of the Comintern? Do they exist for us? It turns out that for Trotsky neither the Party nor the Comintern exists, there exists only Trotsky's personal opinion.

But what if not only Trotsky but also other members of the Party want to behave as Trotsky does? Obviously, this guerrilla mentality, this hetman mentality, can only lead to the destruction of the Party principle. There will no longer be a party; instead there will be the personal opinion of each hetman. That is what Trotsky refuses to understand.

Why did the opposition refuse to refrain from supporting the anti-communist Maslow-Ruth Fischer group? Why did the leaders of the opposition refuse to accept our amendment on that point? Because they want to keep a third weapon in reserve with which to attack the Comintern. That must also be borne in mind.

Whether we reach agreement with them or not, whether they are removed from the Central Committee or not, they will have this weapon in reserve for a future attack on the Comintern.

The fourth question is that of the dissolution of factions. We propose that it be said honestly and straightforwardly: "The faction must be dissolved without fail." The leaders of the opposition refuse to say that. Instead, they say: "The elements of factionalism must be eliminated"; but they add: "the elements of factionalism engendered by the inner-Party regime."

Here you have the fourth little reservation. That is also a weapon held in reserve against our Party and its unity.

What was the intention of the oppositionists in refusing to accept the formulation proposing the immediate dissolution of the faction, which they have, and which intends to hold an illegal conference here in Moscow in a day or two? It means that they want to retain the right to go on organising demonstrations at railway stations, as much as to say: the regime is to blame, we were compelled to organise yet another demonstration. It means that they want to retain the right to go on attacking the Party, as much as to say: the regime compels us to attack. Here you have yet another weapon which they are keeping in reserve.

The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission should know and remember all this.

J. Stalin, On the Opposition, Articles and Speeches (1921-27), Moscow and Leningrad, 1928

* My italics .— J. St.

Notes

1. The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held from July 29 to August 9, 1927. The plenum discussed the following questions: the international situation; economic directives for 1927-28; the work of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection; the Fifteenth Party Congress; breach of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky. At the meeting of the plenum on August 1, J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on "The International Situation and the Defence of the U.S.S.R." On August 2, the plenum elected J. V. Stalin to the commission for drafting the resolution on the international situation. Noting the growing threat of a new armed attack upon the Soviet Union, the plenum condemned the defeatist stand of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc and set the task of strengthening the defence capacity of the Soviet Union to the utmost. The plenum issued economic directives for 1927-28 and noted the utter bankruptcy of the opposition's defeatist line in the sphere of economic policy. In its resolution on the work of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, the plenum outlined a programme for the further improvement of the work of the state apparatus. At the meeting of the plenum on August 5, J. V. Stalin delivered a speech during the discussion of G. K. Orjonikidze's report on the breach of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky. On August 6, the plenum elected J. V. Stalin to the commission for drafting the resolution on G. K. Orjonikidze's report. The plenum exposed the criminal activities of the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc and raised the question of expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Only after this, on August 8, did the leaders of the opposition submit to the plenum a "declaration" in which they hypocritically condemned their own behaviour and promised to abandon factional activities. On August 9, J. V. Stalin delivered a speech at the plenum on the opposition's "declaration." The plenum gave Trotsky and Zinoviev a severe reprimand and warning, demanded that the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc dissolve their faction forthwith, and called upon all the organisations and members of the Party to defend unity and iron discipline in the Party. (For the resolutions of the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp 239-74.)

2. This refers to the armed coup d'etat effected in Poland by Pilsudski in May 1926, as a result of which Pilsudski and his clique established their dictatorship and carried out the fascisation of the country. (On the Pilsudski coup d'etat, see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 8, pp. 177-81.)

3. This refers to the revolutionary action of the proletariat in Vienna on July 15-18, 1927. The action was provoked by the acquittal by a bourgeois court in Vienna of a group of fascists who had killed a number of workers. The action, which arose spontaneously, developed into an uprising with street fighting against the police and troops. The uprising was suppressed as a result of the treachery of the leaders of Austrian Social-Democracy.

4. This refers to the "Left" wing of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party. It arose in 1916 and was headed by F. Adler and O. Bauer. Under cover of revolutionary phrases this Social-Democratic "Left" wing in fact acted against the interests of the workers, and was therefore the most dangerous section of Social-Democracy.

5. The general strike and coal miners' strike in Britain were provoked by the employers' offensive against the standard of living of the working class. On the refusal of the coal miners to accept a reduction of wages and increased hours, the coal owners declared a lock-out. The miners answered this by declaring a strike on May 1, 1926. On May 3, a general strike was proclaimed in solidarity with the miners. Several million organised workers in the most important branches of industry and transport took part in the strike. On May 12, when the workers' struggle was at its height, the leaders of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress betrayed the strikers by calling off the general strike. The miners, however, continued the struggle. It was only due to the repressive measures taken by the government and employers and the extreme distress among the miners that the latter were compelled in November 1926 to go back to work on the coal owners' terms. (On the British general strike, see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 8, pp. 164-77.)

6. Communist International — a magazine, organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, published from May 1919 to June 1943 in Russian, French, German, English and other languages. It ceased publication in connection with the decision taken on May 15, 1943 by the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern to dissolve the Communist International.

7. Brandlerism—a Right-opportunist trend in the Communist Party of Germany, so named after Brandler, who belonged to the leadership of the Communist Party of Germany in 1922-23 and was leader of the Right-wing group. The defeatist policy of the Brandlerites and their collaboration with the Social-Democratic top leadership led to the defeat of the German working class in the 1923 revolution. In 1929, Brandler was expelled from the Communist Party for his factional, anti-Party activities.

8. V. I. Lenin, The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7).

9. The Hongkong strike of the Chinese workers began on June 19, 1925, and lasted sixteen months. The strike bore a political character and was directed against foreign imperialist oppression.

10. The Kuomintang—a political party in China, founded in 1912 by Sun Yat-sen for the purpose of fighting for a republic and for the national independence of the country. In 1924

the Communist Party of China joined the Kuomintang and thus helped to convert the latter into a mass people's revolutionary party. In the first stage of development of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, when the latter was an anti-imperialist revolution of a united all-national front, the Kuomintang was the party of the bloc of the proletariat, the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie and a section of the big national bourgeoisie. In the second stage, in the period of the agrarian, bourgeois-democratic revolution, after the national bourgeoisie had passed into the camp of the counter-revolution, the Kuomintang was a bloc of the proletariat, the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie, and pursued an anti-imperialist revolutionary policy. The expansion of the agrarian revolution and the pressure exerted by the feudal landlords on the Kuomintang on the one hand, and on the other hand the pressure brought to bear by the imperialists, who demanded that the Kuomintang should break with the Communists, frightened the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia (the Lefts in the Kuomintang), who turned to the side of the counter-revolution. When the Left Kuomintangists began to desert the revolution (in the summer of 1927), the Communists withdrew from the Kuomintang and the latter became the centre of the struggle against the revolution. (On the Kuomintang, see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 9, pp. 246-55 and 346-55.)

11. See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 8, pp. 385, 389.

12. This refers to the counter-revolutionary coup in China carried out on April 12, 1927, by the Right-wing Kuomintangists headed by Chiang Kai-shek, as a result of which a counter-revolutionary government was set up in Nanking. (On Chiang Kai-shek's coup, see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 9, pp. 229-31.)

13. V. I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft of Theses on the National and Colonial Questions" (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 122-28).

14. The resolution on the Chinese question drafted by the Eastern Commission of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern was adopted at a plenary meeting on March 13, 1926 (see The Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Theses and Resolutions, Moscow-Leningrad, 1926, pp. 131-36).

15. In an article on the development of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, A. Martynov (a former Menshevik who was admitted to membership of the R.C.P.(B.) by the Twelfth Party Congress) advanced the thesis that the revolution in China could peacefully evolve from a bourgeois-democratic revolution into a proletarian revolution. The Trotsky-Zinoviev anti-Soviet bloc tried to thrust responsibility for Martynov's mistaken thesis upon the leadership of the Comintern and of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

16. See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 9, p. 366.

17. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 15-18.

18. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, pp. 164-70.

19. The Anglo-Soviet, or Anglo-Russian, Unity Committee (the Joint Consultative Committee of the trade-union movements of Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.) was set up on the initiative of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions at an Anglo-Russian trade-union conference in London, April 6-8, 1925. The committee consisted of representatives of the A.U.C.C.T.U. and of the General Council of the British Trades Union Congress. The

committee ceased to exist in the autumn of 1927 owing to the treacherous policy of the reactionary leaders of the British trade unions. (On the Anglo-Russian Committee, see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 8, pp. 193-202, 205-14.)

20. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 1-97.

21. See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 4, pp. 258-59.

22. This refers to the shooting, in accordance with the sentence pronounced on June 9, 1927, by the Collegium of the OGPU of the U.S.S.R., of twenty monarchist whiteguards for conducting terrorist, sabotage and espionage activities. These whiteguards had been sent to the U.S.S.R. by the intelligence services of foreign countries; among them were former Russian princes and members of the nobility, big landlords, industrialists, merchants and guards officers of the tsarist army.

23. The Curzon ultimatum—the Note dated May 8, 1923, sent by Lord Curzon, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, threatening a new intervention against the U.S.S.R.

24. Sotsialistichesky Vestnik (Socialist Herald) — a magazine published by Menshevik whiteguard emigres. From February 1921 to March 1933 it was published in Germany, and later in France and the U.S.A. The magazine is the mouthpiece of the reactionary whiteguard emigres.

25. Rul (Helm) — a Cadet, whiteguard emigre newspaper, published in Berlin from November 1920 to October 1931.

26. J. V. Stalin, "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East" (see Works, Vol 7, pp. 135-54).

27. V. I. Lenin, "The United States of Europe Slogan" (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 311).

28. This refers to the resolution "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I." adopted by the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) held April 27-29, 1925 (see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 43-52).

29. This refers to the resolution on the report of the Central Committee adopted by the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) held December 18-3 1, 1925 (see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 73-82).

30. This refers to the resolution on "The Opposition Bloc in the C.P.S.U.(B.)" adopted by the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) held October 26 to November 3, 1926 (see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 209-20).

31. This refers to the resolution on the Russian question adopted by the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern held November 22 to December 16,

1926 (see Theses and Resolutions of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, pp. 60-70).

32. This refers to the resolution on the Russian question adopted at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International held June 17 to July 8, 1924 (see The Fifth World Congress of the Communist International Theses, Resolutions and Decisions, Moscow 1924, pp. 175-86).

33. V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 427-35.

34. "Ossovskyism"—a counter-revolutionary "theory" that tried to justify the formation of a Trotskyist party in the U.S.S.R. This "theory" was propounded by the Trotskyist Ossovsky, who was expelled from the C.P.S.U.(B.) in August 1926.

35. This refers to the resolution "On Party Unity" adopted by the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) held March 8-16, 1921 (see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part I, 1953, pp. 527-30).

36. The "Workers' Truth" group — a counter-revolutionary underground group formed in 1921. The members of this group were expelled from the R.C.P.(B.).

Questions & Answers to American Trade Unionists: Stalin's Interview With the First American Trade Union Delegation to Soviet Russia
First Published: Pravda September 15, 1927

Introduction
ONE of the most important events in the recent history of the American labor movement is the visit of the First American Labor Delegation to the Soviet Union[1].

To the superficial observer it is difficult to understand why and how it is that the Soviet Union plays such an important role in the development of the American labor movement. In America, we have the most powerful capitalist system. In Soviet Russia, we have a growing socialist economic system. In America the capitalist class rules unchallenged effectively. In Soviet Russia the proletariat rules unchallenged and unchallengeable. But this sharp difference in class relations and in the economic structure of the countries does not itself serve to create a gulf between these two labor movements.

The American labor movement has some very worthwhile tradi-tions. Yet, when compared with the older labor movements in some of the European countries, the traditions of our working class are few. Particularly in a country where the labor movement is young, and the traditions are not many, does the existence of a Soviet Republic in another country play an important role as a source of inspiration and a source of experience. At this particular moment great masses of American workers are not consciously, sufficiently interested in the development within the Soviet Republic. Still there is already an appreciable section of the American working class, virile in character and growing in number, which is keenly interested in the progress and development of the First Workers and Farmers' Soviet Republic in the world.

The establishment of the 7-hour day in the Soviet Union, the steady progress towards building up socialism in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the increasing importance of Soviet Russia in the international arena, the marvelous growth and strength of the Russian trade union movement in contrast with the difficult position and collapse of the labor movement in the capitalist countries, all of these will serve to increase the interest of the great masses of American workers in the progress of the Soviet Republic.

Precisely because of the potentially powerful influences the progress of the Soviet Union will have on the United States as a whole and the American labor movement in particular, have the reactionary trade union bureaucrats mobilized prejudice, ignorance, slander and the vilest misrepresentation against the Soviet Union. Herein lies the reason for the trade union bureaucracy's present policy towards the Soviet Union. Our labor lieutenants of imperialism are well aware of the fact that once the great mass of workers would see through their lies about the Soviet Union, once this weapon of prejudice ended, then one of the most powerful bulwarks of capitalist reaction in the United States — the trade union bureaucracy — would be dealt a mortal blow. This is the specific cause why the official leadership of the American Federation of Labor fights so bitterly against Soviet recognition and why it struggles so desperately against any attempt to bring to the American workers the facts about the situation in the Soviet Republic.

Under these conditions the visit of an American labor delegation composed of bona fide conservative trade unionists, assumes paramount importance. Soviet Russia, as seen thru the eyes of American trade unionists, is portrayed in the Report of the First American Labor

Delegation. "Questions and Answers to American Trade Unionists" completes the study very thoroughly and gives the inside into the problems of the working class of the United States as well as Soviet Russia. This is true despite the fact that the labor delegation did not represent in a narrow form all the prejudices and misconceptions of most of the trade union bureaucracy now dominating the labor movement.

The gap between the developments of class consciousness among the American workers and the class consciousness of the workers in the Soviet Union, is clearly evidenced in the questions and answers herewith given. Equipped with a tremendous capacity for Leninist analysis, Comrade Stalin shows a remarkable understanding not only of the tasks and problems confronting the Russian proletariat, but also of the difficulties and tasks the American working class is facing. In his concise and lucid manner, Comrade Stalin explains very effectively the positive contributions of Leninism to Marxism, the development of the science of proletarian revolution, the role of the Communist Party, the proletarian dictatorship, the forms and methods of building up socialism and the effects of imperialism on the working class.

The discussion between Comrade Stalin and the American trade unionists also focuses attention on certain basic tasks and problems that our working class must meet and meet soon. Why are the Ameri-can workers so poorly organized? Why is so small a proportion of American workers in the trade unions while so large a proportion of the Russian workers is — over 90 per cent — in the trade unions? What are the relations between the skilled and the unskilled workers in the United States. What lessons can we draw from these relations? How does it come about that the reactionary labor bureaucracy is often far more black in its conservative attitude than even some of the leaders of the bourgeoisie? Social insurance, the labor party, recognition of the Soviet Union, the Communist society, the role of the peasantry, incentive under Socialist production, the structure of the Soviet system and the development of genuine working class democracy in the Soviet Union, are among the many questions briefly but thoroughly analysed and explained in this third volume of the Workers Library series.

And why is it that the American Federation of Labor Executive Council has not uttered one word of protest against the recognition of the Fascist Government of Italy and Poland by the United States but has worked overtime to prevent the recognition of the Workers' and Farmers' Soviet Republic of Russia by the United States?

It is seldom that American workers, particularly leaders of the American working class, engage in so thorough an examination of such basic questions as the ones raised in the interview of the First American Labor Delegation with Comrade Stalin. The American workers may consider themselves fortunate to have had some of their leaders secure an explanation of such fundamental problems from so authoritative and able a leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as Comrade Stalin.

Labor delegations from the United States to the Soviet Union are no longer a novelty. Since the ice has been broken by the delegation headed by James P. Maurer, President of the Pennsylvania State Federation of Labor, there has already gone to the Soviet Union another American Labor Delegation. This second trade union delegation is more representative of American labor in certain respects in that it has less of the officialdom and more of the rank and file in the basic industries of the country. Consequently the growing interest on the part of

increasing sections of the American working class in the prob-lems and progress of our Russian brothers should be further stimulated by the contents of this volume.

"Questions and Answers to American Trade Unionists," by Comrade Stalin, should go a good deal of the way towards helping lift the fog that has impeded the vision of the American working class. The Workers' Library, Publishers, can be thankful to the founders of this series, particularly Comrades Bertha and Samuel Rubin, Comrade J. Barry, Dr. B., A. T., and others who have rendered valuable service through their contributions to make possible the publication of such timely literature.

Jay Lovestone
November 24, 1927

Joseph Stalin's Interview With The First American Labor Delegation in Russia
Questions Put By The Delegation and Stalin's Replies

QUESTION I: What are the new principles that Lenin and Communist Party practice in Russia have added to Marxism? Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in "creative revolutions" whereas Marx was more inclined to wait for the culmination of economic forces?

REPLY: I think that Lenin "added" no "new principles" to Marxism nor did Lenin abolish any of the "old" principles of Marxism. Lenin always was and remained a loyal and consistent pupil of Marx and Engels, and wholly and entirely based himself on the principles of Marxism. But Lenin did not merely carry out the doctrines of Marx and Engels. He developed these doctrines further. What does that mean? It means that he developed the doctrines of Marx and Engels in accordance with the new conditions of development, with the new phase of capitalism and with imperialism. This means that in developing further the doctrines of Marx in the new conditions of the class struggle Lenin contributed to Marxism something new as compared with what was created by Marx and Engels and with what they could create in the pre-imperialistic period of capitalism. Moreover, the contribution made by Lenin to Marxism is based wholly and entirely on the principles laid down by Marx and Engels. In that sense we speak of Leninism as Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Here, for example, are a number of questions in the sphere of which Lenin contributed something new in developing further the doctrines of Marx:

First, the question of monopolistic capitalism, — of imperialism as the new phase of capitalism. Marx and Engels lived in the pre-monopolistic period of capitalism, in the period of the smooth evolution of capitalism and its "peaceful" expansion throughout the whole world. This old phase of capitalism came to a close towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, when Marx and Engels had already passed away. Clearly Marx and Engels could only guess at the new conditions of the developiment of capitalism which arose out of the new phase of capitalism which succeeded the older phase. In the imperialistic monopolistic phase of development the smooth evolution of capitalism gave way to sporadic catastrophic development; the unevenness of development and the contradictions of capitalism emerged with particular force; the struggle for markets and spheres for the investment of capital conducted amidst conditions of extreme unevenness of development made periodical imperialist wars for a periodical redistribution of the world and of spheres of influence inevitable. The service Lenin rendered, and, consequently, his new contribution, consisted in that he made a fundamental Marxian analysis of imperialism as the final phase of capitalism, he exposed its ulcers and the conditions of its inevitable doom. On the basis of this

analysis arose Lenin's well-known postulate that the conditions of imperialism made possible the victory of Socialism in separate capitalist countries.

Second: the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The fundamental idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the political domination of the proletariat and as a method of overthrowing the reign of capital by violence was created by Marx and Engels. Lenin's new contribution in this field consists in that (a) utilizing the experience of the Paris Commune and the Russian Revolution he discovered the Soviet form of government as the State form of the Dictator-ship of the Proletariat; (b) he deciphered the formula of Dictatorship of the Proletariat from the point of view of the problem of the proletariat and its allies and defined the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as a special form of class alliance between the proletariat, who is the leader, and the exploited masses of the non-proletarian classes (the peasantry, etc.) who are led; (c) he stressed with particular emphasis the fact that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is a higher type of democracy in class society, the form of proletarian democracy, expressing the interests of the majority (the exploited) as against capitalist democracy which expresses the interests of the minority (the exploiters).

Third: the question of the forms and methods of the successful building up of Socialism in the period of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, in the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism in a country encircled by capitalist States. Marx and Engels regarded the period of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as a more or less prolonged period replete with revolutionary conflicts and civil war in the course of which the proletariat in power would take the economic, political, cultural and organizational measures necessary for the purpose of establishing a new Socialist society, a society without classes and without a State, in place of the old capitalist society. Lenin wholly and entirely based himself on these fundamental postulates of Marx and Engels. Lenin's new contribution in this field was (a) he established the possibility of constructing a complete Socialist Society in a land of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat encircled by imperialist States provided the country is not crushed by the military intervention of the surrounding capitalist States; (b) he outlined the concrete path of economic policy ("the New Economic Policy") by which the proletariat, being in com-mand of the economic key positions (industry, land, trans-port, the banks, etc.), links up Socialized industry with agriculture ("linking up industry with peasant agriculture") and thus leads the whole of national economy towards Socialism; (c) he outlined the concrete channels by which the bulk of the peasantry is gradually brought into the line of Socialist construction through the medium of the cooperative societies, which, in the hands of the Proletarian Dictatorship, represent a powerful instrument for the transformation of petty-peasant economy and for the re-education of the masses of the peas-antry in the spirit of Socialism.

Fourth: the question of the hegemony of the proletariat in revolution, in all popular revolutions — in the revolution against czarism as well as in the revolution against capitalism. Marx and Engels presented the main outlines of the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat. Lenin's new contribution in this field consists in that he further developed and expanded these outlines into a complete system of the hegemony of the proletariat, into a symmetrical system of proletarian leadership of the masses of the toilers in town and country not only in the fight for the overthrow of czarism and capitalism, but also in the work of building up Socialism under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. It is well known that, thanks to Lenin and his Party, the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat was skilfully applied in Russia. This, in passing, explains the fact that the Revolution in Russia brought the proletariat to power. In previous revolutions it usually happened that the workers did all the fighting at the barricades, shed their blood and overthrew the old order, but power passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie,

which later oppressed and exploited the workers. That was the case in England and in France. That was the case in Germany; in Russia, however, things took a different turn. In Russia, the workers did not merely represent the shock troops of the Revolution. While serving as the shock troops of the Revolution, the Russian proletariat at the same time strove for the hegemony, for the political leadership of all the exploited masses of town and country, rallying them around itself, detaching them from the bourgeoisie and politically isolating the bourgeoisie. Being the leader of the exploited masses, the Russian proletariat all the time waged a fight to seize power in its own hands and utilize it in its own interests against the bourgeoisie and against capitalism. This explains why every powerful outbreak of the Revolution in Russia, as in October, 1905, and in February, 1917, gave rise to Councils of Workers' Deputies as the embryo of the new apparatus of power, — the function of which would be to crush the bourgeoisie — as against the bourgeois parliament, the old apparatus of power — the function of which was to crush the proletariat. On two occasions the bourgeoisie in Russia tried to restore the bourgeois parliament and put an end to the Soviets: in August, 1917, at the time of the "Preliminary Parliament" prior to the capture of power by the Bolsheviks, and in January, 1918, at the time of the "Constituent Assembly" after power had been seized by the Proletariat. On both occasions these efforts failed. Why? Because the bourgeoisie was already politically isolated. The vast masses of the toilers regarded the proletariat as the sole leader of the revolution and the Soviets had been already tried and tested by the masses as their own workers' government. For the proletariat to have substituted these Soviets by a bourgeois parliament would be tantamount to committing suicide. It is not surprising, therefore, that bourgeois parliamentarism did not take root in Russia. That is why the Revolution in Russia led to the establishment of the rule of the proletariat. These were the results of the application of the Leninist system of the hegemony of the proletariat in Revolution.

Fifth: the national and colonial question. In analyzing the events in Ireland, India, China and the Central European countries like Poland and Hungary, in their time, Marx and Engels developed the basic, initial ideas of the national and colonial question. In his works Lenin based himself on these ideas. Lenin's new contribution in this field consists in (a) that he gathered these ideas into one symmetrical system of views on national and colonial revolutions in the epoch of imperialism; (b) that he connected the national and colonial question with the question of overthrowing imperialism, and (c) that he declared the national and colonial question to be a component part of the general question of international proletarian revolution.

Finally: the question of the Party of the proletariat. Marx and Engels gave the main outlines of the idea of the Party as being the vanguard of the proletariat without which (the Party) the proletariat could not achieve its emancipation, i. e., could not capture power or reconstruct capitalist society. Lenin's new contribution to this theory consists in that he developed these outlines further and applied them to the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat in the period of imperialism and showed (a) that the Party is a higher form of a class organization of the proletariat as compared with the other forms of proletarian organization (labor unions; co-operative societies, State organization) and, moreover, its function was to generalize and direct the work of these or-ganizations; (b) that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat may be realized only through the Party as its directing force; (c) that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat can be complete only if it is led by a single Party, the Communist Party, which does not and must not share leadership with any other parties; and (d) that without iron discipline in the Party the tasks of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to crush the exploiters and to transform class society into Socialist society cannot be fulfilled.

This, in the main, is the new contribution which Lenin made in his works; he developed and made more concrete the doctrines of Marx in a manner applicable to the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat in the period of imperialism.

That is why we say that Leninism is Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

From this it is clear that Leninism cannot be separated from Marxism, still less can it be contrasted to Marxism. The question submitted by the delegation goes on to ask: "Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in 'con-structive revolution' whereas Marx was more inclined to await the culmination of the development of economic forces?"

I think it would be absolutely incorrect to say that. I think that every popular revolution, if it is really a popular revolution, is a constructive revolution; for it breaks up the old system and creates a new. Of course, there is nothing constructive in such revolutions (if we can call them that) as take place, let us say, in Albania in the form of toy "rebellions" of one tribe against another. But Marxists never regarded such toy "rebellions" as revolutions. Apparently, it is not such "rebellions" that we are discussing, but mass, popular revolutions, the rising of oppressed classes against oppressing class. Such a revolution cannot but be constructive. Marx and Lenin stood for such a revolution and only for such a revolution. It must be added, of course, that such a revolution cannot arise under all conditions, but can unfold itself only under certain favorable economic and political conditions.

QUESTION II. Is it accurate to say that the Communist Party controls the Russian Government?

REPLY: It all depends upon what is meant by control. In capitalist countries they have a rather curious conception of control. I know that a number of capitalist governments are controlled by big banks, notwithstanding the existence of "democratic" parliaments. The parliaments assert that they alone control the government. As a matter of fact, the composition of the governments is predetermined, and their actions are controlled by great financial consortiums. Who does not know that there is not a single capitalist "Power" in which the Cabinet can be formed in opposition to the will of the big financial magnates? It is sufficient to exert financial pressure to cause Cabinet Ministers to fall from their posts as if they were stunned. This is real control exercised by banks over governments in spite of the alleged control of parliament. If such control is meant, then I must declare that control of the government by money-bags is inconceivable and absolutely excluded in the U.S.S.R., if only for the reason that the banks have been long ago nationalized and the money-bags have been ousted. Perhaps the delegation did not mean control, but the guidance exercised by the Party in relation to the Government. If that is what the delegation meant by its question, then my reply is: Yes, our Party does guide the Government. And the Party is able to guide the Government because it enjoys the confidence of the majority of the workers and the toilers generally and it has the right to guide the organs of the Government in the name of this majority.

In what is the guidance of the Government by the workers' Party of the U.S.S.R., by the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., expressed?

First of all it is expressed in that the Communist Party strives, through the Soviets and their Congresses, to secure the election to the principal posts in the Government of its own

candidates, its best workers, who are loyal to the cause of the proletariat and prepared truly and faithfully to serve the proletariat. This it succeeds in doing in the overwhelming majority of cases because the workers and peasants have confidence in the Party. It is not an accident that the chiefs of Government departments in our country are Communists and that these chiefs enjoy enormous respect and authority.

Secondly, the Party supervises the work of the administration, the work of the organs of power; it rectifies their errors and defects, which are unavoidable; it helps them to carry out the decisions of the Government and strives to secure for them the support of the masses. It should be added that not a single important decision is taken by them without the direction of the Party.

Thirdly, when the plan of work is being drawn up by the various Government organs, in industry or agriculture, in trade or in cultural work, the Party gives general leading instructions defining the character and direction of the work of these organs in the course of carrying out these plans.

The bourgeois press usually expresses "astonishment" at this "interference" by the Party in the affairs of the Government. But this "astonishment" is absolutely hypocritical. It is well-known that the bourgeois parties in capitalist countries "interfere" in the affairs of the government and guide the government and moreover that in these countries this guidance is concentrated in the hands of a narrow circle of individuals connected in one way or another with the large banks and because of that they strive to conceal the part they play in this from the people. Who does not know that every bourgeois party in England, or in other capitalist countries, his its secret Cabinet consisting of a close circle of person who concentrate the guidance in their hands?

Recall, for example, Lloyd George's celebrated reference to the "shadow Cabinet" in the Liberal Party. The differences between the land of the Soviets and the capitalist countries in this respect are (a) in capitalist countries the bourgeois parties guide the government in the interest of the bourgeoisie and against the proletariat, whereas in the U.S.S.R. the Communist Party guides the Government in the interests of the proletariat and against the bourgeoisie; (b) the bourgeois parties conceal from the people the role they play in guiding the State, and resort to suspicious, secret cabinets, whereas the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. does not stand in need of such secret cabinets. It condemns the policy and practice of secret cabinets and openly declares to the whole country that it takes upon itself the responsibility for the guidance of the State.

ONE OF THE DELEGATES: On the same principles the Party guides the trade unions?

STALIN: In the main, yes. Formally, the Party cannot give instructions to the trade unions, but the Party gives instructions to the Communists who work in the trade unions. It is known that in the trade unions there are Communist fractions as there are also in the Soviets, cooperative societies, etc. It is the duty of these Communist fractions to secure by argument the adoption of decisions in the trade unions, in the Soviets, cooperative societies, etc., which correspond to the Party’s instructions. This they are able to achieve in the overwhelming majority of cases because the Party exercises enormous influence among the masses and enjoys their great confidence. By these means is secured unity of action of the most varied proletarian organizations. If this were not done there would be confusion and clashing in the work of these working class organizations.

QUESTION III. Since there is legality for one political party only in Russia how do you know that the masses favor Communism?

REPLY: It is true that in the U.S.S.R. there are no legal bourgeois parties, that only one party, the Party of the Workers, the Communist Party, enjoys legality. Have we the ways and means, however, of convincing ourselves that the majority of the workers, the majority of the masses of the toilers sympathize with the Communists? We speak of course of the masses of the workers and peasants and not of the new bourgeoisie or of the remnants of the old exploiting classes which have been already crushed by the proletariat. Yes, it is possible. We have the ways and means of knowing whether the masses of the workers and peasants sympathize with the Communists or not. Take the most important moments in the life of our country and see whether there are any grounds for the assertion that the masses really sympathize with the Communists.

Take, first of all, so important a moment as the period of the October Revolution in 1917, when the Communist Party, precisely as a Party, openly called upon the workers and peasants to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie and when this Party obtained the support of the overwhelming majority of the workers, soldiers and peasants. What was the situation at the time? The Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) and the Social Democrats (Mensheviks) allied with the bourgeoisie were in power then. The governmental apparatus, both in the center and locally, as well as the command of the 12-million army, was in the hands of these parties, in the hands of the government. The Communist Party was in a state of semilegality. The bourgeoisie of all countries prophesied the inevitable collapse of the Bolshevik Party. The Entente wholly and entirely supported the Kerensky Government. Nevertheless, the Communist Party, the Bolshevik Party never ceased to call upon the proletariat to overthrow this government and to establish the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. What happened? The overwhelming majority of the masses of the toilers in the rear as well as at the front most emphatically supported the Bolshevik Party — the Kerensky Government was overthrown and the rule of the Proletariat was established. How is it that the Bolsheviks were able to emerge victorious at that time in spite of the malicious forecasts of the bourgeoisie of all countries of the doom of the Bolshevik Party? Does it not prove that the broad masses of the toilers sympathized with the Bolshevik Party? I think it does. This is the first test of the authority and influence of the Communist Party among the broad masses of the population.

Take the second period, the period of intervention and civil war, when the British capitalists occupied the North of Russia, the districts of Archangel and Murmansk, when the American, British, Japanese and French capitalists occupied Siberia and pushed Kolchak to the forefront, when the French and British capitalists took steps to occupy "South Russia" and raised on their shields Denikin and Wrangel. This was a war conducted by the Entente and the counter-revolutionary generals in Russia against the Communist Government in Moscow, against the achievements of the October Revolution. In this period the strength and stability of the Communist Party among the broad masses of the workers and peasants were put to the greatest test. And what happened? It is generally known that as a result of the Civil War the occupationary troops were driven from Russia and the counterrevolutionary generals were defeated by the Red Army.

Here it was proved that the outcome of war is decided in the last analysis not by technique, with which Kolchak and Denikin were plentifully furnished by the enemies of the U.S.S.R., but by proper policy, the sympathy and support of the millions of the masses of the population. Was it an accident that the Bolshevik Party proved victorious then? Of course not.

Does not this fact prove that the Communist Party in Russia enjoys the sympathy of the wide masses of the toilers? I think it does. This is the second test of the strength and stability of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R.

We will now take up the present period, the post-war period, when questions of peaceful construction are the order of the day. The period of economic ruin has given way to the period of the restoration of industry and later to the period of the reconstruction of the whole of our national economy on a new technical basis. Have we now ways and means of testing the strength and stability of the Communist Party, of determining the degree of sympathy enjoyed by the Party among the broad masses of the toilers? I think we have.

Take first of all the trade unions which combine nearly 10 million proletarians. Let us examine the composition of the leading organs of these trade unions. Is it an accident that Communists are at the head of these organs? Of course not. It would be absurd to think that the workers in the U.S.S.R. are indifferent to the composition of the leading organs of their trade unions.

The workers in the U.S.S.R. grew up and received their training in the storms of three revolutions. They learned, as no other workers learned, to try their leaders and to expel them if they do not satisfy the interests of the proletariat. At one time the most popular man in our Party was Plekhanov. However, the workers did not hesitate to isolate him completely when they became convinced that he had abandoned the proletarian position. And if these workers express their complete confidence in the Communists, elect them to responsible posts in the trade unions, it is direct evidence that the strength and stability of the Communist Party among the workers in the U.S.S.R. is enormous. This is one test of the undoubted sympathy of the broad masses of the workers for the Communist Party.

Take the last Soviet elections. In the U.S.S.R. the whole of the adult population from the age of 18, irrespective of sex and nationality, — except the bourgeois elements who exploit the labor of others and those who have been deprived of their rights by the courts — enjoys the right to vote. The people enjoying the right to vote number 60 millions. The overwhelming majority of these, of course, are peasants. Of these 60 million voters, about 51 per cent, i. e., over 30 millions, exercise their right. Now examine the composition of the leading organs of our Soviets both in the center and locally. Is it an accident that the overwhelming majority of the elected leading elements are Communists? Clearly, it is not an accident. Does not this fact prove that the Communist Party enjoys the confidence of millions of the masses of the peasantry? I think it does. This is another test of the strength and stability of the Communist Party.

Take the Comsomol (Communist Youth League which combines nearly 2 million young workers and peasants. Is it an accident that the overwhelming majority of the elected leading elements in the Communist Youth League are Communists? I think that it cannot be said to be an accident. Thus you have another test of the strength and authority of the Communist Party.

Finally, take the innumerable conferences, consultations, delegate meetings, etc., which embrace millions of the masses of the toilers, both workingmen and working women, peasants and peasant women, among all the nationalities forming the U.S.S.R. In Western countries, people wax ironical over these conferences and consultations and assert that the Russians like to talk very much. For us, however, these conferences and consultations are of enormous significance in that they serve as a test of the mood of the masses and also as a means of

exposing our mistakes and indicating the methods by which these mistakes may be rectified; for we make not a few mistakes and we do not conceal them, because we think that to expose these errors and honestly to rectify them is one of the best means of improving the management of the country. Take the speeches delivered at these conferences and consultations. Note the business-like and ingenuous remarks uttered by these "simple people," these workers and peasants; note the decisions taken and you will see how enormous is the influence and authority of the Communist Party, an influence and authority that any party in the world might envy. Thus you have still another test of the stability of the Communist Party.

These are the ways and means enabling us to test the strength and influence of the Communist Party among the masses of the people.

That is how I know that the broad masses of the workers and peasants in the U.S.S.R. sympathize the Communist Party.

QUESTION IV. If a non-party group should organize a fraction and nominate candidates for office on a platform which supported the Soviet Government, but at the same time demanded the abolition of the foreign trade monopoly, could they have a party treasury and conduct an active political campaign?

REPLY: I think there is an irreconcilable contradiction in this question. We cannot conceive of a group basing itself on a platform supporting the Soviet Government and at the same time demanding the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. Why? Because the monopoly of foreign trade is one of the irremovable foundations of the "platform" of the Soviet Government; because a group demanding the abolition of the foreign trade monoply could not support the Soviet Government; because such a group would be profoundly hostile to the whole Soviet system.

There are, of course, elements in the U.S.S.R. who demand the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. These are the Nepmen, the Kulaks, and the remnants of the already defeated exploiting classes, etc. But these elements represent an insignificant minority of the population. I do not think that the delegation has these elements in mind. If, however, the delegation refers to workers and peasant toilers, then I must say that the demand for the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade would merely call forth ridicule and hostility among them.

Indeed, what would the abolition of monopoly of foreign trade mean for the workers? For them it would mean abandonment of the industrialization of the country, cessation of the construction of new works and factories and of the expansion of the old works and factories. To them it would mean that the U.S.S.R. would be flooded with goods from capitalist countries, the destruction of our industry, because of its relative weakness; increase in unemployment, deterioration of the material conditions of the working class, and the weakening of their economic and political conditions. In the last analysis it would mean the strengthening of the Nepmen and the new bourgeoisie generally. Can the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. agree to committing suicide like this? Clearly it cannot.

And what would the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade mean for the toiling masses of the peasantry? It would mean the transformation of our country from an independent country into a semi-colonial country and the impoverishment of the masses of the peasantry. It would mean a return to the system of "free trade" which prevailed under Kolchak and Denikin when

the combined forces of the counterrevolutionary generals and the "Allies" freely plundered the many millions of the peasantry. In the last analysis it would mean the strengthening of the Kulaks and other exploiting elements in the rural districts. The peasants have sufficiently experienced the charms of this system in the Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, on the Volga, and in Siberia. What grounds are there for believing that they desire to put their heads into this noose again? Is it not clear that the toiling masses of the peasantry cannot support a demand for the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade?

A DELEGATE: The delegation put forward the point concerning the monopoly of foreign trade and of its abolition as a point around which a whole group of the population might organize if there was not the monopoly of a single party, the monopoly of legality in the U.S.S.R.

STALIN: The delegation consequently is returning to the question of the monopoly of the Communist Party, as the sole legal Party in the U.S.S.R. I replied briefly to this question when I spoke about the ways and means of testing the sympathy of the millions of the masses of the workers and peasants towards the Communist Party. As for the other strata of the population, the Kulaks, the Nepmen, the remnants of the old, defeated, exploiting classes, they are deprived of the right to have their political organizations just as they are deprived of the right to vote. The proletariat deprived the bourgeoisie not only of the factories, workshops, banks, railroads, lands, and mines, but they also deprived them of the right to have their political organizations, because the proletariat does not desire the restoration of the rule of the bourgeoisie. The delegation apparently does not object to the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. depriving the bourgeoisie and the landlords of their factories and workshops, of their land and railroads, banks and mines (laughter, but it seems to me that the delegation is somewhat surprised that the proletariat did not limit itself to this, but went further and deprived the bourgeoisie of political rights. This, to my mind, is not altogether logical, or to speak more correctly, is quite illogical. Why should the proletariat be called upon to show magnanimity towards the bourgeoisie? Does the bourgeoisie in Western countries, where they are in power, show the slightest magnanimity towards the working class? Do they not drive genuine revolutionary parties of the working class underground?

Why should the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. be called upon to show magnanimity towards their class enemy? You must be logical. Those who think that political rights can be restored to the bourgeoisie must, if they are to be logical, go further and raise the question of restoring to the bourgeoisie the factories and workshops, railroads and banks.

A DELEGATE: It is the task of the delegation to investigate how the opinion of the working class and the peasantry, as distinct from the opinion of the Communist Party, can find legal expression. It would be incorrect to believe that the delegation is interested in the question of granting political rights to the bourgeoisie, or in the manner in which the bourgeoisie may find legal expression of their opinions. The question is, in what manner can the opinions of the working class and of the peasantry, as distinct from the opinion of the Communist Party, find legal expression?

ANOTHER DELEGATE: These distinctive opinions could find expression in the mass organizations of the working class, in the trade unions, etc.

STALIN: All right. Consequently, the question is not one of the restoration of the political rights of the bourgeoisie, but of the conflict of opinion within the working class and among

the peasantry. Is there any conflict of opinion among the workers and the toiling masses of the peasantry at the present time? Undoubtedly there is. It is impossible for millions of workers and peasants to think all alike. This never happens. First of all, there is a great difference between the workers and peasants relative to their economic position and in their views concerning various questions. Secondly, there is some difference in outlook among various sections of the working class, difference in training, different ages, temperament, a difference between the old standing industrial workers and those who have migrated from the rural districts, etc. All this leads to a conflict of opinion among the workers and the toiling masses of the peasantry which finds legal expression at meetings, in trade unions, in cooperative societies, during elections to the Soviets, etc.

But there is a radical difference between the conflict of opinion now, under the proletarian dictatorship and conflict of opinion in the past, prior to the October Revolution. In the past, the conflict of opinion among the workers and the toiling peasantry was concentrated mainly on questions concerning the overthrow of the landlords, of czarism, of the bourgeoisie and of the break up of the whole capitalist system. Now, however, under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, conflict of opinion does not revolve around questions concerning the overthrow of the Soviet Government, of the break-up of the Soviet system, but around questions concerning the improvement of the organs of the Soviet Government and improvement of their work. This makes a radical difference. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the conflict of opinion in the past around questions concerning the revolutionary destruction of a prevailing system gave grounds for the appearance of several rival parties in the working class and toiling masses of the peasantry. These parties were: the Bolshevik Party, the Menshevik Party, the Socialist Revolutionary Party. On the other hand it is not difficult to understand that conflict of opinion under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, which has for its aim not the break-up of the existing Soviet system, but its improvement and consolidation, provides no nourishment for the existence of several parties among the workers and the toiling masses in the rural districts. That is why the legality of a single Party, the Communist Party, the monopoly enjoyed by that Party, not only raises no objection among the workers and toiling peasants, but on the contrary, is accepted by them as something necessary and desirable.

The position of our Party as the only legal Party in the country (the monopoly of the Communist Party is not something artificial and deliberately invented. Such a position cannot be created artificially by administrative machinations, etc. The monopoly of our Party grew up out of life, it developed historically as a result of the fact that the Socialist Revolutionary Party and Menshevik Party became absolutely bankrupt and departed from the stage of our social life. What were the Socialist Revolutionary Party and Menshevik Party in the past? They were channels for conducting bourgeois influence into the ranks of the proletariat. By what were these parties cultivated and sustained prior to October, 1917? By the existence of the bourgeois class and ultimately by the existence of bourgeois rule. Clearly, when the bourgeoisie was overthrown the basis for the existence of these parties disappeared. What did these parties become after October, 1917? They became parties for the restoration of capitalism and for the overthrow of the rule of the proletariat. Clearly these parties had to lose all support and all influence among the workers and the toiling strata of the peasantry.

The fight between the Communist Party and the Socialist Revolutionary Party and Menshevik Party for influence among the workers did not commence only yesterday. It commenced when the first symptoms of a mass revolutionary movement manifested themselves in Russia, even before 1905.

The period between 1903 and October, 1917, is the period of severe conflicts of opinion within the working class of our country, a period of struggle between the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries for influence in the working class. During this period the working class of the U.S.S.R passed through three revolutions. In the fires of these revolutions it tried and tested the proletarian revolutionary character of these parties and their fitness for the cause of the proletarian revolution.

In October, 1917, after history had summed up the whole of the past revolutionary struggle, and had weighed in the balance the various parties fighting within the working class — the working class of the U.S.S.R. made its final selection and accepted the Communist Party as the only proletarian party. How is the fact that the working class selected the Communist Party to be explained? In April, 1917, for example, the Bolsheviks in the Petrograd Soviet represented an inconsiderable minority. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks at that time had an overwhelming majority. In the October days the whole apparatus of the Government and all means of coercion were in the hands of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Parties who had allied themselves with the bourgeoisie. It is explained by the fact that the Communist Party stood for the termination of the war, for an immediate democratic peace, while the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties insisted upon "War to Complete Victory," the continuation of the imperialist war. It is explained by the fact that the Communist Party stood for the overthrow of the Kerensky Government, for the overthrow of the rule of the bourgeoisie, for the nationalization of the factories and workshops, of the banks and railroads, whereas the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties fought in defence of the Kerensky Government and defended the right of the bourgeoisie to the factories and the workshops, the banks and the railroads. It is to be explained by the fact that the Communist Party stood for the immediate confiscation of the estates of the landowners for the benefit of the peasantry, whereas the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties postponed this question until the Constituent Assembly should be convened, which in its turn was postponed for an indefinite time. What is surprising, therefore, in the fact that the workers and the poor peasants made their final selection in favor of the Communist Party? What is there surprising in the fact that the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties went to the bottom so quickly? That is why the Communist Party came to power.

The subsequent period, the period following October, 1917, the period of civil war, was the period in which the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries finally met their doom; it was the period of the final triumph of the Bolshevik Party. In that period the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves facilitated the triumph of the Communist Party. Broken up and sent to the bottom during the October Revolution, remnants of the Menshevik Party and Socialist-Revolutionary Party began to link themselves up with counterrevolutionary Kulak rebellions, allied themselves with Kolchak and Denikin, went into the service of the Entente and finally and utterly discredited themselves in the eyes of the workers and peasants. The situation then created was that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, having changed from bourgeois revolutionaries into bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, helped the Entente to strangle the new Soviet Russia, whereas the Bolshevik Party, rallying around itself all that was vital and revolutionary, roused fresh ranks of workers and peasants in increasing numbers for the fight in defence of the Socialist fatherland, and against the Entente. It was quite natural that the victory of the Communists in that period should and in fact did lead to the utter defeat of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. What is there surprising, therefore, in the fact that after all this the Communist Party became the sole Party of the working class and the poor peasantry?

That is how the monopoly of the Communist Party as the only legal Party in the country arose.

You speak of a conflict of opinion among the workers and peasants at the present time, under the proletarian dictatorship. I have said already that conflict of opinion exists and will exist in the future, that no progress is possible without this, but conflict of opinion among the workers under present conditions centers not around the question of principle of the overthrow of the Soviet system, but around practical questions like the improvement of the Soviets, the rectification of errors committed by the Soviet organs and, consequently, of consolidating the Soviet rule. Such a conflict of opinion can only serve to strengthen and perfect the Communist Party. Such conflict of opinion can only serve to strengthen the monopoly of the Communist Party. Such a conflict of opinion cannot provide nourishment for other parties within the working class and among the toiling peasantry.

QUESTION V. Will you summarize briefly the outstanding differences between yourself and Trotsky?

REPLY: I must say first of all that the differences with Trotsky are not personal differences. If these differences bore a personal character, the Party would not concern itself with them for a single hour, for it does not like personalities to make themselves prominent. Apparently, you mean the differences in the Party. That is how I understand the question. Yes, such differences do exist in the Party.

The character of these differences was described rather in detail by Comrade Rykov in a speech he delivered recently in Moscow and by Comrade Bukharin in Leningrad. These speeches have been published. I have nothing to add to what is stated in them concerning these differences. If you have not obtained these documents I can get them for you. (The delegation states that it is in possession of the documents.)

A DELEGATE: On our return we shall be questioned concerning these differences, but we have not all the documents. For example, we have not the platform of the "83."

STALIN: I did not sign that platform. I have no right to dispose of other peoples' documents. (Laughter.)

QUESTION VI. In capitalist countries the chief incentive to production is furnished by the hope of private profit. This incentive is of course relatively absent in the U.S.S.R. What alternative displaces it and in your opinion, how effective is it? Can it be maintained indefinitely?

REPLY: It is true that the principal motive power of capitalist economy is profit. It is true also that obtaining profit is neither the aim nor the motive power of our Socialist industry. What then is the motive power of our industry?

First of all, the fact that the factories and workshops in the U.S.S.R. belong to the whole people and not to capitalists, that the factories and workshops are managed not by the appointees of capitalists, but by representatives of the working class; the consciousness that the workers work, not for the capitalist, but for their own State, for their own class, represents an enormous driving force in the development and perfection of our industry. It must be observed that the overwhelming majority of the factory and works managers in Russia are

workingmen, appointed by the Supreme Economic Council in agreement with the trade unions and that not a single factory manager can remain at his post contrary to the will of the workers or the particular trade union.

It must be observed also that in every factory and workshop there is a factory council, elected by the workers, which controls the activities of the management of the particular enterprise. Finally, it must be observed that in every industrial enterprise regular production conferences of workers are held in which all the workers employed in the given enterprise take part and at which the work of the manager of the enterprise is discussed and criticized; the plan of work in the factory administration is discussed, errors and defects are noted and rectified through the trade unions, through the Party and through the organs of the Soviet administration. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, that all these circumstances radically alter the position of the workers as well as the state of affairs in the various enterprises. While, under capitalism the workers regard their factory as a prison, under the Soviet system the workers no longer regard the factory as a prison, but as something near and dear to them and in the development and improvement of which they are vitally interested. It is hardly necessary to prove that this new attitude of the workers towards the enterprise in which they are employed, this understanding of the close ties that link the workers with the enterprise, represents a powerful driving force for the whole of our industry. This circumstance explains the fact that the number of worker-inventors in the field of technique of production, and worker-organizers of industry increases from day to day.

Secondly, the revenues from industry in Russia are employed not for the enrichment of individuals, but for the further expansion of industry, for the improvement of the material and cultural conditions of the working class, for reducing the price of industrial commodities necessary both for the workers and for the peasants, which again is the improvement of the material conditions of the toiling masses. A capitalist cannot employ his revenues for improving the welfare of the working class. He lives for profit; otherwise he would not be a capitalist. He obtains profit in order to invest it as surplus capital in less developed countries suffering from a shortage of capital in order again to obtain fresh and increased profit. That is how capital flows from the United States to China, to Indonesia, to South America and Europe and from France to the French colonies and from England to the British colonies.

In the U.S.S.R. things are altogether different; for we neither conduct nor recognize colonial policy. In Russia, the revenues from industry remain in the country and are employed for the further expansion of industry, for improving the conditions of the workers, for enlarging the capacity of the home market, including also the peasant market, by reducing the price of industrial commodities. Ten per cent of the profits from industry in our country goes to a fund for improving the social conditions of the workers. A sum equal to 13 per cent of the wages paid is contributed to a sick insurance fund for the insurance of workers. (This represents 800 million roubles per annum.) A certain part of the revenues (I cannot just now say exactly how much) is employed for cultural requirements, vocational training and vacations for the workers. A fairly considerable part of these revenues (again I cannot now say exactly how much is employed for the annual increase in the money wages of the workers. The rest of the revenues from industry are employed for the further expansion of industry, for the repair of old workshops, for the construction of new workshops and finally for the reduction of prices of industrial commodities. The enormous significance of these circumstances for our industry consists in (a) that they facilitate the linking up of agriculture with industry and the smoothing out of the antagonism between town and country; (b) that they facilitate the increase of the

capacity of the home market — urban and rural — and by that create a constantly expanding base for the further development of industry.

Finally, the nationalization of industry facilitates the conduct of industry as a whole according to plan.

Will these stimuli and motive forces of our industry be permanent factors? Can they be permanently operative factors? Yes, undoubtedly they are permanently operative stimuli and motive forces, and the more our industry develops, the more the strength and significance of these factors will grow.

QUESTION VII. How far can Soviet Russia cooperate with the capitalist industry of other countries? Is there a definite limit to such cooperation or is it simply an experiment to discover in which field such cooperation is possible and in which it is not?

REPLY: Apparently this is a reference to temporary agreements with capitalist states in the field of industry, in the field of commerce and perhaps of diplomatic relations. I think that the existence of two opposite systems, the capitalist system and the Socialist system, does not exclude the possibility of such agreement. I think that such agreements are possible and expedient in conditions of peaceful development. Exports and imports are the most suitable ground for such agreements. We require equipment, raw material (raw cotton for example, semi-manufactures, (metals, etc. while the capitalists require a market for their goods. This provides a basis for agreement. The capitalists require oil, timber, grain products and we require a market for these goods. Here is another basis for agreement. We require credits, the capitalists require good interest for their credits. Here is still another basis for agreements in the field of credit. It is well known that the Soviet organs are most punctual in their payments.

The same thing may be said in regard to the diplomatic field. We are pursuing a policy of peace and we are prepared to sign a pact of non-aggression with bourgeois States. We are pursuing a policy of peace and we are prepared to come to an agreement concerning disarmament right up to the complete abolition of standing armies, which we declared to the whole world as far back as the time of the Genoa Conference. Here is a basis for agreement on the diplomatic field.

The limits to these agreements? The limits are set by the opposite characters of the two systems between which there is rivalry and conflict. Within the limits permitted by these two systems, but only within these limits agreement is quite possible. This is proved by the experience of the agreements concluded with Germany, Italy, Japan, etc.

Are these agreements merely experiments? Or can they be of a more or less prolonged character? That does not altogether depend upon us. It depends also upon the other parties. It depends upon the general situation. A war may upset any and every agreement. Finally, it depends upon the terms of the agreement. We can never accept conditions of bondage. We have an agreement with Harriman who is exploiting the Manganese mines in Georgia. That agreement extends for twenty years. As you see, not a brief period. We have also an agreement with the Lena Goldfields Company, which is extracting gold in Siberia. That agreement has been signed for thirty years, — a still longer period. Finally, we have an agreement with Japan concerning the exploitation of the oil and coal fields in Saghalin. We would like these agreements to have a more or less solid character. But that depends of course not only upon us, but upon the other parties.

QUESTION VIII. What are the chief ways in which Russia differs from capitalist states in her treatment of national minorities?

REPLY: Apparently, this refers to the nationalities in the U.S.S.R. who were formerly oppressed by Czarism and the Russian exploiting classes and who did not enjoy state sovereignity. The principal distinction is that while in capitalist states national oppression and national enslavement prevails, in the U.S.S.R. both the one and the other have been radically abolished. In capitalist states, side by side with nations of the first rank, privileged nations, "sovereign" nations, we have second rank nations, "non-sovereign" nations, nations which do not enjoy equality, which are deprived of various rights, principally of sovereign rights. In the U.S.S.R., however, all the attributes of national inequality and national oppression have been abolished. In the U.S.S.R., all nations are equal and sovereign, for the national and State privileges which previously were enjoyed by the Great Russian people have been abolished. We do not of course speak of declarations of national equality. All bourgeois and Social-Democratic parties have made not a few declarations concerning national equality. What is the value of such declarations if they are not carried out? The thing to do is to abolish those classes which are the bearers, the creators and the conduits of national oppression. In Russia these classes were the landlords and capitalists. We overthrew these classes and by that abolished the possibility of national oppression. And precisely for the reason that we abolished these classes real national equality became possible in the U.S.S.R. This is what we call the application of the idea of self-determination of nations including even the right of complete separation. Precisely for the reason that we carried out the self-determination of nations, we managed to eliminate mutual suspicion between the toiling masses of the various nationalities in the U.S.S.R. and to unite these nationalities on a voluntary basis into one Federal State. The present Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is the result of our national policy and expression of the voluntary federation of the nationalities in the U.S.S.R. into one federal state.

It is hardly necessary to prove that such a policy in the national question is inconceivable in capitalist countries, for there, the capitalists who are the creators and conduits of national oppression are still in power. For example, we cannot fail to observe that the supreme organ of the U.S.S.R., the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, is headed not necessarily by one Russian chairman, but by six chairmen, representing each of the federal republics forming the U. S. S. R., of whom one is a Russian (Kalinin), the second a Ukrainian (Petrovsky), the third a White Russian (Cheriakov), the fourth and Azerbaidjaman (Musabekov), the fifth a Turkoman (Aitakov), and the sixth an Uzbek (Faizulla Hodjaev). This fact is a striking expression of our national policy. It need hardly be said that not a single bourgeois republic, however democratic it may be, would do this. And yet, with us it is taken as a matter of course, as following directly from our policy of national equality.

QUESTION IX. American labor leaders justify their struggle against the Communists on two grounds: (1) The Communists are disrupting and destroying the labor movement by their factional fights inside the unions and their attacks on all union officials who are not radicals, and (2) American Communists take their orders from Moscow and hence cannot be good trade unionists since their loyalty to an outside foreign body is placed above their loyalty to the union. How can this difficulty to adjusted so that American communists can work jointly with other sections of the American labor movement?

REPLY: I think that the attempts of the American labor leaders to justify their struggle against the Communists do not stand examination. No one has yet proved nor can it be proved that

the Communists disrupt the labor movement. But it can be taken as fully proved that the Communists are the most loyal and boldest champions of the labor movement all over the world, including America. Is it not a fact that during strikes and demonstrations the Communist workingmen take their place in the front ranks of the working class and receive the first blows of the capitalists, whereas the reformist labor leaders take shelter in the backyards of the capitalists?

How can Communists refrain from criticizing the cowardice and the reactionary policies of the reformist labor leaders? Is it not clear that such criticism can serve only to stimulate and strengthen the labor movement? True, such criticism destroys the authority of the reactionary labor leaders, but what about that? Let the reactionary labor leaders answer the criticism, not expel the Communists from the unions. I think that if the labor movement in America desires to live on and develop, it cannot avoid a conflict of opinion and of tendencies within the trade unions. I think that the conflict of opinion and of tendencies within the trade unions, criticism of the reactionary labor leaders, etc., will continue to grow notwithstanding the efforts of the reformist labor leaders to prevent it. The working class of America stands in absolute need of such conflict of opinion and of such criticism in order that it may be able to choose between the various tendencies and finally to take up its stand as an independent organized force within American society. The complaints made by American reformist leaders against the Communists merely indicate that they are not sure of the correctness of their case and do not feel strong in their position. That is why they fight criticism like a plague. It is a remarkable fact that the American labor leaders are more determined opponents of elementary democracy than many capitalists in America.

The assertion that the American Communists work under "orders from Moscow" is absolutely untrue. There are no such Communists in the world who would agree to work "under orders" from outside against their own convictions and will and contrary to the requirements of the situation. Even if there were such Communists they would not be worth a cent. Communists bravely fight against a host of enemies. The value of a Communist, among other things, lies in that he is able to defend his convictions. Therefore, it is strange to speak of American Communists as not having their own convictions and capable only of working according to "orders" from outside. The only part of the labor leaders' assertion that has any truth in it at all is that the American Communists are affiliated to an international Communist organization and from time to time consult with the Central body of this organization on one question or another.

But what is there bad in this? Are the American labor leaders opposed to an international workers' center? It is true they are not affiliated to Amsterdam, not because they are opposed to an international workers' center as such however, but because they regard Amsterdam as being too radical (laughter). Why may the capitalists organize internationally and the working class, or part of it, not have its international organization? Is it not clear that Green and his friends in the American Federation of Labor slander the American Communists when they slavishly repeat the capitalist legends about "orders from Moscow?" Some people believe that the members of the Communist International in Moscow do nothing else but sit and write instructions to all countries. As there are more than 60 countries affiliated to the Comintern, one can imagine the position of the members of the Comintern who never sleep or eat, in fact do nothing but sit day and night and write instructions to all countries. (laughter). And the American labor leaders believe that with this ridiculous legend they can cover up their fear of the Communists and conceal the fact that Communists are the bravest and most loyal workers in the labor movement in America.

The delegation asks for a way out of this situation. I think there is only one way out: leave room for conflict of opinion and of tendencies within the American trade unions, give up the reactionary policy of expelling the Communists from the trade unions, and give the working class of America an opportunity of making a free choice of these tendencies; for America has not yet had its November Revolution and the workers there have not yet had the opportunity of making their final selection from among the various tendencies in the trade unions.

QUESTION X. Is any money now being sent to America to aid either the American Communist Party or the Communist paper, The "Daily Worker"? If not how much do American Communists remit to the Third International in annual membership dues?

REPLY: If this has reference to the relations between the Communist Party of America and the Third International, I must say that the Communist Party of America, as part of the Communist International most likely pays affiliation fee to the Comintern. On the other hand, the Comintern, being the central body of the International Communist movement, we assume, renders assistance to the Communist Party of America whenever it thinks it necessary. I do not think there is anything surprising or exceptional in this. If however, the question refers to the relations between the Communist Party of America and the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., I must say that I do not know of a single occasion on which the representatives of the American Communist Party appealed for aid to the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. You may think this strange but it is a fact, which indicates that the American Communists are rather independent. What would happen if the Communist Party of America did appeal for aid to the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.? I think the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. would render it whatever assistance it could. Indeed, what would be the worth of the Communist Party, a Party which is in power, if it refused to do what it could to aid the Communist Party of another country laboring under the yoke of capitalism. I would say that such a Communist Party would not be worth a cent. Let us assume that the American working class had come into power after overthrowing its bourgeoisie. Let us assume that the working class of another country appealed to the working class of America, which had emerged victorious in a great struggle against capitalism, for material aid; would the American working class refuse it? I think it would disgrace itself if it hesitated to give the assistance asked for.

QUESTION XI. We understand that some good Communists are not in entire sympathy with the Communist Party's demand that all new members be atheists, now that the reactionary clergy are suppressed. Could the Communist Party in the future take a neutral attitude towards a religious faith which supported all the teachings of science and did not oppose Communism? Could you in the future permit some Party members to hold religious opinions if they did not conflict with Party loyalty?

REPLY: In this question there are several inexactitudes. In the first place, I do not know of any such "good Communists" that the delegates talk about. It is hardly likely that such Communists exist at all. Secondly, I must declare that speaking formally, we have no conditions of Party membership which demand that a candidate for Party membership shall be an Atheist.

The conditions of membership of our Party are: acceptance of the program and rules of the Party; absolute subordination to the decisions of the Party and its organs; payment of membership dues; and membership in one of the Party locals.

A DELEGATE: I often read of expulsions from the Party because of belief in God.

STALIN: I can only repeat the conditions of membership in our Party that I have just mentioned. We have no other condition.

Does that mean the Party is neutral towards religion? No, it does not. We carry on and will continue to carry on propaganda against religious prejudices. Our legislation guaranteed to citizens the right to adhere to any religion. This is a matter for the conscience of each individual. That is precisely why we carried out the separation of the Church from the State. But in separating the Church from the State and proclaiming religious liberty we at the same time guaranteed the right of every citizen to combat by argument, by propaganda and agitation any and all religion. The Party cannot be neutral towards religion and does conduct anti-religious propaganda against all and every religious prejudice because it stands for science, while religious prejudices run counter to science, because all religion is something opposite to science. Cases such as recently occurred in America in which Darwinists were prosecuted in court, cannot occur here because the Party carries out a policy of the general defense of science. The Party cannot be neutral towards religious prejudices and it will continue to carry on propaganda against these prejudices because this is one of the best means of undermining the influence of the reactionary clergy who support the exploiting classes and who preach submission to these classes. The Party cannot be neutral towards the bearers of religious prejudices, towards the reactionary clergy who poison the minds of the toiling masses. Have we suppressed the reactionary clergy? Yes, we have. The unfortunate thing is that it has not been completely liquidated. Anti-religious propaganda is a means by which the complete liquidation of the reactionary clergy must be brought about. Cases occur when certain members of the Party hamper the complete development of anti-religious propaganda. If such members are expelled it is a good thing because there is no room for such "Communists" in the ranks of our Party.

QUESTION XII. Can you outline briefly the characteristics of the Society of the future which Communism is trying to create?

REPLY: The general characteristics of Communist society are given in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Briefly, the anatomy of Communist society may be described as follows: It is a society in which (a) there will be no private ownership of the means of production but social, collective ownership; (b) there will be no classes or State, but workers in industry and agriculture managing their economic affairs as a free association of toilers; (c) national economy will be organized according to plan, will be based on the highest technique in both industry and agriculture; (d) there will be no antagonism between town and country, between industry and agriculture; (e) the products will be distributed according to the principle of the old French Communists: "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs"; (f) science and art will enjoy conditions conducive to their highest development; (g) the individual, freed from bread and butter cares, and of necessity of cringing to the "powerful of the earth," will become really free, etc., etc. Clearly, we are still remote from such a society.

With regard to the international conditions necessary for the complete triumph of Communist society, these will develop and grow in proportion as revolutionary crises and revolutionary outbreaks of the working class in capitalist countries grow.

It must not be imagined that the working class in one country or in several countries will march towards Socialism and still more to Communism while the Capitalists of other countries sit still with folded arms and look on with indifference. Nor must it be imagined that

the working class in capitalist countries will agree to be mere spectators of the victorious development of Socialism in one or another country. As a matter of fact, the capitalists will do all in their power to crush such countries. As a matter of fact, every important step taken towards Socialism, and still more towards Communism, in any country will be inevitably accompanied by the unrestrained efforts of the working class in capitalist countries directed towards achieving the dictatorship and Socialism in those countries. Thus, in the further progress of development of the international revolution, two world centers will be formed: the Socialist center, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating towards Socialism, and the Capitalist center, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating towards capitalism. The fight between these two centers for the conquest of world economy will decide the fate of Capitalism and Communism throughout the whole world, for the final defeat of world capitalism means the victory of Socialism in the arena of world economy.

Stalin's Questions to the Delegation and its Replies
STALIN: If the delegation is not too tired, I would ask it to permit me to put several questions. (Delegation agrees).

QUESTION I. How do you account for the small percentage of American workers organized in trade unions? I think there are about 17 million industrial workers in America (the delegates explain that there are from 18 to 19 million industrial workers). I think that about 3 millions are organized. (Delegates explain that the American Federation of Labor has a membership approximately of 3 million and that besides these about a half million workers are organized in other unions, so that taken together 3½ million workers are organized.) Personally I think that the proportion of American workers organized in trade unions is very small. In the U.S.S.R. 90% of all the proletarians in the country are organized in trade unions.

I would like to ask the delegation whether it regards this small percentage of organized workers as a good thing. Does not the delegation think that this small percentage is an indication of the weakness of the American proletariat and of the weakness of its weapon in the struggle against the capitalists in the economic field?

BROPHY: The small membership of trade unions is to be explained not by the bad tactics applied in the labor organizations but by the general economic conditions prevailing in the country, which do not stimulate the whole mass of the workers to organize. These favorable economic conditions restrict the necessity of the working class to fight against the capitalists. Of course, these conditions will change. And simultaneously with the change in these conditions, the trade unions will grow and the whole of the trade union movement will proceed along a different path.

DOUGLAS: I agree with the explanation given by the previous speaker. To that I add however, that first of all, it is necessary to bear in mind that wages in the United States have been recently increased considerably by the capitalists themselves. This process of rising wages was observed in 1917, 1919 and later. If we compare the real wages prevailing at the present time with the wages prevailing in 1911, we will find that they are considerably higher. In the process of its development the trade union movement at first based itself and still bases itself on the craft principle, according to trade, and the trade unions were formed mainly for skilled workers. At the head of these unions, there were definite leaders who represented a close organization and strove to obtain good conditions for their members. They had no stimuli to widen the labor organizations or to organize the unskilled workers. Moreover, the American trade unions come up against well-organized capitalism which has at its disposal all

means to prevent the organization of all the workers in trade unions. If for example, a trust encounters the too strong resistance of the trade unions in one of its enterprises, it will close down that enterprise and transfer its work to another. In this way the resistance of the trade unions is broken. The American capitalists voluntarily raise the wages of the workers but give them no economic power or the possibility of fighting for the economic improvement of their conditions of life. Another very important fact in America is that the capitalists sow dissension among the workers of various nationalities. In the majority of cases the unskilled workers are immigrants from Europe or as become the case recently, Negroes. Dissension is also sown between skilled workers and unskilled workers.

The capitalists systematically sow antagonism among the workers of various nationalities irrespective of their degree of skill. During the last ten years American capitalism has been conducting a more enlightened policy in that they are forming their own trade unions, the so-called company unions. They strive to develop the workers' interest in the enterprise and in the increase of profits. American capitalism shows a tendency to substitute horizontal division by vertical division, i. e., to split up the working class and to give it an interest in capitalism.

COYLE: I approach the question not from the theoretical point of view but from the practical point of view. It is true that it is easier to organize the workers in good times but the statistics of the membership of the American Federation of Labor show that the A. F. of L. is gradually losing the unskilled workers and is increasing its membership of skilled workers. Thus the American Federation of Labor desires to become and is gradually becoming an organization principally of the skilled workers. The trade union movement in America barely touches the unskilled workers. The big branches of industry are hardly touched by the trade unions. Of these big branches of industry only the mining and railroad industries are organized to any extent, and even in the coal industry 65 per cent of the workers are unorganized. The workers in such industries as steel, rubber, and automobiles are hardly organized at all. It may be said that the trade unions do not touch the unskilled workers. There are a number of trade unions outside the American Federation of Labor which strive to organize the unskilled and semiskilled workers. As for the position taken up by the leaders of the American Federation of Labor, for example, the President of the Machinists Union quite frankly stated that he does not wish to attract the unskilled workers to his union. The position in regard to the trade union leaders is this: that a leader caste has grown up consisting of a few score of individuals who receive enormous salaries up to $10,000 per annum and even more, into which it is extremely difficult to penetrate.

DUNN: The question put by Stalin is not fair because if in this country 90 per cent of the workers are organized, it must be borne in mind that here power is in the hands of the working class, whereas in capitalist countries the workers are an oppressed class and the bourgeoisie does everything to prevent the workers from organizing. Moreover, there are reactionary trade unions led by reactionary leaders in those countries. In the conditions prevailing in America it is very difficult to get into the heads of the workers the very idea of trade unionism. This explains why trade unionism in America is not so widespread.

STALIN: Does the speaker agree with the previous speaker that certain leaders of the labor movement in America strive to restrict the trade union movement?

DUNN: I agree.

STALIN: I did not wish to offend anybody. I merely wanted to clear up for myself the difference in the situation that exists in America as compared with the U.S.S.R. If I have offended anybody I hope you will forgive me. (Laughter.)

STALIN: Is there a system of State insurance of workers in America?

A DELEGATE: There is no system of State insurance of workers in America.

COYLE: In the majority of states compensation is paid for accidents during employment and the maximum of 30 per cent of the loss of earning capacity is paid. This is in the majority of states. The compensation is paid by the private firms in whose enterprises the accident occurred. But the law demands that compensation shall be paid.

STALIN: Is there State insurance against unemployment in America?

A DELEGATE: No. The funds for insurance against unemployment might satisfy from 80 to 100,000 unemployed in all states.

COYLE: There is insurance (not government insurance) against accidents during employment but there is no insurance against sickness or old age. The insurance fund is made up of contributions from the workers. As a matter of fact the fund is provided by the workers themselves, because if the workers did not organize these funds they would receive higher wages and as these funds are established in agreement with the employers the workers receive a smaller wage. As a matter of fact, the employers contribute only a very small, proportion of the fund, about 10 per cent. Almost the whole of it is made up by the workers.

STALIN: I think the comrades will be interested to learn that in the U.S.S.R. more than 800 million roubles per annum are appropriated for workers' insurance. It will not be superfluous to add also that our workers in all branches of industry, in addition to their ordinary money wages, receive a supplementary grant of about one-third of the wages paid for insurance, social improvements, cultural requirements.

QUESTION II. How do you explain the absence of a special mass workers' party in the United States? The bourgeoisie in America have two parties, the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. But the American workers have no mass party of their own. Do not the comrades think that the absence of such a mass workers' party even if it were like the British Labor Party weakens the working class in its political fight against the capitalists? Then again, why do the leaders of the Labor movement in America, Green and the others, so strongly oppose the establishment of a Labor Party in America?

BROPHY: Yes, the leaders did decide that there was no necessity for forming such a Party. However, there is a minority which considers that such a Party is necessary.

Conditions in America at the present time are such, as has been pointed out already, that the trade union movement is extremely weak. The weakness of the trade union movement is to be explained in its turn by the fact that the working class at present does not have to fight against the capitalists because the capitalists themselves increase wages and guarantee to them satisfactory material conditions.

STALIN: But it is the skilled workers mainly whose material conditions are guaranteed. There is a contradiction here. On the one hand it would appear that there is no necessity for organization because the workers are provided for. On the other hand it is said that the more secure workers, the skilled workers, are organized in the trade unions. Thirdly, it would appear that the unorganized workers are those least provided for, namely, the unskilled workers who most of all stand in need of organization. I cannot understand this at all.

BROPHY: Yes. There is a contradiction. But So are American political and economic conditions contradictory.

BREBNER: Although the unskilled workers are not organized, they have the political right to vote, so that if there is any discontent the unskilled workers can express this discontent by exercising their political right to vote. On the other hand the organized workers who belong to trade unions, when particularly bad times come, do not turn to their union but exercise their vote. Thus the political right to vote compensates for the lack of trade union organization.

ISRAELS: One of the principal difficulties is the very System of election in the United States. Is is not the man for whom the majority of the votes of the whole country is cast, or even the majority of the votes of any particular class is cast, that is elected as President. In every state there is an electoral college; every state has a certain number of electors who participate in the election of the President. To be elected, the candidate must obtain 51 per cent of the votes. If there were 3 or 4 parties no one candidate would be elected and the election of the President would have to be transferred to the Congress. This is an argument against forming a third Party.

The opponents of the third party argue in this way: Don't put forward a third candidate because you will split the liberal vote and you will prevent the liberal candidate from being elected.

STALIN: But Senator LaFollette in his time was creating a third bourgeois party. It follows then that the third party will not split votes if it is a bourgeois party, but it may split votes if it is a labor party.

DAVIS: I do not regard the fact mentioned by the previous speaker as a fundamental one. I think the most important point is the following. I will quote the example of the city in which I live. During the election campaign the representative of a certain party gives the trade union leader an important job in connection with the campaign and places certain funds at his disposal, which he uses for his own purpose. In this way he obtains a high prestige connected with his job. It turns out, therefore, that the leaders of the trade union support one or the other of the bourgeois parties. Naturally, when there is any talk of forming a third party, a labor party, these labor leaders refuse to do anything in the matter. They argue that if a third party were formed there would be a split in the trade union movement.

DOUGLAS: The fact that only skilled workers are organized in trade unions is due principally to the fact that in order to be able to form a union a man must have money and be will off, because the entrance fees are high and the unskilled worker cannot afford to pay. Moreover, the unskilled workers is under the constant danger of being thrown out of work if he attempts to organize. The unskilled workers can be organized only with the active aid of the skilled workers.

In the majority of cases this aid is not forthcoming and this is one of the principal obstacles to the organization of the unskilled workers. The principal means by which the workers can defend their rights are political means. This in my opinion is the principal reason why the unskilled workers are unorganized. I consider the economic condition the principal factor in the unorganized state of the unskilled workers in the political and industrial fields. I must point to a special feature of the American electoral system. The direct primary election, in which any man may get to the election booth. declare himself a democrat or a republican and cast his vote. I am convinced that Gompers could not keep the workers on a non-partisan political program if he did not have the argument of the direct primary. He always told the workers that if they wished to act politically, they could join either of the existing two political parties, get the responsible positions in them and command influence. With this argument Gompers managed to keep the workers away from the idea of organizing the working class and of forming a Labor Party.

QUESTION III. How do you explain that on the question of recognizing the U.S.S.R. the leaders of the American Federation of Labor are more reactionary than many bourgeois? How do you explain that bourgeois like Mr. Borah and others are in favor of recognizing the U.S.S R., while American labor leaders like Gompers and Green have conducted and still conduct reactionary propaganda against the recognition of the first workers' Republic, against the recognition of the U.S.S.R.? How do you explain that even a reactionary like the late President of the United States Woodrow Wilson was able to "greet" Soviet Russia, while Green and other leaders of the American Federation of Labor wish to be more reactionary than the capitalists? Here is the text of the "greeting" Woodrow Wilson sent to the Soviet Congress in Russia in March, 1918, at the time that the troops of the German Kaiser were marching against Soviet Leningrad:

May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when Germany moves its military forces into your country to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purpose of the people of Russia?

Although the Government of the United States is, unhappily, not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that the Government of the United States will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restoration to her great role in the life of Europe and the modern world.

The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from outocratic government and become the masters of their own life. [Pravda, No. 50, March 16, 1918.]

Can we regard it as normal when the leaders of the American Federation of Labor desire to be more reactionary than reactionary Wilson?

BROPHY: I cannot precisely explain the reason but I think that the leaders of the American Federation of Labor are opposed to the recognition of Soviet Russia for the very same reason that the American Federation of Labor is not affiliated to the Amsterdam International. I think it is due to the peculiar philosophy of the American workers and to the difference in the economic conditions of the American workers as compared with the European workers.

STALIN: But as far as I know the American Federation of Labor does not object to the recognition of Italy or Poland where Fascism reigns.

BROPHY: By quoting the example of Poland and Italy where there are Fascist governments you explain the reason for the non-recognition of the U.S.S.R. by America. The hostile attitude towards the U.S.S.R. is explained by the unpleasantness which the Communists at home cause the American labor leaders.

DUNN: The argument used by the last speaker - that the 1abof leaders cannot recognize the U.S.S.R. because they cannot get on with the Communists at home is not convincing because they preached the non-recognition of the U.S.S.R. before the American Communist Party was organized. The principal reason is that the leaders of the American Federation of Labor are opposed to everything in the nature of Socialism. In this they are encouraged by the capitalists who have their own organization, called the National Civic Federation, which does its utmost to rouse American society against Socialism in any form. This organization opposed the position taken by Ivy Lee who advocates the development of commercial relations between American and the U.S.S.R. The leaders of this organization say: "How can we maintain order among our own working class when liberals begin to talk like this?" The National Civic Federation is an organization of a group of capitalists who have invested a large sum of money in it and who control it. It should be mentioned that the vice-president of this reactionary organization is Matthew Woll, the vice-president of the American Federation of Labor.

BROPHY: The explanations regarding the reactionary character of the labor leaders that have been made here are inadequate. We must look deeper. The presence of the American delegation in the U.S.S.R. is the best reply, and is evidence of the sympathy of a section of the American workers to the workers of the Soviet Union. I think that the opinion of the leaders of the American Federation of Labor in regard to the U.S.S.R. does not differ from the opinion of the majority of the working class in America. The position of the majority of the working class in regard to the U.S.S.R. is to be explained by the remoteness from the U.S.S.R. The working class of America is not interested in international affairs and the influence of the bourgeoisie on the working class of America makes itself felt very strongly in regard to its attitude towards the U.S.S.R.

Notes

1. FIRST AMERICAN TRADE UNION DELEGATION TO SOVIET RUSSIA

Honorary Chairman: L. E. SHEPPARD, President Order of Railway Conductors; Member first Federal Industrial Commission; Chairman U. S. Government Commission on Labor Conditions in the Hawaiian Islands.

Chairman: JAMES H. MAURER, President Pennsylvania State Federation of Labor; President of Workers' Education Bureau; Chairman Brookwood Labor College Committee; Chairman Pennsylvania Old Age Assistance Commission.

JOHN BROPHY, President District 2, United Mine Workers of America (1917-27); member executive committee, Workers' Education Bureau; member Labor Committee, Brookwood Labor College; Vice-President Public Ownership League of America.

FRANK L. PALMER, Editor Colorado Labor Advocate; member International Typographical Union; University of Denver and Denver Labor college.

JAMES WILLIAM FITZPATRICK, President Actors' and Artists of America, Holy Cross College and Catholic University of America.

Secretary: ALBERT F. COYLE, Executive Secretary All American Cooperative Commission; Editor B. of L. E. Journal (1921-27); Chairman Progressive Party of Cuyahoga County, O.; Editor, Cooperative News Service; graduate of Stanford and Yale Universities.

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JEROME DAVIS, PH.D., Professor Practical Philanthrophy, Yale University; Expert on Russian Affairs; author, The Russian Emigrant, etc.

PAUL H. DOUGLAS, PH.D., Professor of Industrial Relations, University of Chicago; author, Wages and the Family, American Apprenticeship and Industrial Education, etc.

ROBERT W. DUNN, research worker; A. B. Yale University; author, American Foreign Investments, Americanization of Labor, etc.

ARTHUR FISHER, A.B. Harvard University and Law School; former Professor of Law, University of Montana.

J. A. H. HOPKINS, Chairman Committee of 48; National Bureau of Information and Education.

CARLOS I. ISRAELS, A.B. Amherst College; Editorial Board Columbia University Law Review.

R. G. TUGWELL, PH.D., Associate Profossor of Economics, Columbia University; author American Economic Life, Industrial Coming of Age, etc.; Editor, Trend of Economics.

CARLETON WASHBURNE, PH.D., Stanford University; Superintendent of Public Schools, Winetka, Ill.; author, New Schools in Old World, etc.

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SARA RAGOZIN, A.B. University of Wisconsin.

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To Comrade M. I. Ulyanova
Reply to Comrade L. Mikhelson

The other day I received from you a copy of Comrade Mikhelson's letter on the national question. Here is my answer in a few words.

1) The Buryat comrades asked me: "How is one to conceive the transition to a single universal culture through the national cultures which are developing within the limits of our individual autonomous republics?" (See Stalin, Problems of Leninism, p. 259.1) I answered that this transition is conceived not as a transition through a "single universal language and the dying away of all other languages in the period of socialism,"2 but through the assimilation by the nationalities of a universal culture that will be proletarian in content, but in forms corresponding to the languages and manner of life of these nationalities (see Problems of Leninism). To explain this I quoted a number of facts about the development of our revolution, which led to the awakening and strengthening of the nationalities formerly pushed into the background, and of their cultures. That is what the controversy was about.

Comrade Mikhelson has failed to understand the essence of the controversy.

2) Comrade Mikhelson, cavilling at my words "in the period of socialism" (see above), and at my statement that the process of assimilation of some nationalities does not imply the disappearance of nations in general, asserts that some of Stalin's formulations can give grounds for interpreting them as "a revision of Leninism" on the national question. Moreover, he quotes Lenin's statement that "the aim of socialism is not only to abolish the division of mankind into small states and all isolation of nations, not only to draw the nations together, but to merge them."3

I think, firstly, that Comrade Mikhelson is diverging from the presentation of the question given by the Buryat comrades in their letter and from which Stalin could not possibly diverge in his speech at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. The Buryats had in mind precisely a transition through national cultures to a universal culture, moreover the Buryat comrades evidently thought that first there will be national cultures and later a universal culture. In his answer, Stalin objected to this and said that this transition will not take place in the way the Buryats imagine, but that among the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. there will be a simultaneous development both of national culture (in form) and of a universal culture (in content), and that only with such a way of this transition can the assimilation of the universal culture by the nationalities take place (see Problems of Leninism).

I think, further, that Comrade Mikhelson has failed to grasp the meaning of my answer. When speaking of the "period of socialism" in our country, I had in mind not the "final" victory of socialism, a victory which can be achieved only on an international scale, when socialism is victorious in all or in a number of the major countries, but the period of the building of socialism in our country. That is obvious from the entire presentation of the question in my speech at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. Can it be asserted that during the period of the building of socialism in our country (the "period of socialism"), i.e., before the victory of socialism in other countries, the nations in our country will unfailingly disappear, that they will merge into one common nation with one common language? I think that it cannot be asserted. More than that. Even after the victory of the proletarian dictatorship on a world scale, even after that, for a long time national and state differences will still exist.

Lenin was quite right when he said that “national and state differences among peoples and countries . . . will continue to exist for a very, very long time ever after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale” (see Vol. XXV, p. 227).

How, then, are we to understand the passage from Lenin quoted by Comrade Mikhelson, which states that the aim of socialism is, in the long run, the merging of nations? I think we should understand it differently from the way Comrade Mikhelson does, for it is obvious from what has been said above that in this passage Lenin had in mind the merging of nations as the ultimate aim of socialism, to be achieved as a result of the victory of socialism in all countries “a very, very long time . . . after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale.”

It follows, therefore, that Comrade Mikhelson does riot understand Lenin. 3) I think that there is no need to make Stalin’s “formulations” “more precise.” I am waiting impatiently for the opposition to dare to touch upon the principle of the national question in an open controversy at the Party congress. I am afraid it will not dare to do that, for after Zinoviev’s unsuccessful speech at the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, the opposition preferred to say absolutely nothing about the question of national culture in its recent “platform.” If, however, the oppositionists do pluck up courage and raise the question, all the better far the Party, for the Party will only gain by it.

J. Stalin
September 16, 1927
Published for the first time

Notes

1. J. V. Stalin, “The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East” (see Works, Vol. 7, p. 142).

2. J. V. Stalin, “The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East” (see Works, Vol. 7, p. 141).

3. V. I. Lenin, The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, p. 135).

The Political Complexion
of the Russian Opposition
Excerpt from a Speech Delivered at a Joint Meeting of the Presidium of the utive Committee of the Comintern and the International Control Commission
September 27, 1927

Comrades, the speakers here have spoken so well and they have discussed the subject so thoroughly that there is little left for me to say.

I did not hear Vuiovich's speech as I was not in the hall; I caught only the end of his speech. From that end I gathered that he accuses the C.P.S.U.(B.) of opportunism, that he regards himself as a Bolshevik and undertakes to teach the C.P.S.U.(B.) Leninism.

What can one say to that? Unfortunately, we have a certain number of people in our Party who call themselves Bolsheviks but actually have nothing in common with Leninism. I think that Vuiovich is one of their number. When people like that undertake to teach the C.P.S.U.(B.) Leninism it is easy to understand that nothing can come of it. I think that Vuiovich's criticism is not worth answering.

I recall an anecdote about the German poet Heine. Permit me to tell it to you. Among the various critics who opposed Heine in the press was a most unfortunate and rather untalented literary critic named Auffenberg. The chief characteristic of this writer was that he tirelessly kept on "criticising" and impertinently attacking Heine in the press. Evidently, Heine did not think it worth while reacting to this "criticism" and maintained a stubborn silence. This surprised Heine's friends and so they wrote to him asking how it was that the writer Auffen-berg had written a heap of critical articles against him and that he did not think it worth while replying. Heine was obliged to answer his friends. What did he say? He answered in the press in these few words: "Auffen-berg the writer I do not know; I believe he is something like Arlincourt, whom I do not know either."

Paraphrasing Heine, the Russian Bolsheviks could say about Vuiovich's exercises in criticism: "Vuiovich the Bolshevik we do not know; we believe he is something like Ali Baba, whom we do not know either."

About Trotsky and the opposition. The opposition's chief misfortune is that it does not know what it is talking about. In his speech Trotsky spoke of policy in China; but he refuses to admit that the opposition has never had any line, any policy in relation to China. The opposition has wobbled, has marked time, has swung to and fro, but it has never had a line. The controversy between us revolved around three questions relating to China: the question of the Communists' participation in the Kuomintang, the question of Soviets, and the question of the character of the Chinese revolution. On all three questions the opposition proved to be bankrupt because it had no line.

The question of taking part in the Kuomintang. In April 1926, that is, a month after the Sixth Plenum of the E.C.C.I., at which a decision was taken in favour of Communists belonging to the Kuomintang, the opposition demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang. Why? Because, frightened by Chiang Kai-shek's first onslaught (March 1926), the opposition in effect demanded submission to Chiang Kai-shek, it wanted to withdraw the Communists from the play of revolutionary forces in China.

The formal grounds, however, on which the opposition based its demand for withdrawal from the Kuomin-tang were that Communists cannot take part in bourgeois-revolutionary organisations, and the Kuomintang was certainly such an organisation. A year later, in April 1927, the opposition demanded that the Communists should take part in the Wuhan Kuomintang. Why? On what grounds? Had the Kuomintang ceased to be a bourgeois organisation in 1927? Is there a line here, even the shadow of a line?

The question of Soviets. Here, too, the opposition had no definite line. In April 1927, one part of the opposition demanded immediate organisation of Soviets in China for the purpose of overthrowing the Kuomintang in Wuhan (Trotsky). At the same time the other part of the opposition also demanded immediate organisation of Soviets, but for the purpose of supporting the Kuomintang in Wuhan, and not of overthrowing it (Zinoviev). And that is what they call a line! Moreover, both parts of the opposition, both Trotsky and Zinoviev, while demanding the organisation of Soviets, at the same time demanded participation of the Communists in the Kuomintang, participation of the Communists in the ruling party. Make head or tail of that, if you can! Organise Soviets and at the same time demand participation of the Communists in the ruling party, that is, in the Kuomintang—not everybody is capable of such a stupidity. And that is called a line!

The question of the character of the Chinese revolution. The Comintern was and still is of the opinion that the basis of the revolution in China in the present period is the agrarian peasant revolution. What is the opposition's opinion on this subject? It never has had any definite opinion on it. At one time it asserted that there cannot be an agrarian revolution in China since there is no feudalism there. At another time it declared that an agrarian revolution is possible and necessary in China, although it did not attach serious significance to the survivals of feudalism there, which made it difficult to understand what could give rise to an agrarian revolution. At yet another time it asserted that the chief thing in the Chinese revolution is not an agrarian revolution, but a revolution for customs autonomy. Make head or tail of that, if you can!

Such is the opposition's so-called "line" on the controversial questions of the Chinese revolution.

That is not a line, but marking time, confusion, complete absence of a line.

And these people undertake to criticise the Leninist position of the Comintern! Is that not ridiculous, comrades?

Trotsky spoke here about the revolutionary movement in Kwangtung, about the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh Ting, and he accused us of creating a new Kuomin-tang here to head this movement. I shall not attempt to refute this story, which Trotsky has simply invented. All I want to say is that the whole business of the southern revolutionary movement, the departure of the troops of

Yeh Ting and Ho Lung from Wuhan, their march into Kwangtung, their joining the peasant revolutionary movement and so forth—I want to say that all this was undertaken on the initiative of the Chinese Communist Party. Does Trotsky know that? He ought to, if he knows anything at all.

Who will head this movement if it gains successes, if there is a new upsurge of the revolution in China? Soviets, of course. Before, in the hey-day of the Kuomin-tang, conditions were unfavourable for the immediate organisation of Soviets. Now, however, that the Kuo-mintangists have disgraced and discredited themselves by their connection with the counter-revolution, now, if the movement gains success, Soviets can become and actually will become, the main force that will rally around itself the workers and peasants of China. And who will be at the head of the Soviets? The Communists, of course. But the Communists will no longer take part in the Kuomintang if a revolutionary Kuomintang appears upon the scene again. Only ignoramuses can combine the existence of Soviets with the possibility of Communists belonging to the Kuomintang party. To combine these two incompatible things means failure to understand the nature and purpose of Soviets.

The same must be said about the Anglo-Russian Committee. Here we have the same wobbling and absence of a line on the part of the opposition. At first the opposition was enchanted by the Anglo-Russian Committee. It even asserted that the Anglo-Russian Committee was a means of "making reformism in Europe harmless" (Zinoviev), evidently forgetting that the British half of the Anglo-Russian Committee consisted precisely of reformists.

Later, when the opposition realised at last that Pur-cell and his friends are reformists, its enchantment gave way to disenchantment, more than that, to desperation, and it demanded an immediate rupture as a means of overthrowing the General Council, failing to understand that the General Council cannot be overthrown from Moscow. Swinging from one piece of stupidity to another — such was the opposition's so-called "line" on the question of the Anglo-Russian Committee.

Trotsky is incapable of understanding that when things are ripe for a rupture, the main thing is not the rupture as such, but the question on which the rupture takes place, the idea that is demonstrated by the rupture. What idea is demonstrated by the rupture that has already taken place? The idea of the threat of war, the idea of the need to combat the war danger. Who can deny that it is precisely this idea that is now the main question of the day all over Europe? From this it follows, however, that it was precisely on this major question that we had to bring the masses of the workers up against the treachery of the General Council, and that is what we did. The fact that the General Council found itself compelled to take the initiative in the rupture and bear the odium of it at a time of the threat of a new war — this fact is the best possible exposure in the eyes of the masses of the workers of the General Council's treacherous and social-imperialist "nature" on the basic question of war. But the opposition asserts that it would have been better had we taken the initiative in the rupture and borne the odium of it!

And that is what they call a line! And these muddle-heads undertake to criticise the Leninist position of the Comintern! Is that not ridiculous, comrades?

The opposition is in an even worse plight on the question of our Party, on the question of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Trotsky does not understand our Party. He has a wrong conception of our Party. He regards our Party in the same way as an aristocrat regards the "rabble," or a bureaucrat his subordinates. If that were not so, he would not assert that it is possible in a party a million strong, in the C.P.S.U.(B.), for individuals, for individual leaders, to "seize," to "usurp" power. To talk about "seizing" power in a party a million strong, a party that has made three revolutions and is now shaking the foundations of world imperialism—such is the depth of stupidity to which Trotsky has sunk!

Is it at all possible to "seize" power in a party a million strong, a party rich in revolutionary traditions? If it is, why has Trotsky failed to "seize" power in the Party, to force his way to leadership of the Party? How is that to be explained? Does Trotsky lack the will and the desire to lead? Is it not a fact that for more than two decades already Trotsky has been fighting the Bolsheviks for leadership in the Party? Why has he failed to "seize" power in the Party? Is he a less powerful orator than the present leaders of our Party? Would it not be truer to say that as an orator Trotsky is superior to many of the present leaders of our Party? How, then, are we to explain the fact that notwithstanding his oratorical skill, notwithstanding his will to lead, notwithstanding his abilities, Trotsky was thrown out of the leadership of the great party which is called the C.P.S.U.(B.)? The explanation that Trotsky is inclined to offer is that our Party, in his opinion, is a voting herd, which blindly follows the Central Committee of the Party. But only people who despise the Party and regard it as rabble can speak of it in that way. Only a down-at-heel party aristocrat can regard the Party as a voting herd. It is a sign that Trotsky has lost the sense of Party principle, has lost the ability to discern the real reasons why the Party distrusts the opposition.

Indeed, why does the C.P.S.U.(B.) express utter distrust of the opposition? The reason is that the opposition intended to replace Leninism by Trotskyism, to supplement Leninism with Trotskyism, to "improve" Leninism by means of Trotskyism. But the Party wants to remain faithful to Leninism in spite of all the various artifices of the down-at-heel aristocrats in the Party. That is the root cause why the Party, which has made three revolutions, found it necessary to turn its back on Trotsky and on the opposition as a whole.

And the Party will behave in a similar way towards all "leaders" and "guides" who intend to embellish Leninism with Trotskyism or any other variety of opportunism.

By depicting our Party as a voting herd, Trotsky expresses contempt for the mass of the C.P.S.U.(B.) membership. Is it surprising that the Party reciprocates this contempt and expresses utter distrust of Trotsky?

The opposition is in the same plight on the question of the regime in our Party. Trotsky tries to make it appear that the present regime in the Party, which is opposed by the entire opposition, is something fundamentally different from the regime that was established inthe Party in Lenin's time. He wants to make it appear that he has no objection to the regime established by Lenin after the Tenth Congress, but that, strictly speaking, he is fighting the present regime in the Party, which, he claims, has nothing in common with the regime established by Lenin.

I assert that here Trotsky is uttering a plain untruth.

I assert that the present regime in the Party is an exact expression of the regime that was established in the Party in Lenin's time, at the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses of our Party.

I assert that Trotsky is fighting the Leninist regime in the Party, the regime that was established in Lenin's time, and under Lenin's guidance.

I assert that the Trotskyists had already started their fight against the Leninist regime in the Party in Lenin's time, and that the fight the Trotskyists are now waging is a continuation of the fight against the regime in the Party which they were already waging in Lenin's time.

What are the underlying principles of that regime? They are that while inner-Party democracy is operated and business like criticism of the Party's defects and mistakes is permitted, no factionalism whatsoever can be permitted, and all factionalism must be abandoned on pain of expulsion from the Party.

When was this regime established in the Party? At the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses of our Party, that is, in Lenin's time.

I assert that Trotsky and the opposition are fighting this very same regime in the Party.

We have a document like the "Declaration of the Forty Six," signed by Trotskyists like Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, Alsky, and others, which definitely said that the regime established in the Party after the Tenth Congress was now obsolete and had become intolerable for the Party.

What did those people demand? They demanded that factional groups be permitted in the Party and that the corresponding decision of the Tenth Congress be rescinded. That was in 1923. I declare that Trotsky has wholly and entirely identified himself with the stand of the "Forty-Six" and is waging a fight against the regime that was established in the Party after the Tenth Congress. There you have the beginning of the Trotskyists' fight against the Leninist regime in the Party. (Trotsky: "I did not speak about the Tenth Congress. You are inventing.") Trotsky must surely know that I can bring documentary proof. The documents have remained in tact; I shall distribute them among the comrades and it will then be clear which of us is speaking the truth. 1

I assert that the Trotskyists who signed the "Declaration of the Forty-Six" were already waging a fight against the Leninist regime in the Party in Lenin's time.

I assert that Trotsky supported this fight against the Leninist regime all the time, inspiring the opposition and egging it on.

I assert that Trotsky's present fight against the regime in our Party is a continuation of the anti-Leninist fight I have just spoken about.

The question of the Trotskyists' illegal, anti-Party printing press. Trotsky constructed his written speech in such a way that he barely mentioned the illegal printing press, evidently considering that he was not obliged to deal with such a "trifle" as the Trotskyists' illegal, anti-Party printing press. It was not the speech of an accused person, but a declaration of the opposition levelling charges against the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.). It is obvious, however, that the question of the Trotskyists' illegal, anti-Party printing press wholly and completely exposes both Trotsky and his supporters in the opposition as enemies of the Party principle, as splitters and disrupters of the proletarian cause.

Indeed, Trotsky thinks that the opposition is right — and therefore it has a right to set up its illegal printing press.

In addition to Trotsky's group, however, there are other opposition groups in the C.P.S.U.(B.): the "Workers' Opposition," the Sapronovites, and so forth. Each of these small groups believes it is right. If we follow in Trotsky's footsteps we must grant that each of these groups has a right to set up its illegal printing press. Let us suppose that they do set up their illegal

printing presses and that the Party takes no steps to combat this evil—what will then be left of the Party?

What would it mean to permit all the various groups in the Party to have their illegal printing presses? It would mean permitting the existence of a number of centres in the Party, each having its "programme," its "platform," its "line." What will then be left of the iron discipline in our Party, the discipline which Lenin regarded as the foundation of the proletarian dictatorship? Is such discipline possible unless there is a single, united leading centre? Does Trotsky realise what a quagmire he is slipping into by advocating the right of opposition groups to have illegal, anti-Party printing presses?

The question of Bonapartism. On this question the opposition betrays utter ignorance. By accusing the overwhelming majority in our Party of making attempts at Bonapartism, Trotsky demonstrates his utter ignorance and failure to understand the roots of Bona-partism.

What is Bonapartism? Bonapartism is an attempt to impose the will of the minority upon the majority by the use of force. Bonapartism is the forcible seizure of power in a party, or in a country, by the minority in opposition to the majority. But since the supporters of the line of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) constitute the overwhelming majority both in the Party and in the Soviets, how can any body be so silly as to say that the majority is trying to impose its own will upon itself by the use of force? Has there ever been a case in history when the majority has imposed its own will upon itself by the use of force? Who but lunatics would believe that such an inconceivable thing is possible?

Is it not a fact that the supporters of the line of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) constitute the overwhelming majority in the Party and in the country? Is it not a fact that the opposition is merely a tiny handful? One can conceive of the majority in our Party imposing its will upon the minority, i.e., the opposition; and that is quite lawful in the Party sense of the term. But how can one conceive of the majority imposing its will upon itself, and by the use of force at that? How can there be any question of Bonapartism here? Would it not be truer to say that a tendency may arise among the minority, that is, among the opposition, to impose its will upon the majority? It would not be surprising if such a tendency did arise, for the minority, that is, the Trotsky-ist opposition, has now no other means of capturing the leadership except by resorting to force against the majority. So that, if we are to speak of Bonapartism, let Trotsky look for Bonaparte candidates in his group.

A few words about degeneration and Thermidor tendencies. I shall not analyse here the foolish and ignorant charges about degeneration and Thermidor tendencies which the oppositionists sometimes advance against the Party. I shall not deal with them because they are not worth analysing. I should like to present the question from the purely practical point of view.

Let us assume for a moment that the Trotskyist opposition is pursuing a genuinely revolutionary policy and not a Social Democratic deviation—if that is the case, how are we to explain the fact that all the degenerate opportunist elements who have been expelled from the Party and from the Comintern gather around the Trotskyist opposition, find shelter and protection there?

How are we to explain the fact that Ruth Fischer and Maslow, Scholem and Urbahns, who have been expelled from the Comintern and from the Communist Party of Germany as

degenerate and renegade elements, find protection and a hearty welcome precisely in the Trotskyist opposition?

How are we to account for the fact that opportunists and real degenerates like Souvarine and Rosmer in France, and Ossovsky and Dashkovsky in the U.S.S.R., find shelter precisely in the Trotskyist opposition?

Can it be called an accident that the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.) expel these degenerates and really Ther-midor minded people from their ranks, whereas Trotsky and Zinoviev welcome them with open arms and afford them shelter and protection?

Do not these facts show that the "revolutionary" phrases of the Trotskyist opposition remain mere phrases, while, in actual fact, the opposition is the rallying centre of the degenerate elements?

Does not all this show that the Trotskyist opposition is a hotbed and nursery of degeneration and Thermidor tendencies?

At any rate among us in the C.P.S.U.(B.), there is one and only one group that rallies around itself all sorts of scoundrels, such as Maslow and Ruth Fischer, Souvarine and Ossovsky. That group is the Trotsky group.

Such, in general, comrades, is the political complexion of the opposition.

You will ask: What conclusion is to be drawn?

There is only one conclusion. The opposition has got itself into such a muddle, it has so agilely landed in an impasse from which there is no escape, that it is faced with the alternative: either the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.), or Maslow, Ruth Fischer, and the renegades of the illegal, anti-Party press.

It cannot go on swinging between these two camps forever. The time has come to choose. Either with the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.), and then—war against Maslow and Ruth Fischer, against all the renegades. Or against the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Comintern, and then—a good riddance of them to the Maslow and Ruth Fischer group, to all the renegades and degenerates, to all the Shcherbakovs and other scum. (Applause.)

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Notes

1. Note of the Editorial Board of "The Communist International": On October 3, Comrade Stalin submitted to the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I., as an appendix to the minutes of the joint meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. and the International Control Commission, the documentary proofs he had referred to in his speech, namely:

1) An excerpt from the "Declaration of the Forty-Six" (October 15, 1923), signed by Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, Alsky, and others, which states: "The regime which has been established in the Party is absolutely intolerable. It kills the Party's independent activity and substitutes for the Party a picked, bureaucratic apparatus, which operates without a hitch in normal times, but which inevitably misfires in moments of crisis, and which is in

danger of proving utterly bankrupt in face of impending grave events. The present situation is due to the fact that the regime of factional dictatorship within the Party that objectively arose after the Tenth Congress is now obsolete."

2) An excerpt from Trotsky's statement to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (October 8, 1923), which states: " The regime which, in the main, had already arisen before the Twelfth Congress and was definitely established and given shape after it, is far more remote from workers' democracy than the regime that existed in the severest periods of war communism."

In explanation of these excerpts it must be said that before the Twelfth ongress we had the Eleventh Congress (in the spring of 1922) and the Tenth Congress (in the spring of 1921), the proceedings of which were directed by Lenin, and the resolutions of which gave definite shape to the very regime in the Party which is attacked in the "Declaration of the Forty-Six" (Trotskyists) and in the above-mentioned statement by Trotsky.

Synopsis of the Article "The International Character of the October Revolution" October 1927

The October Revolution is not merely a revolution "within national bounds," but, primarily, a revolution of an international, world order; for it signifies a radical turn in the world history of mankind from the old to the new.

Revolutions in the past usually ended by one group of exploiters at the helm of government being replaced by another group of exploiters. The exploiters changed, exploitation remained. Such was the case during the revolutions of the slaves, the revolutions of the serfs, the revolutions of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. The October Revolution differs from these revolutions in principle. Its aim is not to replace one form of exploitation by another form of exploitation, one group of exploiters by another group of exploiters, but to abolish all exploitation of man by man, to overthrow all groups of exploiters.

The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the most revolutionary and most organised of all exploited classes.

Precisely for this reason the victory of the October Revolution signifies a radical turn in economics and politics, in the manner of life, customs, habits and traditions, in the culture and in the whole spiritual complexion of the exploited masses throughout the world.

That is the basic reason why the oppressed classes in all countries entertain the greatest sympathy for the October Revolution, which they regard as the pledge of their own emancipation.

Four main features.

1) The centres of imperialism (the "metropolises"). October as the turn from the rule of capitalism in the advanced countries to communism. We often say that the October Revolution is a breach of the world imperialist front. But what does that mean? It means that it ushered in the era of proletarian revolutions and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Formerly, the point of departure was the French Revolution of the eighteenth century; its traditions were utilised and its order was implanted.

Now the October Revolution is the point of departure.

Formerly, France.

Now, the U.S.S. R.

Formerly, the "Jacobin" was the bogy of the entire bourgeoisie.

Now, the Bolshevik is the bogy of the bourgeoisie.

The era of "ordinary" bourgeois revolutions, when the proletariat was merely the shock force, while the exploiters reaped the fruits of revolution, has passed away.

The era of proletarian revolutions in the capitalist countries has begun.

2) The periphery of imperialism. October ushered in the era of liberating revolutions in the colonial and dependent countries.

The proletariat cannot emancipate itself unless it emancipates the peoples oppressed by imperialism. The united front of proletarian revolutions in the metropolises and colonial revolutions in the dependent countries.

The era of tranquil exploitation of the colonies and dependent countries has passed away.

The era of liberating revolutions in the colonies, the era of the awakening of the proletariat in those countries, the era of its hegemony, has begun.

3) The centres and periphery—together. Thereby, October struck world imperialism a mortal blow from which it will never recover.

Imperialism will never recover the "equilibrium" and "stability" that it possessed before October.

The era of the "stability" of capitalism has passed away.

The era of the decline of capitalism has begun.

4) October signifies the ideological victory of communism over Social-Democratism, of Marxism over reformism.

Formerly, before the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S. R., the Social-Democrats and reformists could flaunt the banner of Marxism, could coquet with Marx and Engels, etc., for that was not dangerous for the bourgeoisie, and people did not yet know what the victory of Marxism could lead to.

Now, after the victory of the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., when everybody realises what Marxism leads to and what its victory may signify, the Social-Democrats and reformists, sensing the danger to the bourgeoisie of such flaunting and coquetting with Marxism, have preferred to dissociate themselves from Marxism.

Henceforth, communism is the only shelter and bulwark of Marxism.

Henceforth, the spirit of Marxism is abandoning Social-Democracy, just as Social-Democracy earlier abandoned Marxism.

Now, after the victory of the October Revolution, only those can be Marxists who resolutely and devotedly support the first proletarian dictatorship in the world.

What does supporting the first proletarian dictatorship in the world mean? It means taking the stand of direct struggle against one' s own bourgeoisie. As, however, the Social-Democrats do not want to fight their own bourgeoisie but prefer to adapt themselves to it, they, naturally, take the stand of fighting the first proletarian dictatorship in the world, the stand of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R. That is the twilight of Social-Democracy.

October ushered in the era of the triumph of world communism, which is the era of the twilight of Social-Democracy, of its final desertion to the camp of the bourgeoisie.

October is the victory of Marxism in ideology.

The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now
Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 1
October 23, 1927

I
SOME MINOR QUESTIONS

Comrades, I have not much time; I shall therefore deal with separate questions. First of all about the personal factor. You have heard here how assiduously the oppositionists hurl abuse at Stalin, abuse him with all their might. That does not surprise me, comrades. The reason why the main attacks were directed against Stalin is because Stalin knows all the opposition's tricks better, perhaps, than some of our comrades do, and it is not so easy, I dare say, to fool him. So they strike their blows primarily at Stalin. Well, let them hurl abuse to their heart's content.

And what is Stalin? Stalin is only a minor figure. Take Lenin. Who does not know that at the time of the August bloc the opposition, headed by Trotsky, waged an even more scurrilous campaign of slander against Lenin? Listen to Trotsky, for example:

"The wretched squabbling systematically provoked by Lenin, that old hand at the game, that professional exploiter of all that is backward in the Russian labour movement, seems like a senseless obsession" (see "Trotsky's Letter to Chkheidze," April 1913).

Note the language, comrades! Note the language! It is Trotsky writing. And writing about Lenin.

Is it surprising, then, that Trotsky, who wrote in such an ill-mannered way about the great Lenin, whose shoe-laces he was not worthy of tying, should now hurl abuse at one of Lenin's numerous pupils—Comrade Stalin?

More than that. I think the opposition does me honour by venting all its hatred against Stalin. That is as it should be. I think it would be strange and offensive if the opposition, which is trying to wreck the Party, were to praise Stalin, who is defending the fundamentals of the Leninist Party principle.

Now about Lenin's "will." The oppositionists shouted here—you heard them—that the Central Committee of the Party "concealed" Lenin's "will." We have discussed this question several times at the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, you know that. (A voice: "Scores of times.") It has been proved and proved again that nobody has concealed anything, that Lenin's "will" was addressed to the Thirteenth Party Congress, that this "will" was read out at the congress (Voices: "That's right!"), that the congress unanimously decided not to publish it because, among other things, Lenin himself did not want it to be published and did not ask that it should be published. The opposition knows all this just as well as we do. Nevertheless, it has the audacity to declare that the Central Committee is "concealing" the "will."

The question of Lenin's "will" was brought up, if I am not mistaken, as far back as 1924. There is a certain Eastman, a former American Communist who was later expelled from the Party. This gentleman, who mixed with the Trotskyists in Moscow, picked up some rumours and gossip about Lenin's "will," went abroad and published a book entitled After Lenin's

Death, in which he did his best to blacken the Party, the Central Committee and the Soviet regime, and the gist of which was that the Central Committee of our Party was "concealing" Lenin's "will." In view of the fact that this Eastman had at one time been connected with Trotsky, we, the members of the Political Bureau, called upon Trotsky to dissociate himself from Eastman who, clutching at Trotsky and referring to the opposition, had made Trotsky responsible for the slanderous statements against our Party about the "will." Since the question was so obvious, Trotsky did, indeed, publicly dissociate himself from Eastman in a statement he made in the press. It was published in September 1925 in Bolshevik, No. 16.

Permit me to read the passage in Trotsky's article in which he deals with the question whether the Party and its Central Committee was concealing Lenin's "will" or not. I quote Trotsky's article:

"In several parts of his book Eastman says that the Central Committee 'concealed' from the Party a number of exceptionally important documents written by Lenin in the last period of his life (it is a matter of letters on the national question, the so-called 'will,' and others); there can be no other name for this than slander against the Central Committee of our Party. From what Eastman says it may be inferred that Vladimir Ilyich intended those letters, which bore the character of advice on internal organisation, for the press. In point of fact, that is absolutely untrue. During hisillness Vladimir Ilyich often sent proposals, letters, and so forth, to the Party's leading institutions and to its congress. It goes without saying that all those letters and proposals were always delivered to those for whom they were intended, were brought to the knowledge of the delegates at the Twelfth and Thirteenth Congresses, and always, of course, exercised due influence upon the Party's decisions; and if not all of those letters were published, it was because the author did not intend them for the press. Vladimir Ilyich did not leave any 'will,' and the very character of his attitude towards the Party, as well as the character of the Party itself, precluded the possibility of such a 'will.' What is usually referred to as a 'will' in the emigre and foreign bourgeois and Menshevik press (in a manner garbled beyond recognition) is one of Vladimir Ilyich's letters containing advice on organisational matters. The Thirteenth Congress of the Party paid the closest attention to that letter, as to all of the others, and drew from it conclusions appropriate to the conditions and circumstances of the time. All talk about concealing or violating a 'will' is a malicious invention and is entirely directed against Vladimir Ilyichs real will, and against the interests of the Party he created" (see Trotsky's article "Concerning Eastman's Book After Lenin's Death," Bolshevik, No. 16, September 1, 1925, p. 68).

Clear, one would think. That was written by none other than Trotsky. On what grounds, then, are Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev now spinning a yarn about the Party and its Central Committee "concealing" Lenin's "will"? It is "permissible" to spin yarns, but one should know where to stop.

It is said that in that "will" Comrade Lenin suggested to the congress that in view of Stalin's "rudeness" it should consider the question of putting another comrade in Stalin's place as General Secretary. That is quite true. Yes, comrades, I am rude to those who grossly and perfidiously wreck and split the Party. I have never concealed this and do not conceal it now. Perhaps some mildness is needed in the treatment of splitters, but I am a bad hand at that. At the very first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee after the Thirteenth Congress I asked the plenum of the Central Committee to release me from my duties as General Secretary. The congress itself discussed this question. It was discussed by each delegation

separately, and all the delegations unanimously, including Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, obliged Stalin to remain at his post.

What could I do? Desert my post? That is not in my nature; I have never deserted any post, and I have no right to do so, for that would be desertion. As I have already said before, I am not a free agent, and when the Party imposes an obligation upon me, I must obey.

A year later I again put in a request to the plenum to release me, but I was again obliged to remain at my post.

What else could I do?

As regards publishing the "will," the congress decided not to publish it, since it was addressed to the congress and was not intended for publication.

We have the decision of a plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission in 1926 to ask the Fifteenth Congress for permission to publish this document. We have the decision of the same plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission to publish other letters of Lenin's, in which he pointed out the mistakes of Kamenev and Zinoviev just before the October uprising and demanded their expulsion from the Party. 2

Obviously, talk about the Party concealing these documents is infamous slander. Among these documents are letters from Lenin urging the necessity of expelling Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Party. The Bolshevik Party, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, have never feared the truth. The strength of the Bolshevik Party lies precisely in the fact that it does not fear the truth and looks the truth straight in the face.

The opposition is trying to use Lenin's "will" as a trump card; but it is enough to read this "will" to see that it is not a trump card for them at all. On the contrary, Lenin's "will" is fatal to the present leaders of the opposition.

Indeed, it is a fact that in his "will" Lenin accuses Trotsky of being guilty of "non-Bolshevism" and, as regards the mistake Kamenev and Zinoviev made during October, he says that that mistake was not "accidental." What does that mean? It means that Trotsky, who suffers from "non-Bolshevism," and Kamenev and Zi-noviev, whose mistakes are not "accidental" and can and certainly will be repeated, cannot be politically trusted.

It is characteristic that there is not a word, not a hint in the "will" about Stalin having made mistakes. It refers only to Stalin's rudeness. But rudeness is not and cannot be counted as a defect in Stalin's political line or position.

Here is the relevant passage in the "will":

"I shall not go on to characterise the personal qualities of the other members of the Central Committee. I shall merely remind you that the October episode with Zinoviev and Kamenev was, of course, not accidental, but that they can be blamed for it personally as little as Trotsky can be blamed for his non-Bolshevism."

Clear, one would think.

II
The Opposition's "Platform"

Next question. Why did not the Central Committee publish the opposition's "platform"? Zinoviev and Trotsky say that it was because the Central Committee and the Party "fear" the truth. Is that true? Of course not. More than that. It is absurd to say that the Party or the Central Committee fear the truth. We have the verbatim reports of the plenums of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Those reports have been printed in several thousand copies and distributed among the members of the Party. They contain the speeches of the oppositionists as well as of the representatives of the Party line. They are being read by tens and hundreds of thousands of Party members. (Voices: "That's true!") If we feared the truth we would not have circulated those documents. The good thing about those documents is precisely that they enable the members of the Party to compare the Central Committee's position with the views of the opposition and to make their decision. Is that fear of the truth?

In October 1926, the leaders of the opposition strutted about and asserted, as they are asserting now, that the Central Committee feared the truth, that it was hiding their "platform," concealing it from the Party, and so forth. That is why they went snooping among the Party units in Moscow (recall the Aviapribor Factory), in Leningrad (recall the Putilov Works), and other places. Well, what happened? The communist workers gave our oppositionists a good drubbing, such a drubbing indeed that the leaders of the opposition were compelled to flee from the battlefield. Why did they not at that time dare to go farther, to all the Party units, to ascertain which of us fears the truth—the opposition or the Central Committee? It was because they got cold feet, being frightened by the real (and not imaginary) truth.

And now? Speaking honestly, is not a discussion going on now in the Party units? Point to at least one unit, containing at least one oppositionist and where at least one meeting has been held during the past three or four months, in which representatives of the opposition have not spoken, in which there has been no discussion. Is it not a fact that during the past three or four months the opposition has been coming forward whenever it could in the Party units with its counter-resolutions? (Voices: "Quite true!") Why, then, do not Trotsky and Zinoviev try to go to the Party units and expound their views?

A characteristic fact. In August this year, after the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, Trotsky and Zinoviev sent in a statement that they wanted to speak at a meeting of the Moscow active if the Central Committee had no objection. To this the Central Committee replied (and the reply was circulated among the local organisations) that it had no objection to Trotsky and Zinoviev speaking at such a meeting, provided, however, that they, as members of the Central Committee, did not speak against the decisions of the Central Committee. What happened? They dropped their request. (General laughter.)

Yes, comrades, somebody among us does fear the truth, but it is not the Central Committee, and still less the Party; it is the leaders of our opposition.

That being the case, why did not the Central Committee publish the opposition's "platform"?

Firstly, because the Central Committee did not want and had no right to legalise Trotsky's faction, or any factional group. In the Tenth Congress resolution "On Unity," Lenin said that the existence of a "platform" is one of the principal signs of factionalism. In spite of that, the opposition drew up a "platform" and demanded that it be published, thereby violating the decision of the Tenth Congress. Supposing the Central Committee had published the

opposition's "platform," what would it have meant? It would have meant that the Central Committee was willing to participate in the opposition's factional efforts to violate the decisions of the Tenth Congress. Could the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission agree to do that? Obviously, no self-respecting Central Committee could take that factional step. (Voices: "Quite true!")

Further. In this same Tenth Congress resolution "On Unity," written by Lenin, it is said: "The congress orders the immediate dissolution of all groups without exception that have been formed on the basis of one platform or another," that "non-observance of this decision of the congress shall involve certain and immediate expulsion from the Party." The directive is clear and definite. Supposing the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission had published the opposition's "platform," could that have been called the dissolution of all groups without exception formed on one "platform" or another? Obviously not. On the contrary, it would have meant that the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission themselves were intending not to dissolve, but to help to organise groups and factions on the basis of the opposition's "platform." Could the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission take that step towards splitting the Party? Obviously, they could not.

Finally, the opposition's "platform" contains slanders against the Party which, if published, would do the Party and our state irreparable harm.

In fact, it is stated in the opposition's "platform" that our Party is willing to abolish the monopoly of foreign trade and make payment on all debts, hence, also on the war debts. Everybody knows that this is a disgusting slander against our Party, against our working class, against our state. Supposing we had published the "platform" containing this slander against the Party and the state, what would have happened? The only result would have been that the international bourgeoisie would have begun to exert greater pressure upon us, it would have demanded concessions to which we could not agree at all (for example, the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade, payments on the war debts, and so forth) and would have threatened us with war.

When members of the Central Committee like Trotsky and Zinoviev supply false reports about our Party to the imperialists of all countries, assuring them that we are ready to make the utmost concessions, including the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade, it can have only one meaning: Messieurs the bourgeois, press harder on the Bolshevik Party, threaten to go to war against them; the Bolsheviks will agree to every concession if you press hard enough.

False reports about our Party lodged with Messieurs the imperialists by Zinoviev and Trotsky in order to aggravate our difficulties in the sphere of foreign policy—that is what the opposition's "platform" amounts to.

Whom does this harm? Obviously, it harms the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., our whole state.

Whom does it benefit? It benefits the imperialists of all countries.

Now I ask you: could the Central Committee agree to publish such filth in our press? Obviously, it could not.

Such are the considerations that compelled the Central Committee to refuse to publish the opposition's "platform."

III

Lenin on Discussions and Oppositions in General

The next question. Zinoviev vehemently tried to prove that Lenin was in favour of discussion always and at all times. He referred to the discussion of various platforms that took place before the Tenth Congress and at the congress itself, but he "forgot" to mention that Lenin regarded the discussion that took place before the Tenth Congress as a mistake. He "forgot" to say that the Tenth Congress resolution "On Party Unity," which was written by Lenin and was a directive for the development of our Party, ordered not the discussion of "platforms," but the dissolution of all groups whatsoever formed on the basis of one "platform" or another. He "forgot" that at the Tenth Congress Lenin spoke in favour of the "prohibition" in future of all oppositions in the Party. He "forgot" to say that Lenin regarded the conversion of our Party into a "debating society" as absolutely impermissible.

Here, for example, is Lenin's appraisal of the discussion that took place prior to the Tenth Congress:

"I have already had occasion to speak about this today and, of course, I could only cautiously observe that there can hardly be many among you who do not regard this discussion as an excessive luxury. I cannot refrain from adding that, speaking for myself, I think that this luxury was indeed absolutely impermissible, and that in permitting such a discussion we undoubtedly made a mistake" (see Minutes of the Tenth Congress, p. 16 3).

And here is what Lenin said at the Tenth Congress about any possible opposition after the Tenth Congress:

"Consolidation of the Party, prohibition of an opposition in the Party—such is the political conclusion to be drawn from the present situation. . . ." "We do not want an opposition now, comrades. And I think that the Party congress will have to draw this conclusion, to draw the conclusion that we must now put an end to the opposition, finish with it, we have had enough of oppositions now!" (Ibid., pp. 61 and 63. 4)

That is how Lenin regarded the question of discussion and of opposition in general.

IV

The Opposition and the"Third Force"

The next question. What was the need for Comrade Menzhinsky's statement about the whiteguards with whom some of the "workers" at the Trotskyists' illegal, anti-Party printing press are connected?

Firstly, in order to dispel the lie and slander that the opposition is spreading in connection with this question in its anti-Party sheets. The opposition assures everyone that the report about whiteguards who are con nected in one way or another with allies of the opposition like Shcherbakov, Tverskoy, and others, is fiction, an invention, put into circulation for the purpose of discrediting the opposition. Comrade Menzhinsky's statement, with the depositions made by the people under arrest, leaves no doubt whatever that a section of the "workers" at the Trotskyists' illegal, anti-Party printing press are connected, indubitably connected, with

white-guard counter-revolutionary elements. Let the opposition try to refute those facts and documents.

Secondly, in order to expose the lies now being spread by Maslow's organ in Berlin (Die Fahne des Kommu-nismus, that is, The Banner of Communism). We have just received the last issue of this filthy rag, published by this renegade Maslow, who is occupied in slandering the U.S.S.R. and betraying state secrets of the U.S.S.R. to the bourgeoisie. This organ of the press prints for public information, in a garbled form, of course, the depositions made by the arrested whiteguards and their allies at the illegal, anti-Party printing press. (Voices: "Scandalous!") Where could Maslow get this information from? This information is secret, for not all the members of the whiteguard band that is involved in the business of organising a conspiracy on the lines of the Pilsudski conspiracy have as yet been traced and arrested. This information was made known in the Central Control Commission to Trotsky, Zinoviev, Smilga and other members of the opposition. They were forbidden to make a copy of those depositions for the time being. But evidently, they did make a copy and hastened to send it to Maslow. But what does sending that information to Maslow for publication mean? It means warning the whiteguards who have not yet been traced and arrested, warning them that the Bolsheviks intend to arrest them.

Is it proper, is it permissible for Communists to do a thing like that? Obviously not.

The article in Maslow's organ bears a piquant heading: "Stalin Is Splitting the C.P.S.U.(B.). A Whiteguard Conspiracy. A Letter from the U.S.S.R." (Voices: "Scoundrels!") Could we, after all this, after Maslow, with the aid of Trotsky and Zinoviev, had printed for public information garbled depositions of people under arrest, could we, after all this, refrain from making a report to the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission and from contrasting the lying stories with the actual facts and the actual depositions?

That is why the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission considered it necessary to ask Comrade Menzhinsky to make a statement about the facts.

What follows from these depositions, from Comrade Menzhinsky's statement? Have we ever accused or are we now accusing the opposition of organising a military conspiracy? Of course, not. Have we ever accused or are we now accusing the opposition of taking part in this conspiracy? Of course, not. (Muralov: "You did make the accusation at the last plenum.") That is not true, Muralov. We have two statements by the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission about the illegal, anti-Party printing press and about the non-Party intellectuals connected with that printing press. You will not find a single sentence, not a single word, in those documents to show that we are accusing the opposition of participating in a military conspiracy. In those documents the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission merely assert that, when organising its illegal printing press, the opposition got into contact with bourgeois intellectuals, and that some of these intellectuals were, in their turn, found to be in contact with whiteguards who were hatching a military conspiracy. I would ask Muralov to point out the relevant passage in the documents published by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission in connection with this question. Muralov cannot point out such a passage because it does not exist.

That being the case, what are the charges we have made and still make against the opposition?

Firstly, that the opposition, in pursuing a splitting policy, organised an anti-Party, illegal printing press.

Secondly, that the opposition, for the purpose of organising this printing press, entered into a bloc with bourgeois intellectuals, part of whom turned out to be in direct contact with counter-revolutionary conspirators.

Thirdly, that, by enlisting the services of bourgeois intellectuals and conspiring with them against the Party, the opposition, independently of its will or desire, found itself encircled by the so-called "third force."

The opposition proved to have much more confidence in those bourgeois intellectuals than in its own Party. Otherwise it would not have demanded the release of "all those arrested" in connection with the illegal printing press, including Shcherbakov, Tverskoy, Bolshakov and others, who were found to be in contact with counterrevolutionary elements.

The opposition wanted to have an anti-Party, illegal printing press; for that purpose it had recourse to the aid of bourgeois intellectuals, but some of those intellectuals proved to be in contact with downright counterrevolutionaries—such is the chain that resulted, comrades. Independently of the opposition's will or desire, anti-Soviet elements flocked round it and strove to utilise its splitting activities for their own ends.

Thus, what Lenin predicted as far back as the Tenth Congress of our Party (see the Tenth Congress resolution "On Party Unity"), where he said that the "third force," that is the bourgeoisie, would certainly try to hitch on to the conflict within our Party in order to utilise the opposition's activities for its own class ends, has come true.

It is said that counter-revolutionary elements sometimes penetrate our Soviet bodies also, at the fronts for example without having any connection with the opposition. That is true. In such cases, however, the Soviet authorities arrest those elements and shoot them. But what did the opposition do? It demanded the release of the bourgeois intellectuals who were arrested in connection with the illegal printing press and were found to be in contact with counter-revolutionary elements. That is the trouble, comrades. That is what the opposition's splitting activities lead to. Instead of thinking of all these dangers, instead of thinking of the pit that is yawning in front of them, our oppositionists heap slander on the Party and try with all their might to disorganise, to split our Party.

There is talk about a former Wrangel officer who is helping the OGPU to unmask counter-revolutionary organisations. The opposition leaps and dances and makes a great fuss about the fact that the former Wrangel officer to whom the opposition's allies, all these Shcher-bakovs and Tverskoys, applied for assistance, proved to be an agent of the OGPU. But is there anything wrong in this former Wrangel officer helping the Soviet authorities to unmask counter-revolutionary conspiracies? Who can deny the right of the Soviet authorities to win former officers to their side in order to employ them for the purpose of unmasking counter-revolutionary organisations?

Shcherbakov and Tverskoy addressed themselves to this former Wrangel officer not because he was an agent of the OGPU, but because he was a former Wrangel officer, and they did so in order to employ him against the Party and against the Soviet Government. That is the point, and that is the misfortune of our opposition. And when, following up these clues, the OGPU

quite unexpectedly came across the Trotskyists' illegal, anti-Party printing press, it found that, while arranging a bloc with the opposition, Messieurs the Shcherbakovs, Tverskoys and Bolshakovs were already in a bloc with counter-revolutionaries, with former Kolchak officers like Kostrov and Novikov, as Comrade Menzhinsky reported to you today.

That is the point, comrades, and that is the trouble with our opposition.

The opposition's splitting activities lead it to linking up with bourgeois intellectuals, and the link with bourgeois intellectuals makes it easy for all sorts of counter-revolutionary elements to envelop it—that is the bitter truth.

V

How the Opposition is "Preparing" for the Congress

The next question: about the preparations for the congress. Zinoviev and Trotsky vehemently asserted here that we are preparing for the congress by means of repression. It is strange that they see nothing but "repression." But what about the decision to open a discussion taken by a plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission more than a month before the congress—is that in your opinion preparation for the congress, or is it not? And what about the discussion in the Party units and other Party organisations that has been going on incessantly for three or four months already? And the discussion of the verbatim reports and decisions of the plenum that has been going on for the past six months, particularly the past three or four months, on all questions concerning home and foreign policy? What else can all this be called if not stimulating the activity of the Party membership drawing it into the discussion of the major questions of our policy, preparing the Party membership for the congress?

Who is to blame if, in all this, the Party organisations do not support the opposition? Obviously, the opposition is to blame, for its line is one of utter bankruptcy, its policy is that of a bloc with all the anti-Party elements, including the renegades Maslow and Souvarine, against the Party and the Comintern.

Evidently, Zinoviev and Trotsky think that preparations for the congress ought to be made by organising illegal, anti-Party printing presses, by organising illegal, anti-Party meetings, by supplying false reports about our Party to the imperialists of all countries, by disorganising and splitting our Party. You will agree that this is a rather strange idea of what preparations for the Party congress mean. And when the Party takes resolute measures, including expulsion, against the dis-organisers and splitters, the opposition raises a howl about repression.

Yes, the Party resorts and will resort to repression against disorganisers and splitters, for the Party must not be split under any circumstances, either before the congress or during the congress. It would be suicidal for the Party to allow out-and-out splitters, the allies of all sorts of Shcherbakovs, to wreck the Party just because only a month remains before the congress.

Comrade Lenin saw things in a different light. You know that in 1921 Lenin proposed that Shlyapnikov be expelled from the Central Committee and from the Party not for organising an anti-Party printing press, and not for allying himself with bourgeois intellectuals, but merely because, at a meeting of a Party unit, Shlyapnikov dared to criticise the decisions of the Supreme Council of National Economy. If you compare this attitude of Lenin's with what the

Party is now doing to the opposition, you will realise what licence we have allowed the disorganisers and splitters.

You surely must know that in 1917, just before the October uprising, Lenin several times proposed that Kamenev and Zinoviev be expelled from the Party merely because they had criticised unpublished Party decisions in the semi-socialist, in the semi-bourgeois newspaper Novaya Zhinn. 5 But how many secret decisions of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission are now being published by our opposition in the columns of Maslow's newspaper in Berlin, which is a bourgeois, anti-Soviet, counter-revolutionary newspaper! Yet we tolerate all this, tolerate it without end, and thereby give the splitters in the opposition the opportunity to wreck our Party. Such is the disgrace to which the opposition has brought us! But we cannot tolerate it forever, comrades. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

It is said that disorganisers who have been expelled from the Party and conduct anti-Soviet activities are being arrested. Yes, we arrest them, and we shall do so in future if they do not stop undermining the Party and the Soviet regime. (Voices: "Quite right! Quite right!")

It is said that such things are unprecedented in the history of our Party. That is not true. What about the Myasnikov group? 6 What about the "Workers' Truth" group? Who does not know that the members of those groups were arrested with the full consent of Zinoviev, Trotsky and Kamenev? Why was it permissible three or four years ago to arrest disorganisers who had been expelled from the Party, but is impermissible now, when some of the former members of the Trotskyist opposition go to the length of directly linking up with counterrevolutionaries?

You heard Comrade Menzhinsky's statement. In that statement it is said that a certain Stepanov (an army-man), a member of the Party, a supporter of the opposition, is in direct contact with counter-revolutionaries, with Novikov, Kostrov and others, which Stepanov himself does not deny in his depositions. What do you want us to do with this fellow, who is in the opposition to this day? Kiss him, or arrest him? Is it surprising that the OGPU arrests such fellows? (Voices from the audience: "Quite right! Absolutely right!" Applause.)

Lenin said that the Party can be completely wrecked if indulgence is shown to disorganisers and splitters. That is quite true. That is precisely why I think that it is high time to stop showing indulgence to the leaders of the opposition and to come to the conclusion that Trotsky and Zinoviev must be expelled from the Central Committee of our Party. (Voices: "Quite right!") That is the elementary conclusion and the elementary, minimum measure that must be taken in order to protect the Party from the disorganisers' splitting activities.

At the last plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, held in August this year, some members of the plenum rebuked me for being too mild with Trotsky and Zinoviev, for advising the plenum against the immediate expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee. (Voices from the audience: "That's right, and we rebuke you now.") Perhaps I was too kind then and made a mistake in proposing that a milder line be adopted towards Trotsky and Zinoviev. (Voices: "Quite right!" Comrade Petrovsky: "Quite right. We shall always rebuke you for a rotten 'piece of string'!") But now, comrades, after what we have gone through during these three months, after the opposition has broken the promise to dissolve its faction that it made in its special "declaration" of August 8, thereby deceiving the Party once again, after all this, there can be no more room at all for mildness. We must now step into the front rank with those comrades who are demanding that Trotsky and Zinoviev be expelled from the Central Committee. (Stormy applause. Voices: "Quite

right! Quite right!" A voice from the audience: "Trotsky should be expelled from the Party.") Let the congress decide that, comrades.

In expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee we must submit for the consideration of the Fifteenth Congress all the documents which have accumulated concerning the opposition's splitting activities, and on the basis of those documents the congress will be able to adopt an appropriate decision.

VI
From Leninism to Trotskyism

The next question. In his speech Zinoviev touched upon the interesting question of "mistakes" in the Party's line during the past two years and of the "correctness" of the opposition's line. I should like to answer this briefly by clearing up the question of the bankruptcy of the opposition's line and the correctness of our Party's line during the past two years. But I am taking up too much of your attention, comrades. (Voices: "Please go on!" The chairman: "Anyone against?" Voices: "Please go on!")

What is the main sin of the opposition, which determined the bankruptcy of its policy? Its main sin is that it tried, is trying, and will go on trying to embellish Leninism with Trotskyism and to replace Leninism by Trotskyism. There was a time when Kamenev and Zinoviev defended Leninism from Trotsky's attacks. At that time Trotsky himself was not so bold. That was one line. Later, however, Zinoviev and Kamenev, frightened by new difficulties, deserted to Trotsky's side, formed something in the nature of an inferior August bloc with him and thus became captives of Trotskyism. That was further confirmation of Lenin's earlier statement that the mistake Zinoviev and Kamenev made in October was not "accidental." From fighting for Leninism, Zinoviev and Kamenev went over to the line of fighting for Trotskyism. That is an entirely different line. And that indeed explains why Trotsky has now become bolder.

What is the chief aim of the present united bloc headed by Trotsky? It is little by little to switch the Party from the Leninist course to that of Trotskyism. That is the opposition's main sin. But the Party wants to remain a Leninist party. Naturally, the Party turned its back on the opposition and raised the banner of Leninism ever higher and higher. That is why yesterday's leaders of the Party have now become renegades.

The opposition thinks that its defeat can be "explained" by the personal factor, by Stalin's rudeness, by the obstinacy of Bukharin and Rykov, and so forth. That is too cheap an explanation! It is an incantation, not an explanation. Trotsky has been fighting Leninism since 1904. From 1904 until the February Revolution in 1917 he hung around the Mensheviks, desperately fighting Lenin's Party all the time. During that period Trotsky suffered a number of defeats at the hand of Lenin's Party. Why? Perhaps Stalin's rudeness was to blame? But Stalin was not yet the secretary of the Central Committee at that time; he was not abroad, but in Russia, fighting tsarism underground, whereas the struggle between Trotsky and Lenin raged abroad. So what has Stalin's rudeness got to do with it?

During the period from the October Revolution to 1922, Trotsky, already a member of the Bolshevik Party, managed to make two "grand" sorties against Lenin and his Party: in 1918—on the question of the Brest Peace; and in 1921—on the trade-union question. Both those sorties ended in Trotsky being defeated. Why? Perhaps Stalin's rudeness was to blame here? But at that time Stalin was not yet the secretary of the Central Committee. The secretarial

posts were then occupied by notorious Trotskyists. So what has Stalin's rudeness got to do with it?

Later, Trotsky made a number of fresh sorties against the Party (1923, 1924, 1926, 1927) and each sortie ended in Trotsky suffering a fresh defeat.

Is it not obvious from all this that Trotsky's fight against the Leninist Party has deep, far-reaching historical roots? Is it not obvious from this that the struggle the Party is now waging against Trotskyism is a continuation of the struggle that the Party, headed by Lenin, waged from 1904 onwards?

Is it not obvious from all this that the attempts of the Trotskyists to replace Leninism by Trotskyism are the chief cause of the failure and bankruptcy of the entire line of the opposition?

Our Party was born and grew up in the storm of revolutionary battles. It is not a party that grew up in a period of peaceful development. For that very reason it is rich in revolutionary traditions and does not make a fetish of its leaders. At one time Plekhanov was the most popular man in the Party. More than that, he was the founder of the Party, and his popularity was incomparably greater than that of Trotsky or Zinoviev. Nevertheless, in spite of that, the Party turned away from Ple-khanov as soon as he began to depart from Marxism and go over to opportunism. Is it surprising, then, that people who are not so "great," people like

But the most striking indication of the opposition's opportunist degeneration, the most striking sign of the opposition's bankruptcy and fall, was its vote against the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. The opposition is against the introduction of a seven-hour working day! The opposition is against the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.! The entire working class of the U.S.S.R., the entire advanced section of the proletarians in all countries, enthusiastically welcome the Manifesto, unanimously applaud the idea of introducing a seven-hour working day—but the opposition votes against the Manifesto and adds its voice to the general chorus of bourgeois and Menshevik "critics," it adds its voice to those of the slanderers on the staff of Vorwdrts. 7

I did not think that the opposition could sink to such a disgrace.

VII
Some of the Most Important Results of the Party's Policy During the Past Few Years

Let us pass now to the question of our Party's line during the past two years; let us examine and appraise it.

Zinoviev and Trotsky said that our Party's line has proved to be unsound. Let us turn to the facts. Let us take four principal questions of our policy and examine our Party's line during the past two years from the standpoint of these questions. I have in mind such decisive questions as that of the peasantry, that of industry and its re-equipment, that of peace, and, lastly, that of the growth of the communist elements throughout the world.

The question of the peasantry. What was the situation in our country two or three years ago? You know that the situation in the countryside was a serious one. Our Volost Executive Committee chairmen, and officials in the countryside generally, were not always recognised and were often the victims of terrorism. Village correspondents were met with sawn-off rifles.

Here and there, especially in the border regions, there were bandit activities; and in a country like Georgia there were even revolts. 8 Naturally, in such a situation the kulaks gained strength, the middle peasants rallied round the kulaks, and the poor peasants became disunited. The situation in the country was aggravated particularly by the fact that the productive forces in the countryside grew very slowly, part of the arable land remained quite untilled, and the crop area was about 70 to 75 per cent of the prewar area. This was in the period before the Fourteenth Conference of our Party.

At the Fourteenth Conference the Party adopted a number of measures in the shape of certain concessions to the middle peasants designed to accelerate the progress of peasant economy, increase the output of agricultural produce—food and raw materials, establish a stable alliance with the middle peasants, and hasten the isolation of the kulaks. At the Fourteenth Congress of our Party, the opposition, headed by Zinoviev and Kamenev, tried to disrupt this policy of the Party and proposed that we adopt instead what was, in essence, the policy of de-kulakisation, a policy of restoring the Poor Peasants' Committees. In essence, that was a policy of reverting to civil war in the countryside. The Party repulsed this attack of the opposition; it endorsed the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference, approved the policy of revitalising the Soviets in the countryside and advanced the slogan of industrialisation as the main slogan of socialist construction. The Party steadfastly kept to the line of establishing a stable alliance with the middle peasants and of isolating the kulaks.

What did the Party achieve by this?

What it achieved was that peace was established in the countryside, relations with the main mass of the peasantry were improved, conditions were created for organising the poor peasants into an independent political force, the kulaks were still further isolated and the state and co-operative bodies gradually extended their activities to the individual farms of millions of peasants.

What does peace in the countryside mean? It is one of the fundamental conditions for the building of socialism. We cannot build socialism if we have bandit activities and peasant revolts. The crop area has now been brought up to pre-war dimensions (95 per cent), we have peace in the countryside, an alliance with the middle peasants, a more or less organised poor peasantry, strengthened rural Soviets and the enhanced prestige of the proletariat and its Party in the countryside.

We have thus created the conditions that enable us to push forward the offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside and to ensure further success in the building of socialism in our country.

Such are the results of our Party's policy in the countryside during the two years.

Thus, it follows that our Party's policy on the major question of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry has proved to be correct.

The question of industry. History tells us that so far not a single young state in the world has developed its industry, and its heavy industry in particular, without outside assistance, without foreign loans, or without plundering other countries, colonies, and so forth. That is the ordinary path of capitalist industrialisation. Britain developed her industry in the past by draining the vital sap from all countries, from all colonies, for hundreds of years and investing

the loot in her industry. Germany has begun to rise lately because she has received loans from America amounting to several thousand million rubles.

We, however, cannot proceed by any of these paths. Colonial plunder is precluded by our entire policy. And we are not granted loans. Only one path is left to us, the path indicated by Lenin, namely: to raise our industry, to re-equip our industry on the basis of internal accumulations. The opposition has been croaking all the time about internal accumulations not being sufficient for the re-equipment of our industry. As far back as April 1926, the opposition asserted at a plenum of the Central Committee that our internal accumulations would not suffice for making headway with the re-equipment of our industry. At that time the opposition predicted that we would suffer failure after failure. Nevertheless, on making a check it has turned out that we have succeeded in making headway with the re-equipment of our industry during these two years. It is a fact that during the two years we have managed to invest over two thousand million rubles in our industry. It is a fact that these investments have proved to be sufficient to make further headway with the re-equipment of our industry and the industrialisation of the country. We have achieved what no other state in the world has yet achieved: we have raised our industry, we have begun to re-equip it, we have made headway in this matter on the basis of our own accumulations.

There you have the results of our policy on the question of the re-equipment of our industry.

Only the blind can deny the fact that our Party's policy in this matter has proved to be correct.

The question of foreign policy. The aim of our foreign policy, if one has in mind diplomatic relations with bourgeois states, is to maintain peace. What have we achieved in this sphere? What we have achieved is that we have upheld—well or ill, nevertheless we have upheld—peace. What we have achieved is that, in spite of the capitalist encirclement, in spite of the hostile activities of the capitalist governments, in spite of the provocative sorties in Peking, 9 London 10 and Paris 11 — in spite of all this, we have not allowed ourselves to be provoked and have succeeded in defending the cause of peace.

We are not at war in spite of the repeated prophecies of Zinoviev and others—that is the fundamental fact in face of which all the hysterics of our opposition are of no avail. And this is important for us, because only under peace conditions can we promote the building of socialism in our country at the rate that we desire. Yet how many prophecies of war there have been! Zi-noviev prophesied that we should be at war in the spring of this year. Later he prophesied that in all probability war would break out in the autumn of this year. Nevertheless, we are already facing the winter, but still there is no war.

Such are the results of our peace policy.

Only the blind can fail to see these results.

Lastly, the fourth question—that of the state of the communist forces throughout the world. Only the blind can deny that the Communist Parties are growing throughout the world, from China to America, from Britain to Germany. Only the blind can deny that the elements of the crisis of capitalism are growing and not diminishing. Only the blind can deny that the progress in the building of socialism in our country, the successes of our policy within the country, are one of the chief reasons for the growth of the communist movement throughout

the world. Only the blind can deny the progressive increase in influence and prestige of the Communist International in all countries of the world.

Such are the results of our Party's line on the four principal questions of home and foreign policy during the past two years.

What does the correctness of our Party's policy signify? Apart from everything else, it can signify only one thing: the utter bankruptcy of the policy of our opposition.

VIII
Back to Axelrod

That is all very well, we may be told. The opposition's line is wrong, it is an anti-Party line. Its tactics cannot be called anything else than splitting tactics. The expulsion of Zinoviev and Trotsky is therefore the natural way out of the situation that has arisen. All that is true.

But there was a time when we all said that the leaders of the opposition must be kept in the Central Committee, that they should not be expelled. Why this change now? How is this turn to be explained? And is there a turn at all?

Yes, there is. How is it to be explained? It is due to the radical change that has taken place in the fundamental policy and organisational "scheme" of the leaders of the opposition. The leaders of the opposition, and primarily Trotsky, have changed for the worse. Naturally, this was bound to cause a change in the Party's policy towards these oppositionists.

Let us take, for example, such an important question of principle as that of the degeneration of our Party. What is meant by the degeneration of our Party? Itmeans denying the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. What was Trotsky's position in this matter, say, about three years ago? You know that at that time the liberals and Mensheviks, the Smena-Vekhists12 and all kinds of renegades kept on reiterating that the degeneration of our Party was inevitable. You know that at that time they quoted examples from the French revolution and asserted that the Bolsheviks were bound to suffer the same collapse as the Jacobins in their day suffered in France. You know that historical analogies with the French revolution (the downfall of the Jacobins) were then and are today the chief argument advanced by all the various Mensheviks and Smena-Vekhists against the maintenance of the proletarian dictatorship and the possibility of building socialism in our country.

What was Trotsky's attitude towards this three years ago? He was certainly opposed to the drawing of such analogies. Here is what he wrote at that time in his pamphlet The New Course (1924):

"The historical analogies with the Great French Revolution (the downfall of the Jacobins!) which liberalism and Menshevism utilise and console themselves with are superficial and unsound" (see The New Course, p. 33)

Clear and definite! It would be difficult, I think, to express oneself more emphatically and definitely. Was Trotsky right in what he then said about the historical analogies with the French revolution that were being zealously advanced by all sorts of Smena-Vekhists and Mensheviks? Absolutely right.

But now? Does Trotsky still adopt that position? Unfortunately, he does not. On the contrary even. During these three years Trotsky has managed to evolve in the direction of "Menshevism" and "liberalism." Now he himself asserts that drawing historical analogies with the French revolution is a sign not of Menshevism, but of "real," "genuine" "Leninism." Have you read the verbatim report of the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission held in July this year? If you have, you will easily understand that in his struggle against the Party Trotsky is now basing himself on the Menshevik theories about the degeneration of our Party on the lines of the downfall of the Jacobins in the period of the French revolution. Today, Trotsky thinks that twaddle about "Thermidor" is a sign of good taste.

From Trotskyism to "Menshevism" and "liberalism" in the fundamental question of degeneration—such is the path that the Trotskyists have travelled during the past three years.

The Trotskyists have changed. The Party's policy towards the Trotskyists has also had to change.

Let us now take a no less important question, such as that of organisation, of Party discipline, of the submission of the minority to the majority, of the role played by iron Party discipline in strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. Everybody knows that iron discipline in our Party is one of the fundamental conditions for maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat and for success in building socialism in our country. Everybody knows that the first thing the Mensheviks in all countries try to do is to undermine the iron discipline in our Party. There was a time when Trotsky understood and appreciated the importance of iron discipline in our Party. Properly speaking, the disagreements between our Party and Trotsky never ceased, but Trotsky and the Trotskyists were clever enough to submit to the decisions of our Party. Everybody is aware of Trotsky's repeated statement that, no matter what our Party might be, he was ready to "stand to attention" whenever the Party ordered. And it must be said that often the Trotskyists succeeded in remaining loyal to the Party and to its leading bodies.

But now? Can it be said that the Trotskyists, the present opposition, are ready to submit to the Party's decisions, to stand to attention, and so forth? No. That cannot be said any longer. After they have twice broken their promise to submit to the Party's decisions, after they have twice deceived the Party, after they have organised illegal printing presses in conjunction with bourgeois intellectuals, after the repeated statements of Zinoviev and Trotsky made from this very rostrum that they were violating the discipline of our Party and would continue to do so—after all that it is doubtful whether a single person will be found in our Party who would dare to believe that the leaders of the opposition are ready to stand to attention before the Party. The opposition has now shifted to a new line, the line of splitting the Party, the line of creating a new party. The most popular pamphlet among the oppositionists at the present time is not Lenin's Bolshevik pamphlet One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,13 but Trotsky's old Menshevik pamphlet Our Political Task (published in 1904), written in opposition to the organisational principles of Leninism, in opposition to Lenin's pamphlet One Step Forward, Two Steps Back.

You know that the essence of that old pamphlet of Trotsky's is repudiation of the Leninist conception of the Party and of Party discipline. In that pamphlet Trotsky never calls Lenin anything but "Maximilien Lenin," hinting that Lenin was another Maximilien Robespierre, striving, like the latter, for personal dictatorship. In that pamphlet Trotsky plainly says that Party discipline need be submitted to only to the degree that Party decisions do not contradict

the wishes and views of those who are called upon to submit to the Party. That is a purely Menshevik principle of organisation. Incidentally that pamphlet is interesting because Trotsky dedicates it to the Menshevik P. Axelrod. That is what he says: "To my dear teacher Pavel Borisovich Axelrod." (Laughter. Voices: "An out-and-out Menshevik!")

From loyalty to the Party to the policy of splitting the Party, from Lenin's pamphlet One Step Forward, Two Steps Back to Trotsky's pamphlet Our Political Tasks, from Lenin to Axelrod — such is the organisational path that our opposition has travelled.

The Trotskyists have changed. The Party's organisational policy towards the Trotskyist opposition has also had to change.

Well, a good riddance! Go to your "dear teacher Pavel Borisovich Axelrod"! A good riddance! Only make haste, most worthy Trotsky, for, in view of his senility, "Pavel Borisovich" may die soon, and you may not reach your "teacher" in time. (Prolonged applause.)

Pravda, No. 251, November 2, 1927

Notes

1. The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held October 21-23, 1927. It discussed and approved the draft theses submitted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on the questions of the agenda of the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P. S.U.(B.), namely: directives for drawing up a five-year plan for the national economy; work in the countryside. The plenum approved the appointment of reporters, resolved to open a discussion in the Party, and decided to publish the theses for the Fifteenth Congress for discussion at Party meetings and in the press. In view of the attack of the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition against the Manifesto issued by the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, particularly against the point about going over to a seven-hour working day, the plenum discussed this question and in a special decision declared that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee had acted rightly in its initiative in the publication of the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. and approved the Manifesto itself. The plenum heard a report of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission on the factional activities of Trotsky and Zinoviev after the August (1927) plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.). During the discussion of this matter at the meeting of the plenum held on October 23, J. V. Stalin delivered the speech: "The Trotskyist pposition Before and Now." For deceiving the Party and waging a factional struggle against it, the plenum expelled Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee and decided to submit to the Fifteenth Party Congress all the documents relating to the splitting activities of the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition. For the resolutions and decisions of the plenum, see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II,1953, pp.275-311.)

2. V. I. Lenin, "A Letter to the Members of the Bolshevik Party" and "A Letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P." (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, pp. 185-88 and 192-96).

3. V. I. Lenin, Report on the Political Activities of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), March 8, 1921 (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 152).

4. V. I. Lenin, Reply to the Discussion on the Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), March 9, 1921 (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32,pp.170,177

5. Novaya Zhizn (New Life) — a Menshevik newspaper published in Petrograd from April 1917; closed down in July 1918.

6. Myasnikov group—a counter-revolutionary underground group which called itself the "workers' group." It was formed in Moscow in 1923 by G. Myasnikov and others who had been expelled from the R.C.P.(B.) and had very few members. It was dissolved in the same year.

7. Vorwarts (Forward) — a newspaper, central organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, published from 1876 to 1933. After the Great October Socialist Revolution it became a centre of anti-Soviet propaganda.

8. This refers to the counter-revolutionary revolts that broke out in Georgia on August 28, 1924. They were organised by the remnants of the defeated bourgeois-nationalist parties and by the emigre Menshevik "government" of N. Jordania on the instructions, and with the financial assistance, of the imperialist states and the leaders of the Second International. The revolts were quelled on August 29, the day after they broke out, with the active assistance of the Georgian workers and labouring peasantry.

9. This refers to the armed attack by a detachment of Chinese soldiers and police upon the Soviet Embassy in Peking (Peiping) on April 6, 1927. The attack was instigated by the foreign imperialists with the object of provoking an armed conflict between China and the U.S.S.R.

10. This refers to the police raid on the Soviet Trade Delegation and on Arcos (the Anglo-Russian-Co-operative Society) in London, carried out on May 12, 1927, on the order of the British Conservative Government.

11. This refers to the anti-Soviet campaign in France in the autumn of 1927. It was inspired by the French Government, which supported all kinds of anti-Soviet activities, conducted a campaign of slander against the official Soviet representatives and institutions in Paris, and viewed with favour Britain's rupture of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.

12. Smena-Vekhists — the representatives of a bourgeois political trend which arose in 1921 among the Russian whiteguard intelligentsia living abroad. It was headed by a group consisting of N. Ustryalov, Y. Kluchnikov, and others, who published the magazine Smena Vekh (Change of Landmarks). The Smena-Vekhists expressed the views of the new bourgeoisie and bourgeois intelligentsia in Soviet Russia who believed that, owing to the introduction of the New Economic Policy, the Soviet system would gradually degenerate into bourgeois democracy. (On the Smena-Vekhists, see V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 256-57, and J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 7, pp. 350-51 and Vol. 9, pp. 73-74.)

13. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 7, pp. 185-392.

Interview with
Foreign Workers' Delegations
November 5, 1927

Eighty delegates were present from Germany France, Austria, Czechoslovakia, South America,
China, Belgium, Finland, Denmark and Estonia. The interview lasted six hours.
Stalin : Comrades, yesterday I received an unsigned list of questions in German. This morning I received two other lists, one from the French delegation and another from the Danish delegation. Let us begin with the first list of questions, although I do not know which delegation it comes from. Then we can take the other two lists. If you have no objection, let us begin. (The delegates agree.)

FIRST QUESTION. Why does the U.S.S.R. not take part in the League of Nations?
ANSWER : The reasons why the Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations have been repeatedly given in our press. I can point out some of these reasons.

The Soviet Union is not a member of the League of Nations and does not take part in the League of Nations, firstly, because it does not want to take responsibility for the imperialist policy of the League of Nations, for the "mandates" which are handed out by the League of Nations for the exploitation and oppression of colonial countries. The Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations because it is opposed to imperialism, opposed to the oppression of the colonies and dependent countries.

The Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations, secondly, because it does not want to take responsibility for the war preparations, for the growth of armaments, for the new military alliances, and so forth, which the League of Nations screens and sanctifies, and which are bound to lead to new imperialist wars. The Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations because it is wholly and completely opposed to imperialist wars.

Finally, the Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations because it does not want to be a component part of the screen, in the shape of the League of Nations, for imperialist machinations, which the League covers up by the unctuous speeches of its members.

Under present conditions the League of Nations is a "house of assignation" for the imperialist bosses who transact their nefarious business behind the scenes. What is said officially in the League of Nations is mere talk, designed to deceive the people. But what is done unofficially by the imperialist bosses behind the scenes in the League of Nations is real imperialist action, hypocritically covered up by the grandiloquent orators of the League of Nations.

Is it surprising, then, that the Soviet Union does not want to be a member of, and participant in, this anti-popular farce?

SECOND QUESTION. Why is a Social-Democratic party not allowed in the Soviet Union?
ANSWER: A Social-Democratic party (that is, a Menshevik party) is not allowed in the Soviet Union for the same reason that counter-revolutionaries are not allowed here. Perhaps this may surprise you, but there is nothing surprising about it.

The conditions under which our country developed, the history of its development, are such that, whereas under the tsarist regime Social-Democracy was a more or less revolutionary

party, after the overthrow of tsarism, under Kerensky, it became a government party, a bourgeois party, a party standing for imperialist war, and after the October Revolution it became a party of open counter-revolution, a party standing for the restoration of capitalism.

You must surely be aware that the Social-Democrats in our country took part in the Civil War on the side of Kolchak and Denikin, against Soviet power. At the present time that party stands for the restoration of capitalism, the liquidation of the Soviet system.

I think that this evolution of Social-Democracy is typical of it not only in the U.S.S.R., but also in other countries. In our country Social-Democracy was more or less revolutionary so long as the tsarist regime existed. That, in fact, explains why we Bolsheviks, together with the Mensheviks, that is, the Social-Democrats, formed one party. Social-Democracy becomes a bourgeois party, of the opposition or of the government, when the so-called democratic bourgeoisie comes into power. Social-Democracy turns into a party of open counter-revolution when the revolutionary proletariat comes into power.

A delegate: Does that mean that Social-Democracy is a counter-revolutionary force only here, in the Soviet Union, or can it be described as a counter-revolutionary force in other countries too?

Stalin: I have already said that there is some difference here.

In the land of the proletarian dictatorship, Social-Democracy is a counter-revolutionary force striving for the restoration of capitalism and for the liquidation of the proletarian dictatorship in the name of bourgeois "democracy."

In the capitalist countries, where the proletariat is not yet in power, Social-Democracy is either an opposition party in relation to capitalist rule, or a semi-government party in alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie against the most reactionary forces of capitalism and also against the revolutionary working-class movement, or else an out-and-out government party directly and openly defending capitalism and bourgeois "democracy" against the revolutionary proletarian movement.

It becomes out-and-out counter-revolutionary, and its counter-revolutionary activities are directed against the proletarian regime, only when the latter has become a reality.

THIRD QUESTION. Why is there no freedom of the press in the U.S.S.R.?
ANSWER: What freedom of the press do you mean? Freedom of the press for which class—the bourgeoisie or the proletariat? If you mean freedom of the press for the bourgeoisie, then it does not and will not exist here while the proletarian dictatorship exists. But if you mean freedom for the proletariat, then I must say that you will not find another country in the world where freedom of the press for the proletariat is as wide and complete as it is in the U.S.S.R.

Freedom of the press for the proletariat is not a mere phrase. If the best printing plants and the best press clubs are not available, if there are no openly-functioning working-class organisations, ranging from the narrowest to the widest, that embrace millions of workers, if there is not the widest freedom of assembly, there can be no freedom of the press.

Examine the conditions of life in the U.S.S.R., go into the workers' districts; you will find that the best printing plants, the best press clubs, entire paper mills, entire ink and colour factories

needed by the press, palatial meeting halls, all these and many other things that are needed for working-class freedom of the press are wholly and completely at the disposal of the working class and the masses of the working people. That is what we call freedom of the press for the working class. We have no freedom of the press for the bourgeoisie.

We have no freedom of the press for the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who in our country stand for the interests of the defeated and overthrown bourgeoisie. But is that surprising? We never pledged ourselves to grant freedom of the press to all classes, to make all classes happy. When taking power in October 1917, the Bolsheviks openly declared that this meant the power of one class, the power of the proletariat, which would suppress the bourgeoisie in the interests of the labouring masses of town and country, who form the overwhelming majority of the population of the U.S.S.R.

How, after this, can the proletarian dictatorship be required to grant freedom of the press to the bourgeoisie?

FOURTH QUESTION. Why are the imprisoned Mensheviks not released?
ANSWER: Evidently this refers to the active Men-sheviks. Yes, it is true, the active Mensheviks in our country are not released from prison until their sentences expire. But is that surprising?

Why were not the Bolsheviks, for example, released from prison in July, August, September and October 1917, when the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were in power?

Why was Lenin compelled to hide underground from July to October 1917, when the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were in power? How can you explain the fact that the great Lenin, whose name is the banner of the proletarians of all countries, was compelled to go into hiding from July to October 1917, in Finland, far away from the "democratic republic" of Kerensky and Tsereteli, Chernov and Dan, and that Pravda, the organ of Lenin's Party, was wrecked by the bourgeois authorities in spite of the fact that prominent Mensheviks, active leaders of the Second International, were then at the head of the government?

Obviously, all this is to be explained by the fact that the struggle between bourgeois counter-revolution and proletarian revolution is bound to lead to a certain amount of repression. I have already said that in our country Social-Democracy is a counter-revolutionary party. But from this it follows that the proletarian revolution cannot avoid arresting the leaders of that counter-revolutionary party.

But this is not all. From this it follows also that the arrest of Mensheviks in our country is a continuation of the policy of the October Revolution. In point of fact, what is the October Revolution? The October Revolution is primarily the overthrow of the rule of the bourgeoisie. All more or less class-conscious workers of all countries now admit that the Bolsheviks were right in overthrowing bourgeois rule in October 1917. I have no doubt that you are of the same opinion. But the question is: whom did the proletariat actually overthrow in 1917? History tells us, the facts tell us, that in October 1917 the proletariat overthrew the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, for it was the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, Kerensky and Chernov, Gotz and Lieber, Dan and Tsereteli, Abramovich and Avksentiev, who were in power at that time. And what are the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties? They are parties of the Second International.

It follows, therefore, that in accomplishing the October Revolution the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. overthrew parties of the Second International. This may be unpleasant for some Social-Democrats, but it is an undeniable fact, comrades, and it would be absurd to dispute it.

Hence, it follows that in a proletarian revolution it is possible and necessary to overthrow the rule of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries so that the rule of the proletariat may triumph.

But if they may be overthrown, why cannot they be arrested when they openly and definitely go over to the camp of bourgeois counter-revolution? Do you think that overthrowing the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries is a milder measure than arresting them? The policy of the October Revolution cannot be regarded as correct without also regarding the inevitable results of that policy as correct. One thing or the other: either the October Revolution was a mistake—in which case the arrest of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries is also a mistake; or the October Revolution was not a mistake—in which case the arrest of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who have taken the path of counter-revolution cannot be regarded as a mistake. Logic demands this.

FIFTH QUESTION. Why was the correspondent of the Social-Democratic Press Bureau refused permission to enter the U.S.S.R.?
ANSWER: Because the Social-Democratic press abroad, and Vorwdrts in particular, has outdone even a number of bourgeois newspapers in its monstrous slandering of the U.S.S.R. and its representatives.

Because a number of bourgeois newspapers, like Vossische Zeitung, 1 behave far more "impartially" and "decently" than Vorwdrts in their struggle against the U.S.S.R. This may seem "strange," but it is a fact that cannot be ignored. If Vorwdrts could behave not worse than some bourgeois newspapers, its representatives would most likely have a place in the U.S.S.R. among the representatives of other bourgeois newspapers.

A few days ago a Vorwdrts representative asked a member of our Embassy staff in Berlin what conditions had to be complied with to enable a Vorwdrts representative to receive the right to enter the U.S.S.R. In reply, he was told: "When Vorwdrts proves by deeds that it is prepared to behave towards the U.S.S.R. and its representatives not worse than a 'respectable' liberal newspaper like Vossische Zeitung, the Soviet Government will have no objection to permitting a Vorwdrts correspondent to enter the U.S.S.R."

I think that the answer is quite understandable.

SIXTH QUESTION. Is it possible to unite the Second and Third Internationals?
ANSWER : I think it is impossible.

It is impossible because the Second and Third Internationals have two entirely different lines of policy and look in different directions. Whereas the Third International looks in the direction of the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, the Second International, on the contrary, looks in the direction of the preservation of capitalism and of the destruction of everything that is needed for the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship.

The struggle between the two Internationals is the ideological reflection of the struggle between the supporters of capitalism and the supporters of socialism. In this struggle, either the Second or the Third International must be victorious. There are no reasons for doubting that the Third International will be victorious in the working-class movement.

I think that it is impossible to unite them at the present time.

SEVENTH QUESTION. How do you estimate the situation in Western Europe?
Are revolutionary events to be expected within the next few years?
ANSWER : I think that elements of a profound crisis of capitalism are growing and will continue to grow in Europe. Capitalism may become partly stabilised, it may rationalise its production, it may temporarily hold down the working class—capitalism is still able to do all that, but it will never recover the "stability" and "equilibrium" that it possessed before the world war and the October Revolution. It will never recover that "stability" and "equilibrium."

That this is true is evident if only from the fact that every now and again the flames of revolution break out in the European countries and also in the colonies, which are the source of life of European capitalism. One day the flames of revolution break out in Austria, next day in Britain, the day after that somewhere in France or Germany, and then in China, Indonesia, India, and so forth.

But what are Europe and the colonies? They are the centre and periphery of capitalism. There is "unrest" in the centres of European capitalism. There is still greater "unrest" in its periphery. The conditions for new revolutionary events are maturing. I think that the clearest indication of the growing crisis of capitalism, and the clearest manifestation of the mounting discontent and anger of the working class, are the events connected with the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti. 2

What is the murder of two working men for the capitalist mincing-machine? Have not scores and hundreds of workers been killed up till now every week, every day? But the murder of two workers, Sacco and Vanzetti, was enough to set the working class all over the world in motion. What does that show? It shows that things are getting hotter and hotter for capitalism. It shows that the conditions for new revolutionary events are maturing.

The fact that the capitalists may succeed in sweeping back the first wave of the revolutionary outbreak cannot by any means serve as a consolation for capitalism. The revolution against capitalism cannot advance in one solid and unbroken wave. It always grows in the course of flows and ebbs. It was so in Russia. It will be so in Europe. We are on the threshold of new revolutionary events.

EIGHTH QUESTION. Is the opposition in the Russian Party strong? On what circles does it rely?
ANSWER : I think that it is very weak. More than that, its forces are almost insignificant in our Party. Here I have today's newspaper. It contains a survey of the last few days' discussions. The figures show that over 135,000 members of the Party voted for the Central Committee and its theses, and 1,200 voted for the opposition. That is even less than one per cent.

I think that further voting will show even more ignominious results for the opposition. Our discussion will continue right up to the congress. During this period we shall, if possible, canvass the opinion of the whole Party.

I do not know how discussions are conducted in the Social-Democratic parties in your countries. I do not know whether discussions are conducted at all in the Social-Democratic parties. We consider that a discussion is a serious matter. We shall canvass the opinion of the whole Party and you will see that the relative importance of the opposition in our Party will prove to be even more insignificant than is shown by the figures I have just read out. It is quite likely that at the Fifteenth Congress of our Party the opposition will not have a single representative, not a single delegate.

Let us take, for example, such huge plants as the Treugolnik Factory, or the Putilov Works in Leningrad. The number of workers at the Treugolnik Factory is about 15,000. The number of Party members is 2,122. The opposition received thirty-nine votes. The number of workers at the Putilov Works is about 11,000. The number of Party members is 1,718. The opposition received twenty-nine votes.

On what circles does the opposition rely? I think that the opposition relies primarily on non-proletarian circles. If you were to ask the non-proletarian strata of the population, those who are dissatisfied with the regime of the proletarian dictatorship, whom they sympathise with, they would unhesitatingly answer that they sympathise with the opposition. Why? Because, in essence, the struggle that the opposition is waging is a struggle against the Party, a struggle against the regime of the proletarian dictatorship, with which certain non-proletarian sections cannot help being dissatisfied. The opposition reflects the discontent of the non-proletarian sections of the population, it reflects their pressure upon the proletarian dictatorship.

NINTH QUESTION. Is there any truth in the assertion, circulated in Germany by Ruth Fischer and Maslow, that the present leaders of the Comintern and of the Russian Party are betraying the workers to the counter-revolution?
ANSWER : We must assume that it is true. We must assume that the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.) are betraying the working class of the U.S.S.R. wholesale to the counter-revolutionaries of all countries.

More than that. I can inform you that the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.) recently decided to bring back to the U.S.S.R. all the landlords and capitalists who have been driven out of the country and to restore their factories to them.

Nor is that all. The Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.) have gone even further and have decided that the time has come for the Bolsheviks to become cannibals.

Finally, we have decided to nationalise all women and to make it a practice to violate our own sisters. (General laughter. Several delegates: "Who could have asked such a question?")

I see that you are laughing. Perhaps some of you will think that I am not treating the question seriously. Of course, comrades, such questions cannot be treated seriously. I think that such questions can be answered only by ridicule. (Stormy applause.)

TENTH QUESTION. What is your attitude towards the opposition and to the Ruth Fischer-Maslow trend in Germany?

ANSWER : My attitude towards the opposition and its agency in Germany is the same as the attitude of the well-known French novelist, Alphonse Daudet, towards Tartarin of Tarascon. (Signs of lively amusement among the delegates.)

You have no doubt read Alphonse Daudet's famous novel about Tartarin of Tarascon. Tartarin, the hero of the book, was just an ordinary "good" petty bourgeois. But he had such a wild imagination and such a capacity for "good-natured lying" that in the end he fell victim to these extraordinary abilities.

Tartarin boasted to everybody that he had killed an incalculable number of lions and tigers in the Atlas Mountains. His credulous friends therefore hailed him as the greatest lion-hunter in the world. But Alphonse Daudet certainly knew, as Tartarin himself certainly knew, that Tartarin had never seen a lion or a tiger in his life.

Tartarin boasted to everybody that he had climbed Mont Blanc. His credulous friends therefore hailed him as the greatest mountain-climber in the world. But Al-phonse Daudet certainly knew that Tartarin had never seen the top of Mont Blanc, for he had only roamed about the foot of it.

Tartarin boasted to everybody that he had founded a great colony in a country remote from France. His credulous friends therefore hailed him as the greatest coloniser in the world. But Alphonse Daudet certainly knew, as Tartarin himself had to admit, that the figments of Tartarin's imagination could only lead to his discomfiture.

You know what discomfiture and disgrace for the Tartarinites resulted from Tartarin's fantastic boasting.

I think that the boastful clamour that the leaders of the opposition have raised in Moscow and Berlin will end in similar discomfiture and disgrace for the opposition. (General laughter.)

Thus, we have exhausted the first list of questions.

Let us now pass on to the questions of the French delegation.

FIRST QUESTION. How does the Government of the U.S.S.R. propose to combat the foreign oil firms?
ANSWER : I think that the question is wrongly put. As it stands, one might think that the Soviet oil industry has set out to attack the oil firms of other countries and is seeking to knock them out and liquidate them.

Is that how matters actually stand? No, it is not. In actual fact, the situation is that certain oil firms in capitalist countries are striving to strangle the Soviet oil industry, and so the latter is compelled to defend itself in order to be able to exist and develop.

The fact of the matter is that the Soviet oil industry is weaker than the oil industry of the capitalist countries both as regards output—our output is less than theirs —and as regards connections with the market—they have better connection with the world market than we have.

How does the Soviet oil industry defend itself? It defends itself by improving the quality of its products and, above all, by reducing the price of oil, by putting cheap oil on the market, cheaper than the oil of the capitalist firms.

It may be asked: Are the Soviets so well off that they can afford to sell cheaper than the extremely rich capitalist firms? Of course, Soviet industry is not richer than the capitalist firms. On the contrary, the capitalist firms are much richer than Soviet industry. But it is not a matter of being rich. The point is that the Soviet oil industry is not a capitalist industry and, therefore, does not need enormous super-profits, whereas capitalist oil firms cannot do without colossal super-profits. And precisely because the Soviet oil industry does not need super-profits, it can sell its products cheaper than the capitalist firms.

The same can be said about Soviet grain, Soviet timber, and so forth.

In general, it must be said that Soviet commodities, and especially Soviet oil, are a price-reducing factor in the international market and, therefore, one that helps to improve the conditions of the mass of consumers. Herein lies the strength of the Soviet oil industry and its means of defence against the attacks of the capitalist oil firms. It also explains why the oil owners of all countries, and Deterding in particular, are howling at the top of their voices against the Soviets and the Soviet oil industry, covering up their policy of high oil prices and of robbing the mass of consumers with fashionable talk about "communist propaganda."

SECOND QUESTION. How do you intend to achieve collectivism in the peasant question?
ANSWER : We intend to achieve collectivism in agriculture gradually, by economic, financial, and educational and political measures.

I think that the most interesting question is that of economic measures. The measures we are taking in this sphere run along three lines :

the line of organising the individual peasant farms on a co-operative basis;

the line of organising peasant farms, mainly the farms of poor peasants, in producers' co-operatives, and finally,

the line of bringing the peasant farms within the sphere of operation of the planning and regulating bodies of the state both as regards the marketing of peasant produce and as regards supplying the peasants with necessary articles produced by our industry.

A few years ago the situation was that between industry and peasant economy there were numerous middlemen, private traders, who supplied the peasants with urban manufactures and sold the peasants' grain to the workers. Naturally, these middlemen did not "work" for nothing; they squeezed tens of millions of rubles both out of the peasants and out of the urban population. That was the period when the link between town and country, between socialist industry and the individual peasant farms, had not yet been firmly established. At that time the role played by the co-operatives and the state distributive bodies was relatively insignificant.

A radical change has taken place since then. At present, the role played by the co-operatives and state trading bodies in trade between town and country, between industry and peasant economy, may be regarded not merely as a predominant, but as a supreme, if not monopolistic, one. The co-operatives and state bodies handle over 70 per cent of the textiles

supplied to the countryside. As for agricultural machinery, the co-operatives and state bodies supply nearly 100 per cent. The share of the co-operatives and state bodies in purchasing grain from the peasants is over 80 per cent, and in purchasing raw materials for industry, such as cotton, sugar-beet, etc., the share of the co-operatives and state bodies is almost 100 per cent. What does that mean?

It means, firstly, that the capitalists are being ousted from the sphere of trade; industry is being directly linked with peasant economy; the profits formerly obtained by profiteers and middlemen now remain in industry and agriculture; the peasants are able to buy urban manufactured goods more cheaply, and the workers, in their turn, are able to buy agricultural produce more cheaply.

It means, secondly, that by ousting the middlemen and capitalists from the sphere of trade, industry is able to take the lead of peasant economy, to influence it and raise its efficiency to a higher level, to rationalise and industrialise it.

It means, thirdly, that by linking agriculture with industry the state is able to introduce the principle of planning in the development of agriculture, to supply it with improved seed and fertilisers, to determine the extent of its production, to influence it as regards price policy, and so forth.

It means, finally, that favourable conditions are being created in the countryside for eliminating the capitalist elements, for further restricting and ousting the kulaks, for organising the working peasants' farms in producers' co-operatives, for financing the latter out of state funds.

Let us take, for example, the production of sugar-beet for the sugar industry, and the production of cotton for the textile industry. The volume of production of these kinds of raw materials, as well as their prices and quality, are now not determined haphazardly, not by the play of forces in an unorganised market through middlemen and profiteers, the bourse, various capitalist agencies, and so forth, but according to a definite plan, by definite agreements concluded in advance between the sugar and textile syndicates on the one hand, and tens of thousands of peasant farms represented by beet and cotton growing co-operatives, on the other hand.

Here we no longer have the bourse, agencies, speculation on prices, and so forth. In our country, in this sphere all these instruments of capitalist economy no longer exist. Here, only two parties meet, without any bourse or middlemen—the state syndicates on the one hand, and peasant co-operators on the other. The state syndicates sign contracts with the corresponding co-operative organisations for the production of a particular quantity of sugar-beet or cotton, for the supply of seed, loans, etc., to the peasantry. At the end of the financial year the entire output is taken by the syndicates, and the peasants receive for it the amounts agreed upon in the contracts. That is what we call the contract system.

The advantage of this system is that it is profitable for both sides and links peasant economy directly with industry without any middlemen. This system is the surest path to the collectivisation of peasant economy.

It cannot be said that other branches of agriculture have already reached this stage of development; but it can confidently be said that all branches of agriculture, not excluding

grain production, will gradually take this path of development. And that is the direct path to the collectivisation of agriculture.

All-embracing collectivisation will come when the peasant farms are reorganised on a new technical basis, through mechanisation and electrification, when the majority of the working peasants are organised in co-operative organisations, and when the majority of villages are covered by a network of agricultural co-operatives of a collectivist type.

We are moving towards this goal, but have not yet reached it and are not likely to reach it soon. Why? Because, among other things, it requires large sums of money, which our state does not yet possess, but which will undoubtedly be accumulated in the course of time. Marx said that not a single new social system in history established itself without being abundantly financed, without hundreds and hundreds of millions being spent on it. I think that we are already entering the stage in the development of agriculture when the state is beginning to be able abundantly to finance the new social, collectivist system. The fact that socialist industry has already achieved the role of the leading element in our national economy and that it is taking the lead of agriculture is the surest guarantee that peasant economy will take the path of further collectivisation.

THIRD QUESTION. What were the main difficulties under war communism, when attempts were made to abolish money?
ANSWER : There were many difficulties, both in the sphere of internal development and in the sphere of foreign relations.

Taking internal relations of an economic character, three main difficulties could be noted.

Firstly, the difficulty was that our industry was ruined and paralysed, except for the war industry, which supplied our civil war fronts with munitions during the period of intervention. Two-thirds of our mills and factories were at a standstill, transport was disorganised, there were no manufactured goods, or hardly any.

Secondly, agriculture was in a bad way; the able-bodied men from the peasant farms had been sent to the fronts. There was a shortage of raw materials, a shortage of bread for the urban population, particularly for the workers. In those days the workers' daily bread ration was half a pound and sometimes only an eighth of a pound.

Thirdly, there was little or no smooth-running, intermediary, Soviet trade apparatus between town and country capable of supplying the countryside with manufactured goods and the towns with agricultural produce. The co-operatives and the state trading bodies existed only in embryo.

However, when the Civil War ended and the "New Economic Policy" was introduced, the economic situation in the country underwent a radical change.

Industry developed, gained strength and occupied a commanding position throughout the national economy. The most characteristic fact in this respect is that during the past two years we have been able to invest in industry over two thousand million rubles from our own accumulations, without assistance from abroad, without any foreign loans whatever. It can no longer be said that there are no goods whatever for the peasantry.

Agriculture has developed, its output has reached the pre-war level. It can now no longer be said that there is in general no grain or other agricultural produce for the workers.

The co-operatives and state trading bodies have developed to such an extent that they occupy a commanding position in the trade of the country. It can now no longer be said that we have no intermediary distributive apparatus between town and country, between industry and peasant economy.

Of course, all this is not enough to build a socialist economy at once; but it is quite enough to enable us to proceed further along the path of successful socialist construction.

We must now re-equip our industry and build new factories on a new technical basis.

We must raise the level of efficiency in agriculture, supply the peasantry with the largest possible number of agricultural machines; we must organise the majority of the working peasants in co-operatives and reorganise the individual peasant farms in a wide network of agricultural collective associations.

We must set up an intermediary distributive apparatus between town and country that will be capable of calculating and satisfying the requirements of the towns and villages throughout the country, in the same way that every individual calculates his personal budget of income and expenditure.

When we have achieved all this, it can be presumed that the time will have come when money is no longer needed.

But that is still a long way off.

FOURTH QUESTION. What about the "scissors"?
ANSWER : If by the "scissors" is meant the divergence between the prices of agricultural produce and the prices of manufactured goods from the standpoint of cost of production, the situation as regards the "scissors" is as follows:

Undoubtedly, our manufactured goods are still sold at a somewhat higher price than they could be sold under other circumstances. That is because our industry is young, because it has to be protected from outside competition, because conditions must be created which can accelerate its development. And its rapid development is essential for both town and country, for otherwise we shall be unable in proper time to provide the peasant farmers with an adequate supply of textiles and agricultural machines. This creates a divergence between the prices of manufactured goods and the prices of agricultural produce, which is somewhat to the detriment of peasant economy.

In order to relieve peasant economy of this handicap, the government and the Party have decided to pursue a policy of gradually but steadily reducing the prices of manufactured goods. Can this be called a feasible policy? I think that it is absolutely feasible. It is known, for example, that during the past year we have been able to reduce the retail prices of manufactured goods by about 8-10 per cent. It is also known that our industrial organisations are systematically reducing the cost of production and the wholesale prices of manufactured goods. There is no reason to doubt that this policy will be continued. More than that. I must say that the policy of steadily reducing the prices of manufactured goods is the cornerstone of

our economic policy, without which neither the improvement and rationalisation of our industry nor the strengthening of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry is conceivable.

In bourgeois countries a different policy is adhered to in this respect. There, enterprises are usually organised into trusts and syndicates for the purpose of raising the prices of manufactured goods in the home market, of converting them into monopoly prices in order thereby to squeeze out as much profit as possible and to create a fund for the export of goods abroad, where they are sold by the capitalists at low prices with a view to capturing new markets.

The same policy was pursued here in Russia under the bourgeois regime, when sugar, for example, was sold at exorbitant prices in the home market, while abroad, in Britain, for example, this same sugar was sold so cheaply that it was used for feeding pigs.

The Soviet Government pursues a diametrically opposite policy. It holds that industry must serve the population and not the other way round. It holds that a steady reduction of the prices of manufactured goods is a basic means for ensuring the normal growth of industry. That is apart from the fact that the policy of reducing the prices of manufactured goods helps to increase the demand of the population, increases the capacity of the home market, urban and rural, and thus creates an ever-growing source for the further expansion of industry.

FIFTH QUESTION. What proposals does the Soviet Government offer the small French bondholders?
How are they to be brought to the knowledge of the French rentiers?
ANSWER : Our proposals on the pre-war debts were published in the well-known interview with Rakovsky. I think you must be familiar with them. They are made conditional on simultaneous receipt of credits by the U.S.S.R. In this we adhere to the principle of give and take. If you give us credits you will get something from us in the way of payments on the pre-war debts. If you give nothing you will get nothing.

Does that mean that thereby we have in principle recognised the pre-war debts? No, it does not. It merely means that while leaving in force the well-known decree annulling the tsarist debts, 3 we are nevertheless willing to conclude a working agreement to pay some part of the pre-war debts, provided we are granted the credits which we need and which will also benefit French industry. We regard payments on the debts as extra interest on the credits received by us for the development of our industry.

Some talk about tsarist Russia's war debts. Some talk about all sorts of claims on the U.S.S.R. owing to the results of the October Revolution. They forget, however, that our revolution is the repudiation on principle of imperialist wars and the tsarist debts connected with them. They forget that the U.S.S.R. cannot and will not pay the war debts.

They also forget that the U.S.S.R. cannot wipe off the books the plunder and violence to which the country was subjected for several years, during the armed intervention of foreign states, and in connection with which the U.S.S.R. is making certain counter-claims.

Who is answerable for that plunder and violence? Who must be called to account for it? Who must pay for that plunder and violence? The imperialist bosses are inclined to forget these unpleasant things; but they must know that such things are not forgotten.

SIXTH QUESTION. How do you reconcile the vodka monopoly with the fight against drunkenness?
ANSWER : I think that it is in general difficult to reconcile them. There is undoubtedly a contradiction here. The Party is aware of this contradiction, but it deliberately invited it, knowing that at the present time such a contradiction is the lesser evil.

When we introduced the vodka monopoly we were confronted with the alternatives:

either to go into bondage to the capitalists by ceding to them a number of our most important mills and factories and receiving in return the funds necessary to enable us to carry on,

or to introduce the vodka monopoly in order to obtain the necessary working capital for developing our industry with our own resources and thus avoid going into foreign bondage.

Members of the Central Committee, including myself, had a talk with Lenin at the time, and he admitted that if we failed to obtain the necessary loans from abroad we should have to agree openly and straightforwardly to adopt the vodka monopoly as an extraordinary temporary measure.

That is how matters stood when we introduced the vodka monopoly.

Of course, generally speaking, it would be better to do without vodka, for vodka is an evil. But that would mean going into temporary bondage to the capitalists, which is a still greater evil. We, therefore, preferred the lesser evil. At present the revenue from vodka is over 500 million rubles. To give up vodka now would mean giving up that revenue; moreover there are no grounds for asserting that this would reduce drunkenness, for the peasants would begin to distil their own vodka and to poison themselves with illicit spirits.

Evidently, the serious shortcomings as regards the cultural development of the countryside play a certain role here. This is apart from the fact that the immediate abandonment of the vodka monopoly would deprive our industry of over 500 million rubles, which could not be replaced from any other source.

Does that mean that the vodka monopoly must remain indefinitely? No, it does not. We introduced it as a temporary measure. Hence, it must be abolished as soon as we find in our national economy new sources of revenue for the further development of our industry. That such sources will be found there can be no doubt.

Were we right in transferring the manufacture of vodka to the state? I think we were. If vodka were transferred to private hands it would:

firstly, strengthen private capital,

secondly, deprive the government of the opportunity to regulate properly the production and consumption of vodka, and

thirdly, make it more difficult for the government to abolish the production and consumption of vodka in the future.

At present our policy is gradually to reduce the production of vodka. I think that in the future we shall be able to abolish the vodka monopoly altogether, reduce the output of alcohol to the minimum required for technical purposes, and later on end the sale of vodka altogether.

I think that we should, perhaps, not have to deal with vodka, or with many other unpleasant things, if the West-European proletarians took power into their hands and gave us the necessary assistance. But what is to be done? Our West-European brothers do not want to take power yet, and we are compelled to do the best we can with our own resources. But that is not our fault, it is—fate.

As you see, our West-European friends also bear a share of the responsibility for the vodka monopoly. (Laughter and applause.)

SEVENTH QUESTION, The judicial powers of the GPU, trial without witnesses, without counsel for the defence, secret arrests. Considering that French public opinion finds it hard to approve of these measures, it would be interesting to hear on what grounds they are justified. Is it intended to modify or abolish them?
ANSWER : The GPU, or Cheka, is a punitive organ of the Soviet state. It is an organ more or less analogous to the Committee of Public Safety which was set up during the Great French Revolution. It punishes primarily spies, plotters, terrorists, bandits, profiteers and counterfeiters. It is something in the nature of a military-political tribunal set up for the purpose of protecting the interests of the revolution from the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie and their agents.

This organ was created on the morrow of the October Revolution, after the discovery of all kinds of conspiratorial, terrorist and espionage organisations financed by Russian and foreign capitalists.

This organ developed and gained strength after a series of terrorist acts had been perpetrated against leaders of the Soviet Government, after the murder of Comrade Uritsky, a member of the Revolutionary Committee, in Petrograd (he was killed by a Socialist-Revolutionary), after the murder of Comrade Volodarsky, a member of the Revolutionary Committee, in Petrograd (he was also killed by a Socialist-Revolutionary), after the attempt on the life of Lenin (he was wounded by a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party).

It must be admitted that the GPU at that time struck unerring and telling blows at the enemies of the revolution. Not only that, it has retained that ability to this day. From that time on, the GPU has been the terror of the bourgeoisie, the vigilant guardian of the revolution, the naked sword of the proletariat.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the bourgeois of all countries mortally hate the GPU. There is no limit to the legends that have been invented about the GPU. There is no limit to the slanders that have been circulated about the GPU. What does that mean? It means that the GPU is effectively guarding the interests of the revolution. The sworn enemies of the revolution curse the GPU. It follows, therefore, that the GPU is doing the right thing.

The attitude of the workers towards the GPU is different. Go to the workers' districts and ask the workers what they think of the GPU. You will find that they respect it. Why? Because they regard it as a loyal defender of the revolution.

I can understand why the bourgeois hate and distrust the GPU. I can understand why the first thing various bourgeois tourists enquire about on arriving in the U.S.S.R. is whether the GPU still exists, and whether it is not high time to abolish it. All this is comprehensible and not surprising.

But I cannot understand why some workers' delegates, on arriving in the U.S.S.R., anxiously enquire whether many counter-revolutionaries have been punished by the GPU, whether terrorists and plotters against the proletarian government will still be punished, and whether it is not high time to abolish the GPU.

Why do some workers' delegates show such concern for the enemies of the proletarian revolution? How can it be explained? How can it be justified?

Maximum leniency is advocated, we are advised to abolish the GPU. . . . But is there any guarantee that if the GPU is abolished the capitalists of all countries will give up organising and financing counterrevolutionary groups of plotters, terrorists, wreckers, incendiaries and dynamiters? To disarm the revolution without any guarantees that the enemies of the revolution will be disarmed—would that not be folly, would that not be a crime against the working class?

No, comrades, we do not want to repeat the mistakes of the Paris Communards. The Paris Communards were too lenient in dealing with the Versaillese, for which Marx rightly reproved them at the time. They had to pay for their leniency by tens of thousands of workers being shot by the Versaillese when Thiers entered Paris.

Do the comrades think that the Russian bourgeois and landlords are less bloodthirsty than the Versaillese were in France? At all events, we know how savagely they dealt with the workers when they occupied Siberia, the Ukraine and the North Caucasus in alliance with the French and British, the Japanese and American interventionists.

I do not mean to say that it is the internal situation of the country that obliges us to have punitive organs of the revolution. From the standpoint of the internal situation, the revolution is so firm and unshakable that we could manage without the GPU. But the point is that our enemies at home are not isolated individuals. The point is that they are connected by a thousand threads with the capitalists of all countries, who support them with all their might and all their means. We are a country surrounded by capitalist states. The internal enemies of our revolution are agents of the capitalists of all countries. The capitalist states are a base and rear for the internal enemies of our revolution. Hence, in fighting the enemies at home we are fighting the counter-revolutionary elements of all countries. Now judge for yourselves whether, under these circumstances, we can manage without punitive organs like the GPU.

No, comrades, we do not want to repeat the mistakes of the Paris Communards. The revolution needs the GPU; and the GPU will continue to exist to the terror of the enemies of the proletariat. (Stormy applause.)

A delegate: Allow me, Comrade Stalin, to thank you on behalf of the delegates present for your explanations and for refuting the lies about the U.S.S.R. that are spread abroad. You need have no doubts that we shall be able to tell our workers at home the truth about the U.S.S.R.

Stalin: There is no need to thank me, comrades. I consider it my duty to answer your questions and to report to you. We Soviet leaders regard it as our duty to report to our class brothers on all questions on which they wish to hear reports. Our state is the offspring of the world proletariat. The leaders of our state merely do their duty to the international proletariat when they report to its representatives. (Applause.)

Pravda, Nos. 260 and 261, November 13 and 15, 1927

Notes

1. Vossische Zeitung — a German bourgeois newspaper published in Berlin from 1704 until April 1934.

2. Sacco and Vanzetti—Italian workers, immigrants in the United States, were arrested on May 5, 1920, in Brockton, Massachusetts, on a framed-up charge of murder and robbery and in 1921 were sentenced to death by an American reactionary court. Mass demonstrations, meetings and strikes in which millions of working people took part, were held all over the world in protest against this sentence. On August 23, 1927, Sacco and Vanzetti were executed.

3. The decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies annulling the tsarist government's state debts was adopted on January 21, 1918.

The International Character of
the October Revolution
On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution
November 6-7, 1927

The October Revolution cannot be regarded merely as a revolution "within national bounds." It is, primarily, a revolution of an international, world order, for it signifies a radical turn in the world history of mankind, a turn from the old, capitalist world to the new, socialist world.

Revolutions in the past usually ended by one group of exploiters at the helm of government being replaced by another group of exploiters. The exploiters changed, exploitation remained. Such was the case during the liberation movements of the slaves. Such was the case during the period of the uprisings of the serfs. Such was the case during the period of the well-known "great" revolutions in England, France and Germany. I am not speaking of the Paris Commune, which was the first glorious, heroic, yet unsuccessful attempt on the part of the proletariat to turn history against capitalism.

The October Revolution differs from these revolutions in principle. Its aim is not to replace one form of exploitation by another form of exploitation, one group of exploiters by another group of exploiters, but to abolish all exploitation of man by man, to abolish all groups of exploiters, to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, to establish the power of the most revolutionary class of all the oppressed classes that have ever existed, to organise a new, classless, socialist society.

It is precisely for this reason that the victory of the October Revolution signifies a radical change in the history of mankind, a radical change in the historical destiny of world capitalism, a radical change in the liberation movement of the world proletariat, a radical change in the methods of struggle and the forms of organisation, in the manner of life and traditions, in the culture and ideology of the exploited masses throughout the world.

That is the basic reason why the October Revolution is a revolution of an international, world order.

That also is the source of the profound sympathy which the oppressed classes in all countries entertain for the October Revolution, which they regard as a pledge of their own emancipation.

A number of fundamental issues could be noted on which the October Revolution influences the development of the revolutionary movement throughout the world.

1. The October Revolution is noteworthy primarily for having breached the front of world imperialism, for having overthrown the imperialist bourgeoisie in one of the biggest capitalist countries and put the socialist proletariat in power.

The class of wage-workers, the class of the persecuted, the class of the oppressed and exploited has for the first time in the history of mankind risen to the position of the ruling class, setting a contagious example to the proletarians of all countries.

This means that the October Revolution has ushered in a new era, the era of proletarian revolutions in the countries of imperialism.

It took the instruments and means of production from the landlords and capitalists and converted them into public property, thus counterposing socialist property to bourgeois property. It thereby exposed the lie of the capitalists that bourgeois property is inviolable, sacred, eternal.

It wrested power from the bourgeoisie, deprived the bourgeoisie of political rights, destroyed the bourgeois state apparatus and transferred power to the Soviets, thus counter-posing the socialist rule of the Soviets, as proletarian democracy, to bourgeois parliamentarism, as capitalist democracy. Lafargue was right when he said, as far back as 1887, that on the morrow of the revolution "all former capitalists will be disfranchised." 1

The October Revolution thereby exposed the lie of the Social-Democrats that at the present time a peaceful transition to socialism is possible through bourgeois parliamentarism.

But the October Revolution did not and could not stop there. Having destroyed the old, bourgeois order, it began to build the new, socialist order. The 10 years of the October Revolution have been 10 years of building the Party, trade unions, Soviets, co-operatives, cultural organisations, transport, industry, the Red Army. The indubitable successes of socialism in the U.S.S.R. on the front of construction have clearly shown that the proletariat can successfully govern the country without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie, that it can successfully build industry without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie, that it can successfully direct the whole of the national economy without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie, that it can successfully build socialism in spite of the capitalist encirclement.

Menenius Agrippa, the famous Roman senator of ancient times, was not the only one to uphold the old "theory" that the exploited cannot do without the exploiters any more than the head and other parts of the body can do without the stomach. This "theory" is now the corner-stone of the political "philosophy" of Social-Democracy in general, and of the Social-Democratic policy of coalition with the imperialist bourgeoisie in particular. This "theory," which has acquired the character of a prejudice, is now one of the most serious obstacles in the path towards the revolutionisation of the proletariat in the capitalist countries. One of the most important results of the October Revolution is that it dealt this false "theory" a mortal blow.

Is there any further need to prove that these and similar results of the October Revolution could not and cannot fail to exert an important influence on the revolutionary movement of the working class in the capitalist countries?

Such generally known facts as the progressive growth of communism in the capitalist countries, the growing sympathy of the proletarians of all countries for the working class of the U.S.S.R. and, finally, the many workers' delegations that come to the Land of Soviets, prove beyond doubt that the seeds sown by the October Revolution are already beginning to bear fruit.

2. The October Revolution has shaken imperialism not only in the centres of its domination, not only in the "metropolises." It has also struck at the rear of imperialism, its periphery, having undermined the rule of imperialism in the colonial and dependent countries.

Having overthrown the landlords and the capitalists, the October Revolution broke the chains of national and colonial oppression and freed from it, without exception, all the oppressed

peoples of a vast state. The proletariat cannot emancipate itself unless it emancipates the oppressed peoples. It is a characteristic feature of the October Revolution that it accomplished these national-colonial revolutions in the U.S.S.R. not under the flag of national enmity and conflicts among nations, but under the flag of mutual confidence and fraternal rapprochement of the workers and peasants of the various peoples in the U.S.S.R., not in the name of nationalism, but in the name of internationalism.

It is precisely because the national-colonial revolutions took place in our country under the leadership of the proletariat and under the banner of internationalism that pariah peoples, slave peoples, have for the first time in the history of mankind risen to the position of peoples that are really free and really equal, thereby setting a contagious example to the oppressed nations of the whole world.

This means that the October Revolution has ushered in new era, the era of colonial revolutions which are being carried out in the oppressed countries of the world in alliance with the proletariat and under the leadership of the proletariat.

It was formerly the "accepted" idea that the world has been divided from time immemorial into inferior and superior races, into blacks and whites, of whom the former are unfit for civilisation and are doomed to be objects of exploitation, while the latter are the only bearers of civilisation, whose mission it is to exploit the former.

That legend must now be regarded as shattered and discarded. One of the most important results of the October Revolution is that it dealt that legend a mortal blow, by demonstrating in practice that the liberated non-European peoples, drawn into the channel of Soviet development, are not one whit less capable of promoting a really progressive culture and a really progressive civilisation than are the European peoples.

It was formerly the "accepted" idea that the only method of liberating the oppressed peoples is the method of bourgeois nationalism, the method of nations drawing apart from one another, the method of disuniting nations, the method of intensifying national enmity among the labouring masses of the various nations.

That legend must now be regarded as refuted. One of the most important results of the October Revolution is that it dealt that legend a mortal blow, by demonstrating in practice the possibility and expediency of the proletarian, internationalist method of liberating the oppressed peoples, as the only correct method; by demonstrating in practice the possibility and expediency of a fraternal union of the workers and peasants of the most diverse nations based on the principles of voluntariness and internationalism. The existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is the prototype of the future integration of the working people of all countries into a single world economic system, cannot but serve as direct proof of this.

It need hardly be said that these and similar results of the October Revolution could not and cannot fail to exert an important influence on the revolutionary movement in the colonial and dependent countries. Such facts as the growth of the revolutionary movement of the oppressed peoples in China, Indonesia, India, etc., and the growing sympathy of these peoples for the U.S.S.R., unquestionably bear this out.

The era of tranquil exploitation and oppression of the colonies and dependent countries has passed away.

The era of liberating revolutions in the colonies and dependent countries, the era of the awakening of the proletariat in those countries, the era of its hegemony in the revolution, has begun.

3. Having sown the seeds of revolution both in the centres of imperialism and in its rear, having weakened the might of imperialism in the "metropolises" and having shaken its domination in the colonies, the October Revolution has thereby put in jeopardy the very existence of world capitalism as a whole.

While the spontaneous development of capitalism in the conditions of imperialism has passed—owing to its unevenness, owing to the inevitability of conflicts and armed collisions, owing, finally, to the unprecedented imperialist slaughter—into the process of the decay and the dying of capitalism, the October Revolution and the resultant dropping out of a vast country from the world system of capitalism could not but accelerate this process, undermining, bit by bit, the very foundations of world imperialism.

More than that. While shaking imperialism, the October Revolution has at the same time created—in the shape of the first proletarian dictatorship—a powerful and open base for the world revolutionary movement, a base such as the latter never possessed before and on which it now can rely for support. It has created a powerful and open centre of the world revolutionary movement, such as the latter never possessed before and around which it can now rally, organising a united revolutionary front of the proletarians and of the oppressed peoples of all countries against imperialism.

This means, firstly, that the October Revolution inflicted a mortal wound on world capitalism from which the latter will never recover. For that very reason capitalism will never recover the "equilibrium" and "stability" that it possessed before October.

Capitalism may become partly stabilised, it may rationalise its production, turn over the administration of the country to fascism, temporarily hold down the working class; but it will never recover the "tranquillity," the "assurance," the "equilibrium" and the "stability" that it flaunted before; for the crisis of world capitalism has reached the stage of development when the flames of revolution must inevitably break out, now in the centres of imperialism, now in the periphery, reducing to naught the capitalist patch-work and daily bringing nearer the fall of capitalism. Exactly as in the well-known fable, "when it pulled its tail out of the mud, its beak got stuck; when it pulled its beak out, its tail got stuck."

This means, secondly, that the October Revolution has raised to such a height the strength and importance, the courage and the fighting preparedness of the oppressed classes of the whole world as to compel the ruling classes to reckon with them as a new, important factor. Now the labouring masses of the world can no longer be regarded as a "blind mob," groping in the dark and devoid of prospects; for the October Revolution has created a beacon which illumines their path and opens up prospects for them. Whereas formerly there was no world-wide open forum from which the aspirations and strivings of the oppressed classes could be expounded and formulated, now such a forum exists in the shape of the first proletarian dictatorship.

There is hardly room for doubt that the destruction of this forum would for a long time cast the gloom of unbridled, black reaction over the social and political life of the "advanced countries." It cannot be denied that the very existence of a "Bolshevik state" puts a curb upon the dark forces of reaction, thus helping the oppressed classes in their struggle for liberation. It is this that explains the savage hatred which the exploiters of all countries entertain for the Bolsheviks.

History repeats itself, though on a new basis. Just as formerly, during the period of the downfall of feudalism, the word "Jacobin" evoked dread and abhorrence among the aristocrats of all countries, so now, in the period of the down fall of capitalism, the word "Bolshevik" evokes dread and abhorrence among the bourgeois in all countries. And conversely, just as formerly Paris was the refuge and school for the revolutionary representatives of the rising bourgeoisie, so now Moscow is the refuge and school for the revolutionary representatives of the rising proletariat. Hatred of the Jacobins did not save feudalism from collapse. Can there be any doubt that hatred of the Bolsheviks will not save capitalism from its inevitable downfall?

The era of the "stability" of capitalism has passed away, carrying away with it the legend of the indestructibility of the bourgeois order.

The era of the collapse of capitalism has begun.

4. The October Revolution cannot be regarded merely as a revolution in the sphere of economic and social-political relations. It is at the same time a revolution in the minds, a revolution in the ideology, of the working class. The October Revolution was born and gained strength under the banner of Marxism, under the banner of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, under the banner of Leninism, which is Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Hence it marks the victory of Marxism over reformism, the victory of Leninism over Social-Democratism, the victory of the Third International over the Second International.

The October Revolution has brought into being an impassable chasm between Marxism and Social-Democratism, between the policy of Leninism and the policy of Social-Democratism.

Formerly, before the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Social-Democracy, while refraining from openly repudiating the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat but doing nothing, absolutely nothing, to bring nearer the realisation of this idea, could flaunt the banner of Marxism, and it is obvious that this behaviour of Social-Democracy created no danger whatever for capitalism. Then, in that period, Social-Democracy was formally identified, or almost completely identified, with Marxism.

Now, after the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, when everybody has seen for himself to what Marxism leads and what its victory may signify, Social-Democracy is no longer able to flaunt the banner of Marxism, can no longer coquet with the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat without creating a certain danger for capitalism. Having long ago broken with the spirit of Marxism, it has found itself compelled to discard also the banner of Marxism; it has openly and unambiguously taken a stand against the offspring of Marxism, against the October Revolution, against the first dictatorship of the proletariat in the world.

Now it has had to dissociate itself from Marxism, and has actually done so; for under present conditions one cannot call oneself a Marxist unless one openly and devotedly supports the first proletarian dictatorship in the world, unless one wages a revolutionary struggle against one's own bourgeoisie, unless one creates the conditions for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one's own country.

A chasm has opened between Social-Democracy and Marxism. Henceforth, the only bearer and bulwark of Marxism is Leninism, communism.

But matters did not end there. The October Revolution went further than drawing a demarcation line between Social Democracy and Marxism; it relegated Social-Democracy to the camp of the direct defenders of capitalism against the first proletarian dictatorship in the world. When Messieurs the Adlers and Bauers, the Welses and Levis, the Longuets and Blums abuse the "Soviet regime" and extol parliamentary "democracy," these gentlemen mean that they are fighting and will continue to fight for the restoration of the capitalist order in the U.S.S.R., for the preservation of capitalist slavery in the "civilised" states.

Present-day Social-Democratism is an ideological support of capitalism. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said that the present-day Social-Democratic politicians are "real agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class," that in the "civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie" they would inevitably range themselves "on the side of the 'Versaillese' against the 'Communards.'" 2

It is impossible to put an end to capitalism without putting an end to Social-Democratism in the labour movement. That is why the era of dying capitalism is also the era of dying Social-Democratism in the labour movement.

The great significance of the October Revolution consists, among other things, in the fact that it marks the inevitable victory of Leninism over Social-Democratism in the world labour movement.

The era of the domination of the Second International and of Social-Democratism in the labour movement has ended.

The era of the domination of Leninism and of the Third International has begun.

Pravda, No. 255, November 6-7, 1927

Notes

1. Paul Lafargue, On the Morrow of the Revolution (see Works, Russ. ed., Vol. I, 1925, pp. 329-30).

2. V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, p. 182).

To the Party Conference of the
Moscow Military Area1
November 18, 1927

Fraternal greetings to you, comrades! I wish you every success in your work. Long live our glorious Red Army!

J. Stalin

Published in the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 263, November 18, 1927

The Party and the Opposition
Speech Delivered at the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference 1
November 23, 1927

Comrades, permit me briefly to sum up the struggle between the Party and the opposition, to sum up the discussion that has developed during the past three or four weeks within the Party and—it must be frankly stated—outside it.

I
Brief Results of the Discussion
The following statistical results are available: up to the present, something over 572,000 comrades have declared for the Party, for its Central Committee; for the opposition—something over 3,000.

The opposition is usually fond of flaunting figures, percentages, claiming that it has the support of 99 per cent, and so forth. Everybody sees now that over 99 per cent have declared against the opposition and for the Central Committee of the Party.

Who is to "blame" for that? The opposition itself! Every now and again the opposition has tried to push us into a discussion. For two years a]ready, hardly a day passed without it making a new demand for a discussion. We resisted that pressure; we members of the Central Committee resisted that pressure, knowing that our Party is not a debating society, as Lenin quite rightly said, knowing that our Party is the militant party of the proletariat, surrounded by enemies, engaged in building socialism, faced with an enormous number of practical tasks of creative activity and, therefore, unable to concentrate all its attention ever so often on the disagreements within the Party.

But time moved on towards a discussion, and a month, more than a month, before the Fifteenth Congress, the Party, in conformity with the Party Rules, said: Very well, you want a discussion, you want a fight—let's have it, then! And here is the result: over 99 per cent for the Party, for its Central Committee; less than one per cent for the opposition.

The opposition's bluff has been called 100 per cent, so to speak.

It may be said that this result is not decisive. It may be said that besides the Party there is also the working class and the masses of the labouring peasantry. It may be said that here, in this sphere, the results have not yet been summed up. That is not true, comrades! The results have been summed up in this sphere too.

What were the November Seventh demonstrations in all the cities and villages throughout our vast country? Were they not all a tremendous demonstration of the working class, of the labouring sections of the peasantry, of the Red Army and the Red Navy, for our Party, for the government, and against the opposition, against Trotskyism?

Is not the ignominy that the opposition called down upon its own head on the Tenth Anniversary of October, is not the unanimity with which the millions of working people greeted the Party and the government on that day, proof that not only the Party, but also the working class, not only the working class, but also the labouring sections of the peasantry, not only the labouring sections of the peasantry, but also the entire Army and the entire Navy,

stand like a rock for the Party, for the government and against the opposition, against the disorganisers? (Prolonged applause.)

What more results do you need?

There you have, comrades, a brief summing up of the struggle between the Party and the opposition, between the Bolsheviks and the opposition, the struggle that developed within the Party and later, through the opposition's own fault, went beyond the borders of the Party.

How is this ignominious defeat of the opposition to be explained? It is a fact that no other opposition in the history of our Party since the Bolsheviks took power has ever suffered such an ignominious defeat.

We know about the opposition of the Trotskyists in the period of the Brest Peace. At that time it had the support of about a quarter of the Party.

We know about the opposition of the Trotskyists in 1921, during the trade-union discussion. At that time it had the support of about one-eighth of the Party.

We know about the so-called "New Opposition," the Zinoviev-Kamenev opposition, at the Fourteenth Congress. It then had the support of the entire Leningrad delegation.

But now? Now the opposition is more isolated than ever before. It is doubtful now whether it will have even one delegate at the Fifteenth Congress. (Prolonged applause.)

The failure of the opposition is due to its being completely divorced from the Party, from the working class, from the revolution. The opposition has turned out to be a handful of intellectuals divorced from life, divorced from the revolution. Therein lies the root of the opposition's ignominious failure.

Let us, by way of a test, take two or three of the questions which separate the opposition from the Party.

II
The Working Class and the Peasantry

The question of the relations between the working class and the peasantry.

Lenin said that the question of the relations between the working class and the peasantry in our country is a fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the fundamental question of our revolution. He said :

"Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions, which are growing, are delayed)." 2

What are correct relations with the peasantry? By correct relations with the peasantry Lenin meant the establishment of a "stable alliance" with the middle peasants, while relying on the poor peasants.

But what is the opposition's view on this question? It not only attaches no value to the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, it not only fails to appreciate the immense

importance of such an alliance for the development of our revolution, but it goes "further" and proposes a policy that would inevitably lead to the break-up of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, to the rupture of the bond between the working class and the peasantry.

Not to go far for proof of this, I could refer to Pre-obrazhensky, the opposition's chief economist, who regards the peasantry as a "colony" for our industry, as an object to be exploited to the utmost.

I could also refer to a number of the opposition's documents in favour of raising the prices of manufactured goods, which would inevitably cause our industry to wilt, would strengthen the kulaks, ruin the middle peasants and force the poor peasants into bondage to the kulaks.

All these and similar opposition documents are part and parcel of the opposition's policy calculated to cause a rupture with the peasantry, a rupture with the masses of the middle peasantry.

Is anything said plainly and openly about this in the opposition's "platform" or in its counter-theses? No. In the opposition's "platform" and counter-theses all this is carefully hidden and veiled. On the contrary, in the opposition's "platform" and counter-theses you can find scores of compliments addressed to the middle peasants and to the poor peasants. They also contain thrusts at the Party's alleged kulak deviation. But they say nothing, absolutely nothing, plainly and openly about the opposition's fatal line, which leads and is bound to lead to a rupture between the working class and the peasantry.

But what the leaders of the opposition are hiding so carefully from the workers and peasants I shall now try to bring into the light of day and lay on the table in order to teach the opposition not to deceive the Party in future. I have in mind the speech recently delivered by Ivan Nikitich Smirnov at the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky District Party Conference. Smirnov, one of the leaders of the opposition, proved to be one of the few honest men among them who had the courage to tell the truth about the opposition's line. Do you want to know what the opposition's real "platform" is on the question of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry? Read Smirnov's speech and study it, for it is one of those rare opposition documents which tell the whole truth about the stand actually taken by our oppositionists.

Here is what Smirnov said in his speech:

"We say that our state budget must be revised in such a way that the greater part of this five thousand million budget should flow into industry, for it would be better for us to put up with discord with the middle peasants than to invite certain doom."

That is the fundamental thing of all that the leaders of the opposition have been concealing in their "platform" and counter-theses, and what Smirnov, also a leader of the opposition, conscientiously dragged into the light of day.

Hence, not a stable alliance with the middle peasants, but discord with the middle peasants—that, it appears, is the means of "saving" the revolution.

Lenin said that "the supreme principle of the dictatorship is the maintenance of the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and state power." 3

But the opposition disagrees with that and asserts that the important thing for the dictatorship of the proletariat is not an alliance with the peasantry, with the main mass of the peasantry, but discord with it.

Lenin said, and not only said but constantly reiterated, from the Eighth Party Congress onwards, that it will be impossible to build socialism successfully in our country unless we have "a stable alliance with the middle peasants." 4

But the opposition disagrees with that and asserts that the policy of a stable alliance with the middle peasants can be replaced by a policy of discord with them.

Lenin said that in building socialism we must move forward together with the main mass of the peasantry.

But the opposition disagrees with that and asserts that we must move forward not together with the peasantry, but in discord with them.

That is the principal disagreement between the Party and the opposition on the cardinal question of the relations between the working class and the peasantry.

In its "platform" the opposition tried to hide its true countenance by addressing compliments to the peasantry and making hypocritical thrusts at the Party's alleged kulak deviation. But Smirnov introduced a radical amendment to the opposition's "platform" by tearing the mask from the leaders of the opposition and telling the Party the truth about the opposition, the truth about the opposition's actual platform.

What follows from this? It follows from this that the opposition's "platform" and counter-theses are mere scraps of paper, calculated to deceive the Party and the working class.

What does a policy of discord with the middle peasants mean? The policy of discord with the middle peasants is a policy of discord with the majority of the peasants, for the middle peasants constitute not less than 60 per cent of the entire peasantry. That is precisely why the policy of discord with the middle peasants leads to the majority of the peasants being driven into the arms of the kulaks. And a policy of driving the majority of the peasants into the arms of the kulaks means strengthening the kulaks, isolating the poor peasants, weakening Soviet rule in the countryside and helping the kulaks to throttle the poor peasants.

But the matter does not end here. To pursue a policy of discord with the majority of the peasantry means starting civil war in the countryside, making it difficult for our industry to be supplied with the raw materials produced by the peasants (cotton, sugar-beet, flax, hides, wool, etc.), disorganising the supply of agricultural produce for the working class, shattering the very foundations of our light industry, disrupting our entire work of construction, disrupting our whole plan of industrialising the country.

That is the turn the matter takes, comrades, if we bear in mind not the bare statements the opposition makes in its "platform" and counter-theses, but the opposition's actual policy as authoritatively explained to us by Smirnov.

I am far from accusing the opposition of deliberately striving for all these misfortunes. It is not, however, a matter of what the opposition desires and is striving for, but of the results that must inevitably follow from the opposition's policy of discord with the middle peasantry.

The same thing is happening to the opposition here as happened with the bear in Krylov's fable "The Hermit and the Bear." (Laughter.) It goes without saying that the bear's intention in smashing the head of his friend the hermit with a lump of rock was to deliver him from the importunate fly. The bear was prompted by the friendliest motives. Nevertheless, the bear's friendly motives led to an action that was far from friendly, and for which the hermit paid with his life. Of course, the opposition wishes the revolution nothing but good. But to achieve this it proposes such means as would result in the utter defeat of the revolution, in the utter defeat of the working class and the peasantry, in the disruption of all our work of construction.

The opposition's "platform" is a platform for the rupture of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, a platform for the disruption of all our work of construction, a platform for the disruption of the work of industrialisation.

III
The Party and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat
The question of the Party.

Lenin says that the unity and iron discipline of the Party are the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The opposition in actual fact holds the opposite view. It thinks that for the proletarian dictatorship we need not the unity and iron discipline of the Party, but the destruction of the Party's unity and discipline, the splitting of the Party and the formation of a second party. True, the opposition talks and writes, writes and talks, and not so much talks as howls about Party unity. But the opposition's talk about Party unity is hypocritical chatter calculated to deceive the Party. (Applause.)

For, while talking and shouting about unity, the opposition is building a new, anti-Leninist party. And it is not only engaged in building it, it has already built it, as is shown by authentic documents, such as the speeches of Kuzovnikov, Zof and Reno, former oppositionists.

We are now in possession of exhaustive documentary evidence that for over a year already the opposition has had its own anti-Leninist party, with its Central Committee, regional bureaux, gubernia bureaux, and so forth. What can the opposition oppose to these facts except hypocritical chatter about unity?

The opposition is shouting that the Central Committee of the Party will not succeed in pushing it into the position of a second party. Strange! Has the Central Committee ever tried to push the opposition into such a position? Is it not a fact that the Central Committee has all along been restraining the opposition from slipping into the line of organising a second party?

The entire history of our disagreements during the past two years is a history of the efforts of the Central Committee of our Party to restrain the opposition from taking steps towards a split and to keep the opposition people within the Party.

Take the case of the opposition's well-known "declaration" of October 16, 1926. Was that not an attempt of the Central Committee to keep the opposition within the ranks of the Party?

Take the opposition's second "declaration" of August 8, 1927. What does that show if not that the Central Committee of the Party has been anxious all along to keep the opposition within the ranks of a single party?

But what happened? The opposition made declarations about unity, made promises to maintain unity, gave assurances that it would abandon factionalism; but actually it continued to build a second party.

What does all that show? It shows that we cannot take the opposition at its word; that the opposition must be tested not by its "platforms" and counter-theses, but by its deeds.

Lenin said: learn to test groups, trends and parties not by their promises and "platforms," but by their deeds. We regard it as our duty to follow in Lenin's footsteps and to test the opposition not by the papers and "platforms" it concocts, but by its deeds.

When the opposition writes "platforms" and counter-theses and raises a howl about Party unity, it is deceiving the Party, it is hypocrisy, mere words. But when the opposition builds a new party, sets up its own central committee, organises regional bureaux, and so forth, thereby disrupting the unity and proletarian discipline of our Party, those are the opposition's deeds, its nefarious deeds.

That does not mean, of course, that the opposition has already succeeded in creating anything like a real party. No. It has not succeeded in that, and it never will. It will not succeed, because the working class is against the opposition. In trying to create a new party, a second party, the opposition is in reality engaged in a childish game, playing at being a party, a central committee, regional bureaux, and so forth. Routed and disgraced, they find consolation in amusing themselves by playing at being a party, a central committee, regional bureaux, and so forth. (Laughter. Applause.)

But, comrades, there are games and games. When the opposition plays at being a party it can only arouse laughter, because, for the Party, that playing is nothing more than an amusing fancy.

We have, however, not only the Party to consider. We still have classes, we still have anti-Soviet elements in our country. And those anti-Soviet elements are watching the opposition's game, learning from it how to fight the Party, how to fight the Soviet regime, how to fight our revolution. For those elements, the opposition's game of being a party, the opposition's thrusts at the Party, the opposition's anti-Soviet sorties, serve as a sort of school, a sort of preparatory school for learning how to fight the Soviet regime, how to unleash the forces of counter-revolution.

It is not surprising that all sorts of anti-Soviet elements flock around the opposition. Herein lies the danger of the opposition's game of being a party. And precisely because a grave

danger lurks here, the Party cannot look on indifferently at the opposition's anti-Soviet exercises; precisely for this reason it must put a stop to them altogether.

As for the working class, it cannot fail to see how dangerous is the anti-Party game the opposition is playing. For the opposition, the Party is a chess-board. In fighting the Party, it makes various chess moves. One day it submits a declaration promising to end factionalism. Next day it repudiates its own declaration. A day later it submits a new declaration, only to repudiate its own declaration again a few days after. These are chess moves for the opposition. They are players and nothing more.

But that is not the way the working class looks upon its Party. For the working class the Party is not a chess-board, but the instrument of its emancipation. For the working class the Party is not a chess-board, but a vital means of overcoming its enemies, of organising new victories, of achieving the final victory of socialism. Hence the working class can only despise those who turn its Party, its holy of holies, into a chess-board for the dishonest games of the oppositionist players. For the working class cannot but know that the opposition's efforts to disrupt our Party's iron discipline, its efforts to split our Party, are, in essence, efforts to disrupt the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country.

The opposition's "platform" is a platform for wrecking our Party, a platform for disarming the working class, a platform for unleashing the anti-Soviet forces, a platform for disrupting the dictatorship of the proletariat .

IV
The Prospects of Our Revolution
Let us pass to the third question, the question of the prospects of our revolution.

The characteristic feature of the whole line of the opposition is disbelief in the strength of our revolution, disbelief in the proletariat's strength and capacity to lead the peasantry, disbelief in the strength and capacity of the working class to build socialism.

I have already quoted the passage from Smirnov's speech about the inevitable "doom" of our revolution if we do not establish discord with the middle peasantry. This is not the first time that we have heard the songs of the opposition about the "doom" of the revolution. This is not the first time that in the opposition's declarations we have encountered continual whining and consternation in face of difficulties, predictions of the twilight and collapse of our revolution. From the time that the opposition's factional policy began to suffer defeat after defeat the opposition has not ceased shouting about the "doom" of our revolution, making out the doom of its own group to be the "doom" of the revolution. The opposition has only to find itself in the minority, to get a drubbing from the Party, for it to rush into the street and start shouting about the "doom" of the revolution and to utilise all possible difficulties against the Party.

As early as in the period of the Brest Peace, in 1918, when the revolution was experiencing certain difficulties, Trotsky, after being defeated by the Party at the Seventh Congress, began to shout about the "doom" of our revolution. But the revolution did not perish, and Trotsky's prophecies remained empty prophecies.

In 1921, in the period of the trade-union discussion, when we were faced with new difficulties arising from the abolition of the surplus appropriation system, and Trotsky suffered another defeat, at the Tenth Party Congress, he again began to shout about the "doom" of the

revolution. I well remember Trotsky asserting at a meeting of the Political Bureau, in Lenin's presence, that the Soviet regime had "sung its swan-song," that its days and hours were numbered. (Laughter.) But the revolution did not perish, the difficulties were overcome, and the hysterical fuss about the "doom" of the revolution remained mere fuss.

I don't know whether the days and hours were numbered at that time or not; but if they were, all I can say is, they were numbered incorrectly. (Applause, laughter.)

In 1923, in a period of new difficulties, this time arising out of NEP, in the period of the market crisis, Trotsky again began a swan-song about the "doom" of the revolution, making out the defeat of his own group at the Thirteenth Conference of our Party to be the defeat of the revolution. The revolution, however, ignored this swan-song and overcame the difficulties facing it at that time.

In 1925-26, in a period of new difficulties arising from the progress of our industry, Trotsky, this time in chorus with Kamenev and Zinoviev, again began a swan-song about the "doom" of the revolution, making out the defeat of his own group at the Fourteenth Congress and after the Fourteenth Congress to be the defeat of the revolution. The revolution, however, had no intention of dying, the self-styled prophets were pushed into the background and the difficulties were overcome, as always, as in the past, for Bolsheviks look upon difficulties not as something to wail and whine over, but as something to overcome. (Loud applause.)

Now, at the end of 1927, owing to the new difficulties in the period of the reconstruction of our whole economy on a new technical basis, they have again begun a swan-song about the "doom" of the revolution, trying, in this way, to cover up the actual doom of their own group. But, comrades, you all see that the revolution is alive and thriving, while it is others who are perishing.

And so they sang and sang their swan-song until at last they found themselves in a hopeless position. (Laughter.)

The opposition's "platform" is a platform for the "doom" of our revolution.

V
What Next ?

Such is the opposition's actual platform on the three principal questions on which we disagree: the question of the working class and the peasantry, the question of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and finally, the question of the prospects of our revolution.

You see that this queer platform testifies to the opposition's complete divorce from the Party, from the working class, from our revolution. It is the platform of intellectuals who have broken with Leninism and are divorced from life.

Is it surprising, after all this, that the Party and the working class have completely turned away from the opposition?

That is why the opposition suffered ignominious defeat in its struggle against the Party during the last discussion.

What next?—we are asked.

The opposition complains that the other day it submitted a declaration on unity, signed by thirty-one Trotskyists, but has not yet received a satisfactory answer. But indeed what answer can be given to the hypocritical declaration of the thirty-one Trotskyists when the opposition's false declarations are refuted again and again by its splitting activities? The history of our Party records a similar declaration made, I think in 1907, by thirty-one Mensheviks. (Voices from the audience: "That's right!") Lenin at the time called that declaration "the hypocrisy of the thirty-one Menshe-viks." 5 (Laughter.) I think that the hypocrisy of the thirty-one Trotskyists is quite analogous to the hypocrisy of the thirty-one Mensheviks. (Voices from the audience: "Quite true!") The opposition has twice deceived the Party. Now it wants to deceive the Party a third time. No, comrades, we have had enough of deception, enough of games. (Applause.)

What next?

The limit has been reached, comrades, for the opposition has exceeded all bounds of what is permissible in the Party. It cannot go on swinging from side to side in two parties at once, in the old, Leninist Party, the one and only Party, and in the new, Trotskyist party. It must choose between these two parties.

Either the opposition itself does away with this second, Trotskyist party, abandoning its anti-Leninist views and frankly condemning its own mistakes before the whole Party;

or the opposition fails to do that—in which case we ourselves will do away with the Trotskyist party altogether. (Applause.)

One thing or the other.

Either the oppositionists take this necessary step, or they do not do so, and in that case they will be sent flying out of the Party. (Stormy and prolonged applause. An ovation from the entire hall. The "Internationale" is sung.)

Pravda, No. 269, November 24, 1927

Notes

1. The Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held November 20-28, 1927. The conference heard reports of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), discussed the prospects of the work of economic construction in the Moscow Gubernia in connection with the general plan for the development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R., reports of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), a report on work in the countryside, and other questions. J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on November 23, at the morning session of the conference. In its resolution on the report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), the conference approved the Central Committee's political and organisational activities and also its decisions on the Trotskyist opposition. The conference elected J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

2. V. I. Lenin, "Outline of the Pamphlet The Tax in Kind" (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 302-03).

3. V. I. Lenin, Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P.(B.), delivered at the Third Congress of the Communist International, July 5, 1921 (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 466).

4. V. I. Lenin, Opening Speech at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), March 18, 1919 (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 125).

5. V. I. Lenin "The Elections in St. Petersburg and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks" (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 12, pp. 17-27).

The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)1
December 2-19, 1927

Political Report of the Central Committee
December 3
I
The Growing Crisis of World Capitalism and the External Situation of the U.S.S.R.
Our country, comrades, is living and developing in the conditions of capitalist encirclement. Its external position depends not only on its internal forces, but also on the state of that capitalist encirclement, on the situation in the capitalist countries which surround our country, on their strength and weakness, on the strength and weakness of the oppressed classes throughout the world, on the strength and weakness of the revolutionary movement of those classes. That is apart from the fact that our revolution is a part of the international revolutionary movement of the oppressed classes.

That is why I think that the Central Committee's report must start with a sketch of our country's international position, with a sketch of the situation in the capitalist countries and of the state of the revolutionary movement in all countries.

1. The Economics of World Capitalism and the Intensification of the Struggle for Foreign Markets
The basic fact in this sphere, comrades, is that during the past two years, during the period under review, production in the capitalist countries has transcended the pre-war level, has gone beyond the pre-war level.

Here are some figures relating to this.

Index of world output of pig iron: in 1925—97.6 per cent of pre-war; in 1926—already 100.5 per cent of prewar; for 1927 no complete figures are available; figures are available for the first half year, showing a further increase in the output of pig iron.

Index of world output of steel: in 1925—118.5 per cent; in 1926—122.6 per cent of pre-war.

Index of world output of coal: in 1925—97.9 per cent; in 1926—a slight drop—96.8 per cent. This evidently reflects the effect of the British strike.

World consumption of cotton: in 1925-26—108.3 per cent of pre-war; in 1926-27—112.5 per cent of pre-war.

World crop of five cereals 2: in 1925—107.2 per cent of pre-war; in 1926—110.5 per cent; in 1927— 112.3 per cent.

Thus, slowly, in short steps, the general index of world production is moving forward and has exceeded the pre-war level.

On the other hand, however, some capitalist countries are not merely going forward, but leaping forward, leaving behind the pre-war level; for example, the United States of America, and in some respects, Japan. Figures for the United States: growth of manufacturing industry in 1925—148 per cent of pre-war; 1926—152 per cent of pre-war; growth of mining industry in 1925— 143 per cent of pre-war; 1926—154 per cent.

Growth of world trade. World trade is not advancing as rapidly as production, it usually lags behind production, but for all that it has approached the prewar level. Index of foreign trade all over the world and in the chief countries in 1925—98.1 per cent of prewar; in 1926—97.1 per cent. For individual countries: United States of America in 1925—134.3 per cent of pre-war; in 1926—143 per cent; France—98.2 per cent and 99.2 per cent; Germany—74.8 per cent and 73.6 per cent; Japan—176.9 and 170.1 per cent.

Taken as a whole, world trade has already approached the pre-war level, and in some countries, the United States and Japan, for example, it has already exceeded the pre-war level.

Lastly, a third series of facts testifying to technical progress, rationalisation of capitalist industry, creation of new industries, increasing trustification, increasing cartellisation of industry on an international scale. These facts, I think, are known to everybody. Therefore, I shall not dwell on them. I shall merely observe that capital has prospered not only as regards the growth of production and as regards trade as well, but also in the field of improving methods of production, in the field of technical progress and the rationalisation of production; moreover all this has led to the further strengthening of the largest trusts and to the organisation of new, powerful, monopolist cartels.

Such are the facts, comrades, that should be noted, and that should serve as our starting-point.

Does all this mean that, thereby, the stabilisation of capitalism has become firm and lasting? Of course not! It was already stated in the report to the Fourteenth Congress 3 that capitalism might reach the prewar level, might exceed that pre-war level, might rationalise its production, but that this did not mean—did not by a long way mean—that the stabilisation of capitalism could as a result become firm, that capitalism could recover its former, pre-war stability. On the contrary, this very stabilisation, the fact that production is growing, that trade is growing, that technical progress and production potentialities are increasing, whereas the world market, the limits of that market, and the spheres of influence of the individual imperialist groups, remain more or less stable—precisely this is giving rise to a most profound and acute crisis of world capitalism, a crisis which is fraught with new wars and which threatens the existence of any stabilisation at all.

Partial stabilisation is giving rise to an intensification of the crisis of capitalism, and the growing crisis is upsetting stabilisation—such are the dialectics of the development of capitalism in the present period of history.

b) The most characteristic feature of this growth of production and trade of world capitalism is that the development proceeds unevenly. Development is not taking place in such a way that the capitalist countries are moving forward one behind the other, smoothly and evenly, without hindering one another and without upsetting each other, but, on the contrary, in such a way that some countries are being ousted and are declining, while others are pushing forward and moving upward; it is proceeding in the form of a mortal struggle of continents and countries for supremacy in the market.

The economic centre is shifting from Europe to America, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The share of world trade of America and Asia is thereby growing at the expense of Europe.

A few figures: in 1913, Europe's share of world foreign trade was 58.5 per cent, America 's—21.2 per cent and Asia's—12.3 per cent; in 1925, however, Europe's share dropped to 50 per

cent, America's share rose to 26.6 per cent and Asia's share rose to 16 per cent. Parallel with countries in which capitalism is tearing ahead (the U.S.A. and partly Japan), we have other countries which are in a state of economic decline (Britain). Parallel with growing capitalist Germany and rising countries which have been coming to the front in recent years (Canada, Australia, Argentina, China, India), we have countries in which capitalism is becoming stabilised (France, Italy). The number of claimants to markets is growing, production potentialities are growing, and supply is growing, but the dimensions of markets and the borders of spheres of influence remain more or less stable.

Such is the basis of the growing irreconcilable contradictions of present-day capitalism.

c) This contradiction between the growth of the production potentialities and the relative stability of markets lies at the root of the fact that the problem of markets is today the fundamental problem of capitalism. An aggravation of the problem of markets in general, especially an aggravation of the problem of foreign markets, and an aggravation of the problem of markets for capital exports in particular—such is the present state of capitalism.

This, indeed, explains why it is becoming a common thing for mills and factories to work below capacity. Raising tariff barriers only adds fuel to the flames. Capitalism is becoming cramped in the framework of the present markets and spheres of influence. Peaceful attempts to solve the problem of markets have not produced results, nor could they do so. As everybody knows, the bankers' declaration in 1926 about free trade ended in a fiasco. 4 The Economic Conference of the League of Nations in 1927, the object of which was to "unite the economic interests" of the capitalist countries, also ended in a fiasco. The peaceful road to the solution of the problem of markets remains closed to capitalism. The only "way out" left open for capitalism is a new redivision of colonies and of spheres of influence by force, by means of armed collisions, by means of new imperialist wars.

Stabilisation is intensifying the crisis of capitalism.

2. The International Policy of Capitalism and the Preparation of New Imperialist Wars
a) In this connection, the question of redividing the world and spheres of influence, which constitute the basis of foreign markets, is today the principal question in the policy of world capitalism. I have already said that the existing distribution of colonies and spheres of influence brought about as a result of the last imperialist war has already become obsolete. It now fails to satisfy either the United States, which, not being content with South America, is trying to penetrate Asia (primarily China); or Britain, whose dominions and a number of whose most important Eastern markets are slipping from her hands; or Japan, which every now and again is "obstructed" in China by Britain and America; or Italy and France, which have an incalculable number of "points of dispute" in the Danubian countries and in the Mediterranean; and least of all does it satisfy Germany, which is still bereft of colonies. Hence the "general" striving for a new redivision of markets and sources of raw materials. That the Asiatic markets and the routes to them are the chief arena of the struggle needs no proof. Hence a series of key problems, which are hotbeds of new conflicts. Hence the so-called Pacific problem (the America-Japan-Britain antagonism) as the origin of the struggle for supremacy in Asia and on the routes to it. Hence the Mediterranean problem (the Britain-France-Italy antagonism) as the origin of the struggle for supremacy on the shores of the Mediterranean, as the origin of the struggle for the shortest routes to the East. Hence the aggravation of the oil problem (antagonism between Britain and America), for without oil it is

impossible to wage war, and whoever has the advantage as regards oil has a chance of victory in the coming war.

Recently, the-British press published Chamberlain's "latest" plan for "settling" the Mediterranean problem. I cannot guarantee the authenticity of this plan; but there can be no doubt that the appearance of Chamberlain's plan in the press is symptomatic. According to this plan, the "mandate" for Syria is to be transferred from France to Italy, Tangiers is to be transferred to France on the payment of financial compensation to Spain, the Cameroons are to be restored to Germany, Italy is to pledge herself to stop "making trouble" in the Balkans, etc.

All this is on the pretext of fighting the Soviets. It is well known that no dirty work is undertaken nowadays without dragging in the Soviets.

But what is the real intention of this plan? Its intention is to oust the French bourgeoisie from Syria. Since ancient times Syria has been the gate to the East, to Mesopotamia, Egypt, etc. From Syria it is possible to do harm to Britain both in the area of the Suez Canal and in the area of Mesopotamia. And so, apparently, Chamberlain wants to put a stop to this unpleasant state of affairs. Needless to say, the appearance of this plan in the press cannot be called an accident. The value of this fact is that it presents a vivid picture of the squabbles, conflicts and military collisions which can arise from the present relations between the so-called "great powers."

As regards the present state of the oil problem and the struggle around it, this is spoken of rather eloquently in the October issue of the well-known American magazine The World's Work 5:

"Herein lies a very real danger to peace and understanding between the Anglo-Saxon peoples. . . . The support of American businessmen by the State Department will inevitably become stronger as the need for it increases. If the British Government becomes identified with the British oil industry, sooner or later the American Government will become identified with the American oil industry. The struggle cannot be transferred to the governments without vastly increasing the danger of war."

This leaves no room for doubt: things are moving towards the organisation of new coalitions of powers in order to prepare new wars for foreign markets, for sources of raw materials, and for the routes to them.

b) Have attempts been made during the period under review to bring about a "peaceful settlement" of the maturing military conflicts? Yes, there have been more of them than might have been expected; but they have led to nothing, absolutely nothing. Not only that; those attempts have turned out to be merely a screen for the preparations that the "powers" are making for new wars, a screen intended to deceive the people, to deceive "public opinion."

Take the League of Nations, which, according to the mendacious bourgeois press, and the no less mendacious Social-Democratic press, is an instrument of peace. What has all the League of Nations' talk about peace, disarmament, reduction of armaments led to? To nothing, except the deception of the masses, except new spurts in armaments, except a further aggravation of the maturing conflicts. Can it be regarded as accidental that although the League of Nations has been talking about peace and disarmament for three years, and although the so-called

Second International has been giving its support to this mendacious talk for three years, the "nations" are continuing to arm more and more, expanding the old conflicts among the "powers," piling up new conflicts, and thus undermining the cause of peace?

What does the failure of the tripartite conference for the reduction of naval armaments (Britain, America and Japan) 6 indicate, if not that the Pacific problem is the source of new imperialist wars, that the "powers" do not want either to disarm or to reduce armaments? What has the League of Nations done to avert this danger?

Or take, for example, the recent declarations of the Soviet delegation in Geneva on the question of genuine disarmament (and not window-dressing).7 What is the explanation of the fact that Comrade Litvinov's straightforward and honest declaration in favour of complete disarmament struck the League of Nations with paralysis and came as a "complete surprise" to it? Does not this fact show that the League of Nations is not an instrument of peace and disarmament, but an instrument for covering up new armaments and the preparation of new wars?

The venal bourgeois press of all countries, from Japan to Britain, from France to America, is shouting at the top of its voice that the Soviet disarmament proposals are "insincere." In that case, why not test the sincerity of the Soviet proposals and proceed at once, in practice, to disarm, or at least considerably to reduce armaments? What prevents this?

Or, for example, the present system of "friendship pacts" between capitalist states: the pact between France and Yugoslavia, the pact between Italy and Albania, the "pact of friendship" between Poland and Lithuania that Pilsudski is preparing, the "Locarno system," 8 the "spirit of Locarno," etc.—what is this if not a system of preparation of new wars and of alignment of forces for future military collisions?

Or take, for example, the following facts: from 1913 to 1927 the numerical strength of the armies of France, Britain, Italy, the United States and Japan increased from 1,888,000 to 2,262,000 men; in the same period the military budgets of the same countries grew from 2,345 million gold rubles to 3,948 million; in the period from 1923 to 1927, the number of aircraft in commission in these five countries rose from 2,655 to 4,340; the cruiser tonnage of these five powers rose from 724,000 tons in 1922 to 864,000 tons in 1926; the position as regards war chemicals is illustrated by the well-known statement of General Fries, Chief of the United States Chemical Warfare Service: "One chemical air-bomb of 450 kilograms charged with Lewisite can make ten blocks of New York uninhabitable, and 100 tons of Lewisite dropped from 50 aeroplanes can make the whole of New York uninhabitable, at least for a week."

What do these facts show if not that the preparation of a new war is in full swing?

Such are the results of the "peace policy" and of the "disarmament" policy of the bourgeois states in general, of the League of Nations especially, and of Social-Democratic servility to capital in particular.

Formerly, the justification put forward for the growth of armaments was that Germany was armed from head to foot. Today this "justification" falls to the ground because Germany has been disarmed.

Is it not obvious that the growth of armaments is dictated by the inevitability of new imperialist wars between the "powers," that the "spirit of war" is the principal content of the "spirit of Locarno"?

I think that the present "peaceful relations" could be likened to an old, worn-out shirt consisting of patches held together by a thin thread. It is enough to pull this thread fairly hard, to break it in some place or other, for the whole shirt to fall to pieces, leaving nothing but patches. It is enough to shake the present "peaceful relations" somewhere in Albania or Lithuania, in China or North Africa, for the whole "edifice of peaceful relations" to collapse.

That is how things were before the last imperialist war, when the assassination in Sarajevo 9 led to war.

That is how things are now.

Stabilisation is inevitably giving rise to new imperialist wars.

3. The State of the World Revolutionary Movement and the Harbingers of a New Revolutionary Upsurge

a) For waging war, increased armaments are not enough, the organisation of new coalitions is not enough. For this it is necessary in addition to strengthen the rear in the capitalist countries. Not a single capitalist country can wage an important war unless it first strengthens its own rear, unless it curbs "its" workers, unless it curbs "its" colonies. Hence the gradual fascisation of the policy of the bourgeois governments.

The fact that the Right bloc now rules in France, the Hicks-Deterding-Urquhart bloc in Britain, the bourgeois bloc in Germany, the war party in Japan, and fascist governments in Italy and Poland, cannot be called accidental.

Hence the pressure that is being brought to bear upon the working class: the Trade-Union Act in Britain, 10 the law on "arming the nation" in France, 11 the abolition of the eight-hour day in a number of countries, and the offensive of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat everywhere.

Hence the increased pressure that is being brought to bear upon the colonies and dependent countries, the reinforcement there of imperialist troops, whose number has now reached a million, of which over 700,000 are quartered in the British "spheres of influence" and "possessions."

b) It is not difficult to understand that this brutal pressure of the fascisised governments was bound to meet with a counter-movement on the part of the oppressed peoples in the colonies and of the working class in the metropolises. Facts like the growth of the revolutionary movement in China, Indonesia, India, etc., cannot fail to have a decisive significance for the fate of world imperialism.

Judge for yourselves. Of the 1,905 million inhabitants of the entire globe, 1,134 million live in the colonies and dependent countries, 143,000,000 live in the U.S.S.R., 264,000,000 live in the intermediate countries, and only 363,000,000 live in the big imperialist countries, which oppress the colonies and dependent countries.

Clearly, the revolutionary awakening of the colonial and dependent countries presages the end of world imperialism. The fact that the Chinese revolution has not yet led to direct victory over imperialism cannot be of decisive significance for the prospects of the revolution. Great popular revolutions never achieve final victory in the first round of their battles. They grow and gain strength in the course of flows and ebbs. That has been so everywhere, including Russia. So it will be in China.

The most important result of the Chinese revolution is the fact that it has awakened from age-long slumber and has set in motion hundreds of millions of exploited and oppressed people, has utterly exposed the counter-revolutionary character of the cliques of generals, has torn the mask from the faces of the Kuomintang servitors of counter-revolution, has raised the prestige of the Communist Party among the masses of the common people, has raised the movement as a whole to a higher stage and has roused new hope in the hearts of the millions of the oppressed classes in India, Indonesia, etc. Only the blind and the faint-hearted can doubt that the Chinese workers and peasants are moving towards a new revolutionary upsurge.

As regards the revolutionary working-class movement in Europe, here in this sphere, too, we have obvious signs of a swing to the Left on the part of the rank-and-file workers and of a revolutionary revival. Facts like the British general strike and coal strike, the revolutionary action of the workers in Vienna, the revolutionary demonstrations in France and Germany in connection with the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti, the election successes achieved by the German and Polish Communist Parties, the obvious differentiation that is taking place in the British working-class movement, whereby the workers are moving to the Left while the leaders are moving to the Right, into the camp of avowed social-imperialism, the degeneration of the Second International into a direct appendage of the imperialist League of Nations, the decline of the prestige of the Social-Democratic parties among the broad masses of the working class, the universal growth of the influence and prestige of the Comintern and its sections among the proletarians in all countries, the growth of the prestige of the U.S.S.R. among the oppressed classes all over the world, the "Congress of the Friends of the U.S.S.R.," 12 etc.—all these facts undoubtedly indicate that Europe is entering a new period of revolutionary upsurge.

If a fact like the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti could give rise to working-class demonstrations, it undoubtedly indicates that revolutionary energy has accumulated in the depths of the working class and is seeking, and will continue to seek, a cause, an occasion, sometimes seemingly most insignificant, to break to the surface and hurl itself upon the capitalist regime.

We are living on the eve of a new revolutionary upsurge both in the colonies and in the metropolises.

Stabilisation is giving rise to a new revolutionary upsurge.

4. The Capitalist World and the U.S.S.R.

a) Thus, we have all the symptoms of a most profound crisis and of the growing instability of world capitalism.

Whereas the temporary post-war economic crisis of 1920-21, with the chaos within the capitalist countries, and the breakdown of their external ties, may be regarded as having been overcome, as a result of which a period of partial stabilisation has begun, the general and

fundamental crisis of capitalism ushered in as a result of the victory of the October Revolution and the dropping out of the U.S.S.R. from the world capitalist system, far from being overcome is, on the contrary, becoming deeper and deeper, and is shaking the very foundations of the existence of world capitalism.

Far from hindering the development of this general and fundamental crisis, stabilisation, on the contrary, has provided the basis and source for its further development. The growing struggle for markets, the necessity of a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence, the bankruptcy of bourgeois pacifism and of the League of Nations, the feverish efforts to form new coalitions and to align forces in view of the possibility of a new war, the furious growth of armaments, the savage pressure upon the working class and the colonial countries, the growth of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and in Europe, the growth of the prestige of the Comintern throughout the world, and lastly, the consolidation of the might of the Soviet Union and its enhanced prestige among the workers of Europe and the labouring masses in the colonies—all these are facts which cannot but shake the very foundations of world capitalism.

The stabilisation of capitalism is becoming more and more putrid and unstable.

Whereas a couple of years ago it was possible and necessary to speak of the ebb of the revolutionary tide in Europe, today we have every ground for asserting that Europe is obviously entering a period of new revolutionary upsurge; to say nothing of the colonies and dependent countries, where the position of the imperialists is becoming more and more catastrophic.

b) The capitalists' hopes of taming the U.S.S.R., of its capitalistic degeneration, of the decline of its prestige among the workers of Europe and the labouring masses of the colonies, have collapsed. The U.S.S.R. is growing and developing precisely as a country which is building socialism. Its influence among the workers and peasants all over the world is growing and gaining strength. The very existence of the U.S.S.R. as a country which is building socialism is one of the greatest factors in the disintegration of world imperialism and in the undermining of its stability both in Europe and in the colonies. The U.S.S.R. is obviously becoming the banner of the working class of Europe and of the oppressed peoples of the colonies.

Therefore, to clear the ground for future imperialist wars, to secure a tighter grip on "their" working class and to curb "their" colonies with the object of strengthening the capitalist rear, it is necessary, the bourgeois bosses think, first of all to curb the U.S.S.R., that seat and hotbed of revolution, which, moreover, could be one of the biggest markets for the capitalist countries. Hence the revival of interventionist tendencies among the imperialists, the policy of isolating the U.S.S.R., the policy of encircling the U.S.S.R., the policy of preparing the conditions for war against the U.S.S.R.

The strengthening of interventionist tendencies in the camp of the imperialists and the threat of war (against the U.S.S.R.) is one of the basic factors in the present situation.

It is considered that the most "threatened" and "injured" party under the conditions of the developing crisis of capitalism is the British bourgeoisie. And it is the British bourgeoisie that has taken the initiative in strengthening interventionist tendencies. Obviously, the assistance that the Soviet workers rendered the British coal miners, and the sympathy of the working class of the U.S.S.R. for the revolutionary movement in China, could not but add fuel to the

flames. All these circumstances determined Britain's rupture with the U.S.S.R. and the worsening of relations with a number of other states.

c) The struggle between two tendencies in the relations between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R., the tendency towards military aggression (primarily Britain) and the tendency to continue peaceful relations (a number of other capitalist countries), is, in view of this, the basic fact in our foreign relations at the present time.

Facts which denote the tendency towards peaceful relations during the period under review are: the Non-Aggression Pact with Turkey; the Guarantee Pact with Germany; the Tariff Agreement with Greece; the agreement with Germany on credits; the Guarantee Pact with Afghanistan; the Guarantee Pact with Lithuania; the initialling of a Guarantee Pact with Latvia; the Trade Agreement with Turkey; the settlement of the conflict with Switzerland; the Treaty of Neutrality with Persia; improvement in relations with Japan; growth of commercial intercourse with America and Italy.

Facts which denote the tendency towards military aggression during the period under review are: the British Note in connection with financial assistance to the striking coal miners; the raid on the Soviet diplomatic representatives in Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai; the raid on Arcos; Britain's rupture with the U.S.S.R.; the assassination of Voikov; terroristic acts by British hirelings in the U.S.S.R.; strained relations with France on the question of the recall of Rakovsky.

Whereas a year or two ago it was possible and necessary to speak of a period of a certain equilibrium and "peaceful co-existence" between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries, today we have every ground for asserting that the period of "peaceful co-existence" is receding into the past, giving place to a period of imperialist assaults and preparation for intervention against the U.S.S.R.

True, Britain's attempts to form a united front against the U.S.S.R. have failed so far. The reasons for this failure are: the contradiction of interests in the camp of the imperialists; the fact that some countries are interested in economic relations with the U.S.S.R.; the peace policy of the U.S.S.R.; the counter-action of the working class of Europe; the imperialists' fear of unleashing revolution in their own countries in the event of war against the U.S.S.R. But this does not mean that Britain will abandon her efforts to organise a united front against the U.S.S.R., that she will fail to organise such a front. The threat of war remains in force, despite Britain's temporary setbacks.

Hence the task is to take into account the contradictions in the camp of the imperialists, to postpone war by "buying off" the capitalists and to take all measures to maintain peaceful relations.

We must not forget Lenin's statement that as regards our work of construction very much depends upon whether we succeed in postponing war with the capitalist world, which is inevitable, but which can be postponed either until the moment when the proletarian revolution in Europe matures, or until the moment when the colonial revolutions have fully matured, or, lastly, until the moment when the capitalists come to blows over the division of the colonies.

Therefore, the maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us.

Our relations with the capitalist countries are based on the assumption that the co-existence of two opposite systems is possible. Practice has fully confirmed this. Sometimes the question of debts and credits is a stumbling-block. In this our policy is clear. It is based on the formula: "give and take." If you give us credits with which to fertilise our industry, you will get some part of the pre-war debts, which we regard as extra interest on the credits. If you give nothing, you will get nothing. Facts show that we have some achievements to record as regards receiving industrial credits. I have in mind just now not only Germany, but also America and Britain. Wherein lies the secret? In the fact that our country could be a vast market for imports of equipment, while the capitalist countries need markets for precisely that kind of goods.

5. Conclusions
To sum up, we have:

Firstly, the growth of the contradictions within the capitalist encirclement; the necessity for capitalism of a new redivision of the world by means of war; the interventionist tendencies of one part of the capitalist world headed by Britain; the reluctance of the other part of the capitalist world to become involved in war against the U.S.S.R., preferring to establish economic relations with it; a conflict between these two tendencies and a certain possibility for the U.S.S.R. to turn these contradictions to account for the purpose of maintaining peace.

Secondly, we have the collapsing stabilisation; the growth of the colonial-revolutionary movement; the signs of a new revolutionary upsurge in Europe; the growth of the prestige of the Comintern and its sections throughout the world; the obvious growth of the sympathy of the working class of Europe for the U.S.S.R.; the growing might of the U.S.S.R. and the growing prestige of the working class of our country among the oppressed classes throughout the world.

Hence the Party's tasks:

1) In the sphere of the international revolutionary movement:

a) to strive to develop the Communist Parties throughout the world;

b) to strive to strengthen the revolutionary trade unions and the workers' united front against the capitalist offensive;

c) to strive to strengthen the friendship between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the working class in the capitalist countries;

d) to strive to strengthen the link between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries.

2) In the sphere of the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy:

a) to combat the preparations for new imperialist wars;

b) to combat Britain's interventionist tendencies and to strive to strengthen the U.S.S.R. 's defensive capacity;

c) to pursue a policy of peace and to maintain peaceful relations with the capitalist countries;

d) to expand our trade with the outside world on the basis of strengthening the monopoly of foreign trade;

e) rapprochement with the so-called "weak" and "unequal" states, which are suffering from oppression and exploitation by the ruling imperialist powers.

II
The Successes of Socialist Construction and the Internal Situation in the U.S.S.R.
Permit me, comrades, to pass to the internal situation in our country, to the successes of our socialist construction, to the question of the fate of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of its development, of its consolidation.

The Fourteenth Congress of our Party instructed the Central Committee to direct the development of our national economy from the standpoint of the following principal tasks:

firstly, that our policy should promote the progressive growth of production in the national economy as a whole;

secondly, that the Party's policy should promote the acceleration of the rate of development of industry and ensure for industry the leading role in the whole of the national economy;

thirdly, that in the course of development of the national economy, the socialist sector of the national economy, the socialist forms of economy, should be ensured ever-increasing relative importance at the expense of the private-commodity and capitalist sectors;

fourthly, that our economic development as a whole, the organisation of new branches of industry, the development of certain branches for raw materials, etc., should be conducted along such lines that the general development should ensure the economic independence of our country, that our country should not become an appendage of the capitalist system of world economy;

fifthly, that the dictatorship of the proletariat, the bloc of the working class and the peasant masses, and the leadership by the working class in this bloc, should be strengthened, and

sixthly, that the material and cultural conditions of the working class and of the rural poor should be steadily improved.

What has our Party, the Central Committee of our Party, done in regard to carrying out these tasks during the period under review?

1. The National Economy as a Whole
First question—development of the national economy as a whole. I shall quote here some of the principal figures showing the growth of the national economy as a whole, and of industry and agriculture in particular, during the period under review. I take these figures from the

estimates of the State Planning Commission. I have in mind the State Planning Commission's control figures for 1927-28 and the rough draft of the five-year plan.

a) Growth of production in the whole of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. during the two years. Whereas in 1924-25, according to the State Planning Commission's new calculations, the gross output of agriculture amounted to 87.3 per cent of the pre-war level and the output of industry as a whole amounted to 63.7 per cent of the pre-war level, now, two years later, in 1926-27, agricultural output already amounts to 108.3 per cent, and industrial output to 100.9 per cent. According to the State Planning Commission's control figures for 1927-28, a further increase in agricultural output to 111.8 per cent of pre-war and of industrial output to 114.4 per cent of pre-war is anticipated.

The growth of trade turn-over (wholesale and retail) in the country during the two years. Taking the volume of trade in 1924-25 at 100 (14,613 million chervonets rubles), we have an increase in 1926-27 by 97 per cent (28,775 million rubles), and in 1927-28 a further growth to over 116 per cent of the previous year (33,440 million rubles) is anticipated.

The development of our credit system during the two years. Taking the combined balance-sheets of all our credit institutions on October 1, 1925, at 100 (5,343 million chervonets rubles), we have an increase on July 1, 1927 by 53 per cent (8,175 million rubles). There are no grounds for doubting that 1927-28 will show a further growth of our nationalised credit system.

The development of railway transport during the two years. Whereas the freight turn-over of the whole of our railway system in 1924-25 amounted to 63.1 per cent of pre-war, now, in 1926-27, it amounts to 99.1 per cent, and in 1927-28 it will amount to 111.6 per cent. That is apart from the fact that during these two years the total length of our railways increased from 74,400 kilometres to 76,200 kilometres, which is an increase of 30.3 per cent above the pre-war level and of 8.9 per cent above the level of 1917.

The growth of the state budget during the two years. Whereas our combined budget (the single state budget plus the local budgets) in 1925-26 amounted to 72.4 per cent of pre-war (5,024 million rubles), at the present time, i.e., 1927-28, the combined budget should amount to 110-112 per cent of pre-war (over 7,000 million rubles). The increase during the two years is 41.5 per cent.

The growth of foreign trade during the two years. Whereas our total foreign trade turn-over in 1924-25 amounted to 1,282 million rubles, i.e., about 27 per cent of pre-war, now, in 1926-27, we have a turn-over of 1,483 million rubles, i.e., 35.6 per cent of pre-war, and it is anticipated that in 1927-28 we shall have a turn-over of 1,626 million rubles, i.e., 37.9 per cent of pre-war.

The causes of the slow rate of development of foreign trade:

firstly, the fact that the bourgeois states often place obstacles in the way of our foreign trade which sometimes amount to a secret blockade;

secondly, the fact that we cannot trade according to the bourgeois formula: "we shall export, even if we go short of food."

A good feature is the favourable balance of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade in 1926-27, amounting to 57 million rubles. This is the first year since 1923-24 that we have had a favourable balance of foreign trade.

Summing up, we have the following picture of the general growth of the total national income during the two years: whereas the national income of the U.S.S.R. in 1924-25 amounted to 15,589 million chervonets rubles, in 1925-26 we had 20,252 million rubles, i.e., an increase for the year of 29.9 per cent; and in 1926-27 we had 22,560 million rubles, i.e., an increase of 11.4 per cent for the year. According to the State Planning Commission's control figures, in 1927-28 we shall have 24,208 million rubles, i.e., an increase of 7.3 per cent.

Bearing in mind that the average annual increase in the national income of the United States does not exceed 3-4 per cent (only once, in the eighties of the last century, did the United States have an increase in national income of about 7 per cent), and that the annual increase in the national income of other countries, Britain and Germany, for example, does not exceed 1-3 per cent, it must be admitted that the rate of growth of the national income of the U.S.S.R. during the last few years is a record one compared with that of the major capitalist countries of Europe and America.

Conclusion: the national economy of our country is growing at a rapid rate.

The Party's task: further to promote the development of our country's national economy in all branches of production.

b) The growth of our national economy is proceeding not blindly, not along the line of a simple quantitative increase in production, but in a known, strictly defined direction. The decisive factors in the development of the national economy during the past two years have been the following two principal circumstances:

Firstly, the key-note of the development of our national economy is the industrialisation of the country, the increasingly important role of industry in relation to agriculture.

Secondly, the development of the national economy, the industrialisation of the country, is proceeding in the direction of an increase in the relative importance and commanding role of the socialist forms of economy, in both production and trade, at the expense of the private-commodity and capitalist sectors.

Figures showing the increase of the relative importance of industry in the national economy (exclusive of transport and electrification). Whereas in 1924-25, industry's share of the gross output of the national economy, calculated at pre-war prices, amounted to 32.4 per cent, and the share of agriculture to 67.6 per cent, in 1926-27 industry's share rose to 38 per cent while the share of agriculture dropped to 62 per cent. In 1927-28, industry's share should rise to 40.2 and that of agriculture should drop to 59.8 per cent.

Figures showing the increase in the relative importance of the production of instruments and means of production — which is the chief core of industry, as compared with the whole of industry during the two years: in 1924-25 the share of production of means of production—34.1 per cent; in 1926-27—37.6 per cent; in 1927-28 it is proposed to bring it up to 38.6 per cent.

Figures showing the increase of the relative importance of the production of means of production in state large-scale industry during the two years: in 1924-25— 42.0 per cent; in 1926-27—44.0 per cent; in 1927-28 it is proposed to bring it up to 44.9 per cent.

As regards industry's output of commodities and the relative importance of this output in the total volume of commodities, industry's share in the two years rose from 53.1 per cent in 1924-25 to 59.5 per cent in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 it should reach 60.7 per cent, whereas agriculture's share of the output of commodities amounted to 46.9 per cent in 1924-25, dropped to 40.5 per cent in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should drop further to 39.3 per cent.

Conclusion: our country is becoming an industrial country.

The Party's task: to take all measures further to promote the industrialisation of our country.

Figures showing the growth of the relative importance and commanding role of the socialist forms of economy at the expense of the private-commodity and capitalist sectors during the two years. Whereas capital investments in the socialised sector of the national economy (state and co-operative industry, transport, electrification, etc.) increased from 1,231 million rubles in 1924-25 to 2,683 million rubles in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should rise to 3,456 million rubles, which amounts to an increase from 43.8 per cent of total investments in 1924-25 to 65.3 per cent in 1927-28—investments in the non-socialised sector of the national economy have been relatively decreasing all the time, and in absolute figures have increased only slightly from 1,577 million rubles in 1924-25 to 1,717 million rubles in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should reach the figure of 1,836 million rubles, which will be a fall in the relative importance of investments in the non-socialised sector from 56.2 per cent in 1924-25 to 34.7 per cent in 1927-28.

Whereas the gross output of the socialised sector of industry rose from 81 per cent in 1924-25 to 86 per cent of the total industrial output in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should rise to 86.9 per cent, the share of the non-socialised sector of industry has been falling year by year: from 19 per cent of the total industrial output in 1924-25 to 14 per cent in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 it should fall still further to 13.1 per cent.

As regards the part played by private capital in large-scale (statistically registered) industry, it is falling not only relatively (3.9 per cent in 1924-25 and 2.4 per cent in 1926-27), but also absolutely (169 million pre-war rubles in 1924-25 and 165 million pre-war rubles in 1926-27).

The same ousting of private capitalist elements is seen in the sphere of home trade. Whereas in 1924-25 the socialised sector's share of the total trade turn-over (wholesale and retail) amounted to 72.6 per cent— wholesale 90.6 per cent and retail 57.3 per cent, in 1926-27 the socialised sector's share of total trade rose to 81.9 per cent—wholesale to 94.9 per cent and retail to 67.4 per cent. On the other hand, the private sector's share dropped in this period from 27.4 per cent of total trade to 18.1 per cent—wholesale from 9.4 per cent to 5.1 per cent and retail from 42.7 per cent to 32.6 per cent, and in 1927-28 a further drop in the private sector's share in all branches of trade is anticipated.

Conclusion: our country is confidently and rapidly proceeding towards socialism, pushing the capitalist elements into the background and step by step ousting them from the national economy.

This fact reveals to us the basis of the question: "Who will beat whom?" This question was raised by Lenin in 1921, after the New Economic Policy was introduced. Shall we succeed in linking our socialised industry with peasant economy, ousting the private trader, the private capitalist, and learning to trade; or will private capital beat us by causing a split between the proletariat and the peasantry?—that is how the question stood at that time. Now we can say that, in the main, we have already achieved decisive successes in this sphere. Only the blind or the imbecile can deny that.

Now, however, the question: "Who will beat whom?" assumes a different character. This question is now shifting from the sphere of trade to the sphere of production, to the sphere of handicraft production, to the sphere of agricultural production, where private capital is of a certain importance, and from which it must be systematically eliminated.

The Party's task: to extend and consolidate our socialist key positions in all branches of the national economy, both in town and country, pursuing a course towards the elimination of the capitalist elements from the national economy.

2. The Rate of Development of Our Large-Scale Socialist Industry

a) The growth of the output of large-scale nationalised industry, which constitutes over 77 per cent of all industry in the country. Whereas in 1925-26 the increase in output (calculated in pre-war rubles) of large-scale nationalised industry over that of the preceding year amounted to 42.2 per cent, in 1926-27 to 18.2 per cent, and in 1927-28 will amount to 15.8 per cent, the State Planning Commission's rough and very conservative five-year estimates provide for an increase in output during five years of 76.7 per cent, with an average arithmetical annual increase of 15 per cent and an increase in industrial output in 1931-32 to double the pre-war output.

If we take the gross output of all industry in the country, both large-scale (state and private) and small industry, then the annual, average arithmetical increase in output, according to the State Planning Commission's five-year estimates, will be about 12 per cent, which will be an increase in total industrial output in 1931-32 of nearly 70 per cent compared with the prewar level.

In America, the annual increase in total industrial output for the five years 1890-95 was 8.2 per cent, for the five years 1895-1900—5.2 per cent, for the five years 1900-05—2.6 per cent, for the five years 1905-10—3.6 per cent. In Russia, for the ten years 1895-1905, the average annual increase was 10.7 per cent, for the eight years 1905-13—8.1 per cent.

The percentage of annual increase in the output of our socialist industry, and also in the output of all industry, is a record one, such as not a single big capitalist country in the world can show.

And that is in spite of the fact that American industry, and especially Russian pre-war industry, were abundantly fertilised by a powerful flow of foreign capital, whereas our nationalised industry is compelled to base itself on its own accumulations.

And that is in spite of the fact that our nationalised industry has already entered the period of reconstruction, when the re-equipment of old factories and the erection of new ones has acquired decisive importance for increasing industrial output.

In the rate of its development, our industry in general, and our socialist industry in particular, is overtaking and outstripping the development of industry in the capitalist countries.

b) How is this unprecedented rate of development of our large-scale industry to be explained?

Firstly, by the fact that it is nationalised industry, thanks to which it is free from the selfish and anti-social interests of private capitalist groups and is able to develop in conformity with the interests of society as a whole.

Secondly, by the fact that it is conducted on a larger scale and is more concentrated than industry anywhere else in the world, thanks to which it has every possibility of beating private capitalist industry.

Thirdly, by the fact that the state, controlling nationalised transport, nationalised credit, nationalised foreign trade and the general state budget, has every possibility of directing nationalised industry in a planned way, as a single industrial enterprise, which gives it enormous advantages over all other industry and accelerates its rate of development many times over.

Fourthly, by the fact that nationalised industry, being industry of the biggest and most powerful kind, has every possibility of pursuing a policy of steadily reducing production costs, of reducing wholesale prices and cheapening its products, thereby expanding the market for its products, increasing the capacity of the home market and creating for itself a continuously increasing source for the further expansion of production.

Fifthly, by the fact that nationalised industry is able for many reasons, one of them being that it pursues the policy of reducing prices, to develop under conditions of gradual rapprochement between town and country, between the proletariat and the peasantry, in contrast with capitalist industry, which develops under conditions of increasing enmity between the bourgeois town, which bleeds the peasantry white, and the decaying countryside.

Lastly, by the fact that nationalised industry is based on the working class, which is the leader in all our development, thanks to which it is able more easily to develop technology in general, and the productivity of labour in particular, and to apply rationalisation to production and management, with the support of the broad masses of the working class, which is not and cannot be the case under the capitalist system of industry.

All this is proved beyond doubt by the rapid growth of our technology during the past two years and the rapid development of new branches of industry (machines, machine-tools, turbines, automobiles and aircraft, chemicals, etc.).

It is also proved by the rationalisation of production that we are carrying out, along with a shorter working day (a 7-hour day) and along with a steady improvement in the material and cultural conditions of the working class, which is not and cannot be the case under the capitalist system of economy.

The unprecedented rate of development of our socialist industry is direct and indubitable proof of the superiority of the Soviet system of production over the capitalist system.

Lenin was right in saying, as far back as September 1917, before the Bolsheviks had captured power, that after establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat we can and must "overtake and outstrip the advanced countries economically as well" (Vol. XXI, p. 191).

The Party's task: to maintain the achieved rate of development of socialist industry and to increase it in the near future with the object of creating the favourable conditions necessary for overtaking and outstripping the advanced capitalist countries.

3. The Rate of Development of Our Agriculture

a) In the countryside, on the other hand, we have a relatively slow growth of output. Whereas in 1925-26 the increase in gross output (calculated in pre-war rubles) compared with the preceding year amounted to 19.2 per cent, in 1926-27 to 4.1 per cent, and in 1927-28 will amount to 3.2 per cent, the State Planning Commission's rough and very conservative five-year estimates provide for an increase in output during five years of 24 per cent, with an average arithmetical annual increase in output of 4.8 per cent, and with an increase in agricultural output in 1931-32 of 28-30 per cent compared with prewar output.

This is a more or less tolerable annual increase in agricultural output. But it cannot possibly be called either a record one compared with the capitalist countries, or an adequate one for maintaining in the future the necessary equilibrium between agriculture and our nationalised industry.

In the U.S.A., the annual increase in the gross output of agriculture was 9.3 per cent in the decade 18901900, 3.1 per cent in the decade 1900-10, and 1.4 per cent in the decade 1910-20. In pre-war Russia the annual increase in agricultural output in the decade 1900-11 was 3.2-3.5 per cent.

True, the annual increase in the output of our agriculture in the five-year period 1926-27—1931-32 will amount to 4.8 per cent; moreover, as is seen, the percentage increase in agricultural output under Soviet conditions has grown compared with that in the period of capitalist Russia. But it must not be forgotten that whereas the gross output of nationalised industry in 1931-32 will be double that of pre-war industry and the output of all industry in 1931-32 will show an increase of about 70 per cent above the pre-war level, the output of agriculture by that time will exceed the pre-war agricultural output only by 28-30 per cent., i.e., by less than a third.

In view of this, the rate of development of our agriculture cannot be regarded as quite satisfactory.

b) How is this relatively slow rate of development of agriculture compared with the rate of development of our nationalised industry to be explained?

It is due to the extreme backwardness of our agricultural technique and the exceedingly low cultural level in the countryside, and particularly to the fact that our scattered agricultural production does not have the advantages that our large-scale, united, nationalised industry has. First of all, agricultural production is not nationalised and not united, but broken up and scattered. It is not carried on in a planned way, and for the time being an enormous part of it is subjected to the anarchy of small production. It is not united and organised in large units on the lines of collective farming and for that reason still provides a convenient field for exploitation by kulak elements. These circumstances deprive scattered agriculture of the

colossal advantages of large-scale, united and planned production which our nationalised industry possesses.

What is the way out for agriculture? Perhaps the slowing down of the rate of development of our industry in general and of our nationalised industry in particular? Under no circumstances! That would be most reactionary, anti-proletarian utopianism. (Voices : "Quite right!") Nationalised industry must and will develop at an accelerated rate. That is the guarantee of our advance to socialism. That is the guarantee that, finally, agriculture itself will be industrialised.

What is the way out? The way out is to turn the small and scattered peasant farms into large united farms based on cultivation of the land in common, to go over to collective cultivation of the land on the basis of a new and higher technique.

The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant farms gradually but surely, not by pressure, but by example and persuasion, into large farms based on common, co-operative, collective cultivation of the land with the use of agricultural machines and tractors and scientific methods of intensive agriculture.

There is no other way out.

Unless this is done, our agriculture will be unable either to overtake or to outstrip the capitalist countries with the most developed agriculture (Canada, etc.).

All the measures we have taken to restrict the capitalist elements in agriculture, to develop the socialist elements in the countryside, to draw the peasant farms into the channel of co-operative development, to exercise planned influence by the state on the countryside by embracing peasant economy both as regards supplies and marketing, and as regards production—all these measures are decisive, it is true, but for all that they are only preparatory to putting agriculture on to a collectivist basis.

c) What has the Party done in this direction during the two years? Not a little has been done, but it is far from all that could have been done.

As regards embracing agriculture from outside, so to speak, along the line of supplying agriculture with the manufactured goods it needs and the marketing of agricultural produce, we have the following achievements: the agricultural co-operatives now unite about a third of all peasant households; the consumers co-operatives have increased their share of supplies to the countryside from 25.6 per cent in 1924-25 to 50.8 per cent in 1926-27; the co-operative and state bodies have increased their share of the marketing of agricultural produce from 55.7 per cent in 1924-25 to 63 per cent in 1926-27.

As regards embracing agriculture from inside, so to speak, along the line of agricultural production, terribly little has been done. Suffice it to say that at the present time the collective farms and state farms provide only a little over 2 per cent of the total agricultural produce and a little over 7 per cent of the total marketed produce.

There are quite a few reasons for this, of course, both objective and subjective. Unskilful approach to the matter, insufficient attention to it on the part of our officials, the conservatism and backwardness of the peasants, the shortage of funds necessary for financing the passing

over of the peasants to the common cultivation of the land, etc. And quite large funds are needed for this purpose.

Lenin said at the Tenth Congress that we still lacked the funds necessary for making agriculture subject to the state or collective principle. I think that now we shall have those funds, and they ought to increase in the course of time. But, meanwhile, things are taking such a turn that unless the scattered peasant farms are united, unless they go over to cultivation of the land in common, it will be impossible to make serious progress either in the intensification or in the mechanisation of agriculture, it will be impossible to arrange things in such a way that the rate of development of our agriculture can exceed that of capitalist countries, such as Canada, for example.

Therefore, the task is to concentrate the attention of our officials in the countryside on this important matter.

I think that in this matter the machine-hiring stations under the People's Commissariats of Agriculture and of the agricultural co-operatives must play an exceedingly important role.

Here is an example how the state farms sometimes help the peasants to go over to collective cultivation of the land with enormous benefit to the peasants. I have in mind the assistance in the way of tractors which the Association of Ukrainian State Farms rendered the peasants in the Odessa District, and the letter from those peasants, recently published in Izvestia, expressing thanks for this assistance. Permit me to read this letter. (Voices : "Please do!")

"We settlers in the hamlets of Shevchenko, Krasin, Kalinin, Red Dawn and Rising Sun express our profound gratitude to the Soviet Government for the enormous assistance afforded us in restoring our farms. The majority of us—being poor, possessing neither horses nor implements—were unable to cultivate the land allotted to us and were obliged to lease it to the long-resident kulaks, receiving part of the crop in return. The crop was a bad one because, naturally, a tenant will not trouble to cultivate properly other people's land. The small credits we received from the state we used up for food and we sank into deeper poverty every year.

"This year a representative of the Association of Ukrainian State Farms visited us and proposed to us that instead of taking financial credits we should allow our land to be ploughed with tractors. All the settlers, except for a few kulaks, agreed to this, although we had little confidence that the work would be done efficiently. To our great joy, and to the chagrin of the kulaks, the tractors ploughed up all the virgin land and fallow land; they ploughed and harrowed 5-6 times to clear the land of weeds and finally sowed all the fields with high-grade wheat. The kulaks are not jeering at the work of the tractor team now. This year, owing to the absence of rain, the peasants in our district planted hardly any winter wheat, and where it was planted it has not come up yet. But our, settlers', fields, stretching for hundreds of dessiatins, are green with splendid fallow-sown wheat such as cannot be seen even in the richest German settlements.

"In addition to sowing winter wheat, the tractors ploughed up the whole of the winter fallow for the spring crops. Now, not a dessiatin of our land has been left unploughed, or leased out. There is not a single poor peasant among us who has not several dessiatins of winter wheat.

"After we have seen the way the tractors work we do not want to carry on poor, small farming any more, and we have decided to organise common tractor farming in which there will be no separate peasant plots. The organisation of tractor farming for us has already been undertaken by the Taras Shevchenko State Farm, with which we have signed a contract" (Izvestia, No. 267, November 22, 1927).

That is what the peasants write.

If we had more examples like this, comrades, it would be possible to make great progress in the collectivisation of the countryside.

The Party's task: to enlarge the extent of peasant economy embraced by the co-operatives and state bodies in the matter of marketing and supplies, and to make it the immediate practical task of our work in the countryside gradually to transform the scattered peasant farms into united, big farms, to introduce collective cultivation of the land on the basis of the intensification and mechanisation of agriculture, calculating that such a path of development is a most important means of accelerating the rate of development of agriculture and of defeating the capitalist elements in the countryside.

Such, on the whole, are the results and achievements in the sphere of the work of economic construction.

This does not mean that all is well with us in this sphere. No, comrades, by no means everything is well with us.

For example, we have elements of a goods shortage. That is an unfavourable feature in our economy, but, unfortunately, for the time being an inevitable one. For the fact that we are developing the production of instruments and means of production at a faster rate than light industry, this fact in itself predetermines that there will still be elements of a goods shortage in the country during the next few years. But we cannot act otherwise if we want to push forward the industrialisation of the country to the utmost.

There are people, our opposition for example, who draw material for their ideology in profiteers' queues and shout about the goods shortage, and at the same time demand a policy of "super-industrialisation." But that, of course, is stupid, comrades. Only ignoramuses can talk like that. We cannot, we must not, cut down our heavy industry for the sake of developing light industry to the utmost. And, besides, it is impossible to develop light industry to a sufficient extent unless the development of heavy industry is accelerated.

We could have increased imports of finished goods and thus have mitigated the goods shortage, and that is what the opposition insisted on at one time. But that proposal was so silly that the opposition had to drop it. Whether we are working efficiently enough to mitigate the elements of the goods shortage, which it is quite possible to do under our conditions and on which our Party has always insisted, is another question. I think that it is precisely in this sphere that not all is well with us.

Further, we have a fact like the relatively large number of capitalists both in the sphere of industry and in the sphere of trade. The relative importance of these elements is really not quite so small as some of our comrades sometimes depict it. That, too, is a liability in the balance-sheet of our economy.

Recently I read what is in every respect an interesting book by Comrade Larin: Private Capital in the U.S.S.R. I would advise you to read this book, comrades. In it you will see how adroitly and skilfully the capitalist hides himself behind the flag of producers' co-operation, behind the flag of agricultural co-operation, behind the flag of state trading bodies of one kind or other. Is everything being done to restrict, reduce and, finally, to oust the capitalist elements from the sphere of our national economy? I do not think that everything is being done. I know, for example, that in handicraft industry in general, and in the leather and textile industries in particular, there are quite a number of new millionaires, who are enslaving the handicraft workers and small producers generally. Is everything being done economically to surround and oust these exploiting elements by linking the handicraft workers with the co-operatives or with state bodies? There can scarcely be any doubt that far from everything is being done in this sphere. And yet this question is of extreme importance for us.

Further, there has been a certain increase in the number of kulaks in the countryside. That is a liability in the balance-sheet of our economy. Is everything being done economically to restrict and isolate the kulaks? I do not think that everything is being done. Those comrades are wrong who think that it is possible and necessary to put an end to the kulaks by means of administrative measures, through the GPU: give an order, affix a seal, and that settles it. That is an easy way, but it is far from being effective. The kulak must be defeated by means of economic measures and in conformity with Soviet law. Soviet law, however, is not a mere phrase. This does not, of course, preclude the taking of certain necessary administrative measures against the kulaks. But administrative measures must not take the place of economic measures. Serious attention must be paid to the fact that the Party's line in the fight against the kulaks is being distorted in the practice of our co-operative bodies, especially in the matter of agricultural credits.

Further, we have a fact like the extremely slow rate of reduction of production costs in industry, of reduction of wholesale prices of manufactured goods, and especially of retail prices of urban goods. This, too, is a liability in the balance-sheet of our work of economic construction. We cannot but observe that in this we encounter the tremendous resistance of the apparatus— state, co-operative and Party. Evidently, our comrades fail to understand that the policy of reducing the prices of manufactured goods is one of the principal levers for improving our industry, expanding the market and strengthening the very basis on which alone our industry can expand. There can scarcely be any doubt that only by ruthlessly combating this inertia of the apparatus, this resistance of the apparatus to the policy of reducing prices, will it be possible to wipe out this liability.

Lastly, we have liabilities like vodka in the budget, the extremely slow rate of development of foreign trade and the shortage of reserves. I think that it would be possible to start gradually to reduce the output of vodka and, instead of vodka, to resort to sources of revenue such as the radio and the cinema. Indeed, why not take these extremely important means in hand and put on this job real Bolsheviks, shock workers, who could successfully expand the business and make it possible, at last, to reduce the output of vodka?

As regards foreign trade, it seems to me that a number of the economic difficulties we are encountering are due to the insufficiency of exports. Can we push exports forward? I think we can. Is everything being done to increase exports to the utmost? I do not think that everything is being done.

The same must be said about reserves. Those comrades are wrong who say, sometimes thoughtlessly and sometimes because of their ignorance of the matter, that we have no reserves. No, comrades, we have some kind of reserves. All the organs of our state, from uyezd and gubernia to regional and central, try to put something in reserve for a rainy day. But these reserves are small. That must be admitted. Therefore, the task is to increase reserves as much as possible, even if that sometimes entails cutting down some current requirements.

Such, comrades,, are the darker sides of our work of economic construction, to which attention must be paid, and which must be eliminated at all costs in order to be able to move forward at a faster rate.

4. Classes, the State Apparatus and the Country's Cultural Development
From questions of the country's economic situation let us pass to questions of the political situation.

a) The working class. Figures showing the numerical growth of the working class and of wage-workers generally. In 1924-25 there were 8,215,000 wage-workers (not including unemployed); in 1926-27 there were 10,346,000. An increase of 25 per cent. Of these, manual workers, including agricultural and seasonal, numbered 5,448,000 in 1924-25, and in 1926-27—7,060,000. An increase of 29.6 per cent. Of these, workers in large-scale industry numbered 1,794,000 in 1924-25, and in 1926-27—2,388,000. An increase of 33 per cent.

The material conditions of the working class. In 1924-25 the wage-workers' share of the national income amounted to 24.1 per cent, and in 1926-27 it grew to 29.4 per cent, which is 30 per cent above the wage-workers' share of the national income before the war, whereas the share of the national income received by other social groups, including the bourgeoisie, diminished during this period (for example, the share of the bourgeoisie dropped from 5.5 per cent to 4.8 per cent). In 1924-25 real wages (exclusive of social services) of the workers in state industry as a whole amounted to 25.18 Moscow computed rubles per month; in 1926-27 they amounted to 32.14 rubles, which is an increase of 27.6 per cent for the two years and is 5.4 per cent above the pre-war level. If we add social insurance and cultural, municipal and other services, wages in 1924-25 were 101.5 per cent of pre-war and in 1926-27—128.4 per cent of pre-war. The social insurance funds increased from 461 million rubles in 1924-25 to 852 million rubles in 1926-27, i.e., by 85 per cent, which made it possible to send 513,000 persons to rest homes and sanatoriums, to provide allowances for 460,000 unemployed and 700,000 pensioners (disabled workers and disabled civil war veterans) and to pay workers full wages during sickness.

Two years ago, in 1924-25, expenditure on workers' housing amounted to something over 132,000,000 rubles; in 1925-26—to something over 230,000,000 rubles; in 1926-27—282,000,000 rubles, and in 1927-28 it will amount to something over 391,000,000 rubles, including 50,000,000 rubles provided for in the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee. The total expenditure on workers' housing in the past three years by industry, transport, local Executive Committees and co-operatives (not including individual construction) was 644,700,000 rubles, and including the assignments for 1927-28—1,036 million rubles. These assignments for the three years made it possible to build housing accommodation with a floor space of 4,594,000 sq. metres and to provide accommodation for 257,000 workers, and, counting their families, for about 900,000 persons.

The question of unemployment. I must say that there is a discrepancy here between the figures of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and those of the People's Commissariat of Labour. I take the figures of the People's Commissariat of Labour because they cover the truly unemployed element connected with the labour exchanges. According to the returns of the People's Commissariat of Labour, the number of unemployed during the two years increased from 950,000 to 1,048,000. Of these, industrial workers constitute 16.5 per cent and brain workers and unskilled labourers 74 per cent. Thus, the chief source of unemployment in our country is the over-population in the countryside; the fact that our industry has to some extent failed to absorb a certain minimum of industrial workers is only a subsidiary source.

To sum up: there is an undoubted rise in the standard of living of the working class as a whole.

The Party's task: to continue along the line of further improving the material and cultural conditions of the working class, offurther raising the wages of the working class.

b) The peasantry. I do not think it is worth while quoting figures on differentiation among the peasantry because my report is already too long, and everybody is familiar with the figures. There can be no doubt that differentiation under the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be identified with differentiation under the capitalist system. Under capitalism the extremes grow, the poor peasants and the kulaks, while the middle peasants melt away. In our country the opposite is the case; the number of middle peasants is growing, because a certain part of the poor peasants rise to the position of middle peasants; the number of kulaks is growing; the number of poor peasants is diminishing. This fact shows that the central figure in agriculture is, as previously, the middle peasant. The bloc with the middle peasants, while relying on the poor peasants, is of decisive importance for the fate of our entire work of construction, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The general improvement of material conditions in the countryside. We have figures on the increase in the incomes of the peasant population. Two years ago, in 1924-25, the income of the peasant population amounted to 3,548 million rubles, in 1926-27 this income grew to 4,792 million rubles, i.e., it increased 35.1 per cent, whereas the peasant population during this period increased only 2.38 per cent. This is an indubitable indication that material conditions in the countryside are improving.

This does not mean that the material conditions of the peasantry have improved in all districts of the country. It is well known that in some places the harvest was uneven during these two years, and the effects of the crop failure of 1924 have not yet been fully overcome. Hence the assistance the state renders the working peasantry in general and the poor peasants in particular. In 1925-26 state assistance to the working peasantry amounted to 373,000,000 rubles and in 1926-27 to 427,000,000 rubles. Special assistance to the rural poor in 1925-26 in the shape of grants to the poorest farms amounted to 38,000,000 rubles, tax exemptions for poor farms amounted to 44,000,000 rubles and insurance exemptions for poor peasants to 9,000,000 rubles, making a total of 91,000,000 rubles. Special assistance to the rural poor in 1926-27 under the same heads: 39,000,000 rubles, 52,000,000 rubles and 9,000,000 rubles, making a total of about 100,000,000 rubles.

To sum up: there is an improvement in the material conditions of the main mass of the peasantry.

The Party' s task: to continue along the line of further improving the material and cultural conditions of the main mass of the peasantry, primarily of the poor peasants, to strengthen the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, to raise the prestige of the working class and of its Party in the countryside.

c) The new bourgeoisie. The intelligentsia. A characteristic feature of the new bourgeoisie is that, unlike the working class and the peasantry, it has no reason to be satisfied with the Soviet regime. Its dissatisfaction is not accidental. It has its roots in life.

I have spoken about the growth of our national economy, I have spoken about the growth of our industry, about the growth of the socialist elements of our national economy, about the decline in the relative importance of the private owners, about the elimination of the small traders. But what does that mean? It means that while our industry and our trading bodies are growing, tens of thousands of small and medium capitalists are being ruined. How many small and medium shops have been closed during these years? Thousands. And how many small manufacturers have been proletarianised? Thousands. And how many civil servants have been discharged in connection with the reduction of staffs in our state apparatus? Hundreds and thousands.

The progress of our industry, the progress of our trading and co-operative bodies, the improvement of our state apparatus, is progress and improvement of benefit to the working class, of benefit to the main mass of the peasantry, but of disadvantage to the new bourgeoisie, of disadvantage to the middle strata generally and to the urban middle strata in particular. Is it to be wondered at that discontent with the Soviet regime is growing among those strata? Hence the counter-revolutionary moods in those circles. Hence the Smena-Vekhist ideology, as a fashionable commodity on the political market of the new bourgeoisie.

But it would be a mistake to think that the whole of the civil service element, the whole of the intelligentsia is in a state of discontent, in a state of grumbling or unrest against the Soviet regime. Parallel with the growth of discontent in the depths of the new bourgeoisie we have the fact of a differentiation among the intelligentsia, a desertion from Smena-Vekhism, the passing of hundreds and thousands of working intellectuals to the side of the Soviet regime. This fact, comrades, is undoubtedly a favourable fact, which must be noted.

The pioneers in this are the technical intelligentsia, because, being closely connected with the process of production, they cannot but see that the Bolsheviks are leading the country forward, to a better future. Such gigantic works of construction as the Volkhov Power Plant, the Dnieper Power Plant, the Svir Power Plant, the Turkestan Railway, the Volga-Don project and a whole series of new gigantic industrial plants with which the fate of whole strata of the technical intelligentsia is bound up, cannot but exercise some beneficial influence upon these strata. It is not only a bread and butter question for them, it is also a matter of honour, a matter of creative effort, which naturally draws them to the working class, to the Soviet regime.

That is apart from the rural working intelligentsia, especially village school-teachers, who began to support the Soviet regime long ago, and who cannot help welcoming the development of education in the countryside.

Therefore, parallel with the growth of dissatisfaction among certain strata of the intelligentsia, we have the bond between the working intelligentsia and the working class.

The Party' s task is to continue along the line of isolating the new bourgeoisie and to strengthen the bond between the working class and the working Soviet intelligentsia in town and country.

d) The state apparatus and the struggle against bureaucracy. So much is being said about bureaucracy that there is no need to dilate on it. That elements of bureaucracy exist in our state, co-operative and Party apparatus, there can be no doubt. That it is necessary to combat the elements of bureaucracy, and that this task will confront us all the time, as long as we have state power, as long as the state exists, is also a fact.

But one must know how far one can go. To carry the struggle against bureaucracy in the state apparatus to the point of destroying the state apparatus, of discrediting the state apparatus, of attempts to break it up— that means going against Leninism, means forgetting that our apparatus is a Soviet apparatus, which is a state apparatus of a higher type than any other state apparatus in the world.

Wherein lies the strength of our state apparatus? In that it links the state power with the millions of workers and peasants through the Soviets. In that the Soviets are schools of administration for tens and hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants. In that the state apparatus does not fence itself off from the vast masses of the people, but merges with them through an incalculable number of mass organisations, all sorts of commissions, committees, conferences, delegate meetings, etc., which encompass the Soviets and in this way buttress the organs of government.

Wherein lies the weakness of our state apparatus? In the existence within it of elements of bureaucracy, which spoil and distort its work. In order to eliminate bureaucracy from it—and this cannot be done in one or two years—we must systematically improve the state apparatus, bring it closer to the masses, reinvigorate it by bringing in new people loyal to the cause of the working class, remodel it in the spirit of communism, but not break it up or discredit it. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said: "Without an 'apparatus' we would have perished long ago. If we do not wage a systematic and stubborn struggle to improve the apparatus we shall perish before we have created the base for socialism." 13

I shall not dilate on those defects in our state apparatus that are glaring enough as it is. I have in mind, primarily, "Mother Red Tape." I have at hand a heap of materials on the matter of red tape, exposing the criminal negligence of a number of judicial, administrative, insurance, co-operative and other organisations.

Here is a peasant who went to a certain insurance office twenty-one times to get some matter put right, and even then failed to get any result.

Here is another peasant, an old man of sixty-six, who walked 600 versts to get his case cleared up at an Uyezd Social Maintenance Office, and even then failed to get any result.

Here is an old peasant woman, fifty-six years old, who, in response to a summons by a people's court, walked 500 versts and travelled over 600 versts by horse and cart, and even then failed to get justice done.

A multitude of such facts could be quoted. It is not worth while enumerating them. But this is a disgrace to us, comrades! How can such outrageous things be tolerated?

Lastly, facts about "demoting." It appears, that in addition to workers who are promoted, there are also such as are "demoted," who are pushed into the background by their own comrades, not because they are incapable or inefficient, but because they are conscientious and honest in their work.

Here is a worker, a tool-maker, who was promoted to a managerial post at his plant because he was a capable and incorruptible man. He worked for a couple of years, worked honestly, introduced order, put a stop to inefficiency and waste. But, working in this way, he trod on the toes of a gang of so-called "Communists," he disturbed their peace and quiet. And what happened? This gang of "Communists" put a spoke in his wheel and thus compelled him to "demote himself," as much as to say: "You wanted to be smarter than us, you won't let us live and make a bit in quiet—so take a back seat, brother."

Here is another worker, also a tool-maker, an adjuster of bolt-cutting machines, who was promoted to a managerial post at his factory. He worked zealously and honestly. But, working in this way, he disturbed somebody's peace and quiet. And what happened? A pretext was found and they got rid of this "troublesome" comrade. How did this promoted comrade leave, what were his feelings? Like this: "In whatever post I was appointed to I tried to justify the confidence that was placed in me. But this promotion played a dirty trick on me and I shall never forget it. They threw mud at me. My wish to bring everything into the light of day remained a mere wish. Neither the works committee, nor the management, nor the Party unit would listen to me. I am finished with promotion, I would not take another managerial post even if offered my weight in gold" (Trud, 14 No. 128, June 9, 1927).

But this is a disgrace to us, comrades! How can such outrageous things be tolerated?

The Party's task is, in fighting against bureaucracy and for the improvement of the state apparatus, to extirpate with a red-hot iron such outrageous things in our practical work as those I have just spoken about.

e) Concerning Lenin's slogan about the cultural revolution. The surest remedy for bureaucracy is raising the cultural level of the workers and peasants. One can curse and denounce bureaucracy in the state apparatus, one can stigmatise and pillory bureaucracy in our practical work, but unless the masses of the workers reach a certain level of culture, which will create the possibility, the desire, the ability to control the state apparatus from below, by the masses of the workers themselves, bureaucracy will continue to exist in spite of everything. Therefore, the cultural development of theworking class and of the masses of the working peasantry, not only the development of literacy, although literacy is the basis of all culture, but primarily the cultivation of the ability to take part in the administration of the country, is the chief lever for improving the state and every other apparatus. This is the sense and significance of Lenin's slogan about the cultural revolution.

Here is what Lenin said about this in March 1922, before the opening of the Eleventh Congress of our Party, in his letter to the Central Committee addressed to Comrade Molotov:

"The chief thing we lack is culture, ability to administer. . . . Economically and politically NEP fully ensures us the possibility of laying the foundation of socialist economy. It is 'only' a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard." 15

These words of Lenin's must not be forgotten, comrades. (Voices : "Quite right!")

Hence the Party's task: to exert greater efforts to raise the cultural level of the working class and of the working strata of the peasantry.

* * *

How can the internal political situation in our country be summed up?

It can be summed up in this way: The Soviet regime is the most stable regime in the world. (Stormy applause.)

But while the Soviet regime is stronger than all the other regimes existing in the world, a regime that any bourgeois government may envy, that does not mean that all is well with us in this sphere. No, comrades, we have shortcomings in this sphere too, which we, as Bolsheviks, cannot and must not conceal.

Firstly, we have unemployment. This is a serious shortcoming, which we must overcome, or at least reduce to a minimum at all costs.

Secondly, we have grave defects in housing construction for the workers, a housing crisis, which we must also overcome, or at least reduce to a minimum within the next few years.

We have some manifestations of anti-Semitism, not only among certain circles of the middle strata of the population, but also among a certain section of the workers, and even in some quarters in our Party. This evil must be combated, comrades, with all ruthlessness.

We also have a shortcoming like the slackening in the struggle against religion.

And lastly, we have a terrible cultural backwardness, not only in the broad sense of the term, but also in its narrow sense, in the sense of elementary literacy, for the percentage of illiteracy in the U.S.S.R. is still not inconsiderable.

All these and similar shortcomings must be eliminated, comrades, if we want to advance at a more or less rapid rate.

To finish with this section of my report, permit me to say a few words about the most characteristic appointments during the period under review. I shall not touch on the appointment of the Vice-Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. Nor shall I touch on the appointment of the People's Commissars of the Supreme Council of National Economy, of the People's Commissariat of Trade, and of the Joint State Political Administration of the U.S.S.R. I would like to deal with three appointments that are significant. You know that Lobov has been appointed Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the R.S.F.S.R. He is a metalworker. You know that Ukha-nov, a metalworker, has been elected Chairman of the Moscow Soviet in place of Kamenev. You know also that Komarov, also a metalworker, has been elected Chairman of the Leningrad Soviet in place of Zinoviev. Thus the "Lord Mayors" of our two capitals are metalworkers. (Applause.) It is true that they are not of the nobility, but they are managing the affairs of our capitals better than any member of the nobility. (Applause.) You may say that this is a tendency towards metallisation, but I don't think there is anything bad about that. (Voices: "On the contrary, it is very good.")

Let us wish the capitalist countries, let us wish London, let us wish Paris, success in catching up with us at last and in putting up their own metalworkers as "Lord Mayors." (Applause.)

III
The Party and the Opposition
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1. The State of the Party

Comrades, I shall not deal at length with the numerical and ideological growth of our Party, I shall not quote figures, because Kosior will report to you on this in detail.

Nor shall I speak about the social composition of our Party, or about the figures relating to this, because Kosior will give you exhaustive data on it in his report.

I should like to say a few words about the higher level, the qualitative improvement, in our Party's work of leadership both in the sphere of economics and in the sphere of politics. There was a time, comrades, two or three years ago, when a section of our comrades, headed by Trotsky, I think (laughter, voices: "Think?"), rebuked our Gubernia Committees,our Regional Committees and our Central Committee, asserting that the Party organisations were not competent to interfere in the country's economic affairs and had no business to do so. Yes, there was such a time. Today, however, it is doubtful whether anybody would dare to cast such accusations at the Party organisations. That the Gubernia and Regional Committees have mastered the art of economic leadership, that the Party organisations are leading the work of economic construction and not trailing in its rear, is such a glaring fact that only the blind or imbecile would dare to deny it. The very fact that we have decided to put on the agenda of this congress the question of a five-year plan of development of the national economy, this very fact alone shows that the Party has made immense progress in the planned leadership of our work of economic construction both in the districts and at the centre.

Some people think that there is nothing special about this. No, comrades, there is something special and important about this, which must be noted. Reference is sometimes made to American and German economic bodies which, it is alleged, also direct their national economy in a planned way. No, comrades, those countries have not yet achieved this, and never will achieve it, as long as the capitalist system exists there. To be able to lead in a planned way it is necessary to have a different system of industry, a socialist and not a capitalist system; it is necessary to have at least a nationalised industry, a nationalised credit system, nationalised land, a socialist bond with the countryside, working-class rule in the country, etc.

True, they also have something in the nature of plans; but these are forecast plans, guess-work plans, not binding on anybody, and they cannot serve as a basis for directing the country's economy. Things are different in our country. Our plans are not forecast plans, not guess-work plans, but directive plans, which are binding upon our leading bodies, and which determine the trend of our future economic development on a country-wide scale.

You see, we have a fundamental difference here.

That is why I say that even the mere fact that the question of a five-year plan of development of the national economy has been put on the congress agenda, even this fact is a sign of the qualitatively higher level of our leadership in planning.

Nor shall I deal at length with the growth of inner-Party democracy in our Party. Only the blind fail to see that inner-Party democracy, genuine inner-Party democracy, an actual upsurge of activity on the part of the mass of the Party membership, is growing and developing in our Party. There is talk about democracy. But what is democracy in the Party? Democracy for whom? If by democracy is meant freedom for a couple or so of intellectuals divorced from the revolution to engage in endless chatter, to have their own press organ, etc., then we have no use for such "democracy," because it is democracy for an insignificant minority that sets at naught the will of the overwhelming majority. If, however, by democracy is meant freedom for the mass of the Party membership to decide questions connected with our work of construction, an upsurge of activity of the Party membership, drawing them into the work of Party leadership, developing in them the feeling that they are the masters in the Party, then we have such democracy, that is the democracy we need, and we shall steadily develop it in spite of everything. (Applause.)

Nor shall I, comrades, deal at length with the fact that, parallel with inner-Party democracy, collective leadership is growing, step by step, in our Party. Take our Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. Together they constitute a leading centre of 200-250 comrades, which meets regularly and decides highly important questions connected with our work of construction. It is one of the most democratic and collectively functioning centres our Party has ever had. Well? Is it not a fact that the settlement of highly important questions concerning our work is passing more and more from the hands of a narrow upper group into the hands of this broad centre, which is most closely connected with all branches of our work of construction and with all the districts of our vast country?

Nor shall I dilate on the growth of our Party cadres. It is indisputable that during the past few years the old cadres of our Party have been permeated with new, rising cadres, consisting mainly of workers. Formerly, we counted our cadres in hundreds and thousands, but now we have to count them in tens of thousands. I think that if we begin from the lowest organisations, the shop and team organisations, and proceed to the top, all over the Union, we shall find that our Party cadres, the overwhelming majority of whom are workers, now number not less than 100,000. This indicates the immense growth of our Party. It indicates the immense growth of our cadres, the growth of their ideological and organisational experience, the growth of their communist culture.

Lastly, there is one further question, which there is no need to deal with at length but which ought to be mentioned. That is the question of the growth of the Party's prestige among the non-Party workers and the masses of the working people in general of our country, among the workers and the oppressed classes in general all over the world. There can scarcely be any doubt now that our Party is becoming the banner of liberation for the masses of the working people all over the world, and that the title of Bolshevik is becoming a title of honour for the best members of the working class.

Such, in general, comrades, is the picture of our achievements in the sphere of Party affairs.

This does not mean, comrades, that there are no shortcomings in our Party. No, there are shortcomings, and grave ones at that. Permit me to say a few words about them.

Let us take, for example, the guidance of economic and other organisations by our Party organisations. Is all well with us in this respect? No, not all. Often we settle questions, not only in the districts, but also at the centre, by the family, domestic-circle method, so to speak.

Ivan Ivanovich, a member of the top leadership of such and such an organisation, has, say, made a gross mistake and has messed things up. But Ivan Fyodorovich is reluctant to criticise him, to expose his mistakes and to correct them. He is reluctant to do so because he does not want to "make enemies." He has made a mistake, he has messed things up—what of it? Who of us does not make mistakes? Today I shall let him, Ivan Fyodorovich, off; tomorrow he will let me, Ivan Ivanovich, off; for what guarantee is there that I, too, shall not make a mistake? Everything in order and satisfactory. Peace and good will. They say that a mistake neglected is detrimental to our great cause? Never mind! We'll muddle through somehow.

Such, comrades, is the way some of our responsible workers usually argue.

But what does that mean? If we Bolsheviks, who criticise the whole world, who, in the words of Marx, are storming heaven, if we, for the sake of this or that comrade's peace of mind, abandon self-criticism, is it not obvious that that can lead only to the doom of our great cause? (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

Marx said that what, among other things, distinguishes the proletarian revolution from every other revolution is that it criticises itself and, in criticising itself, strengthens itself. 16 That is an extremely important point of Marx's. If we, the representatives of the proletarian revolution, shut our eyes to our defects, settle questions by the family-circle method, hush up each other's mistakes and drive the ulcers inwards into the organism of the Party, who will correct these mistakes, these defects?

Is it not obvious that we shall cease to be proletarian revolutionaries, and that we shall certainly perish if we fail to eradicate from our midst this philistinism, this family-circle method of settling highly important questions of our work of construction?

Is it not obvious that by refraining from honest and straightforward self-criticism, by refraining from honest and open correction of our mistakes, we close our road to progress, to the improvement of our work, to new successes in our work?

After all, our development does not proceed in the form of a smooth, all-round ascent. No, comrades, we have classes, we have contradictions within the country, we have a past, we have a present and a future, we have contradictions between them, and our onward progress cannot take the form of a smooth rocking on the waves of life. Our advance takes place in the process of struggle, in the process of the development of contradictions, in the process of overcoming these contradictions, in the process of bringing these contradictions to light and eliminating them.

As long as classes exist we shall never be in a position to say: Well, thank God, everything is all right now. We shall never be in such a position, comrades.

Something in life is always dying. But that which is dying refuses to die quietly; it fights for its existence, defends its moribund cause.

Something new in life is always being born. But that which is being born does not come into the world quietly; it comes in squealing and screaming, defending its right to existence. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

The struggle between the old and the new, between the dying and the nascent—there you have the basis of our development. By failing to note and bring to light openly and honestly, as befits Bolsheviks, the defects and mistakes in our work, we close our road to progress. But we want to go forward. And precisely because we want to go forward we must make honest and revolutionary self-criticism one of our most important tasks. Without this there is no progress. Without this there is no development.

But it is precisely along this line that things with us are still in a bad way. More than that, it is enough for us to achieve a few successes to forget about the shortcomings, to take it easy and get conceited. Two or three big successes—and already we become reckless. Another two or three big successes—and already we become conceited, we expect a "walk-over"! But the mistakes remain, the defects continue to exist, the ulcers are driven inwards into the organism of the Party and the Party begins to sicken.

A second shortcoming. It consists in introducing administrative methods in the Party, in replacing the method of persuasion, which is of decisive importance for the Party, by the method of administration. This shortcoming is a danger no less serious than the first one. Why? Because it creates the danger of our Party organisations, which are independently acting organisations, being converted into mere bureaucratic institutions. If we take into account that we have not less than 60,000 of the most active officials distributed among all sorts of economic, co-operative and state institutions, where they are fighting bureaucracy, it must be admitted that some of them, while fighting bureaucracy in those institutions, sometimes become infected with bureaucracy themselves and carry that infection into the Party organisation. And this is not our fault, comrades, but our misfortune, for that process will continue to a greater or lesser degree as long as the state exists. And precisely because that process has some roots in life, we must arm ourselves for the struggle against this shortcoming, we must raise the activity of the mass of the Party membership, draw them into the decision of questions concerning our Party leadership, systematically implant inner-Party democracy and prevent the method of persuasion in our Party practice being replaced by the method of administration.

A third shortcoming. This consists in the desire of a number of our comrades to swim with the stream, smoothly and calmly, without perspective, without looking into the future, in such a way that a festive and holiday atmosphere should be felt all around, that we should have celebration meetings every day, with applause everywhere, and that all of us should be elected in turn as honorary members of all sorts of presidiums. (Laughter, applause.)

Now it is this irresistible desire to see a festive atmosphere everywhere, this longing for decoration, for all sorts of anniversaries, necessary and unnecessary, this desire to swim with the stream without noticing where it is taking us (laughter, applause)—it is all this that forms the substance of the third shortcoming in our Party practice, the basis of the defects in our Party life.

Have you seen boatmen, rowing conscientiously, in the sweat of their brows, but not seeing where the current is carrying them? I have seen such boatmen on the Yenisei. They are honest and tireless boatmen. But the trouble is that they do not see, and refuse to see, that the current may carry them against the rocks, where doom awaits them.

The same thing happens to some of our comrades. They row conscientiously, without stopping, their boat floats smoothly with the stream, only they do not know where it is taking

them, and they do not even want to know. Working without perspective, floating without sail or rudder—that is what the desire to swim with the stream necessarily leads to.

And the results? The results are obvious: first they become coated with mould, then they become drab, after that they sink into the quagmire of philistinism and subsequently turn into regular philistines. That is the path of real degeneration.

There you have, comrades, some of the shortcomings in our Party practice and in our Party life, about which I wanted to say a few bitter words to you.

And now permit me to pass to questions connected with the discussion and our so-called opposition.

2. The Results of the Discussion
Is there any sense, any value in a Party discussion?

Sometimes people say: Why on earth was this discussion started, what good is it to anyone, would it not have been better to settle the disputed questions privately, without washing dirty linen in public? That is wrong, comrades. Sometimes a discussion is absolutely necessary, and indubitably useful. The whole point is—what kind of discussion? If the discussion is conducted within comradely limits, within Party limits, if its object is honest self-criticism, criticism of shortcomings in the Party, if, therefore, it improves our work and arms the working class, then such a discussion is necessary and useful.

But there is another kind of discussion, the object of which is not to improve our common work but to worsen it; not to strengthen the Party, but to disintegrate and discredit it. Such a discussion usually leads not to the arming, but to the disarming of the proletariat. Such a discussion we do not need. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

When the opposition demanded an all-Union discussion about three months before the congress, before the Central Committee's theses had been drawn up, before the publication of those theses, it tried to thrust upon us the kind of discussion that would inevitably have facilitated the task of our enemies, the task of the enemies of the working class, the task of the enemies of our Party. That was precisely the reason why the Central Committee opposed the opposition's plans. And it is precisely because it opposed the opposition's plans that we succeeded in placing the discussion on the right lines by giving it a basis in the shape of the Central Committee's theses for the congress. Now we can say without hesitation that, on the whole, the discussion has been a gain.

As regards washing dirty linen in public, that is nonsense, comrades. We have never been, and never will be, afraid of openly criticising ourselves and our mistakes before the whole Party. The strength of Bolshevism is precisely that it is not afraid of criticism and that, in criticising its defects, it acquires the energy for making further progress. Thus, the present discussion is a sign of our Party's strength, a sign of its might.

It must not be forgotten that in every big party, especially a party like ours, which is in power, and which contains a certain proportion of peasants and civil servants, there accumulate in the course of a certain time some elements who are indifferent to questions of Party practice, who vote blindly and swim with the stream. The presence of a large number of these elements is an evil which must be combated. These elements constitute the marsh in our Party.

A discussion is an appeal to this marsh. The oppositionists appeal to it in order to win over some part of it. And they do indeed win over its worst part. The Party appeals to it in order to win over its best part to draw it into active Party life. As a result, the marsh is compelled to exercise self-determination in spite of all its inertia. And it does indeed exercise self-determination as a result of these appeals, by giving up one section of its ranks to the opposition and another to the Party, thus ceasing to exist as a marsh. In the general balance-sheet of our Party development this is an asset. As a result of our present discussion, the marsh has diminished; it has wholly ceased, or is ceasing, to exist. Herein lies the advantage of the discussion.

The results of the discussion? The results are known. Up to yesterday, it turns out, 724,000 comrades voted for the Party and a little over 4,000 voted for the opposition. Such are the results. Our oppositionists thundered that the Central Committee had become divorced from the Party, that the Party had become divorced from the class, that if "ifs" and "ans" were pots and pans they, the oppositionists, would certainly have had 99 per cent on their side. But since "ifs" and "ans" are not pots and pans, it turns out that the opposition has not even one per cent. Such are the results.

How could it happen that the Party as a whole, and after it the working class as well, so thoroughly isolated the opposition? After all, the opposition is headed by well-known people with well-known names, people who know how to advertise themselves (voices: "Quite right!"), people who are not afflicted with modesty (applause) and who are able to blow their own trumpets, to make the most of their wares.

It happened because the leading group of the opposition proved to be a group of petty-bourgeois intellectuals divorced from life, divorced irom the revolution, divorced from the Party, from the working class. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

A little while ago I spoke about the successes we have achieved in our work, about our achievements in the sphere of industry, in the sphere of trade, in the sphere of our economy as a whole, and in the sphere of foreign policy. But the opposition is not concerned with those achievements. It does not see, or does not wish to see them. It does not wish to see them partly because of its ignorance and partly because of the obstinacy characteristic of intellectuals who are divorced from life.

3. The Fundamental Divergences Between the Party and the Opposition

You will ask, what then, after all, are the disagreements between the Party and the opposition, on what questions do they disagree?

On all questions, comrades. (Voices: "Quite right!") Recently I read a statement made by a non-Party worker in Moscow, who is joining the Party, or has already joined. Here is how he formulates the disagreements between the Party and the opposition:

"Formerly we tried to find out what the Party and the opposition disagreed about. Now we cannot find out on what the opposition agrees with the Party. (Laughter, applause.) The opposition is against the Party on all questions, therefore if I sided with the opposition I would not join the Party." (Laughter, applause.) (See Izvestia, No. 264.)

You see how aptly and at the same time concisely workers are sometimes able to express themselves. I think that this is the aptest and truest characterisation of the opposition's attitude to the Party, to its ideology, its programme and its tactics.

It is precisely the fact that the opposition disagrees with the Party on all questions that makes it a group with its own ideology, its own programme, its own tactics and its own organisational principles.

The opposition possesses everything that is needed to form a new party, everything except a "trifle"—the strength to do so. (Laughter, applause.)

I could mention seven main questions on which there is disagreement between the Party and the opposition.

First. The question of the possibility of the victorious building of socialism in our country. I shall not refer to the opposition's documents and declarations on this question. Everybody is familiar with them and there is no point in repeating them. It is clear to everybody that the opposition denies the possibility of the victorious building of socialism in our country. In denying that possibility, however, it is directly and openly slipping into the position of the Mensheviks.

The opposition's line on this question is not a new one for its present leaders. It was the line taken by Kamenev and Zinoviev when they refused to go towards the October uprising. They stated plainly at the time that by making an uprising we were heading for destruction, that we must wait for the Constituent Assembly, that the conditions for socialism had not matured and would not mature soon.

Trotsky took the very same line when he went towards the uprising; for he said plainly that if a victorious proletarian revolution in the West did not bring timely assistance in the more or less near future, it would be foolish to think that a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe.

Indeed, how did Kamenev and Zinoviev on the one side, Trotsky on the other, and Lenin and the Party on the third, go towards the uprising? That is a very interesting question, about which it is worth while saying a few words, comrades.

You know that Kamenev and Zinoviev were driven towards the uprising with a stick. Lenin drove them with a stick, threatening them with expulsion from the Party (laughter, applause), and they were compelled to drag themselves to the uprising. (Laughter, applause.)

Trotsky went towards the uprising voluntarily. He did not go whole-heartedly, however, but with a slight reservation, which already at that time brought him close to Kamenev and Zinoviev. It is an interesting fact that it was precisely before the October Revolution, in June 1917, that Trotsky deemed it appropriate to publish in Petrograd a new edition of his old pamphlet A Peace Programme, as if wishing to show thereby that he was going towards the uprising under his own flag. What does he speak about in that pamphlet? In it he pole-mises with Lenin on the question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, considers this idea of Lenin's incorrect and asserts that we shall have to take power, but that if timely aid does not come from the victorious West-European workers it is hopeless to think

that a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe, and whoever does not agree with Trotsky's criticism suffers from national narrow-mindedness.

Here is an excerpt from Trotsky's pamphlet of that time:

"Without waiting for the others, we begin and continue the struggle nationally, in the full confidence that our initiative will give an impetus to the struggle in other countries, but if this should not occur, it would be hopeless to think—as historical experience and theoretical considerations testify—that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe". . . . "To accept the perspective of a social revolution within national bounds is to fall a prey to that very national narrow-mindedness which constitutes the essence of social-patriotism." (Trotsky, The Year 1917, Vol. III, Part 1, p. 90.)

Such, comrades, was Trotsky's slight reservation, which goes far to explain to us the roots and the subsoil of his present bloc with Kamenev and Zi-noviev.

But how did Lenin, how did the Party, go towards the uprising? Also with a slight reservation? No, Lenin and his Party went towards the uprising without any reservations. Here is an excerpt from one of Lenin's splendid articles "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution," published abroad in September 1917:

"The victory of socialism in one country does not at one stroke altogether eliminate all war. On the contrary, it presupposes wars. The development of capitalism proceeds extremely unevenly in the various countries. It cannot be otherwise under commodity production. From this it follows irrefutably that socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously in all countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois for some time. This is bound to create not only friction, but a direct striving on the part of the bourgeoisie of the other countries to crush the victorious proletariat of the socialist state. In such cases a war on our part would be a legitimate and just war. It would be a war for socialism, for the liberation of other peoples from the bourgeoisie." (Lenin, "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution," Notes of the Lenin Institute, Part II, p. 7. 17)

You see that we have a totally different line here. Whereas Trotsky went towards the uprising with a slight reservation that brought him close to Kamenev and Zinoviev, asserting that, taken by itself, proletarian power cannot amount to anything much if timely aid does not come from outside, Lenin, on the contrary, went to the uprising without reservations, asserting that proletarian power in our country must serve as a base for assisting the proletarians of other countries to emancipate themselves from the yoke of the bourgeoisie.

That is how the Bolsheviks went towards the October uprising, and that is why Trotsky, and Kamenev and Zinoviev found common ground in the tenth year of the October Revolution.

One could depict in the form of a dialogue the conversation between Trotsky on the one hand, and Kame-nev and Zinoviev on the other, when the opposition bloc was being formed.

Kamenev and Zinoviev to Trotsky: "So you see, dear comrade, in the end we proved to be right when we said that we ought not to go towards the October uprising, that we ought to wait for the Constituent Assembly, and so forth. Now, everybody sees that the country is degenerating, the government is degenerating, we are heading for destruction and there won't

be any socialism in our country. We ought not to have gone towards the uprising. But you went to the uprising voluntarily. You made a big mistake."

Trotsky replies to them: "No, dear colleagues, you are unjust towards me. True, I went towards the uprising, but you forgot to say how I went. After all, I did not go to the uprising whole-heartedly, but with a reservation. (General laughter.) And since it is evident now that aid cannot be expected from anywhere outside, it is clear that we are heading for destruction, as I foretold at the time in A Peace Programme."

Zinoviev and Kamenev: "Yes, you may be right. We forgot about your slight reservation. It is clear now that our bloc has an ideological foundation." (General laughter. Applause.)

That is how the opposition's line of denying the possibility of victoriously building socialism in our country came into being.

What does that line signify? It signifies surrender. To whom? Obviously to the capitalist elements in our country. To whom else? To the world bourgeoisie. But the Left phrases, the revolutionary gestures—what has become of them? They have vanished. Give our opposition a good shaking, cast aside the revolutionary phraseology, and at bottom you will find that they are defeatists. (Applause.)

Second. The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Have we the dictatorship of the proletariat or not? Rather a strange question. (Laughter.) Nevertheless, the opposition raises it in every one of its declarations. The opposition says that we are in a state of Thermidor degeneration. What does that mean? It means that we have not got the dictatorship of the proletariat, that both our economics and our politics are a failure and are going backwards, that we are not moving towards socialism, but towards capitalism. That, of course, is strange and foolish. But the opposition insists on it.

There you have, comrades, yet another divergence. It is on this that Trotsky's well-known thesis about Clemenceau is based. If the government has degenerated, or is degenerating, is it worth while sparing, defending, upholding it? Clearly, it is not worth while. If a situation arises favourable to the "removal" of such a government, if, say, the enemy comes within 80 kilometres of Moscow, is it not obvious that advantage should be taken of that situation to sweep this government away and to set up a new, Clemenceau, i.e., Trotskyist, government?

Clearly, there is nothing Leninist in this "line." It is Menshevism of the purest water. The opposition has slipped into Menshevism.

Third. The question of the bloc between the working class and the middle peasants. The opposition has all along concealed its hostility to the idea of such a bloc. Its platform, its counter-theses, are remarkable not so much for what they say as for what the opposition has tried to conceal from the working class. But a man was found, I. N. Smirnov, also one of the leaders of the opposition, who had the courage to tell the truth about the opposition, to drag it into the light of day. And what do we find? We find that we "are heading for destruction," and if we want to "save ourselves," we must go in for discord with the middle peasants. Not very clever, but clear.

Here, too, the opposition's Menshevik ears have at last become exposed for everybody to see.

Fourth. The question of the character of our revolution. If the possibility of victoriously building socialism in our country is denied, if the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat is denied, if the necessity of a bloc between the working class and the peasantry is denied, what then remains of our revolution, of its socialist character? Obviously, nothing, absolutely nothing. The proletariat came to power, it carried the bourgeois revolution to completion, the peasantry now has nothing to do with the revolution since it has already received land, so the proletariat can now retire and make room for other classes.

There you have the opposition's line, if we delve down to the roots of the oppositionist views.

There you have all the roots of the defeatism of our opposition. No wonder the Bundist defeatist Abramo-vich praises it.

Fifth. The question of Lenin's line on the leadership of colonial revolutions. Lenin took as his starting-point the difference between imperialist countries and oppressed countries, between communist policy in imperialist countries and communist policy in colonial countries. Taking this difference as his starting-point, he said, already during the war, that the idea of defending the fatherland, which is inacceptable and counterrevolutionary for communism in imperialist countries, is quite acceptable and legitimate in oppressed countries that are waging a war of liberation against imperialism.

That is why Lenin conceded the possibility, at a certain stage and for a certain period, of a bloc and even of an alliance with the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries, if this bourgeoisie is waging war against imperialism, and if it is not hindering the Communists from training the workers and poor peasants in the spirit of communism.

The sin of the opposition here is that it has completely abandoned this line of Lenin's and has slipped into that of the Second International, which denies the expediency of supporting revolutionary wars waged by colonial countries against imperialism. And it is this that explains all the misfortunes that have befallen our opposition on the question of the Chinese revolution.

There you have yet another divergence.

Sixth. The question of united front tactics in the world working-class movement. The sin of the opposition here is that it has abandoned the Leninist tactics on the question of gradually winning the vast masses of the working class to the side of communism. The vast masses of the working class are not won over to the side of communism merely by the Party pursuing a correct policy. The Party's correct policy is a big thing, but it is by no means everything. In order that the vast masses of the working class should come over to communism, the masses themselves should become convinced through their own experience that the communist policy is correct. And for the masses to become convinced requires time, requires that the Party should work skilfully and ably in leading the masses to its positions, that the Party should work skilfully and ably to convince the vast masses that its policy is correct.

We were absolutely right in April 1917, for we knew that things were moving towards the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and to the establishment of Soviet power. But we did not yet call upon the broad masses of the working class to rise in revolt against the power of the bourgeoisie. Why? Because the masses had not yet had the opportunity to become convinced that our absolutely correct policy was correct. Only when the petty-bourgeois Socialist-

Revolutionary and Men-shevik parties had utterly discredited themselves on the fundamental questions of the revolution, only when the masses began to be convinced that our policy was correct, only then did we lead the masses to the uprising. And it is precisely because we led the masses to the uprising at the proper time that we achieved victory then.

There you have the roots of the united front idea. Lenin put the united front tactics into operation precisely for the purpose of helping the vast masses of the working class in the capitalist countries, who are infected with the prejudices of the Social-Democratic policy of compromise, to learn from their own experience that the Communists' policy is correct, and to pass to the side of communism.

The sin of the opposition is that it utterly repudiates these tactics. At one time it was infatuated, stupidly and unwisely infatuated, with the tactics of the united front, and it enthusiastically welcomed the conclusion of an agreement with the General Council in Britain, believing that that agreement was "one of the surest guarantees of peace," "one of the surest guarantees against intervention," one of the surest means of "rendering reformism in Europe harmless" (see Zinoviev's report to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)). But when its hopes of rendering reformism "harmless" through the aid of the Purcells and Hickses were cruelly dashed to the ground, it rushed to the other extreme and utterly repudiated the idea of united front tactics.

There you have, comrades, yet another divergence demonstrating the opposition's complete abandonment of the Leninist united front tactics.

Seventh. The question of the Leninist Party principle, of Leninist unity in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and in the Comintern. Here, the opposition utterly abandons the Leninist organisational line and takes the path of organising a second party, the path of organising a new International.

There you have seven main questions, showing that on all of them the opposition has slipped into Menshevism.

Can these Menshevik views of the opposition be regarded as compatible with our Party's ideology, with our Party's programme, with its tactics, with the tactics of the Comintern, with the organisational line of Leninism?

Under no circumstances; not for a single moment!

You will ask: how could such an opposition come into being among us, where are its social roots? I think that the social roots of the opposition lie in the fact of the ruin of the urban petty-bourgeois strata in the circumstances of our development, in the fact that these strata are discontented with the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the striving of these strata to change that regime, to "improve" it in the direction of establishing bourgeois democracy.

I have already said that as a result of our progress, as a result of the growth of our industry, as a result of the growth of the relative importance of the socialist forms of economy, a section of the petty bourgeoisie, particularly of the urban bourgeoisie, is being ruined and is going under. The opposition reflects the grumbling of these strata and their discontent with the regime of the proletarian revolution.

Such are the social roots of the opposition.

4. What Next?
What is to be done now with the opposition?

Before passing to this question I should like to tell you the story of an experiment in joint work with Trotsky that Kamenev made in 1910. This is a very interesting question, the more so as it could give us some clue to the proper approach to the question raised. In 1910 a plenum of our Central Committee was held abroad. It discussed the question of the relations between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, and Trotsky in particular (we were then a part of one party that included the Mensheviks, and we called ourselves a group). The plenum decided in favour of conciliation with the Men-sheviks and, consequently, with Trotsky, in spite of Lenin, in opposition to Lenin. Lenin was left in the minority. But what about Kamenev? Kamenev undertook to co-operate with Trotsky. His co-operation was with Lenin's knowledge and consent, because Lenin wanted to prove to Kamenev by experience that it was harmful and impermissible to co-operate with Trotsky against Bolshevism.

Listen to what Kamenev relates about this:

"In 1910, the majority of our group made an attempt at conciliation and agreement with Comrade Trotsky. Vladimir Ilyich was strongly opposed to this attempt and, 'as a punishment,' as it were, for my persistence in the attempt to reach agreement with Trotsky, insisted that I should be the one sent by the Central Committee as its representative on the editorial board of Comrade Trotsky's newspaper. By the autumn of 1910—having worked on this editorial board for several months—I was convinced that Vladimir Ilyich was right in his opposition to my 'conciliatory' line, and with his consent I resigned from the editorial board of Comrade Trotsky's organ. Our rupture with Comrade Trotsky at that time was marked by a series of sharply-worded articles in the Central Organ of the Party. It was at that time that Vladimir Ilyich suggested to me that I should write a pamphlet summing up our disagreements with the Menshevik-Liquidators and with Comrade Trotsky. "You have made an experiment at agreement with the extreme Left (Trotskyist) wing of the anti-Bolshevik groups, you have become convinced that agreement is impossible, and so you must write a summarising pamphlet,' Vladimir Ilyich said to me. Naturally, Vladimir Ilyich particularly insisted that precisely on the subject of the relations between Bolshevism and what we then called Trotskyism everything should be told . . . to the very end." (L. Kamenev's preface to his pamphlet Two Parties.)

What were the results of this? Listen further:

"The experiment in joint work with Trotsky—which, I make bold to say, I performed with sincerity, as is proved precisely by the way Trotsky is now exploiting my letters and private conversations—showed that conciliation irresistibly slips into defence of Liq-uidationism and definitely takes the side of the latter." (L. Kame-nev, Two Parties.)

And further:

"Oh, had 'Trotskyism' been victorious as a mood in the Party, what a clear field there would have been for Liquidationism, for Ot-zovism, and for all the trends that were fighting the Party" (ibid.).

There, comrades, you have an experiment in joint work with Trotsky. (A voice: "An instructive experiment.") Kamenev, at the time, described the results of that experiment in a special pamphlet that was published in 1911 under the title Two Parties. I have no doubt that this pamphlet was very useful to all those comrades who still harboured illusions about co-operation with Trotsky.

And now I would ask: would not Kamenev try to write another pamphlet, also bearing the title Two Parties, about his present experiment in co-operating with Trotsky? (General laughter. Applause.) Perhaps there would be some use in his doing so. Of course, I can give Kamenev no guarantee that Trotsky will not now use his letters and intimate conversations against him as he did then. (General laughter.) But it is scarcely worth while being afraid of that. At all events, a choice has to be made: either to be afraid that Trotsky will use Kamenev's letters and divulge his secret conversations with Trotsky, in which case the danger arises of being outside the Party; or to cast off all fear and remain in the Party.

That is how the question stands now, comrades: one thing or the other.

It is said that the opposition intends to present to the congress some kind of a declaration to the effect that it, the opposition, submits and will in future submit to all Party decisions (a voice: "Just as it did in October 1926?"), dissolve its faction (a voice: "We have heard that twice!") and defend its views, which it does not renounce (voices: "Oh!" "No, we had better dissolve it ourselves!"), within the framework of the Party Rules. (Voices: "With slight reservations." "Our framework is not made of rubber.")

I think, comrades, that nothing will come of this. (Voices: "Quite right!" Prolonged applause.) We too, comrades, have made some experiment with declarations (applause), we made an experiment with two declarations (voices: "Quite right!"), that of October 16, 1926 and that of August 8, 1927. What did that experiment lead to? Although I do not intend to write a pamphlet Two Parties, I make bold to say that that experiment led to the most negative results (voices: "Quite right!"), to the deception of the Party on two occasions, to the slackening of Party discipline. What grounds has the opposition now for demanding that we, the congress of a great Party, the congress of Lenin's Party, should take its word after such an experiment? (Voices: "It would be foolishness." "Whoever does so will get into trouble.")

It is said that they are also raising the question of the reinstatement in the Party of those who have been expelled. (Voices: "That won't come off." "Let them go into the Menshevik marsh.") I think, comrades, that that, too, will not come off. (Prolonged applause.)

Why did the Party expel Trotsky and Zinoviev? Because they are the organisers of the entire work of the anti-Party opposition (voices: "Quite right!), because they set out to break the laws of the Party, because they thought that nobody would dare to touch them, because they wanted to create for themselves the position of a nobility in the Party.

But do we want to have a privileged nobility and an unprivileged peasantry in the Party? Shall we Bolsheviks, who uprooted the nobility, restore them now in our Party? (Applause.)

You ask: why did we expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party? Because we do not want a nobility in the Party. Because there is a single law in our Party, and all members of the Party have equal rights. (Voices: "Quite right!" Prolonged applause.)

If the opposition wants to be in the Party let it submit to the will of the Party, to its laws, to its instructions, without reservations, without equivocation. If it does not want to do that—let it go where it will find more freedom. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.) We do not want new laws providing privileges for the opposition, and we will not create them. (Applause.)

The question is raised about conditions. We make only one condition: the opposition must disarm wholly and entirely, both ideologically and organisationally. (Voices: "Quite right!" Prolonged applause.)

It must renounce its anti-Bolshevik views openly and honestly, before the whole world. (Voices: "Quite right!" Prolonged applause.)

It must brand the mistakes it has committed, mistakes which have grown into crimes against the Party, openly and honestly, before the whole world.

It must surrender its units to us in order that the Party may be able to dissolve them so that nothing is left. (Voices: "Quite right!" Prolonged applause.)

Either that, or let them go out of the Party. And if they do not go out, we shall throw them out. (Voices: "Quite right!" Prolonged applause.)

That is how the matter stands with the opposition, comrades.

IV
General Summary
I am concluding, comrades.

What is the general summary for the period under review? It is as follows:

1) we have maintained peace with the surrounding states, in spite of enormous difficulties, in spite of the provocative attacks of the bourgeoisie of the "great powers";

2) we have strengthened the link between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the workers in the imperialist countries and in the colonies, in spite of a multitude of obstacles, in spite of the ocean of slander poured out against us by the venal, hundred-mouthed bourgeois press;

3) we have raised the prestige of the proletarian dictatorship among the vast masses of the working people in all parts of the world;

4) we, as a party, have helped the Comintern and its sections to increase their influence in all countries in the world;

5) we have done everything one party can do to develop and accelerate the world revolutionary movement;

6) we have raised further our socialist industry, establishing for it a record rate of development and consolidating its hegemony in the entire national economy;

7) we have established a bond between socialist industry and peasant economy;

8) we have strengthened the alliance between the working class and the middle peasants, while relying on the peasant poor;

9) we have strengthened the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country, in spite of the hostile international encirclement, and have shown the workers of all countries that the proletariat is able not only to destroy capitalism, but also to build socialism;

10) we have strengthened the Party, upheld Leninism and utterly routed the opposition.

Such is the general summary.

What is the conclusion? Only one conclusion can be drawn: we are on the right road; our Party's policy is correct. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

And from this it follows that, continuing along this road, we shall certainly achieve the victory of socialism in our country, the victory of socialism in all countries. (Prolonged applause.)

But that does not mean that we shall not encounter difficulties on our road. There will be difficulties. But difficulties do not daunt us, for we are Bolsheviks who have been steeled in the fire of revolution.

There will be difficulties. But we shall surmount them, as we have surmounted them up to now, for we are Bolsheviks, who have been wrought by Lenin's iron Party in order to combat difficulties and surmount them, and not to whine and moan.

And precisely because we are Bolsheviks we shall certainly be victorious.

Comrades! Forward to the victory of communism in our country, to the victory of communism all over the world! (Stormy and prolonged applause. All rise and give Comrade Stalin an ovation. The "Internationale" is sung.)

Reply to the Discussion on the Political Report of the Central Committee
December 7

Comrades, after the speeches delivered by a whole series of delegates, there is little left for me to say. Concerning the speeches of Yevdokimov and Muralov I cannot say anything of their substance, for they provide no material for that. Only one thing could be said about them: Allah, forgive them their trespasses, for they know not what they are talking about. (Laughter, applause?) I should like to deal with the speeches delivered by Rakovsky and, particularly, Kamenev, whose speech was the most hypocritical and lying of all the speeches of the oppositionists. (Voices: "Quite right!")

I
Concerning Rakovsky's Speech

a) Concerning foreign policy. I think that it was to no purpose that Rakovsky touched upon the question of war and foreign policy here. Everybody knows that at the Moscow conference Rakovsky made a fool of himself on the question of war. Evidently, he came here and took the floor in order to correct that stupidity, but he made an even bigger fool of himself. (Laughter.) I think it would have been better for Rakovsky not to say anything about foreign policy.

b) Concerning Left and Right. Rakovsky asserts that the opposition is the Left sector of our Party. That is enough to make a cat laugh, comrades. Obviously, such statements are made for political bankrupts to console themselves with. It has been proved that the opposition is the Menshevik wing of our Party, that the opposition has slipped into Menshevism, that, objectively, the opposition has become a tool of the bourgeois elements. All this has been proved over and over again. How then can there be any talk here about the opposition's Leftism? How can a Menshevik group which, objectively, has become a tool of the "third force," of the bourgeois elements, how can such a group be more Left than the Bolsheviks? Is it not obvious that the opposition is the Right, Menshevik wing of the C.P.S.U.(B.)? Evidently, Rakovsky has got himself thoroughly mixed up and has confused the right with the left. Do you remember Gogol's Selifan?—"Oh you, dirty legs. . . . You don't know which is right and which is left!"

c) Concerning the opposition' s assistance. Rakovsky says that the opposition is prepared to support the Party if the imperialists attack us. How generous, to be sure! They, a tiny group, scarcely half of one per cent of our Party, graciously promise to assist us if the imperialists attack our country. We have no faith in your assistance, and we don't need it! We ask only one thing of you: Don't hinder us, stop hindering us! All the rest we shall do ourselves, you can be sure of that. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

d) Concerning "signalmen." Rakovsky states further that the opposition is signalling to us about the dangers, the difficulties, the "destruction" facing our country. Fine "signalmen," indeed, who want to save the Party from "destruction" when they themselves are rushing to their doom and really need saving! They can barely keep on their feet themselves and yet want to save others! Isn't it ridiculous, comrades? (Laughter.)

Picture to yourselves a tiny boat at sea, barely able to keep afloat, ready to founder at any moment, and picture to yourselves a magnificent steamship powerfully cutting the waves and confidently making headway. What would you say if this tiny boat thrust itself forward to save the huge steamship? (Laughter.) It would be more than ridiculous, would it not? That is exactly the position the "signalmen" of our opposition are in now. They are signalling to us about dangers, difficulties, "destruction," and what not, but they themselves are sinking, they do not realise that they have already gone to the bottom.

Speaking of themselves as "signalmen," the oppositionists thereby lay claim to the leadership of the Party, of the working class, of the country. The question is— on what grounds? Have they, the oppositionists, given any practical proof that they are capable of leading anything, let alone the Party, the class, the country? Is it not a fact that the opposition, headed by people like Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, has been leading its group for two years already and that, by their leadership, the leaders of the opposition have brought it to complete bankruptcy? Is it not a fact that during these two years the opposition has led its group from defeat to defeat? What does this show if not that the leaders of the opposition are bankrupt, that their leadership has proved to be leadership to defeat, not to victory? But since the leaders of the opposition failed in a small matter, what grounds are there for thinking that they will be successful in a big one? Is it not obvious that people who have gone bankrupt in leading a small group cannot possibly be entrusted with the leadership of such a big thing as the Party, the working class, the country?

That is what our "signalmen" refuse to understand.

II

Concerning Kamenev's Speech

I pass on to Kamenev's speech. That speech was the most lying, hypocritical, fraudulent and scoundrelly of all the opposition speeches delivered here, from this rostrum. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

a) Two faces in one person. The first thing Kamenev tried to do in his speech was to cover up his tracks. The representatives of the Party spoke here about our Party's achievements, about our successes in construction, about the improvement in our work, etc. Further, they spoke of the Menshevik sins of the oppositionists, of their having slipped into Menshevism by denying the possibility of successfully building socialism in our country, denying the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R., denying the expediency of the policy of alliance between the working class and the middle peasants, spreading slanders about a Thermidor, etc. Lastly, they said that these views of the opposition are incompatible with membership of our Party, that the opposition must abandon these Menshevik views if it wants to remain in the Party.

Well? Kamenev could think of nothing better than to evade these questions, to cover up his tracks and pass on. He was asked about vital questions of our programme, our policy, our work of construction; but he evaded them, as if they did not concern him. Can this behaviour of Kamenev's be called a serious attitude towards the matter? How is this behaviour of the opposi tion to be explained? It can be explained only by one thing: the desire to deceive the Party, to lull its vigilance, to fool the Party once again.

The opposition has two faces: a hypocritically genial one, and a Menshevik anti-revolutionary one. It shows the Party its hypocritically genial face when the Party puts pressure on it and demands that it should abandon its factionalism, its splitting policy. It shows its Menshe-vik anti-revolutionary face when it sets out to appeal to the non-proletarian forces, when it sets out to appeal to the "street" against the Party, against the Soviet regime. Just now, as you see, it has turned its hypocritically genial face to us in the endeavour to deceive the Party once again. That is why Kamenev tried to cover up his tracks by evading the highly important questions on which we disagree. Can this duplicity, this double-facedness, be tolerated any longer?

One thing or the other: either the opposition wants to talk seriously to the Party, in which case it must throw off its mask; or it intends to keep its two faces, in which case it will find itself outside the Party. (Voices: "Quite right!")

b) Concerning the traditions of Bolshevism. Kamenev asserts that there is nothing in the traditions of our Party, in the traditions of Bolshevism, that justifies the demand that a member of the Party should give up certain views that are incompatible with our Party's ideology, with our programme. Is that correct? Of course not. More than that, it is a lie, comrades!

Is it not a fact that all of us, including Kamenev, expelled Myasnikov and the Myasnikovites from the Party? Why did we expel them? Because their Men-shevik views were incompatible with the Party's views.

Is it not a fact that all of us, including Kamenev, expelled part of the "Workers' Opposition" from the Party? Why did we expel it? Because its Menshevik views were incompatible with our Party's views.

Why were Ossovsky and Dashkovsky expelled from the Party? Why were Maslow, Ruth Fischer, Katz and others expelled from the Comintern? Because their views were incompatible with the ideology of the Comintern, with the ideology of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

Our Party would not be a Leninist Party if it permitted the existence of anti-Leninist elements within our organisations. If this were permitted, then why not bring the Mensheviks into our Party? What is to be done with people who, while in the ranks of our Party, have slipped into Menshevism and propagate their anti-Leninist views? What can there be in common between the Leninist Party and such people? Kamenev slanders our Party, abandons the traditions of our Party, abandons the traditions of Bolshevism by asserting that we can tolerate within our Party people who profess and preach Menshevik views. And it is precisely because Kamenev, and the entire opposition with him, trample upon the revolutionary traditions of our Party that the Party demands that the opposition should abandon its anti-Leninist views.

c) The opposition' s pretended devotion to principle. Kamenev asserts that it is difficult for him and the other oppositionists to abandon their views because they are accustomed to defend their views in the Bolshevik manner. He says that it would be unprincipled on the part of the opposition to abandon its views. It appears, then, that the leaders of the opposition are men of high principle. Is that true, comrades? Do the leaders of the opposition really value their principles, their views, their convictions so highly? It does not seem like it, comrades. It does not seem like it, bearing in mind the history of the formation of the opposition bloc. (Laughter.) The very opposite is the case. History shows, facts show, that nobody has jumped so easily from one set of principles to another, nobody has changed his views so easily and freely as the leaders of our opposition have done. Why, then, should they not give up their views now, too, if the interests of the Party demand it?

Here are some examples from the history of Trotskyism.

It is well known that Lenin, mustering the Party, convened a conference of Bolsheviks in Prague in 1912. It is well known that that conference was of very great importance in the history of our Party, for it drew a dividing line between the Bolsheviks and the Menshe-viks and united the Bolshevik organisations all over the country into a single Bolshevik Party.

It is well known that in that same year, 1912, a Men-shevik conference of the August bloc, headed by Trotsky, took place. Further, it is well known that that conference proclaimed war on the Bolshevik conference and called upon the workers' organisations to liquidate Lenin's Party. What did the conference of Trotsky's August bloc accuse the Prague Bolshevik conference of at that time? Of all the mortal sins. It accused it of usurpation, sectarianism, of organising a "coup d'etat" in the Party, and the devil knows what else.

Here is what the conference of the August bloc said at that time about the Bolshevik conference in Prague in its statement to the Second International:

"The conference declares that that conference (the Bolshevik conference in Prague in 1912—J. St.) is an open attempt of a group of persons, who have quite deliberately led the Party to a split, to usurp the Party's flag, and it expresses its profound regret that several Party

organisations and comrades have fallen victims to this deception and have thereby facilitated the splitting and usurpatory policy of Lenin's sect. The conference expresses its conviction that all the Party organisations in Russia and abroad will protest against the coup d'etat that has been brought about, will refuse to recognise the central bodies elected at that conference, and will by every means help to restore the unity of the Party by the convocation of a genuine all-Party conference." (From the statement of the August bloc to the Second International, published in Vorwdrts, March 26, 1912.)

As you see, everything is here: Lenin's sect, usurpation, and a "coup d'etat" in the Party.

And what happened? A few years passed—and Trotsky abandoned those views of his about the Bolshevik Party. He not only abandoned his views, but crawled on his belly to the Bolshevik Party, joining it as one of its active members. (Laughter.)

What grounds are there for assuming, after all this, that Trotsky and the Trotskyists will not be able once again to abandon their views about Thermidor tendencies in our Party, about usurpation, etc.?

Another example from the same sphere.

It is known that at the end of 1924, Trotsky published a pamphlet entitled The Lessons of October. It is known that in this pamphlet Trotsky described Kamenev and Zinoviev as the Right, semi-Menshevik wing of our Party. It is known that Trotsky's pamphlet was the cause of a whole discussion in our Party. And what happened? Only about a year passed—and Trotsky abandoned his views and proclaimed that Zinoviev and Kamenev were not the Right wing of our Party but its Left, revolutionary wing.

Another example, this time from the history of the Zinoviev group. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev have written a whole pile of pamphlets against Trotskyism. It is known that as far back as 1925 Zinoviev and Kamenev declared, together with the whole Party, that Trotskyism is incompatible with Leninism. It is known that both Zinoviev and Kamenev, together with the whole Party, carried resolutions, both at the congresses of our Party and at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, about Trotskyism being a petty-bourgeois deviation. And what happened? Less than a year passed after that before they renounced their views and proclaimed that Trotsky's group was a genuinely Leninist and revolutionary group within our Party. (A voice: "A mutual amnesty!")

Such, comrades, are the facts, many more of which could be quoted if desired.

Is it not obvious from this that the high devotion to principle of the leaders of the opposition that Kamenev tells us about here is a fairy-tale that has nothing in common with reality?

Is it not obvious that nobody in our Party has managed to renounce his principles so easily and freely as Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev? (Laughter.) The question arises: what grounds are there for assuming that the leaders of the opposition, who have abandoned their principles and their views several times already, will not be able to abandon them once again?

Is it not obvious that our demand that the opposition should abandon its Menshevik views is not as harsh for the leaders of the opposition as Kamenev tries to make out? (Laughter.) This

is not the first time they have had to abandon their views, so why should they not abandon them just once again? (Laughter.)

d) Either the Party, or the opposition. Kamenev asserts that it is wrong to require the oppositionists to abandon certain views of theirs which have become incompatible with the Party's ideology and programme. I have already shown how foolish this assertion of Kamenev's is, bearing in mind the opposition bloc's past and present. But let us assume for a moment that Kamenev is right. What will the position be then? Can the Party, our Party, abandon its views, convictions, principles? Can our Party be required to abandon its views, its principles? The Party has arrived at the definite conviction that the opposition must abandon its anti-Leninist views, that if it does not do so it will be sent flying out of the Party. If it is wrong to require the opposition to abandon its convictions, why is it right to require the Party to abandon its views and convictions about the opposition? According to Kamenev, however, the opposition cannot abandon its anti-Leninist views, but the Party must abandon its view that the opposition cannot be allowed to remain in our Party unless the opposition abandons its anti-Leninist views. Where is the logic in this? (Laughter, applause.)

Kamenev asserts that the oppositionists are courageous men who stand up for their convictions to the last. I have little belief in the courage and devotion to principle of the leaders of the opposition. I have especially little belief in the courage, for example, of Zinoviev or Kamenev (laughter), who abuse Trotsky one day and embrace him the next. (A voice: "They are accustomed to play leap-frog.") But let us assume for a moment that the leaders of our opposition have retained some modicum of courage and devotion to principle. What grounds are there for assuming that the Party is less courageous and devoted to principle than, say, Zinoviev, Kamenev or Trotsky? What grounds are there for assuming that the Party will more easily abandon its convictions about the opposition, its conviction that the latter's Menshevik views are incompatible with the Party's ideology and programme, than that the leaders of the opposition will abandon their views, which they change every now and again like gloves? (Laughter.)

Is it not clear from this that Kamenev is requiring the Party to abandon its views about the opposition and the latter's Menshevik mistakes? Is not Kamenev going too far? Will he not agree that it is dangerous to go so far?

The question is this: either the Party, or the opposition. Either the opposition abandons its anti-Leninist views; or it does not do so—in which case not even the memory of it will remain in the Party. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

e) The opposition has broken away from the traditions of Bolshevism. Kamenev asserts that there is nothing in Bolshevik traditions that justifies the demand that members of the Party should abandon their views. Speakers here have fully proved that is not correct. Facts confirm that Kamenev is telling a downright untruth.

But the question is: is there in Bolshevik traditions any instance of what the opposition permits itself to do and continues doing? The opposition organised a faction and converted it into a party within our Bolshevik Party. But who has ever heard that Bolshevik traditions permitted anybody to commit such an outrageous act? How can one talk about Bolshevik traditions while at the same time bringing about a split in the Party and the formation of a new, anti-Bolshevik party within it?

Further. The opposition organised an illegal printing press, entering into a bloc with bourgeois intellectuals, who, in their turn, were found to be in a bloc with avowed whiteguards. The question arises: how can one talk about the traditions of Bolshevism when one permits such an outrageous act, which borders on downright treachery to the Party and the Soviet regime?

Lastly, the opposition organised an anti-Party, anti-Soviet demonstration, appealing to the "street," appealing to non-proletarian elements. But how can one talk about Bolshevik traditions when one appeals to the "street" against one's own Party, against one's own Soviet regime? Who has ever heard that Bolshevik traditions permitted such an outrageous act, which borders on downright counter-revolution?

Is it not obvious that Kamenev speaks of the traditions of Bolshevism in order to screen his rupture with those traditions in the interests of his anti-Bolshevik group?

The opposition gained nothing from its appeal to the "street" because the opposition proved to be an insignificant coterie. That was not its fault but its misfortune. And what if the opposition had a little more strength behind it? Is it not obvious that its appeal to the "street" would have turned into an open putsch against the Soviet regime? Is it difficult to understand that, in essence, this attempt of the opposition's differed in no way from the well-known attempt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1918? (Voices: "Quite right!") By rights, for those attempts we ought to have arrested all the active members of the opposition on November 7. (Voices: "Quite right!" Prolonged applause.) We did not do so only because we took pity on them, we displayed magnanimity and wanted to give them an opportunity to come to their senses. But they interpreted our magnanimity as weakness.

Is it not obvious that Kamenev's talk about Bolshevik traditions is empty and deceitful talk intended to screen the opposition's rupture with the traditions of Bolshevism?

f) Concerning sham unity and genuine unity. Kamenev gave us a song here about unity. He positively warbled, begging the Party to come to the rescue and establish unity "at all costs." They, the leaders of the opposition, don't you see, are opposed to the two-party policy. They, don't you see, are in favour of Party unity "at all costs." And yet, we know for certain that at the very moment that Kamenev was singing about Party unity here, his supporters were passing resolutions at their secret meetings to the effect that the opposition's declaration on unity was a manoeuvre designed to preserve its forces and enable its splitting policy to be continued. On the one hand, the opposition sings about Party unity at the congress of the Leninist Party. On the other hand, the opposition works underground to split the Party, to organise a second party, to undermine Party unity. That is what they call unity "at all costs." Is it not time to stop this criminal, swindling game?

Kamenev talked about unity. Unity with whom? Unity with the Party, or with Shcherbakov? Is it not time to understand that Leninists and Messieurs the Shcherbakovs cannot be united in one Party?

Kamenev talked about unity. Unity with whom? With Maslow and Souvarine, or with the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.)? Is it not time to understand that one cannot speak of unity with the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Comintern while persisting in unity with the Maslows and Souvarines? Is it not time to understand that it is impossible to unite Leninist views with the opposition's Menshevik views?

Unite Lenin and Abramovich? No thank you, comrades! It is time to stop this swindling game.

That is why I think that Kamenev's talk about unity "at all costs" is a hypocritical game intended to deceive the Party.

We need genuine unity and not playing at unity. Have we genuine, Leninist unity in our Party? Yes, we have. When 99 per cent of our Party vote for the Party and against the opposition, that is real, genuine, proletarian unity such as we have not had in our Party before. Here you have the Party Congress, at which there is not a single opposition delegate. (Applause.) What is that if not the unity of our Leninist Party? That is what we call the Leninist unity of the Bolshevik Party.

g) "Finish with the opposition!" The Party has done all that could possibly be done to put the opposition on the Leninist road. The Party has displayed the utmost leniency and magnanimity to enable the opposition to come to its senses and rectify its mistakes. The Party has called upon the opposition to renounce its anti-Leninist views openly and honestly, before the whole Party. The Party has called upon the opposition to admit its mistakes and denounce them in order to free itself of them once and for all. The Party has called upon the opposition completely to disarm, both ideologically and organisationally.

What is the Party's object in doing so? Its object is to finish with the opposition and to pass on to positive work. Its object is to liquidate the opposition at last and obtain the opportunity to get right down to our great work of construction.

Lenin said at the Tenth Congress: "We do not want an opposition now . . . we must now put an end to the opposition, finish with it, we have had enough of oppositions now!" 18

The Party wants this slogan of Lenin's to be put into effect at last in the ranks of our Party. (Prolonged applause.)

If the opposition disarms—well and good. If it refuses to disarm—we shall disarm it ourselves. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

III
The Summing Up

From Kamenev's speech it is evident that the opposition does not intend to disarm completely. The opposition's declaration of December 3 indicates the same thing. Evidently, the opposition prefers to be outside the Party. Well, let it be outside the Party. There is nothing terrible, or exceptional, or surprising, in the fact that they prefer to be outside the Party, that they are cutting themselves off from the Party. If you study the history of our Party you will find that always, at certain serious turns taken by our Party, a certain section of the old leaders fell out of the cart of the Bolshevik Party and made room for new people. A turn is a serious thing, comrades. A turn is dangerous for those who do not sit firmly in the Party cart. Not everybody can keep his balance when a turn is made. You turn the cart—and on looking round you find that somebody has fallen out. (Applause.)

Let us take 1903, the period of the Second Congress of our Party. That was the period of the Party's turn from agreement with the liberals to a mortal struggle against the liberal bourgeoisie, from preparing for the struggle against tsarism to open struggle against it for

completely routing tsarism and feudalism. At that time the Party was headed by the six: Plekhanov, Zasulich, Martov, Lenin, Axelrod and Potresov. The turn proved fatal to five out of the six. They fell out of the cart. Lenin alone remained. (Applause.) It turned out that the old leaders of the Party, the founders of the Party (Ple-khanov, Zasulich and Axelrod) plus two young ones (Martov and Potresov) were against one, also a young one, Lenin. If only you knew how much howling, weeping and wailing there was then that the Party was doomed, that the Party would not hold out, that nothing could be done without the old leaders. The howling and wailing subsided, however, but the facts remained. And the facts were that precisely thanks to the departure of the five the Party succeeded in getting on to the right road. It is now clear to every Bolshevik that if Lenin had not waged a resolute struggle against the five, if the five had not been pushed aside, our Party could not have rallied as a Bolshevik Party capable of leading the proletarians to the revolution against the bourgeoisie. (Voices: "That's true!")

Let us take the next period, the period 1907-08. That was the period of our Party's turn from open revolutionary struggle against tsarism to flanking methods of struggle, to the use of all kinds of legal possibilities —from insurance funds to the floor of the Duma. It was the period of retreat after we had been defeated in the 1905 Revolution. This turn required of us that we should master new methods of struggle in order, after mustering our forces, to resume the open revolutionary struggle against tsarism. But this turn proved fatal to a number of old Bolsheviks. Alexinsky fell out of the cart. At one time he was quite a good Bolshevik. Bogdanov fell out. He was one of the most prominent leaders of our Party. Rozhkov—a former member of the Central Committee of our Party—fell out. And so forth. There was, perhaps, at that time no less howling and wailing that the Party would perish than in 1903. The howling, however, subsided but the facts remained. And the facts showed that the Party would not have been able to get on to the right road under the new conditions of struggle had it not purged itself of the people who were wavering and hindering the cause of the revolution. What was Lenin's object at that time? He had only one object: to rid the Party of the unstable and whining elements as quickly as possible, so that they should not get in our way. (Applause.) That is how our Party grew, comrades. Our Party is a living organism like every organism, it undergoes a process of metabolism: the old and obsolete passes away (applause), the new and growing lives and develops. (Applause.) Some go away, both at the top and at the bottom. New ones grow, both at the top and at the bottom, and lead the cause forward. That is how our Party grew. That is how it will continue to grow.

The same must be said about the present period of our revolution. We are in the period of a turn from the restoration of industry and agriculture to the reconstruction of the entire national economy, to its reconstruction on a new technical basis, when the building of socialism is no longer merely in prospect, but a living, practical matter, which calls for the surmounting of extremely great difficulties of an internal and external character.

You know that this turn has proved fatal to the leaders of our opposition, who were scared by the new difficulties and intended to turn the Party in the direction of surrender. And if certain leaders, who do not want to sit firmly in the cart, now fall out, it is nothing to be surprised at. It will merely rid the Party of people who are getting in its way and hindering its progress. Evidently, they seriously want to free themselves from our Party cart. Well, if some of the old leaders who are turning into trash intend to fall out of the cart— a good riddance to them! (Stormy and prolonged applause. The whole congress rises and gives Comrade Stalin an ovation.)

Pravda, Nos. 279, 282 December 6 and 9, 1927

Notes

1. The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, December 2-19, 1927. The congress discussed the political and organisational reports of the Central Committee, the reports of the Central Auditing Commission, of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, and of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern; it also discussed the directives for the drawing up of a five-year plan for the development of the national economy and a report on work in the countryside; it heard the report of the congress commission on the question of the opposition and elected the central bodies of the Party. On December 3, J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the Central Committee of the C.P. S.U.(B.) and on December 7 he replied to the discussion. On December 12, the congress elected J. V. Stalin a member of the commission for drafting the resolution on the report about the work of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern. The congress approved the political and organisational line of the Party's Central Committee and instructed it to continue to pursue a policy of peace and of strengthening the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R., to continue with unrelaxing tempo the socialist industrialisation of the country, to extend and strengthen the socialist sector in town and countryside and to steer a course towards eliminating the capitalist elements from the national economy. The congress passed a resolution calling for the fullest development of the collectivisation of agriculture, outlined a plan for the extension of collective farms and state farms and indicated the methods of fighting for the collectivisation of agriculture. The Fifteenth Congress has gone into the history of the Party as the Collectivisation of Agriculture Congress. It gave in-structions for the drawing up of the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. In its decisions on the opposition directed towards the liquidation of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc, the congress noted that the disagreements between the Party and the opposition had developed into programmatic disagreements, that the Trotskyist opposition had taken the path of anti-Soviet struggle, and declared that adherence to the Trotskyist opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible with membership of the Bolshevik Party. The congress approved the decision of the joint meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of November 1927 to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party and decided to expel from the Party all active members of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. (On the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1954, pp. 447-49. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress, see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 313-71.)

2. This refers to the grain crops: wheat, rye, barley, oats and maize.

3. J. V. Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), December 18, 1925 (see Works, Vol. 7, pp. 267-361).

4. This refers to the declaration of bankers, industrialists and merchants of the United States, Britain and other countries, published in October 1926, calling for the removal of the tariff barriers set up by the European states. Actually, it was an attempt on the part of Anglo-American finance capital to establish its hegemony in Europe.

5. The World's Work — a magazine that expressed the views of the ruling circles of the big bourgeoisie of the United States, published in Garden City, New York State, from 1899 to 1932.

6. The tripartite conference on the reduction of naval armaments took place in Geneva, from June 20 to August 4, 1927.

7. On November 30, 1927, the fourth session was opened in Geneva of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the forthcoming conference on disarmament. The Soviet delegation made a declaration at the session proposing a programme of universal and total disarmament. The Soviet disarmament project was rejected.

8. The "Locarno system"—a system of treaties and agreements concluded by the imperialist states at a conference held in Locarno, Switzerland, October 5-16, 1925, for the purpose of consolidating the post-war order in Europe created by the Versailles Peace Treaty and of utilising Germany against the Soviet Union. (On the Locarno Conference, see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 7, pp. 277-78, 279-80.)

9. This refers to the assassination by a Serbian nationalist of the Austrian Crown Prince, Francis-Ferdinand, in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, which served as the ostensible reason for unleashing the world imperialist war of 1914-18.

10. The Trade-Union Act passed by the Conservative Government of Britain in 1927 encouraged strike-breaking, restricted the right of the trade unions to collect dues for political purposes, and prohibited civil servants from belonging to trade unions affiliated to the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party. The Act authorised the government to ban any strike.

11. The law on "arming the nation," passed by the French Chamber of Deputies in March 1927, was part of a general plan for the reorganisation of the war machine of French imperialism and for the preparation of a new war. It provided for the militarisation of the political and economic life of the country, the mobilisation of the entire population of the metropolis and the colonies in the event of war, the militarisation of the trade unions and other workers' organisations, the abolition of the right to strike, the increase of the standing army and the employment of the armed forces to suppress revolutionary actions by the proletariat of France and the oppressed peoples of the colonies.

12. The World Congress of the Friends of the U.S.S.R. was held in Moscow, November 10-12, 1927. It was convened on the initiative of the foreign workers' delegations that had come to the Soviet Union for the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The congress was attended by 947 delegates from 43 countries. The delegates heard reports on the progress of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. during the ten years and on the protection of the first proletarian state in the world from the danger of war. The congress adopted an appeal to the working people of all countries ending with the words "Make use of all means and all methods to fight for, defend and protect the U.S.S.R., the motherland of the working people, the bulwark of peace, the centre of liberation, the fortress of socialism"

13. V. I. Lenin, "Outline of the Pamphlet The Tax in Kind" (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 301).

14. Trud (Labour) — a daily newspaper, organ of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, issued in Moscow since February 19, 1921.

15. V. I. Lenin, Letter to V. M. Molotov on a Plan of the Political Report for the Eleventh Congress of the Party (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 223-24).

16. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (see K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 228).

17. V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 23, p. 67.

18. V. I. Lenin, Reply to the Discussion on the Report of the Central Committee to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), March 9, 1921 (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 177).

Statement to Foreign Press Correspondents Concerning the Counterfeit "Article by Stalin"
December 16, 1927

In answer to the enquiry made by foreign press correspondents in Moscow (Associated Press, Wolff Bureau, Neue Freie Pressed 1etc.) in connection with the counterfeit "articles by Stalin," I consider it necessary to state the following:

It is scarcely necessary now to refute the falsifiers from the New York American,2 the Wide World News Agency, or the Anglo-American Newspaper Service, who are circulating all sorts of fables in the shape of nonexistent "articles by Stalin" on the "air force" of the U.S.S.R., on "conciliation" between the Soviet Government and the "Orthodox Church," on the "restoration" to the capitalists of "oil properties" in the U.S.S.R., and so forth. There is no need to refute them because those gentlemen expose themselves in the press precisely as professional falsifiers who live by trading in forgeries. It is sufficient to read the "explanations" that those gentlemen gave in the press the other day in the attempt to "justify" their knavish tricks, to realise that we are dealing here not with press correspondents, but with pen pirates.

Nevertheless, in answer to the enquiry made by the press correspondents, I am willing to say that:

a) I have never set eyes upon "Hermann Gottfrei" or any other of the foreign press correspondents alleged to have interviewed me;

b) I have given no interview, either to those gentlemen or any other foreign press correspondent, during the past year;

c) I have delivered no speeches, whether in the "Presidium of the Moscow Soviet" or in the "Moscow Committee" of the Party, either on the "restoration" to the capitalists of "oil properties" in the U.S.S.R., or on the "Orthodox Church," or on the "air force" of the U.S.S.R.;

d) I have given the press no "articles" or "notes" of that nature.

The gentlemen of the New York American, the Wide World News Agency and the Anglo-American Newspaper Service are deceiving their readers in asserting that the counterfeit "articles by Stalin" were not repudiated in Moscow at the time. The counterfeit "articles" on the "air force" of the U.S.S.R. and on "conciliation" with the "Orthodox Church" became known in Moscow at the end of November 1927. They were at once exposed by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs as forgeries, and this was communicated to the Associated Press correspondent in Moscow, Mr. Reswick. On these grounds Mr. Reswick at once sent the following telegram, dated December 1, to the Associated Press:

"I was informed in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs today that they are here seriously considering the question of taking legal proceedings in New York against the New York American and the Hearst press in general with a view to putting a stop to the circulation of the articles bearing Stalin's signature. The authorities here object particularly to the item in the New York American of November 6 under the heading "Using the Church to Support the Soviets," alleged to be a secret report by Stalin at a meeting of the Moscow Presidium.

According to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the articles are pure inventions. Reswick, December 1, 1927."

Was this telegram published in the United States? And if not, why not? Was it not because the publication of Mr. Reswick's cable would have deprived that American-Hungarian, or Hungarian-American, Mr. Korda, of a source of income?

This is not the first time the New York American has tried to make capital out of forged non-existent Stalin "interviews" and "articles." I know, for example, that in June 1927 the New York American published a counterfeit "interview with Stalin," alleged to have been given to a certain Cecil Winchester, about a "rupture with Britain," abandonment of "world revolution," the Arcos raid, and so forth. In connection with this, the Argus Clipping Bureau wrote to me at the time asking me to confirm the genuineness of that "interview" and inviting me to become its client. Having no doubt that this was a piece of trickery, I at once sent the following refutation to the New York Daily Worker:3

"Dear comrades, the Argus Clipping Bureau has sent me a cutting from the New York American (of June 12, 1927), containing an interview which I am supposed to have given to a certain Cecil Winchester. I hereby declare that I have never seen any Cecil Winchester and never gave him or anyone else any interview, and I have had absolutely nothing to do with the New York American. If the Argus Clipping Bureau is not a bureau of swindlers it must be surmised that it was misled by swindlers and blackmailers connected with the New York American. J. Stalin. July 11, 1927."

Nevertheless, the falsifiers in Mr. Korda's organisation are continuing their knavish tricks. . . .

What is the object of those tricks? What do Korda and Co. want to achieve by their tricks? Sensation, perhaps? No, not only sensation. Their aim is to counteract the effect produced by the U.S.S.R. delegation at Geneva by its declaration on complete disarmament.

Will they achieve their object? Of course not! The forgery will be exposed (it has already been exposed), but the facts will remain. The facts are that the U.S.S.R. is the only country in the world which is pursuing a genuine peace policy, that the U.S.S.R. is the only country in the world which has honestly raised the question of real disarmament.

The fact that in their struggle against the peace policy of the U.S.S.R. the agents of capital are compelled to resort to the assistance of all sorts of shady individuals and pen pirates is the best demonstration of the moral strength and soundness of principle of the stand taken on the question of disarmament by the U.S.S.R. delegation at Geneva.

December 16, 1927
J. Stalin

Pravda, No. 200 December 18, 1927

Notes
1. Neue Freie Presse — a bourgeois-liberal newspaper published in Vienna from 1864 until January 1939.

2. New York American — a reactionary Hearst newspaper published in New York from 1882 until 1937. During the last years of its existence it took a pro-fascist line.

3. Daily Worker — a newspaper, central organ of the Workers (Communist) Party of America. From 1922 until 1924 it was published as a weekly in Chicago under the title of The Worker. In 1924 it was transformed into a daily under the title of the Daily Worker. Since 1927 it has been published in New York.

Volume 10
Biographical Chronicle
August - December, 1927

July 29-August 9
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

August 1
At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "The International Situation and the Defence of the U.S.S.R."

August 2
At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission for editing the draft resolution on the international situation.

August 5
At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech in connection with G. K. Orjonikidze's report on the breach of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky.

August 6-9
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the commission of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) for drafting the resolution on the breach of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky.

August 9
At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech "With Reference to the Opposition's 'Declaration' of August 8, 1927."

August 11
J. V. Stalin is present at a meeting of the active of the Moscow organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) during the discussion of a report on the decisions of the August joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

September 4
J. V. Stalin is present at a youth demonstration held in the Red Square, Moscow, to celebrate the thirteenth anniversary of International Youth Day.

September 9
J. V. Stalin has an interview with the first American labour delegation.

September 16
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to M. I. Ulyanova.
J. V. Stalin has a talk with the French writer Henri Barbusse.

September 27

At a joint meeting of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and the International Control Commission, J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "The Political Complexion of the Russian Opposition."

September 30
J. V. Stalin has a talk with a group of members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and with E. Thalmann, the chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany.

October 21-23
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

October 23
At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now."
The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) appoints J. V. Stalin to make the Central Committee's political report at the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

October 26
J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of workers from the Moscow State Aircraft Factory.

October
J. V. Stalin writes the synopsis of the article "The International Character of the October Revolution."

November 3
The Eighth Krasnaya Presnya District Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

November 5
J. V. Stalin gives an interview to foreign workers' delegations who have arrived in the U.S.S.R. to take part in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of theGreatOctoberSocialist Revolution.

November 6
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech of greetings at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet held to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

November 6-7
J. V. Stalin's article "The International Character of the October Revolution. On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution" is published in Pravda, No. 255.

November 7
J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of the Moscow garrison and the demonstration of the working people in the Red Square, Moscow, held in honour of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

November 9
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech of greetings at a meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, called by the Central Council of the Society for the Promotion of Air and Chemical Defence of the U.S.S.R. in honour of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the progress of aircraft construction in the U.S.S.R.

November 10
J. V. Stalin attends the first session of the World Congress of the Friends of the U.S.S.R. held in the Hall of Columns of the House of Trade Unions.

November 16
J. V. Stalin has a talk with a group of army personnel — delegates to the Seventh Party Conference of the Moscow Military Area.

November 18
J. V. Stalin's greetings to the Seventh Party Conference of the Moscow Military Area are published in Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 263.

November 19
The First Leningrad Regional Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the Leningrad Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

November 23
At the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "The Party and the Opposition."

November 28
The Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin as a delegate to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

December 2-19
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

December 3
J. V. Stalin delivers the political report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

December 7
J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion on the Central Committee's political report to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

December 12
The Fifteenth Party Congress elects J. V. Stalin to the commission for drafting the resolution on the report of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

December 16
J. V. Stalin writes an answer to the enquiry made by foreign press correspondents in Moscow concerning the counterfeit "articles by Stalin."

December 17

J. V. Stalin takes part in the meeting of the commission set up by the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) to draft the resolution on the report of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

December 19
The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the Central Committee of the Party.
J . V. Stalin takes part in the work of the plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) that was elected by the Fifteenth Congress.
The plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), with the participation of members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, elects J. V. Stalin to the Political Bureau, Organising Bureau and Secretariat of the Central Committee, and appoints him General Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).